Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- MOHAMMAD SHAIKH AND ANOTHER--Defendants vs MAMINUD DIN SHAIKH1971 PLD Dacca 106 · Dacca · 1970-01-30Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD SHAFQAT vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-02Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his criminal revision by the High Court, which had maintained his conviction and sentence under Section 326/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing injuries with a chhuri. The core legal questions involved whether the absence of a formal First Information Report or confusion surrounding its recording caused prejudice to the accused, and whether the non-examination of the injured victim as a prosecution witness vitiated the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that since there were no material contradictions between the ocular testimony and the First Information Report, no prejudice was caused to the petitioner. Furthermore, the prosecution is not strictly bound to produce every witness, and a conviction can safely rest on reliable ocular testimony even if the primary victim is not examined, provided no miscarriage of justice is shown. The court laid down that mere academic discrepancies regarding the First Information Report or the non-production of a witness do not warrant leave to appeal where reliable ocular evidence establishes guilt.
Questions settled- Does the absence of a material contradiction between the ocular testimony and the First Information Report prejudice the accused?
- Can a conviction be sustained on reliable ocular testimony alone when a material witness is not examined by the prosecution?
- Does the non-production of the injured victim as a prosecution witness automatically vitiate the trial?
- MOHAMMAD SHAFI vs MOHAMMAD SIDDIQUE1971 P Cr. L J 596 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-24Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD RAMZAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 788 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-27Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD RAMZAN AND ANOTHER vs HABIBULLAH1971 PLD Lahore 495 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-18Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD NAWAZ AND 2 OTHERS vs Sh. ABDUL LATIF AND Another1971 SCMR 198 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-16Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The dispute centers around a godown in Multan City originally belonging to Miran Khan and inherited by his heirs, including his daughter who sold her share to Sh. Abdul Latif. The other co-heirs obtained an ejectment order against the tenant, Muhammad Bashir. Sh. Abdul Latif subsequently filed a partition suit and sought a temporary injunction to restrain the co-heirs from executing the eviction decree against Muhammad Rafiq, alleged to be his tenant and brother. The trial court and District Judge dismissed the injunction application, finding no proof of tenancy between Abdul Latif and Muhammad Rafiq. However, the High Court set aside these orders in revision, holding that Abdul Latif was in possession through his co-sharer status and brother. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal, holding that a co-sharer in possession of joint property cannot be evicted without a partition suit, and the High Court validly restrained the execution of the decree against the occupant.
Questions settled- Can a co-sharer in possession of joint property be evicted without filing a suit for partition?
- Whether the High Court can restrain the execution of an ejectment decree against a co-sharer or person in possession through a co-sharer?
- Is a concurrent finding of fact regarding tenancy open to interference if the lower courts failed to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with law?
- MOHAMMAD IDRIS vs THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 736 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-28Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter involves a civil suit concerning the importation of betelnuts under an import licence issued pursuant to the import schedule published on 30th June 1969, covering medicines, herbs, and crude drugs. The core legal question is whether the court should grant an interlocutory mandatory injunction directing the customs authorities to release confiscated goods to the plaintiff pending the final determination of the suit involving the interpretation of import trade regulations. The court held that a mandatory injunction at the interlocutory stage cannot be issued to undo a final adjudication and confiscation order passed by the Collector of Customs, as such an order would create an irretrievable situation rather than restore the status quo. The key principle laid down is that mandatory injunctions at an interlocutory stage are granted rarely and only to restore the status quo, not to establish a new state of things or undo completed confiscation orders, and an offer to furnish a bank guarantee does not suffice to alter this principle where goods have been lawfully confiscated.
Questions settled- Can a mandatory injunction be issued at the interlocutory stage to undo a confiscation order passed by the Collector of Customs?
- Does the offer of a bank guarantee justify the release of confiscated goods to an importer pending the final decision of the suit?
- Whether an import licence covering medicines, herbs, and crude drugs includes betelnuts.
- MOHAMMAD HASHIM AND Others vs DR. MOHAMMAD ASGHAR (REPRESENTED1971 SCMR 539 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-11Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a review petition filed against a Supreme Court judgment that dismissed an appeal regarding the title and possession of a property in Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether a civil court possesses jurisdiction to challenge an order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property confirming an exchange of property, and whether the petitioners, as claimant displaced persons, had the locus standi to challenge the decree for specific performance obtained by the respondent. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the validity of an exchange confirmed by the Custodian is immune from the jurisdiction of civil courts. The Court further affirmed that allegations of fraud regarding such exchanges must be raised before the Custodian, not in civil proceedings. Additionally, the Court held that the petitioners lacked locus standi because their own transfer of the property had been cancelled by settlement authorities. The key principle laid down is that civil courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of orders passed by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, and review petitions cannot be used to raise new arguments that were available but not presented during the original appeal.
Questions settled- Does a civil court have jurisdiction to challenge an order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property confirming an exchange of property?
- Can a party raise new arguments in a review petition that were within their knowledge but not raised during the original appeal?
- Is a decree for specific performance obtained by a party regarding evacuee property immune from challenge in a civil court?
- MOHAMMAD DIN vs GHULAM FARID AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 526 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-28Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had acquitted one respondent and reduced the sentence of another respondent convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petition was filed with a delay of 186 days. The core legal question was whether the delay in filing the petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal or for enhancement of sentence could be condoned based on the petitioner's claim of ignorance of the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Court held that in cases involving appeals against acquittals or petitions seeking enhancement of sentences, delay will not be condoned unless the applicant demonstrates that they were actively prevented by the acquitted persons themselves from approaching the Court within the statutory limitation period. The Court reaffirmed that a private complainant lacks a sufficient interest to justify condonation of delay in such matters, strictly adhering to established precedents regarding the limitation period for criminal appeals.
Questions settled- Can delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal be condoned if the petitioner claims ignorance of the judgment?
- Does the principle requiring proof that the acquitted person prevented the filing of an appeal apply to petitions seeking enhancement of sentence?
- Is a private complainant entitled to condonation of delay in a petition seeking enhancement of punishment?
- MOHAMMAD AZEEM KHAN vs MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, MARDAN1971 SCMR 346 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-15Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a civil petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which was dismissed as time-barred by 164 days. The core legal question was whether the time spent pursuing an application for a certificate of fitness for appeal under the Letters Patent extends the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period begins to run from the date of the delivery of the judgment, not from the date of the receipt of an order refusing a certificate of fitness. While the time spent pursuing such a certificate and obtaining certified copies may be excluded, the petitioner must still satisfactorily explain each day of delay. Because the petitioner failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the entire period of delay, the Court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The judgment reaffirms that the mere filing of an application for a certificate of fitness does not grant a fresh start to limitation.
Questions settled- Does the filing of an application for a certificate of fitness for appeal under the Letters Patent provide a fresh start to the limitation period for a petition for special leave to appeal?
- From what date does the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal begin to run?
- Is a petitioner required to explain each day of delay when seeking condonation for a time-barred petition?
- MOHAMMAD ASHRAF vs The STATE1971 SCMR 183 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-21Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arose from a High Court order granting bail to three convicts while refusing bail to three others, including the appellant, pending their appeal against convictions under Sections 302, 148, 307, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The appellant contended that the trial was vitiated because evidence was recorded by different Sessions Judges, and that his role was indistinguishable from those granted bail. The Supreme Court held that merits-based arguments, such as procedural trial defects, cannot be raised at the bail stage while the main appeal is sub judice. Furthermore, the Court observed that the High Court erred in granting bail to the other convicts based on their placement in the second column of the police challan, as a police challan is merely the opinion of the investigating agency and irrelevant for bail post-conviction. Although the distinction made by the High Court was improper, the refusal of bail to the appellant was held to be correct, and the appeal was dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a plea regarding a procedural defect in a trial, such as different judges recording evidence, be raised to secure bail while the main appeal is sub judice?
- Is the placement of an accused's name in the second column of a police challan a relevant consideration for granting bail after conviction?
- Can bail be granted to a convicted person based solely on the opinion of the investigating agency as expressed in the police challan?
- MOHAMMAD ASHIQ vs THE STATE AND Another1971 SCMR 137 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-23Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns two petitions filed by Mohammad Ashiq and Ghauhar Rahman seeking the transfer of criminal cases pending before Magistrates' Courts in Karachi to competent courts in Lahore and Abbottabad, respectively. The petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 9 of the President's Order No. 8 of 1970, arguing that the Karachi Magistrates lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaints. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court possessed the authority under the cited provision to transfer proceedings pending before a Magistrate's Court. Upon examination of Article 9 of the President's Order No. 8 of 1970, the Court held that its power to transfer proceedings is strictly limited to cases pending before a 'new High Court' to another 'new High Court.' Since the subject cases were pending before Magistrates' Courts and not before any High Court, the Supreme Court determined it lacked the requisite jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. Consequently, the Court dismissed both petitions as misconceived and not maintainable under the invoked legal provision.
Questions settled- Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction under Article 9 of the President's Order No. 8 of 1970 to transfer cases pending before a Magistrate's Court?
- What is the scope of the Supreme Court's power to transfer proceedings under Article 9 of the President's Order No. 8 of 1970?
- MOHAMMAD ANWAR AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 424 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-30Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD AHMAD CHUGHTAI vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, INDUSTRIES COMMERCE1971 PLC 86 [C. S. T.] · Service Tribunal · 1970-10-22Read full judgment →
- MOHAMMAD ABUL HASHEM vs THE SECRETARY, ORIENTAL MUTUAL LIFE1971 PLC 480 · Labour Court · 1970-11-03Read full judgment →
- MODERN SANITARY FITTINGS MANUFACTURING CO. (PRIVATE), LTD. SRAMIK1971 PLC 58 · Labour Court · 1970-08-04Read full judgment →
- MOBARAK ALI GAZI vs MOKBUL SARDAR AND 4 OTHERS1971 PLD Dacca 277 · Dacca · 1970-01-03Read full judgment →
- MIZAR KRISHNA ANNA PPA PAI & Co. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,1971 PTD 257 · Mysore High CourtRead full judgment →
- Miss S. N. NAQVI vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT1971 PLC 166 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · -Read full judgment →
- Miss NOOR JEHAN vs THE STATE AND 3 OTHERS1971 P Cr. L J 1006 · Sindh High Court · 1971-01-18Read full judgment →
- Miss AMINA MANTHJI vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, EDUCATION1971 PLC 207 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-06-09Read full judgment →
- Mirza RIAZUL HASSAN vs Hafiz Mirza HAFIZUL HASAN1971 PLD Karachi 649 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-01Read full judgment →
- Mirza MEHBOOB BEG vs The STATE1971 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-17Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against an order of the High Court in a criminal matter, which was barred by 17 days. The core legal question concerns whether sufficient cause was shown for the condonation of delay in instituting the petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition was time-barred, noting that the petitioner had been duly informed of the High Court judgment by his counsel and that there was no valid explanation for the subsequent delay in filing the petition after receiving direct intimation. The key principle laid down is that negligence or failure to act diligently after receiving intimation of a judgment does not constitute sufficient ground for the condonation of delay under limitation principles.
Questions settled- Whether the failure of a petitioner to act upon intimation given by counsel constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
- Is a petition for leave to appeal liable to be dismissed when there is no adequate explanation for the delay in its institution?
- Mirza INAYATULLAH AND Another vs Ch. MUHAMMAD SHAFI1971 P Cr. L J 498 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-26Read full judgment →
- Mir RIASAT ALI vs THE GOVERNMENT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN1971 PLD Lahore 115 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-24Read full judgment →
- Mir JAFFAR KHAN JAM ALI AND ANOTHER., Mir JAFFAR KHAN JAMALI vs THE STATE AND 3 OTHERS., DILMURAD AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Quetta 84 · Balochistan High Court · 1971-04-05Read full judgment →
- MIR AND Another vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 1214 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-19Read full judgment →
- MIR ALAM AND 4 Otherss vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 5 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-03Read full judgment →
- MIR ABDUL QAYYUM vs THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1965-04-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is an appeal under Article 58(2)(c) of the Constitution against the conviction of the appellant, an Advocate, for contempt of court under Article 123 of the Constitution by a Special Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan. The appellant had sent telegrams to the Chief Justice and the Provincial Public Service Commission strongly protesting against and alleging arbitrary selection of Civil Judge candidates by the High Court. The core legal question was whether criticism of an act of the High Court that is neither strictly judicial nor a mandatory statutory duty—namely, assisting the Public Service Commission with preliminary sifting of candidates—can constitute contempt of court by scandalising the High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutional provisions regarding contempt of court apply to actions of the High Court in its public capacity, including administrative functions and other acts undertaken as a court. The key principle laid down is that any public attack on the High Court as such, imputing unprincipled or arbitrary conduct, tends to bring the court into hatred, ridicule, or contempt and falls squarely within the mischief of contempt under Article 123 of the Constitution.
Questions settled- Whether criticism of an act of the High Court that is neither a judicial act nor a mandatory statutory duty can amount to contempt of court?
- Does the power of a court to punish for contempt under Article 123 of the Constitution extend to the administrative functions of the High Court?
- Whether sending a telegram containing derogatory allegations regarding judicial selection to a third party constitutes sufficient publication for contempt of court?
- MINA SHAMSUR RAHMAN vs THE SECRETARY, REVENUE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF EAST PAKISTAN AND 4 OTHERS1971 PLD Dacca 49 · Dacca · 1970-03-04Read full judgment →
- Mian RAFI-UD-DIN AND 6 OTHERS vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-25Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellants to challenge the transfer of the Regal Cinema, Lahore, to respondent No. 3 by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The core legal questions involved whether the appellants had acquired a vested right to the transfer of the cinema upon making their application under paragraph 15(2) of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether a subsequent notification issued under paragraph 15-A of the Schedule could retrospectively affect their pending application or constituted excessive delegation of legislative power. By a majority decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a claimant does not acquire an indefeasible vested right to a specific property merely by applying for its transfer, and that the Central Government retains the statutory power under section 10(b) of the Act and paragraph 15-A of the Schedule to alter the mode of disposal for properties not yet finally transferred. The key principle laid down is that an applicant's entitlement under evacuee legislation remains subject to the Central Government's overriding power to prescribe alternative modes of property disposal until a final transfer order is executed.
Questions settled- Whether a claimant acquires an indefeasible vested right to the transfer of a specific evacuee property merely by submitting an application under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
- Can the Central Government alter the mode of disposal of properties from the compensation pool after transfer applications have already been filed by claimants?
- Whether a notification issued under paragraph 15-A of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, operates retrospectively on pending proceedings without express statutory backing?
- Does the power reserved under section 10(b) and paragraph 15-A of the Schedule authorize the Central Government to prescribe new conditions of eligibility for the transfer of industrial concerns and cinema houses?
- Mian MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH vs Sheikh NAWAB DIN1971 SCMR 336 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-12Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan allowing a tenant's second appeal and remanding an ejectment case to the Rent Controller. The landlord had sought the tenant's ejectment on the ground of default in rent payment under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Although there was a bona fide dispute regarding the rent due, the Rent Controller ordered the deposit of rent without determining the approximate amount of rent due as mandated by section 13(6) of the Ordinance, subsequently striking off the tenant's defence and ordering eviction. The core legal questions involved whether the Rent Controller was bound to determine the approximate rent in case of a dispute and whether an interlocutory order can be challenged in an appeal from the final decision without having filed a separate appeal against the interlocutory order itself. The Supreme Court held that the failure to determine the approximate rent warranted a remand, and that a party is not legally compelled to appeal from every interlocutory order under penalty of forfeiting the right to challenge it in an appeal from the final decree or decision. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a Rent Controller is required to determine the approximate amount of rent due under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, when a dispute regarding rent exists?
- Can an aggrieved party challenge the legality of an interlocutory order in an appeal from the final decision without having filed a separate appeal against the interlocutory order itself?
- Whether prior payments made by a tenant by cheque can be taken into consideration for adjustment despite being paid before the order for deposit was made?
- Mian GHULAM KADIR vs DILMURAD AND Another1971 SCMR 75 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-19Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter originated as a dispute over a plot of land in Kotri Mohammad Kabir, initially granted to the respondent by the Deputy Commissioner. The petitioner challenged this grant through administrative appeals, eventually leading to a civil suit seeking a declaration that the property belonged to the Government. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner sought an interim injunction under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. While the trial court dismissed the application, the District Judge granted the injunction on appeal. The High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's revision application against that order. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in maintaining the District Judge's exercise of discretion regarding the grant of an interim injunction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that because the respondent had been allotted the land and had already raised construction upon it, the District Judge's discretion in granting the injunction was not exercised improperly. The principle established is that appellate courts will not interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion regarding interim injunctions where the lower court's decision is supported by the factual circumstances of the case, such as existing possession and construction.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court interfere with the exercise of discretion by a lower court in granting an interim injunction?
- Is the existence of construction on disputed land a relevant factor in determining the grant of an interim injunction?
- Does the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against an order maintaining an interim injunction where discretion was exercised properly?
- Mian ABDUR REHMAN vs Haji MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Baghdad-ul-Jadid 17 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1970-11-24Read full judgment →
- Mian ABDUL GHAFOOR vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, PUNJAB,1971 PLC 120 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-03-24Read full judgment →
- M. H. KHONDKAR AND Another M. NOMAN vs THE STATE AND Another DACCA1971 SCMR 743 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1964-01-15Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter involves petitions for special leave to appeal against orders of the Dacca High Court dismissing a contempt application and suo motu issuing show-cause notices for contempt to a petitioner and his advocates. The core legal question is whether special leave to appeal can be granted against the mere issuance of a suo motu show-cause notice for contempt by a High Court. The Supreme Court held, following the precedent in Sir Edward Snelson, that a show-cause notice issued by a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of contempt cannot be interfered with at the initial stage, as granting leave would amount to prematurely assuming the High Court's jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not grant leave to appeal against a mere show-cause notice for contempt issued by a High Court unless a clear legal bar to the issuance of such notice is established.
Questions settled- Can special leave to appeal be granted against the mere issuance of a suo motu show-cause notice for contempt by a High Court?
- Does the fact that a contempt notice was issued by judges against whom allegations were made constitute a legal bar to the issuance of the notice?
- METAL BOX COMPANY OF INDIA LTD. vs THEIR WORKMEN1971 PTD 687 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-20Read full judgment →
- MESSRS USMANIA GLASS SHEET FACTORY LIMITED, CHITTAGONG vs SALES TAX OFFICER, CHITTAGONG1971 PTD 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-19Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court of East Pakistan, which challenged the refusal of the Sales Tax Officer to grant a tax exemption on glass sheets manufactured by the appellant. The appellant contended that its glass sheets qualified as 'concrete building components' exempt under a Central Government notification issued under the Sales Tax Act, 1951. The core legal question was whether glass sheets fell within the scope of the term 'concrete building components' as used in the exemption notification. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that in the context of building materials, the term 'concrete' implies a substance formed by a mixture where cement is an essential ingredient. Consequently, glass sheets, lacking this composition, did not qualify for the exemption. The Court affirmed that while statutes should generally be interpreted using the popular meaning of words, technical or trade-specific meanings apply when the statute relates to a particular industry. Furthermore, the Court reiterated that writ jurisdiction is an appropriate remedy for enforcing fiscal rights derived from statutory instruments.
Questions settled- Does the term 'concrete building components' in a tax exemption notification include glass sheets?
- Is a writ petition maintainable to challenge a tax demand where a fiscal right based on a statutory instrument is disputed?
- How should the term 'concrete' be interpreted when used in the context of building materials in a statute?
- MESSRS THE INTERNATIONAL BODY BUILDERS- vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-1971 PTD 513 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-06Read full judgment →
- MESSRS THE INTERNATIONAL BODY BUILDERS vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-1971 PLD Lahore 559 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-06Read full judgment →
- MESSRS THE BATALA ENGINEERING Co. (PAK.) LTD., LAHORE vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, NORTH ZONE (WEST PAKISTAN)LAHORE1971 PTD 357 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-30Read full judgment →
- MESSRS THE BATALA ENGINEERING Co. (PAK.) LTD., LAHORE vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, NORTH ZONE (WEST PAKISTAN), LAHORE1971 PLD Lahore 619 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-30Read full judgment →
- MESSRS TAJ DIN MAULA BUX vs THE SALES TAX OFFICER, D-CIRCLE, LAHORE1971 PTD 50 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-30Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SURYA BROTHERS vs MESSRS DADA SOAP FACTORY LTD.1971 PLD Karachi 189 · Sindh High Court · 1970-09-21Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal under Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, challenged the Registrar of Trade Marks' order rejecting the appellants' application for registration of the trade mark 'Kalapan'. The Registrar had denied registration, finding the mark deceptively similar to the respondents' registered mark 'Motia Pan' and rejecting the appellants' claim of honest concurrent user since 1948. The Court held that while the two marks shared visual and phonetic similarities likely to cause confusion among illiterate or semi-literate consumers, the Registrar erred in rejecting the appellants' evidence of long-standing user. The Court found the documentary evidence, including cash memos and block preparation receipts, sufficient to establish honest concurrent user under Section 10(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940. Furthermore, the Court noted that the respondents' own mark had been registered despite the existence of a prior similar mark, rendering the Registrar's refusal inconsistent. Consequently, the Court set aside the Registrar's order and directed the registration of the appellants' trade mark.
Questions settled- Does the similarity between two trade marks, likely to cause confusion among illiterate or semi-literate consumers, preclude registration if honest concurrent user is established?
- Can an appellate court consider the existence of a prior registered trade mark as evidence of inconsistent application of registration standards by the Registrar?
- Is the rejection of affidavits solely on the ground that they are couched in similar language legally sustainable?
- Does the failure of a respondent to dispute a claim of user in initial objections create a presumption of admission?
- MESSRS SULTAN TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX1971 PLD Lahore 14 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-26Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SERVICE MEDICAL AND GENERAL STORES, KARACHI vs Haji1971 SCMR 591 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-24Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from eviction proceedings initiated by landlords under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, regarding a commercial shop in Karachi. The landlords obtained an eviction order against the recognized tenant, which was upheld through appellate forums. Meanwhile, third parties claiming to be partners in the business operating in the shop sought to intervene, alleging the tenancy proceedings were collusive and fraudulent, and filed applications under Order XXI, rule 99 and rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, alongside a civil suit. The High Court dismissed their revision and appeal. Upon petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that although the executing court should not have dismissed the stay application summarily, the question had become academic since the petitioners had already been dispossessed. The Court ruled that their proper remedy lay under Order XXI, rule 100, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and through their pending civil suit where allegations of fraud could be examined. The petition for special leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether an application under Order XXI rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 can be dismissed summarily without issuing notice?
- What is the appropriate remedy for a third party dispossessed in execution of an ejectment decree?
- Can questions of fraud in eviction proceedings be agitated in a separate civil suit and under Order XXI rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- MESSRS SABINA LTD. vs CHINA SILK HOUSE1971 PLD Karachi 255 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-17Read full judgment →
- MESSRS SAADULLAH KHAN & BROS. AND ANOTHER vs THE PROVINCE OF WEST1971 PLD Quetta 101 · Balochistan High Court · 1970-06-29Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This was a writ petition filed under Article 98 of the abrogated Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1962, challenging the Provincial Government's policy change regarding the allocation of public works contracts in the Quetta and Kalat regions. The core legal question was whether the government's decision to shift from an open tender system to a system of nomination for awarding contracts was subject to judicial review, and whether the petitioners possessed a legal right or standing to challenge this executive action. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the government has the discretion to formulate its own policy for awarding contracts. The Court found that no specific law mandated the use of open tenders, and the petitioners had no vested right to be awarded contracts. The key principle laid down is that executive decisions regarding the discretionary allocation of public resources, such as government contracts, are not subject to judicial review in the absence of a specific legal duty or an infringement of a vested legal right. A petitioner must demonstrate a 'legal grievance' to establish locus standi.
Questions settled- Is the government's policy for awarding public works contracts subject to judicial review?
- Does a government contractor have a vested right to demand the continuation of an open tender system?
- What constitutes a 'person aggrieved' for the purpose of maintaining a writ petition under Article 98 of the abrogated Constitution of 1962?
- Can an executive policy decision regarding the allocation of contracts be challenged if it lacks a specific statutory basis?
- MESSRS S. M. RAFI ALLAWALLA vs KAYSER (PAKISTAN) MANAGING AGENCY CO.1971 PLD Karachi 756 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MESSRS S. M. ILAHI & COMPANY vs THE WEST PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT1971 SCMR 708 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1967-05-19Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave challenges the validity of cotton fees imposed by the Provincial Government under the West Punjab Cotton Control Act, 1949. The core legal questions involve whether a factory running on a diesel engine falls within the definition of a cotton ginning factory under the Act, and whether the Government can revise cotton fee rates with retrospective effect to affect past transactions. The Supreme Court held that while the appellants failed to prove they ran the factory exclusively on diesel or that they regularized alterations without permission, the Government cannot revise cotton fee rates with retrospective effect so as to impair vested rights or past and closed transactions. The Court laid down the principle that courts must lean against giving statutes or executive notifications retrospective operation where they prejudicially affect vested rights or the legality of past transactions, restricting the Government to realizing the fee at the previously fixed rate of annas 4 per maund.
Questions settled- Whether the Government can revise cotton fee rates with retrospective effect so as to affect past and closed transactions?
- Does a factory originally installed with a steam engine and later run with a diesel engine without statutory permission cease to be a cotton ginning factory under the West Punjab Cotton Control Act, 1949?
- Can an occupier registered as running a factory avoid liability for cotton fees by claiming a change of occupancy that was never communicated to the Government?
- MESSRS RIVOLI THEATRES, Karachis vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, SOUTH ZONE, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1971 SCMR 621 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-09-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arose from a High Court order refusing to interfere with the orders of the Income-tax authorities regarding the assessment year 1961-62. The appellant, a partnership firm, sought to carry forward and set off unabsorbed depreciation from the previous assessment year. During the relevant period, one partner died, another retired, and three new partners were admitted under a newly registered partnership deed. The Income-tax Officer split the accounting year into three periods, treating the firm as an association of persons during the interim period and as a newly succeeded entity after the execution of the new deed, thereby denying the carry-forward of depreciation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that under Section 42 of the Partnership Act 1932, subject to contract, a firm is not dissolved by the death of a partner. Since the original agreement allowed continuation, the same assessable entity continued to exist until the execution of the new deed. However, the retirement of a partner coupled with the admission of new partners under a fresh deed created an entirely different assessable entity, breaking the identity of the firm. Consequently, the Court partly allowed the appeal, permitting the set-off only for the interim period prior to the execution of the new deed.
Questions settled- Does the death of a partner dissolve a partnership firm if the partnership agreement contains a contract to the contrary?
- Whether a change in the constitution of a firm by the retirement of a partner and the admission of new partners under a fresh deed creates a new assessable entity for income tax purposes?
- Can a newly constituted partnership firm claim the unabsorbed depreciation of its predecessor unregistered firm under the Income-tax Act?
- MESSRS QAMAR DIN AHMAD & Co. vs PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 38 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-28Read full judgment →
- MESSRS PREMIER INSURANCE Co. OF PAKISTAN LTD. vs MESSRS GULF1971 PLD Karachi 99 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-08Read full judgment →
- MESSRS PASCO CORPORATION (ENGINEERS), LAHORE vs Ch. MANSHA KHAN1971 P Cr. L J 136 · Lahore High Court · 1966-12-12Read full judgment →
- MESSRS ODEON CINEMA, LAHORE vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, LAHORE ZONE, LAHORE1971 PTD 212 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-16Read full judgment →
- MESSRS MOOSA OOMAR & CO. LTD., KARACHI vs MESSRS Haji E. DOSSA &1971 PLD Karachi 899 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This Letters Patent Appeal arose from a dispute concerning a contract for the sale of cotton seeds, where the respondent appointed a sole arbitrator after the appellant failed to do so. The appellant challenged the resulting award, alleging non-compliance with Section 9(b) of the Arbitration Act, legal misconduct regarding damage calculation, and arbitrator bias. The Court first addressed the maintainability of the appeal, holding that a Letters Patent Appeal is an internal review mechanism and not a "second appeal" barred by Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act. Regarding the merits, the Court found that the respondent’s notices constituted substantial compliance with Section 9(b). It further held that an arbitrator’s failure to strictly apply the market-price-difference rule for damages does not constitute legal misconduct, nor does a familial relationship alone establish bias without specific evidence. However, the Court modified the award by striking the interest component, as no express contract or trade usage justified it. The judgment affirms that lay arbitrators are not bound by strict legal standards, and procedural technicalities do not vitiate awards where substantial compliance is evident.
Questions settled- Is a Letters Patent Appeal barred by the restriction on second appeals under Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act?
- Does the failure to strictly follow the notice procedure in Section 9(b) of the Arbitration Act vitiate an award if substantial compliance is demonstrated?
- Does an arbitrator's failure to calculate damages based strictly on the difference between contract and market price amount to legal misconduct?
- Is an award liable to be set aside solely on the ground that the arbitrator is related to one of the parties?
- Can an arbitrator award interest on damages in the absence of an express or implied contract or usage of trade?
- MESSRS M. WAHAB-UD-DIN & SONS vs THE CONTROLLER OF RENTS AND 111971 PLD Peshawar 236 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-05-25Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This writ petition challenges the appellate judgment of the District Judge, Peshawar, directing the petitioner to vacate a disputed shop premises and hand it over to respondent No. 3. The petitioner, an allottee of evacuee property subsequently purchased by the respondents' predecessor-in-interest, resisted eviction. The core legal questions involved whether a co-owner could independently maintain an eviction application, the retroactivity of statutory protections under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and the loss of statutory tenant protection due to ownership of another shop within the urban/cantonment area. The Peshawar High Court held that a co-owner can maintain the application if other co-owners are impleaded without objection, and that a tenant who owns another shop in the urban or cantonment area loses protection against eviction under the amended statutory provisions. The court laid down the principle that statutory tenancy protections under evacuee legislation are subject to disqualifications such as ownership of alternative property in the same urban area, and that premature suits or applications can be maintained if the cause of action ripens during the pendency of proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether a single co-owner has the locus standi to file an eviction application against a tenant when other co-owners are impleaded as defendants?
- Does a tenant who owns another shop within the same urban or cantonment area forfeit the statutory protection against eviction under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
- Can an eviction application that was premature at the time of its filing be decreed if the cause of action matures during the pendency of the proceedings?
- Does the definition of 'urban area' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 include a Cantonment?
- MESSRS KHURSHEED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION AND OTHERS vs MESSRS1971 SCMR 12 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-17Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal arose from an appellate judgment of the High Court of East Pakistan, which affirmed a District Court's decree declaring the respondents as registered proprietors of a tiffin carrier design, granting a permanent injunction, and disallowing damages. The petitioners contended that under Section 54 of the Patents and Designs Act 1911, the jurisdictional provisions of Section 29 relating to patents applied to designs. They argued that because their written statement alleged fraudulent and collusive registration, it constituted a counter-claim for revocation, requiring the suit's transfer to the High Court under the proviso to Section 29(1). They further argued that registration only raises a rebuttable presumption and does not automatically confer an absolute right without verifying if the design was new and original. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that these novel points of law concerning jurisdiction and the scope of design infringement suits required examination in a developing economy. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the legal questions raised.
Questions settled- Whether the provisions of Section 29 of the Patents and Designs Act 1911 relating to patents apply to designs by virtue of Section 54 of the same Act?
- Does a written statement alleging fraudulent and collusive registration of a design constitute a counter-claim for revocation requiring transfer of the suit to the High Court under the proviso to Section 29(1) of the Patents and Designs Act 1911?
- Is registration under the Patents and Designs Act 1911 sufficient to confer an absolute right to restrain others, or does it merely raise a rebuttable presumption requiring proof of a new and original design?
- MESSRS K. S. B. PUMPS Co. LTD., DACCA vs WORKMEN1971PLC 166 · Labour Court · 1970-10-13Read full judgment →
- MESSRS JAMAL SOAP FACTORY, DACCA vs PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Dacca 19 · Dacca · 1970-03-20Read full judgment →
- MESSRS JAMAL JUTE BALING & Co., DACCA vs MESSRS M. SARKIES & SONS, DACCA1971 PLD Supreme Court 784 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding an arbitration award regarding a jute supply contract. The appellant contended that the contract was void because it was signed in a trade name (a department of a parent company) rather than the parent company itself, and that the arbitration reference was invalid. The Supreme Court examined whether a contract signed in a trade name is binding and if an arbitration agreement requires formal signatures. The Court held that a legal person may conduct business under an assumed name, and a contract signed in that name by an authorized agent is valid. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that an arbitration agreement is binding if its terms are reduced to writing and accepted by the parties, even without formal signatures. Regarding allegations of arbitrator misconduct and improper procurement due to professional associations, the Court found no evidence of bias or undue influence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, establishing that commercial contracts signed in trade names are enforceable and that arbitration awards cannot be set aside based on speculative allegations of misconduct without proof.
Questions settled- Can a legal person carry on business under an assumed trade name?
- Is a contract signed in a trade name by an authorized agent valid and binding?
- Does an arbitration agreement require formal signatures to be valid if the terms are reduced to writing and accepted by the parties?
- Does the mere existence of professional connections between a party and the arbitration chamber constitute proof of improper procurement of an award?
- MESSRS JAFFER EBRAHIM & CO. LTD. vs THE DEPUTY CONTROLLER, EXCHANGE1971 PLD Karachi 10 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-30Read full judgment →
- MESSRS HOOSEN BROTHERS LTD., KARACHI vs MESSRS S. ABDULLAH & Co., KARACHI1971 PLD Karachi 729 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MESSRS HIRJINA & Co. (PAKISTAN) LTD., KARACHI vs COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX CENTRAL, KARACHI1971 PTD 200 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is a certificated appeal from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan concerning the interpretation of the definition of 'sale price' under the Sales Tax Act, 1951, and the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 1957. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal rightly construed that prior to 16th March 1956, Provincial Excise Duty could not be included in the sale price of manufactured and sold liquors for computing sales tax. The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Tribunal was correct in concluding that the 1957 amendment was not merely declaratory or retrospective beyond the specific date provided, and that the unamended definition of 'sale price' did not include Provincial Excise Duty. The key principle laid down is that in interpreting taxing statutes, courts must look strictly to the words clearly expressed and cannot imply provisions or extend retrospective operation beyond what the Legislature has expressly stated.
Questions settled- Whether the unamended definition of 'sale price' under the Sales Tax Act, 1951 included Provincial Excise Duty prior to the 1957 amendment?
- Can a statutory amendment to a taxing statute be given a greater retrospective effect than what is expressly provided by the Legislature?
- Is the Provincial Excise Duty on liquor an incidental expense that forms part of the sale price without explicit statutory inclusion?
- MESSRS HELAL JUTE PRESS LTD. vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DACCA ZONE, DACCA AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Dacca 173 · Dacca · 1969-12-18Read full judgment →
- MESSRS HAROON INDUSTRIES LTD., Karachis vs MOHAMMAD RAFIQ AND 21971 SCMR 754 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-10Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is a leave petition filed by Messrs Haroon Industries Limited against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan at Karachi, which vacated an earlier interim order and upheld a Labour Court order directing the petitioner to prohibit a lock-out pending a constitutional petition. The core legal question involves the propriety of interfering with interim discretionary orders passed by the High Court when the main constitutional petition is still pending. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the leave petition, holding that it was inexpedient to express an opinion on the merits of the dispute to avoid prejudicing the pending constitutional petition. The Court laid down the principle that discretionary interim orders of the High Court should not be lightly interfered with, and matters involving intertwined stay and main issues should be expedited rather than bifurcated, protecting the petitioner from prosecution under the Industrial Relations Ordinance until the main petition is decided.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a discretionary interim order of the High Court when the main constitutional petition is still pending?
- Can an employer be prosecuted for failing to reinstate retrenched workers while a labour court's lock-out order and a constitutional petition are sub judice?
- MESSRS Haji NAZIMUDDIN MD. AMANULLAH AND OTHERSs vs THE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, DACCA ZONE, DACCA1971 PTD 182 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-21Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court decision affirming the competence of an Examining Officer to assess sales tax. The core legal question was whether an Examining Officer appointed under the Income-tax Act, 1922, qualifies as an 'Income-tax Officer' for the purposes of exercising powers under Section 5(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, given that the definition of 'Income-tax Officer' was subsequently amended to include Examining Officers. The Supreme Court held that the reference to 'Income-tax Officer' in Section 5 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, refers to the office as it exists for the time being under the Income-tax Act, 1922, rather than being frozen to the definition as it stood in 1951. Consequently, since Examining Officers were included within the definition of Income-tax Officers by subsequent statutory amendments, they are legally competent to exercise the powers of a Sales Tax Officer. The Court affirmed that such officers can be assigned cases and areas by the Commissioner, thereby validating the assessment.
Questions settled- Does the term 'Income-tax Officer' in Section 5 of the Sales Tax Act 1951 refer to the definition as it stood in 1951 or as it exists for the time being under the Income-tax Act 1922?
- Is an Examining Officer appointed under the Income-tax Act 1922 competent to exercise the powers of a Sales Tax Officer under the Sales Tax Act 1951?
- Can a Commissioner of Income-tax assign areas or cases to an Examining Officer for the purpose of assessing sales tax?
- MESSRS Haji NAZIMUDDIN MD. AMANULLAH AND Others vs THE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, DACCA ZONE, DACCA1971 SCMR 134 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-21Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court answering a reference in the affirmative regarding the competence of an Examining Officer to assess sales tax. The core legal question was whether a person appointed as an Examining Officer under the Income-tax Act, 1922, qualifies as a Sales Tax Officer under section 5(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, by virtue of subsequent statutory amendments enlarging the definition of 'Income-tax Officer'. The Supreme Court held that the reference to 'Income-tax Officer' in section 5 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951, refers to the Income-tax Officer for the time being under the Income-tax Act, 1922, thereby encompassing Examining Officers included in that definition through later amendments. The Court laid down the principle that statutory references to income-tax authorities incorporated into sales tax legislation apply dynamically to those authorities as constituted from time to time under the governing income-tax law.
Questions settled- Whether a person appointed as an Examining Officer under the Income-tax Act, 1922 is also a Sales Tax Officer under section 5(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
- Does the term 'Income-tax Officer' in section 5 of the Sales Tax Act, 1951 refer strictly to the definition as it stood in 1951 or as amended from time to time?
- Can an Examining Officer legally assess and levy sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1951?
- MESSRS HAJEE MOHAMMADIN & Co. Plaintiff vs THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF1971 PLD Dacca 68 · Dacca · 1969-10-22Read full judgment →
- MESSRS GAMMON (EAST PAKISTAN) LTD., DACCA vs THE CHAIRMAN, SECOND1971 PLC 396 · Dacca · 1970-01-28Read full judgment →
- MESSRS G. M. PFAFF A. G. vs SARTAJ ENGINEERING CO. LTD. AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 564 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-14Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had upheld the stay of a trademark infringement suit under section 34 of the Arbitration Act based on an arbitration clause contained in the Articles of Association of the respondent company. The appellant-company, a shareholder in the respondent company, filed a suit alleging infringement of its registered trademark 'Pfaff' and breach of a separate commercial agreement. The trial court stayed the suit and vacated a temporary injunction, a decision affirmed by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a dispute regarding trademark infringement between a company and its shareholder, arising from an independent commercial transaction, falls within the arbitration clause of the company's Articles of Association. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that the Articles of Association constitute a contract only in respect of the ordinary rights and obligations of members as members, and do not extend to rights or liabilities arising from independent transactions or distinct capacities. Consequently, the dispute was outside the scope of the arbitration clause.
Questions settled- Whether an arbitration clause in a company's Articles of Association applies to disputes arising from independent commercial transactions between a company and its shareholder in a capacity other than that of a member?
- Do the Memorandum and Articles of Association of a company constitute a contract in respect of rights which a member possesses apart from his membership?
- Can a suit for trademark infringement brought by a shareholder against a company be stayed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act based on an internal arbitration clause of the company?
- MESSRS FRIENDS CLOTH STORE AND ANOTHER vs Mst. Syeda AMTUL AZIZ1971 PLD Karachi 739 · Sindh High Court · 1970-09-02Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This second appeal arises from concurrent judgments of the lower courts directing eviction of the appellants from the disputed premises under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The core legal questions involved whether the appellant firm, M/s. Friends Cloth Stores, was the lawful statutory tenant comprising specific partners, whether valid notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act was served upon the firm, and whether concurrent findings of fact could be disturbed in second appeal due to misreading of evidence. The High Court held that documentary evidence overwhelmingly established the firm consisting of Mohd. Shafi and Abdul Kadir as the statutory tenant, that service of notice upon one partner in his individual capacity did not constitute valid notice to the firm under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, and that concurrent findings vitiated by misreading of evidence are not binding in second appeal. The court laid down the principle that statutory notice under section 30 must be properly served upon the actual statutory tenant entity, and failure to serve notice renders an eviction application not maintainable.
Questions settled- Can concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be disturbed in second appeal if they are based on a misreading or misinterpretation of documentary evidence?
- Does service of notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act upon one partner in his individual capacity constitute valid service upon the partnership firm?
- Is an eviction application maintainable under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance without a valid notice served under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act?
- MESSRS EVERLAST ENTERPRISES LTD., LAHORE vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN1971 PLD Lahore 999 · Lahore High Court · 1971-01-23Read full judgment →
- MESSRS DEVELOPMENT CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION LTD., KARACHI vs WEST1971 PLD Karachi 292 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-26Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This civil application under Sections 5 and 41 of the Arbitration Act 1940 was filed by a contractor seeking to revoke an arbitration reference and challenge the jurisdiction of a sole arbitrator appointed by the Provincial Public Works Department. The dispute arose after a construction contract originally executed with the Central Public Works Department was transferred to the Provincial Public Works Department. The petitioner contended that under Clause 25 of the agreement, only the Chief Engineer of the Central Department possessed the authority to nominate an arbitrator. The High Court dismissed the application, holding that while an arbitration agreement must be in writing under Section 2(a) of the Arbitration Act 1940, subsidiary procedural provisions regarding the mechanism of appointment do not enjoy exclusive sanctity under Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1872. The Court laid down that a party who repeatedly requests an authority to appoint an arbitrator, participates fully in the proceedings, and submits to jurisdiction cannot subsequently challenge the appointment. Such conduct constitutes waiver, acquiescence, and a novation of the appointment clause.
Questions settled- Can a party that actively participates in arbitration proceedings without objection later challenge the arbitrator's jurisdiction on grounds of irregular appointment?
- Do subsidiary procedural clauses regarding the appointment mechanism of an arbitrator require written modification under the Arbitration Act 1940?
- Does a party's conduct in requesting an alternative authority to nominate an arbitrator constitute a novation of the arbitration clause?
- MESSRS DADA LTD. vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE VICE-1971 PLD Lahore 743 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-15Read full judgment →
- MESSRS COLONY TEXTILE MILLS LTD., LAHORE vs THE INCOME-TAX APPELLATE1971 PTD 1061 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- MESSRS COLONY TEXTILE MILLS LTD., LAHORE vs THE INCOME-TAX APPELLATE1971 PLD Lahore 861 · Lahore High CourtRead full judgment →
- MESSRS AZAM AGENCIES LTD. AND ANOTHER vs THE TRANS-OCEANIC1971 PLD Karachi 56 · Sindh High Court · 1970-02-19Read full judgment →
- MESSRS AUTO UNION CO OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD., KARACHI AND 7 Others vs MESSRS NATIONAL CO OPERATIVE BANK LTD., KARACHI AND Another1971 SCMR 593 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-24Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a dispute regarding a loan obtained by the petitioners from the respondents, which was referred to arbitration under section 54 of the West Pakistan Co-operative Societies Act. An award was rendered based on a compromise between the parties. Upon default by the petitioners, the respondents obtained a certificate under section 59 of the said Act and filed an execution application in the High Court. The petitioners filed objections, which were dismissed by a Single Judge, and subsequent appeals and remands culminated in a dismissal by a Division Bench of the High Court. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioners could raise new contentions regarding the execution proceedings and the status of the High Court for the first time before the apex court. The Supreme Court held that contentions not urged before the High Court, particularly those not raised before the Single Judge, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a party raise a new legal objection in the Supreme Court that was never urged before the High Court?
- Whether an execution application for a co-operative award can be filed in the High Court?
- Are petitioners entitled to challenge the execution of an award on grounds not taken before the Single Judge?
- MESSRS ATA MAQBOOL INDUSTRIES LTD. vs DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL1971 PLD Karachi 652 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- MESSRS ANSARI BROTHERS (REPRESENTED BY 6 HEIRS) vs HOLY TRINITY1971 PLD Supreme Court 700 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-06Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This civil appeal by special leave arose out of ejectment proceedings under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. The Rent Controller had directed the tenant to deposit arrears of rent and future monthly rent before the 5th of each month. The tenant appealed and obtained a stay, but the appeal was dismissed without fixing a new deadline for compliance. The core legal questions were whether the tenant defaulted in depositing rent for March 1960 after the dismissal of the appeal, and whether the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to extend time for payment after a default occurred. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 13(6) of the Ordinance is mandatory. Upon dismissal of the appeal, the original deposit order revived and required compliance within a reasonable time or by the statutory due date. The tenant defaulted in depositing the rent for March 1960 by the 5th of April 1960. Consequently, the Rent Controller had no discretion or authority to extend time or issue a subsequent order condoning default, and was bound to strike off the defence and order summary ejectment.
Questions settled- Is the requirement to strike off defence under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 mandatory upon default in depositing rent?
- Does a Rent Controller have jurisdiction to extend time for payment of rent after a default has occurred?
- How is the time limit for depositing rent determined when an appellate court dismisses an appeal against an interim deposit order without specifying a new deadline?
- MESSRS AHMAD FOOD -INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI vs AMINUL HAQ AND 41971 PLC 425 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-12-03Read full judgment →
- MESSRS A. K. KHAN & Co. LTD., CHITTAGONG vs EAST PAKISTAN WATER1971 PLC 109 · Labour Court · 1970-07-02Read full judgment →
- MESSERS HABIBUR RAHMAN AND ANOTHER vs AMIN MATCH WORKS, DACCA1971 PLC 79 · Labour Court · 1970-07-08Read full judgment →
- MESAL AND Another vs THE CROWN1971 SCMR 239 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-02-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.Criminal appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a decision of the Judicial Commissioners, N.-W.F.P., which confirmed the convictions and life sentences under Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 of appellants Masal and Abdul Khabir, while acquitting co-accused Multan. The core legal questions involved whether the lower appellate court erred in holding that eye-witness testimony required corroboration against individual accused persons, and whether absconding/surrendering later constitutes valid corroboration of flawed eye-witness evidence. The Supreme Court held, by majority, that the trial court's unreserved acceptance of the eye-witness testimony was sound and no corroboration was required. The majority further ruled that absconding by itself is valueless as independent corroboration to remedy inherent defects in eye-witness evidence, as an innocent person may abscond out of fear in a local feud. Eliminating the lower court's erroneous reasoning, the majority dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions.
Questions settled- Can the conduct of an accused in absconding serve as independent corroboration to cure inherent defects in eye-witness testimony?
- Whether absconding by an accused person in a murder case arising from a local feud necessarily points to guilt?
- Is corroboration of direct eye-witness evidence required when the witnesses are deemed credible and disinterested by the trial court?
- MEHRA vs ZAHUR AHMAD1971 PLD Lahore 834 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-10Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This regular second appeal challenges the dismissal of a pre-emption suit concerning land previously held as evacuee property. The core legal question was whether a sale of land by a provisional permanent allottee is subject to the right of pre-emption and whether civil courts possess the jurisdiction to entertain such suits. The lower courts, relying on earlier precedents, had dismissed the suit, reasoning that such land remained evacuee property and was thus immune from pre-emption. The High Court, however, held that upon permanent settlement under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, the land ceases to be evacuee property and vests absolutely in the allottee. Consequently, the transaction becomes pre-emptible, and the statutory bar against civil court jurisdiction is removed. The Court established that the permanent settlement of land confers full proprietary rights, rendering the property susceptible to pre-emption claims. Accordingly, the appeal was accepted, the lower courts' decrees were set aside, and the case was remanded for disposal on merits.
Questions settled- Is a sale of land by a provisional permanent allottee of evacuee property subject to the right of pre-emption?
- Does the permanent settlement of land under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, extinguish the status of the land as evacuee property?
- Do civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for possession of land by pre-emption once it has been permanently settled on an allottee?
- Does the amendment introduced by the Displaced Persons (Laws Amendment) Ordinance, 1964, confer full proprietary rights on a displaced person in land settled on them?
- MESSRS SHARKAT KALAMIYA VATAN, KARACHI MUHAMMAD YAKOOB vs MRS.1971 SCMR 706 · Supreme Court of PakistanRead full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns three petitions for special leave to appeal against the judgments of a learned Single Judge of the Karachi High Court, which affirmed the ejectment of the petitioners from godowns occupied by them as tenants. The ejectment proceedings were initiated by the respondent landlord under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, following the petitioners' failure to deposit rent for October 1963 by the prescribed deadline of the 5th of November 1963. The petitioners contended that their failure to deposit the rent on time was due to administrative difficulties at the Rent Controller's office, a plea they attempted to substantiate with additional evidence introduced at the appellate stage. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the additional evidence was improperly admitted as it introduced a new plea inconsistent with the petitioners' earlier affidavits and, upon examination, actually contradicted their claims. Consequently, the Court held that the failure to deposit rent within the stipulated time justified the ejectment order and dismissed the petitions, affirming that procedural defaults in rent payment cannot be excused by unsubstantiated or inconsistent explanations.
Questions settled- Can additional evidence be introduced at the appellate stage to support a new plea inconsistent with previous affidavits?
- Does a failure to deposit rent by the prescribed deadline under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act 1953 justify an order of ejectment?
- Is an appellate court justified in rejecting additional evidence that contradicts the party's own earlier pleadings?
- MD. ZIAUL ISLAM KHAN vs MANAGING PARTNER, SABUJ LIBRARY, DACCA1971 PLC 87 · Labour Court · 1970-08-12Read full judgment →
- MD. SOLAIMAN vs MESSRS HOTEL NIZAMI AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLC 462 · Labour Court · 1970-11-18Read full judgment →
- MD. SHAHIDUL HOQUE vs MESSRS ART PRESS, CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 539 · Labour Court · 1970-09-03Read full judgment →
- MD. REZA KHAN vs MANAGEMENT, UNITED METAL WORKS LTD., BOGRA1971 PLC 224 · Labour Court · 1970-10-19Read full judgment →
- MD. OBAIDUL ISLAM vs Messrs BRITISH INSULATED CALLENDER's1971 PLC 69 · Labour Court · 1970-07-27Read full judgment →
- MD. NIZAMUDDIN vs Messrs DELTA CONSTRUCTIONS LTD., DACCA1971- PLC 40 · Labour Court · 1970-07-29Read full judgment →
- MD. MOFIZULLA vs THE MANAGER, KARIM JUTE MILLS LTD.,1971 PLC 15 · Labour Court · 1970-06-05Read full judgment →
- MD. KHALIL KHAN vs THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION; ALAUDDIN AND TAIWA1971 PLC 289 · Labour Court · 1970-08-31Read full judgment →
- MD. JALALUDDIN AHMED vs HAROON SONS TRADING CORPORATION, DACCA1971PLC170 · Labour Court · 1970-10-02Read full judgment →
- MD. HAFIZUDDIN MIAH vs MD. BELAYET HUSSAIN1971 PLC 482 · Labour Court · 1970-11-03Read full judgment →
- MD. FALIK ALI vs CHHATTAK CEMENT FACTORY, EPIDC, SYLHET1971 PLC 118 · Labour Court · 1970-07-06Read full judgment →
- MD. BADIUL ALAM vs IDRIS AL QAZI AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLC 76 · Labour Court · 1970-07-10Read full judgment →
- MD. AZIZUR RAHMAN vs THE ADMINISTRATOR, NORTH BENGAL SUGAR MILL Co.1971 PLC 258 · Labour Court · 1970-10-31Read full judgment →