Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• MD. ASKIR MIA AND Another vs MD. AYUBULLAH1971 P Cr. L J 420 · Dhaka High Court · 1970-05-01Read full judgment →
• MD. ANWARULLAH MAZUMDAR vs TAMINA BIBI AND 5 Other1971 SCMR 94 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-15
  specific performancebainapatraconcurrent findings of factbona fide purchaserante-dated documentburden of proofcontract for sale
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, alleging an agreement with the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. The defendants contested the suit, claiming to be bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The trial court, the District Judge, and the High Court concurrently found that the petitioner's agreement (bainapatra) was a fraudulent, collusive, and ante-dated document created to nullify subsequent sales to the defendants. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal, arguing that the courts below erred in their findings regarding the document's date and the burden of proof. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the fraudulent nature of the document were based on evidence that effectively rebutted any presumption of validity. The Court emphasized that once the petitioner's foundational document was proven fraudulent, the suit must fail, regardless of the defendants' position. The Court affirmed that a plaintiff cannot succeed on the weakness of the defendant's case if they fail to establish their own.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance succeed if their own foundational contract document is proven to be fraudulent and ante-dated?
  • Does the presumption that a document was made on the date it bears constitute a conclusive presumption?
  • Can a party succeed in a civil suit by relying solely on the alleged weakness of the defendant's case when their own case is not established?
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• MD. ABDUL SOBHAN KHAN vs THE PROPRIETOR, MAYA BISCUIT COMPANY, DACCA1971PLC47 · Labour Court · 1970-08-07Read full judgment →
• MD. ABDUL BARI vs UNITED JUTE MILLS LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 172 · Labour Court · 1970-09-29Read full judgment →
• MAZHAR ALI AZHAR vs Dr. INZARUL ISLAM QURESHI1971 PLD Lahore 104 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-25Read full judgment →
• MAY & BAKER EMPLOYEES' UNION vs MAY & BAKER LTD. DACCA1971 PLC 294 · Labour Court · 1970-09-05Read full judgment →
• Maulvi QAMAR-UD-DIN vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD1971 PLD Lahore 408 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-25Read full judgment →
• Maulvi ABDUL AZIZ KHAN vs Mst. SHAH JAHAN BEGUM AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 434 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-31
  Civil ProcedureOrder XVII Rule 3AdjournmentEvidenceTrial CourtForthwithInterpretation of Statutes
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a civil suit where the appellant challenged a trial court’s order closing his evidence under Order XVII, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The appellant contended that the trial court acted illegally by failing to decide the suit 'forthwith' on the day the evidence was closed, arguing that the term mandated an immediate decision on the same day. The Supreme Court of Pakistan addressed the interpretation of the word 'forthwith' within the context of Order XVII, Rule 3. The Court held that the term does not require the court to decide the suit on the same day. Instead, it signifies that the court must proceed to decide the suit within a reasonable time, considering the specific circumstances of the case. Consequently, the Court ruled that the trial court’s decision to adjourn the proceedings for arguments after closing the evidence was legally sound and did not violate the statutory provision. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that 'forthwith' implies reasonable dispatch rather than instantaneous resolution.

  Questions settled

  • Does the term 'forthwith' in Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 require a court to decide a suit on the same day that evidence is closed?
  • What is the legal meaning of 'forthwith' when used in the context of Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Can a trial court adjourn a case for arguments after closing a party's evidence under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• MAULA BAKHSH vs ABDUL HAMID AND 4 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 512 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-06Read full judgment →
• MAULA BAKHSH vs ABDUL HAMID AND 4 Other1971 SCMR 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-08
  abatement of appealsubstitution of legal representativesrent restrictionlegislation by referenceprocedural lawlimitation period
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a Letters Patent Appeal by the Lahore High Court, which had affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's second appeal due to abatement. The petitioner, a tenant, faced ejectment proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. During the pendency of the second appeal, the original landlord died, and the petitioner failed to substitute the legal representatives within the statutory limitation period. The core legal question was whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding the abatement of appeals for non-substitution of legal representatives, apply to appeals filed in the High Court under the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the Explanation to subsection (4) of section 15 of the Ordinance explicitly incorporates the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding appeals. Consequently, the Court affirmed that such appeals are subject to the same rules of abatement as civil appeals under the Code. The petition was dismissed, establishing that procedural rules governing abatement apply to rent restriction appeals by statutory reference.

  Questions settled

  • Do the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding the abatement of appeals apply to appeals filed in the High Court under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Does the failure to substitute the legal representatives of a deceased party within the prescribed limitation period result in the abatement of an appeal under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
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• MATHER & CO. (PRIVATE) LTD. vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES CIRCLE, ERNAKULAM1971 PTD 424 · Kerala High Court · 1968-05-21Read full judgment →
• MASUDA KHAT UN vs PROVINCE OF EAST PAKISTAN1971 PLD Dacca 21 · Dacca · 1969-10-16Read full judgment →
• MASTAKIM ALI AND 3 OTHERS vs SHAFIQUE UDDIN CHOWDHURY AND 51971 PLD Supreme Court 170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  tenancy by holding overnon-agricultural landlease determinationauction-purchaserent executionadverse possessiontenant possession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a title suit for declaration of tenancy right, recovery of khas possession, compensation, and mesne profits regarding non-agricultural land situated within the Sylhet Municipality. The core legal question was whether the original lessee and his heirs acquired a tenancy by holding over or a limited tenancy right by adverse possession following the expiry of a short-term lease, and what title an auction-purchaser acquired in a rent execution sale. The Supreme Court held that the long, undisturbed, and continuous possession of the land by the lessee coupled with municipal records in his name established acquiescence by the landlord and subsequent lessees, constituting a tenancy by holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, or alternatively, a limited tenancy right acquired by over thirty-three years of open possession. Consequently, an auction-purchase in a rent execution proceeding against superior tenure-holders did not affect the subsisting tenancy rights of the plaintiffs. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

  Questions settled

  • Does a lessee remaining in possession after the determination of a lease with the lessor's assent constitute a tenancy by holding over?
  • Can a tenant acquire a limited tenancy right through continuous and open possession for over thirty-three years?
  • What is the effect of an auction-purchase in a rent execution case upon the pre-existing tenancy rights of a sub-tenant or original lessee?
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• MASOOM BEG vs MUHAMMAD MUNIR AND Another1971 SCMR 476 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-19
  culpable homicidemurdersudden quarrelheat of passionprivate defencealteration of convictioncriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal, arising from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, examined whether the High Court was justified in altering the accused's conviction from murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part I of section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution case was that following a minor dispute over a game of carom earlier in the day, the accused stabbed the deceased during a subsequent encounter in the evening, resulting in the victim's death. The trial court convicted the accused of murder, but the High Court altered the conviction, holding that the fatal injury was inflicted during a sudden quarrel and grappling following provocation, thereby attracting exceptions to murder. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court was fully justified in altering the conviction, as the evidence established that the fatal blow was delivered without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction of the accused from section 302 to Part I of section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code on the materials on record?
  • Does the mere carrying of a knife imply that the accused went with the intention to kill?
  • Whether the fourth exception to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code applies when a fatal injury is inflicted without premeditation in a sudden quarrel in the heat of passion?
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• MASOOD QURESHI vs AZIZUL HAMEED AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 678 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-04Read full judgment →
• MASOOD MALIK vs Rana ALLAH DAD, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ITTEHAD1971 PLC 371 · Labour Court · 1971-01-16Read full judgment →
• MASHOOQ HUSSAIN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 107 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-11Read full judgment →
• MASHKOOR KHAN AND Others vs PROVINCE OF SIND AND Other1971 SCMR 572 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-17
  temporary injunctionservice matterreversionofficiating postbalance of convenienceirreparable injurycivil suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This order disposes of multiple civil petitions for leave to appeal arising from service disputes. The petitioners, originally holding subordinate posts, were promoted to higher posts on an officiating or ad hoc basis and subsequently reverted to their substantive positions. They filed civil suits challenging their reversion and sought temporary injunctions. The High Court set aside the temporary injunctions granted by the lower appellate court, holding that reversion from an officiating post does not constitute a reduction in rank. The Supreme Court of Pakistan affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that temporary injunctions in service matters against government departments should not ordinarily be issued as they disrupt administrative arrangements. The Court held that the balance of convenience does not favor such injunctions, and no irreparable injury is caused since any loss can be compensated monetarily if the suits succeed. The petitions were dismissed with directions to the trial courts to expedite the hearings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the reversion of a civil servant from an officiating post to their substantive post constitutes a reduction in rank?
  • Should temporary injunctions against government departments in service matters be ordinarily granted?
  • Can a civil servant claim irreparable injury for reversion when monetary compensation is available upon succeeding in the main suit?
  • Whether the High Court is justified under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in setting aside an injunction where the lower court failed to consider the balance of convenience and irreparable injury?
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• MAQSOOD vs ALI MUHAMMAD AND Another1971 SCMR 657 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-08
  suspension of sentencepost-conviction bailmedical groundsold ageappellate jurisdictionexercise of discretion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed by the complainant challenging the order of the High Court of Lahore, which suspended the sentence of the respondent and released him on bail pending his appeal. The respondent, who had been convicted of an offence carrying transportation for life, was granted bail by the High Court under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the grounds of old age and illness, supported by a medical report. The petitioner contended that Section 426 did not permit bail and, alternatively, that the High Court could not suspend the sentence without first calling for and perusing the trial record. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that Section 426 explicitly empowers the appellate court to suspend a sentence and release a convict on bail pending appeal. The Court further ruled that there is no statutory requirement under Section 426 to call for the record before suspending a sentence. Additionally, the Court laid down the principle that the statutory exceptions for sick or infirm persons under Section 497 of the Code serve as appropriate guidelines for exercising judicial discretion under Section 426.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 empower an appellate court to release a convicted person on bail pending appeal?
  • Is the appellate court required to call for and peruse the trial record before suspending a sentence under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the statutory guidelines for granting bail to sick or infirm persons under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be applied to the suspension of sentences under Section 426?
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• MAQBUL HUSSAIN vs MANAGER, TANGAIL COTTON MILLS LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 63 · Labour Court · 1970-07-28Read full judgment →
• MAQBOOL AHMAD MAQBOOL vs THE PROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND 10 Other1971 SCMR 727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-28
  public service commissioninterview by single memberquorum requirementsdelegation of functionswrit petitionestoppel
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1962). The petitioner challenged the selection process conducted by the West Pakistan Public Service Commission for the post of Extra Assistant Director of Agriculture, contending that an interview conducted by a single member of the Commission was illegal and violated the quorum requirement of two members prescribed under Rules 3 and 9 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between Rules 3, 8, and 9 of the Rules of Procedure. The Court held that Rule 8 expressly empowers the Commission to refer any matter to an individual member for consideration and report, while the final decision rests with the Commission itself. The Court held that the interview conducted by a single member under Rule 8 was lawful. Additionally, the Court noted that having voluntarily participated in the interview without objection, the petitioner could not subsequently challenge its validity after being unsuccessful.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a single member of the Public Service Commission can lawfully conduct interviews when the quorum for a full meeting is set at two members?
  • What is the legal distinction between the reference of a matter to an individual member under Rule 8 and the delegation of functions to a committee under Rule 9 of the West Pakistan Public Service Commission Rules of Procedure?
  • Can a candidate who voluntarily participates in a selection interview without objection subsequently challenge the competence of the interviewing panel upon failing to be selected?
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• MAPP (INSPECTOR OF TAXES) vs ORAM1971 PTD 731 · Court of Appeals · 1968-05-15Read full judgment →
• MANZOOR AHMAD vs The STATE1971 SCMR 508 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-05
  triple murderspecial leave to appealocular testimonymedical evidencedying declarationfirst information reportappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner for the triple murder of his step-mother, step-sister, and step-maternal grandmother, which was upheld by the High Court. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eyewitness testimony, the alleged contradiction between ocular evidence and medical evidence regarding gunshot wounds, and the omission of an eyewitness in the first information report. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence was consistent with the oral testimony when accounting for the different types of ammunition used in the double-barreled gun, and that the prompt lodging of the first information report excluded any possibility of concoction or false implication. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction and sentence based on reliable eyewitness accounts and a dying declaration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether inconsistencies between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding gunshot wounds are sufficient to discredit eyewitness accounts?
  • Can an eyewitness whose name is omitted from the first information report still be relied upon?
  • Does the prompt lodging of a first information report exclude the possibility of concoction and false implication in a murder case?
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• MANZOOR AHMAD AND 2 Other vs WEST PAKISTAN PROVINCE THROUGH THE MEMBER1971 PLC 6 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-12-08Read full judgment →
• MANTAZUDDIN Alias MANTAJ MEA vs The STATE1971 SCMR 14 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-25
  wrongful confinementkidnappingcircumstantial evidenceappreciation of evidencespecial leave to appealcriminal liabilitymens rea
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner under Section 368 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for wrongfully concealing or keeping in confinement a kidnapped person. The petitioner was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment, a decision upheld by the High Court of East Pakistan. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in law by inferring the petitioner's knowledge of the boy's kidnapped status based on circumstantial evidence, specifically the petitioner's failure to report the boy's presence despite suspicious circumstances, the boy's dialect, and the petitioner's restrictions on the boy's movement. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances relied upon by the High Court were sufficient to support the inference of knowledge and constituted conduct wholly incompatible with innocence. The Court affirmed that it would not interfere with the appreciation of evidence by lower courts, as that function falls outside its scope. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing that circumstantial evidence regarding an accused's conduct can sufficiently prove the requisite knowledge for a conviction under Section 368.

  Questions settled

  • Can circumstantial evidence regarding an accused's conduct be sufficient to prove knowledge that a person was kidnapped?
  • Does the Supreme Court of Pakistan interfere with the appreciation of evidence by lower courts in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Is the failure to report the presence of a suspicious individual to authorities a factor in establishing guilty knowledge under Section 368 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
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• MANSAB ALI vs AMIR AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 124 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-04
  Criminal Law Amendment Actright to be heardjurisdictionvoid proceedingsnatural justicereference to tribunalmandatory condition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a criminal matter involving the abduction and murder of one Rutallon. The Commissioner, Sargodha Division, referred the case to a Tribunal under the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, without providing the accused an opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal convicted the respondents, and the Commissioner subsequently enhanced their sentences in revision. The Home Secretary later set aside these convictions, but the High Court restored them following a Supreme Court precedent. However, the High Court later allowed a writ petition by the respondents, declaring the initial reference to the Tribunal void for lack of notice. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to provide the accused an opportunity to show cause before the Commissioner exercised the power of reference under section 3 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, rendered the entire proceedings ab initio void. The Court affirmed that where a mandatory condition for the exercise of jurisdiction is not fulfilled, all subsequent proceedings, including those in appeal or revision, suffer from a fundamental lack of jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide an accused an opportunity to be heard before a reference is made under section 3 of the West Pakistan Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1963, render the subsequent proceedings void?
  • Can proceedings that follow an illegal order of reference be validated by the failure of the accused to raise the issue in earlier revision petitions?
  • What is the legal effect on subsequent proceedings when a mandatory condition for the exercise of jurisdiction by a tribunal is not fulfilled?
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• MANICK CHANDRA SEAL vs THE MANAGING PARTNER, FAZLI BROTHERS, CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 120 · Labour Court · 1970-07-02Read full judgment →
• MANGA KHAN vs PUNJAB ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1971 PLC 334 · Labour Court · 1971-01-26Read full judgment →
• Man NAZAR FARID AHMAD KHAN MANEKA AND 3 OTHERS vs THE CONTROLLER1971 PLD Lahore 1032 · Lahore High Court · 1971-08-10Read full judgment →
• MAMOON AND 9 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 197 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-08Read full judgment →
• Malik ZAKAUDDIN AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 152 · Lahore High Court · 1970-02-11Read full judgment →
• MALIK SINGH TIRATH SINGH vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1971 PTD 71 · Allahabad High Court · 1971-09-05Read full judgment →
• Malik MUMTAZ ALI vs PAKISTAN THROUGH SECRETARY, REFUGEES AND WORKS, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, RAWALPINDI AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 395 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-05
  withdrawal of writ petitiontransposition of partiesevacuee propertypermanent transfer deedOrder I Rule 10 CPCOrder XXIII Rule 1 CPCapplicability of CPC to writ petitions
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition was filed by a displaced person challenging a sanction granted by the Central Government under Section 25(2)(s) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957 for the sale of evacuee land to the Municipal Committee of Lyallpur. During the pendency of the petition, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner issued a Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD) in favor of the petitioner under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. Consequently, the petitioner sought to withdraw the writ petition. The Municipal Committee opposed the withdrawal and applied under Order I Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to be transposed as a co-petitioner to challenge the PTD. The High Court held that transposition under Order I Rule 10 cannot be allowed where a respondent's claim runs completely counter to the petitioner's cause of action and radically alters the suit's character. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court held that Civil Procedure Code provisions apply to writ proceedings under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962, and under Order XXIII Rule 1, a petitioner has an unconditional right to withdraw a proceeding without liberty to file a fresh suit. The petition was dismissed as withdrawn.

  Questions settled

  • Do the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to writ proceedings under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
  • Can a defendant or respondent be transposed as a co-petitioner under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if their claim runs counter to the original petitioner's claim?
  • Does a petitioner have an absolute right to withdraw a writ petition under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 without seeking permission to file a fresh suit?
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• Malik MUHAMMAD ZAHOOR vs THE STATE,1971 P Cr. L J 1173 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-09Read full judgment →
• Malik MUHAMMAD AKHTAR vs Mian SALAHUDDIN AND 9 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 737 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-11
  nomination paperselection disputemandatory and directory provisionsconstitutional jurisdictionalternative remedyelection petitionbar of jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This constitutional petition challenges the acceptance of a rival candidate's nomination papers by the Returning Officer one day prior to the date specified in the official notification under the election laws. The core legal question is whether the statutory provision regarding the date of filing nomination papers is mandatory or directory, and whether the High Court should interfere with the election process at an intermediate stage. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that the statutory timeline for filing nomination papers is directory rather than mandatory in the absence of a prescribed penal consequence, and that the early acceptance of nomination papers constituted a mere irregularity that did not affect the fair conduct of elections. Furthermore, the court held that election disputes should not be entertained by ordinary courts through extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction when an alternative remedy via an election petition is provided by law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provision specifying the date for filing nomination papers under the election law is mandatory or directory?
  • Can an election dispute be entertained by the High Court under extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction prior to the conclusion of the election?
  • Does the early acceptance of a nomination paper by a Returning Officer invalidate the nomination in the absence of a prescribed penal consequence?
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• MALIK MEHBOOB AND OTHERS vs BACHA GUL1971 PLD (Rev.) Baluchistan 15 · Board of Revenue · 1970-12-24Read full judgment →
• Malik GHULAM MUHAMMAD ETC., SOBA ETC., BAKHTAWAR ETC., GHULAM1971 PLD (Rev.) Punjab 5 · Board of Revenue · 1970-06-11Read full judgment →
• MESSRS ABDULLAH AGENCY, KARACHI vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 479 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• Malik GHULAM HUSSAIN vs Haji MUHAMMAD HAYAT1971 PLD Supreme Court 573 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-03
  tentative rentevacuee propertydisplaced personssecond appealLetters Patent Appealspecial leave to appeallandlord and tenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, modifying the tentative rent fixed by the Rent Controller in an ejectment petition. The core legal questions involved were whether an appeal to the Supreme Court is competent without first exhausting the remedy of a Letters Patent Appeal within the High Court, and whether the High Court was justified in second appeal in interfering with the tentative rent fixed by the authorities below under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The Supreme Court held that while the practice of the court normally requires parties to exhaust Letters Patent appeals, the court may entertain and decide an appeal where leave has already been granted and pending for a considerable time. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that the tenant is liable to pay rent on the same terms and conditions as immediately before the transfer, and the Rent Controller's tentative fixation of rent was in accordance with law. The key principle laid down is that under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, a tenant remains bound by the pre-transfer terms and conditions of tenancy, including aggregate payments previously made to co-allottees and authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court without first exhausting the remedy of a Letters Patent Appeal?
  • What is the basis for determining the rent payable by a tenant of an evacuee property transferred under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can the High Court in second appeal interfere with the tentative rent fixed by the Rent Controller if it was determined in accordance with law?
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• MAJOR Syed WALAYAT SHAH vs MUZAFFAR KHAN AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 184 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-09
  evacuee propertydisplaced personwrit jurisdictionreview jurisdictionsettlement authoritiesjudicial reviewremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave concerns the transfer of an evacuee house in Rawalpindi. The core legal questions were whether the High Court correctly interfered with the Settlement Authorities' findings of fact in its writ jurisdiction, specifically regarding the successor Deputy Settlement Commissioner's jurisdiction to review a predecessor's order without permission, and the proper legal criteria for determining the status of a 'displaced person'. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction in quashing the successor Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order, as it was passed without the requisite legal authority to review a predecessor's decision. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Settlement Commissioner's finding regarding the respondents' status as 'displaced persons' was based on an incorrect legal test—specifically, that mere birth in territory now forming Pakistan is not the sole criterion. The Court upheld the High Court's decision to remand the case for a fresh determination, establishing that findings of fact based on irrelevant legal considerations are subject to judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Does a successor Deputy Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to review an order of his predecessor without prior permission?
  • Is mere birth in territory now forming Pakistan the sole test for determining if a person is a 'displaced person' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can the High Court interfere with findings of fact by Settlement Authorities in its writ jurisdiction if those findings are based on irrelevant legal considerations?
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• MAJOR ATA MUHAMMAD KHAN AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1228 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-14Read full judgment →
• MAJID vs The STATE1971 SCMR 693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-11
  common intentionmurdervicarious liabilitycriminal appeallathi blowsudden affair
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from the conviction of the appellant, Majid, under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mushtaq Ali. The prosecution case was that following a dispute over cattle grazing, the complainant party was confronted by the accused, who were armed with a gun, a pistol, and a dang (lathi). Hafiz Khan fired a fatal gunshot at the deceased, while the appellant struck a complainant with a dang to disarm him. The High Court, while modifying the factual narrative to find that the accused arrived on the spot upon a hue and cry, upheld the appellant's conviction. The core legal question was whether the appellant could be held liable under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, given that the fatal shot was fired solely by his co-accused. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the appellant and his companion arrived armed with the intention of taking revenge and attacked the complainant party, the appellant shared a common intention with the principal offender and was rightly convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused who did not fire the fatal shot can be convicted of murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 if he shared a common intention with the principal offender?
  • Can common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 be inferred from the conduct of the accused in arriving armed at the scene and actively participating in the attack?
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• MAJ. FAZLE ALEEM KHAN vs DR. MRS. A. K. AWAN AND ANOTHER1971 SCMR 408 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-01
  settlement of propertydivisibility of housewrit jurisdictiondisplaced personstransfer of propertylegal heirsettlement commissioner
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a dispute over the transfer of a bungalow under settlement laws. The appellant challenged the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner's decision to divide the property between the appellant and respondent No. 1, arguing that the respondent had not properly filed for transfer. The core legal questions concerned whether the High Court could interfere with the Commissioner's finding of divisibility under writ jurisdiction and the effect of such a declaration on competing claims. The Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner possesses exclusive authority under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1958) to determine the divisibility of a house. Consequently, such a determination is not subject to judicial interference under Article 98 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court established that once a property is declared divisible, it effectively becomes two separate units, rendering comparisons of the parties' respective entitlements unnecessary. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the respondent, as an heir, had validly succeeded to the rights of her deceased father.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a decision of the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner regarding the divisibility of a house under Article 98 of the Constitution?
  • Does the declaration of a house as divisible by the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner eliminate the need to compare the relative entitlements of competing claimants?
  • Does a legal heir succeed to the rights of a deceased claimant in settlement proceedings regarding the transfer of a property?
  Read full judgment →
• MAHRAJ GANESHPURI CHELLA vs GAGOOMAL1971 SCMR 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-18
  promissory noterecovery suithandwriting expertmixed question of law and factnew pleamoney-lender
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the summary dismissal of a First Appeal by the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench. The respondent had filed a suit under Order XXXVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the recovery of a loan amount based on a promissory note executed by the petitioner. The petitioner denied executing the promissory note, claiming he was under police surveillance in a different village during the relevant period. The trial court, relying on handwriting expert evidence, found that the promissory note was executed by the petitioner and was properly stamped, which findings were upheld by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner raised a new plea that the respondent was an unlicensed money-lender, making the suit unmaintainable. The Supreme Court held that a new point representing a mixed question of law and fact cannot be raised for the first time before it. Finding no error in the concurrent findings of fact supported by reliable evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Can a mixed question of law and fact, which was not raised in the courts below, be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Whether concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of expert evidence can be interfered with in a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• MAHMOOD KHAN vs PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY1971 PLC 253 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-06Read full judgment →
• MAHMOOD AHMAD KHAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 723 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-09Read full judgment →
• MAHBOOB ELAHI vs THEM STATE1971 SCMR 796 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-30
  defamationextra-judicial confessionretracted confessioncircumstantial evidencecorroborationSection 500 PPC
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave was filed against the judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which maintained the appellant's conviction and sentence under Section 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly writing defamatory statements on school walls. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence—namely motive and the presence of the appellant near the school on the preceding night—and an extra-judicial confession. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the circumstantial evidence was incompatible with the innocence of the appellant and whether a retracted extra-judicial confession could sustain a conviction without independent corroboration. The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient as it was compatible with innocence, given that other inimical persons were also present or had motive. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a retracted extra-judicial confession made to an unfamiliar person required strong corroboration, which was lacking in this case. Holding that the lower courts misdirected themselves on the law of retracted confessions and circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the appellant's conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether circumstantial evidence that is consistent with the innocence of the accused can form the basis of a criminal conviction?
  • Whether a retracted extra-judicial confession requires independent corroboration before it can support a conviction?
  • Can evidence of motive and mere presence in the vicinity of the crime scene serve as sufficient corroboration for a retracted extra-judicial confession?
  Read full judgment →
• MAHBOOB ALI vs THE TEXTILE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD., HYDERABAD1971 PLC 522 · Labour Court · 1971-01-01Read full judgment →
• MAHABIR SUGAR MILLS (PVT.) LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1971 PTD 294 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-03-29Read full judgment →
• MAFIZUR RAHMAN vs MESSRS J. J. REHBACH (PAK.) LTD., CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 115 · Labour Court · 1970-07-18Read full judgment →
• MADHYA PRADESH STATE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION LTD. vs COMMISSIONER1971 PTD 252 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1968-04-02Read full judgment →
• MADAD KHAN vs The STATE1971 SCMR 661 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-12
  discharge of accusedcriminal breach of trustfurther inquiryrevision petitionquashment of remand orderpremature discharge
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a criminal petition for special leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court, which had dismissed a petition for the quashment of an order of remand passed in revision by the Additional District Magistrate. The petitioner was challaned under sections 406, 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in respect of a criminal breach of trust and forgery concerning a taxi car. The trial magistrate had discharged the petitioner prematurely under section 253(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after examining only one prosecution witness and without examining the accused, citing a four-year delay in lodging the FIR and a lack of corroboration. The core legal question was whether the trial magistrate's order of discharge based on a single unrebutted witness statement was premature and legally sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the trial magistrate's discharge order was indeed premature as the unrebutted statement prima facie disclosed offences requiring the accused to provide an explanation, rendering the Additional District Magistrate's order for further inquiry unexceptionable. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trial magistrate can discharge an accused under section 253(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 after examining only a single prosecution witness?
  • Can an order of discharge be set aside in revision and remanded for further inquiry when the sole recorded statement prima facie discloses an offence?
  • Is it incumbent upon the accused to explain the prosecution case made out even on an unrebutted statement before a discharge can be justified?
  Read full judgment →
• MA GUL AND 2 OTHERS vs Haji FATAK AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Quetta 127 · Balochistan High Court · 1971-05-26Read full judgment →
• M. Z. HAIDER vs MESSRS HAFIZ TEXTILE MILLS LTD., CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 555 · Labour Court · 1970-09-08Read full judgment →
• M. RASHID AHMAD vs NATIONAL & GRINDLAYS BANK LTD. AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 598 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-03
  master and servantwrongful dismissalreinstatementspecific performancedeclaratory suitprivate employmentStanding Orderscommercial establishment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This regular second appeal arose from a civil suit filed by an employee of a private banking institution against his dismissal from service. The plaintiff sought a declaration that his suspension, domestic inquiry, and dismissal were illegal and ultra vires the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1960, along with a decree for reinstatement. The trial court rejected the plaint, and the appellate court affirmed the decision.

  The core legal question was whether an employee of a private commercial establishment can maintain a civil suit for declaration and reinstatement on the ground that his dismissal violated statutory Standing Orders, or whether his remedy is confined to damages for wrongful dismissal under the general law of master and servant.

  The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that in private employment the relationship remains governed by the master and servant rule. A contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, nor can a declaration for reinstatement be granted under Section 42. While Industrial Courts acting under special labor legislation may order reinstatement, ordinary civil courts cannot foist an employee upon an unwilling private employer, and the aggrieved employee's sole remedy in a civil court is a suit for damages.

  Questions settled

  • Can a contract for personal service with a private employer be specifically enforced in a civil court under the Specific Relief Act 1877?
  • Whether an employee of a private bank can seek a declaration of illegal dismissal and reinstatement in a civil court?
  • Does a violation of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1960 entitle a private employee to sue in a civil court for reinstatement rather than damages?
  • Can an ordinary civil court order the reinstatement of a wrongfully dismissed private employee as an Industrial Court might?
  Read full judgment →
• M. RAHMAN, INCOME-TAX OFFICER AND 2 OTHERS- vs NARAYANGANJ COMPANY (PRIVATE) LTD.-1971 PTD 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-23
  income taxassociation of personsescaped assessmentdouble assessmentSection 34rectification of mistakejoint venture
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arose from an order of the High Court of East Pakistan under Article 98 of the Constitution, setting aside a notice issued under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act. The respondent-company and two associates entered into a joint venture and earned profits, which each member reported in their individual tax returns, where they were subsequently assessed and taxed. Later, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice under Section 34 to assess the joint venture's profits as escaped income of an Association of Persons (AOP). The primary issue was whether income already charged to tax in the hands of individual members could be reassessed as income of an AOP under Section 34. The Supreme Court held that once individual members of an association have been assessed and charged to tax on their share of income, the same income cannot be taxed again in their hands as a separate entity under Section 34 without prior annulment or modification of the initial assessments. Section 35 concerns rectifying errors apparent from the record rather than making fresh assessments. Consequently, repeated proceedings under Section 34 for the same assessed income are unauthorized.

  Questions settled

  • Whether income already assessed and taxed in the hands of individual members of an association can be reassessed under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act as income of the association?
  • Whether Section 35 of the Income-tax Act can be utilized to annul an existing assessment and initiate fresh assessment proceedings for escaped income?
  • Can repeated notices under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act be lawfully issued to an assessee in respect of the exact same income already charged to tax?
  Read full judgment →
• M. RAHMAN, INCOME-TAX OFFICER AND 2 OTHERS vs NARAYANGANJ COMPANY (PRIVATE) LTD_1971 PLD Supreme Court 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-03
  income taxescaped assessmentassociation of personsdouble taxationrectification of assessmentconstitutional petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from a High Court order under Article 98 of the Constitution regarding income-tax assessments. The core legal question was whether income-tax authorities could issue a notice under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act to assess income as an 'Association of Persons' when that same income had already been assessed and taxed in the hands of the individual members of that association. The Supreme Court held that once income has been declared and charged to tax in the hands of individual members, it cannot be treated as 'escaped assessment' to justify a fresh notice under Section 34 for the same income as an association. The Court emphasized that while Section 3 of the Income-tax Act treats an association and its members as distinct entities, the authorities cannot, due to their own negligence in failing to assess the association initially, initiate repeated proceedings for the same income already taxed. The key principle laid down is that a fresh notice under Section 34 cannot be issued in respect of income that has already been effectively charged to tax, as such income has not 'escaped assessment'.

  Questions settled

  • Can income-tax authorities issue a notice under Section 34 of the Income-tax Act for income that has already been assessed and taxed in the hands of individual members of an association?
  • Does the Income-tax Act permit repeated notices under Section 34 for the same income?
  • Can an assessment already made be annulled or modified through proceedings under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act?
  Read full judgment →
• M. R. QURESHI AND 9 Others vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 4 Other1971 SCMR 291 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-12-23
  constitutional jurisdictioncivil servantsseniority disputewar service benefitsterms and conditions of serviceservice tribunal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellants, working as Section Officers and Superintendents in the Civil Secretariat of the Government of West Pakistan, filed a writ petition under Article 98 of the abrogated Constitution of 1962 to challenge a policy letter and consequential orders that granted presumptive seniority to respondents by extending war service benefits under the Punjab Government Service (War) Amendment Rules, 1943. The High Court dismissed the petition on merits. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the writ petition was incompetent ab initio. The Court reiterated that under Article 98 of the late Constitution, the High Court's jurisdiction regarding the terms and conditions of public servants is strictly confined to those terms and conditions specified directly in the Constitution, whereas matters of seniority are governed by rules and do not attract constitutional remedies. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on the ground of incompetency, leaving the appellants to pursue remedies before the Service Tribunals.

  Questions settled

  • Does a dispute regarding the fixation of seniority of public servants attract the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962?
  • Are terms and conditions of public servants relating to matters other than remuneration or superannuation age protected under Article 178 for the purpose of invoking constitutional remedies?
  • Where a public servant's grievance concerning seniority falls outside the scope of constitutional terms and conditions, what is the appropriate forum for redress?
  Read full judgment →
• M. N. RAMAS WAMY IYER(BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE) vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KERALA1971 PTD 416 · Kerala High Court · 1968-08-01Read full judgment →
• M. MAHMOOD ISPAHANI vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CHITTAGONG ZONE, CHITTAGONG1971 PLD Dacca 181 · Dacca · 1969-10-20Read full judgment →
• M. M. S. K. CHOWDHURY vs THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, BENGAL ELECTRIC1971 PLC 452 · Labour Court · 1970-12-04Read full judgment →
• M. F. RAHMAN vs Mst. MARYAM A. HASHIM1971 PLD Karachi 84 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-25Read full judgment →
• M. DAUD KHAN AND 20 OTHERS vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 21971 PLD Lahore 462 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-12
  WAPDAelectricity tariffstatutory discretionunilateral contract amendmentpublic authorityadministrative lawnatural justicewrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioners, agricultural consumers of electricity, challenged a notification issued by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) that unilaterally revised electricity tariffs, effectively altering existing agreements. The core legal questions were whether WAPDA could unilaterally amend these tariffs despite prior contracts, whether such actions were subject to the Electricity Act 1910, and whether the revision violated principles of natural justice. The Court dismissed the petitions, holding that WAPDA possesses the statutory authority under the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958 to fix and revise rates. The Court determined that the proviso to Section 12 of the WAPDA Act exempts the Authority from specific obligations under the Electricity Act 1910. Furthermore, the Court established that a public body cannot fetter its future statutory discretion or executive action through private contracts, as the service of the community and public interest override contractual obligations. Finally, the Court held that the fixation of utility rates is an administrative function that does not require a hearing or show-cause notice under the principles of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Can a statutory body like WAPDA unilaterally amend electricity tariffs despite existing agreements with consumers?
  • Does the principle of natural justice require a public authority to issue a show-cause notice to consumers before revising utility tariffs?
  • Can a public body fetter its future statutory discretion by entering into a contract?
  • Are the provisions of the Electricity Act 1910 regarding licensee obligations applicable to WAPDA?
  Read full judgment →
• M. ABDUL AZIZ AND 3 OTHERS vs THE SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION1971 PLD Lahore 871 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-05Read full judgment →
• M. A. ALEEM CHITTARI vs ANWAR H. PIR BHAI AND ANOTHER1971 P Cr. L J 842 · Sindh High Court · 1969-05-19Read full judgment →
• LT. COL. SHUJAUDDIN AHMAD vs OIL & GAS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION1971 SCMR 566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-09-05
  master and servantstatutory corporationcivil servanttemporary injunctiontermination of servicespecific enforcementconstitutional guarantees
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, a retired lieutenant colonel, was employed by the Oil & Gas Development Corporation under a contract of service that was eventually terminated by the Corporation with three months' pay in lieu of notice. The petitioner challenged the termination by filing a civil suit accompanied by an application for a temporary injunction. Although the trial court refused the injunction, the District Judge granted it on appeal. However, the High Court set aside the District Judge's order in revision, relying on established precedents regarding statutory corporations. Seeking special leave to appeal, the petitioner contended that the respondent-Corporation was essentially a government department under executive control, making its employees civil servants protected by constitutional guarantees. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that employees of statutory corporations do not acquire the status of government servants and are governed by the ordinary law of master and servant. The Court reaffirmed that a contract of service cannot be specifically enforced, and consequently, no temporary injunction can be granted in such matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of statutory corporations acquire the status of Government servants entitled to constitutional guarantees?
  • Can a contract of service be specifically enforced under the law of Master and Servant?
  • Is a temporary injunction maintainable in a suit challenging the termination of service of an employee of a statutory corporation?
  Read full judgment →
• LOCAL BUS SERVICE LTD., LYALLPUR vs THE PUNJAB PROVINCIAL TRANSPORT1971 SCMR 805 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-26
  stage carriage permitsroute permitsstatutory interpretationsubordinate legislationinfructuous petitionmotor vehicle regulationpermit cancellation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner-company, which held route permits for stage carriages under the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1969, challenged the cancellation of its permits following the enactment of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Amendment Ordinance IX of 1970. This amendment mandated that permits for stage carriages operating outside urban areas would cease to be valid 60 days after the Ordinance's enforcement. The petitioner contended that a subsequent notification issued by the Governor of the Punjab under the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969, exempted them from this cancellation until August 6, 1971. The High Court dismissed the petition, finding the notification only exempted the company from rule 57-A regarding route classification, which presupposed the existence of valid permits. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, noting that the exemption notification could not revive permits already cancelled by the primary legislation. Furthermore, the Court held that even if the extension were valid, the period had expired by the time of the hearing, rendering the petition infructuous. The Court affirmed that subordinate legislation cannot override the clear statutory mandate of the parent Ordinance regarding permit validity.

  Questions settled

  • Can a notification issued under the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969, override the statutory cancellation of route permits mandated by the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Amendment Ordinance IX of 1970?
  • Does an exemption from route classification rules under the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1969, imply an extension of the validity of a cancelled route permit?
  • Does the expiration of a contested time-extension period render a petition for special leave to appeal infructuous?
  Read full judgment →
• LILAWATI-Judgment-Creditor vs ANWARUL ISLAM--Judgment-Debtor1971 PLD Karachi 25 · Sindh High Court · 1970-01-20Read full judgment →
• LEHAJUDDIN MOLLA vs THE PROPRIETOR, LATIF ART PRESS, DACCA1971 PLC 306 · Labour Court · 1970-09-18Read full judgment →
• LAXMIPAT SINGHANIA vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1971 PTD 924 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-30Read full judgment →
• LAXMIDAS & Co. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY1971 PTD 579 · Bombay High Court · 1968-11-14Read full judgment →
• LATIF BAWANY JUTE MILLS LTD. AND 4 OTHERS-s vs THE SALES TAX OFFICER1971 PTD 26 · Dacca · 1970-04-27Read full judgment →
• LAL MUHAMMAD vs Mst. NIAZ PARWARA1971 PLD Peshawar 157 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-05-05Read full judgment →
• LAL KHAN vs SUBEDAR PAINDA KHAN1971 PLD Rev. (Punjab) 34 · Board of Revenue · 1971-07-26Read full judgment →
• LAL KHAN vs BASCO INDUSTRIES, GUJRAT1971PLC157 · Labour Court · 1970-12-30Read full judgment →
• LAHORE IMPROVEMENT TRUS, LAHORE THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN., UNIVERSITY1971 PLD Supreme Court 811 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  land acquisitionevacuee propertytown improvementpublic purposelegal processstatutory interpretationwrit jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment that invalidated land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Lahore Improvement Trust for a University campus and housing schemes. The core legal questions were whether the Trust's notice under Section 36 of the Town Improvement Act, 1922, required prior Central Government approval under the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, and whether such notice constituted a prohibited "legal process" against evacuee property. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition was valid, ruling that the notice was not a "legal process" barred by the Ordinance and that the scheme fell within the Trust's statutory powers. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Trust could lawfully acquire land for a public purpose like a University campus. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, declaring the subsequent sale of the acquired land by the Custodian of Evacuee Property to a private society void. The principle established is that courts must explore all possible explanations for the validity of public acts before declaring them without lawful authority, and that acquisition for public development is within the scope of the Town Improvement Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does a notice under Section 36 of the Town Improvement Act 1922 constitute a 'legal process' barred by the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance 1949?
  • Can a statutory body like an Improvement Trust acquire land for the purpose of establishing a university campus?
  • Is prior approval of the Central Government required for a notice under Section 36 of the Town Improvement Act 1922 regarding evacuee property?
  • What is the duty of a court when examining the validity of an order passed by a public authority?
  Read full judgment →
• LAHORE AND ANOTHER vs Malik AMAN1971 PLD Quetta 117 · Balochistan High Court · 1971-06-14Read full judgment →
• L. VE. VAIRAVAN CHETTIAR vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1971 PTD 653 · Madras High Court · 1965-04-09Read full judgment →
• L. B. BELAMKAR vs COMMISSIONER OP INCOME-TAX, MYSORE1971 PTD 929 · Mysore High Court · 1968-10-16Read full judgment →
• KV. AL. M. RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1971 PTD 1066 · Madras High Court · 1968-03-12Read full judgment →
• KUNHALAUMMA AND OTHERS vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CALICUT1971 PTD 113 · Kerala High Court · 1966-09-16Read full judgment →
• KUNDAN BIBI AND 4 OTHERSs vs WALAYAT HUSSAIN, CONTROLLER OF ESTATE1971 PTD 43 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-03Read full judgment →
• KUNDAN BIBI AND 4 OTHERS vs WALAYAT HUSSAIN, CONTROLLER OF ESTATE1971 PLD Lahore 360 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-03Read full judgment →
• KODAM ALI vs MESSRS IMPERIAL GLASS INDUSTRIES, DACCA1971 PLC 52 · Labour Court · 1970-08-04Read full judgment →
• KITAB ALI HALDAR (REPRESENTED BY HEIRS)--Plaintiff vs NISHI KANTA MANDAL1971 PLD Dacca 232 · Dacca · 1970-01-27Read full judgment →
• KISHANLAL HARICHARAN vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-WARD, NIZAMABAD1971 PTD 854 · Andhra Paradesh High Court · 1968-07-03Read full judgment →
• KHUSHI MOHAMMAD vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-17
  bailcriminal procedurefoodstuffs controlpaddy and rice controlrefusal of bailsupreme court of pakistan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant filed an appeal against the refusal of bail by the lower courts in a criminal case involving charges under section 6 of the West Pakistan Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958 and section 14 of the West Pakistan Paddy and Rice (Control) Order, 1958 for importing six maunds of rice into Lahore. The core legal question was whether the courts below were required to give reasons for refusing bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when the alleged offence is not punishable with death or transportation for life. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in refusing bail without proper reasons or on extraneous grounds, and considering that the maximum sentence is three years and no steps towards trial were taken by the prosecution since leave was granted, the appeal was allowed and bail was confirmed. The key principle laid down is that under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, courts must properly evaluate and provide reasons when refusing bail in offences not punishable with death or transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Are courts required to give reasons for refusing bail under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for offences not punishable with death or transportation for life?
  • Can bail be refused by a Magistrate or Sessions Judge without assigning proper reasons?
  • What is the effect of prolonged delay in bringing the accused to trial on an interim bail granted by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• KHUSHI MOHAMMAD vs MOHAMMAD YAUSAF AND 6 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 169 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-09Read full judgment →
• KHUSHAL AND Another vs The STATE1971 SCMR 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-16
  murdercommon intentionbenefit of doubtcorroborationdying declarationballistic evidencejoint trial
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan upholding the murder convictions of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code while commuting their sentences from death to transportation for life. The appellants were charged with the murder of their co-villager over a dispute regarding a village path. The core legal questions involved the appreciation of ocular testimony, the necessity of corroboration when a portion of the prosecution case is disbelieved, the benefit of doubt in case of multiple reasonable inferences, and the validity of a joint trial under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court held that while the conviction of one appellant (Kala) was fully supported by ballistic evidence, dying declarations, and ocular testimony, the participation of the other appellant (Khushal) suffered from a lack of independent corroboration, particularly since the robbery charge had failed and the medical evidence was consistent with a single gunshot. The court laid down the principle that where prosecution testimony is disbelieved in a material respect, independent corroboration is required as to the implication of each accused, and where two possibilities exist, the one favorable to the accused must be adopted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether independent corroboration is required for an accused's implication when the prosecution's testimony is disbelieved in a material respect?
  • Should the benefit of doubt be resolved in favor of the accused when the medical and physical evidence supports two competing possibilities?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused rendered in a joint trial vitiate the legality of the trial under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• KHUDA YAR vs MOHAMMAD ALI AND 6 Other1971 SCMR 737 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-01
  criminal appealmurderacquittalleave to appealocular testimonyappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondents of charges under sections 302/149 and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The trial court had initially convicted the respondents, but the High Court reversed the decision, citing unreliable and interested ocular testimony, doubts regarding the presence of eyewitnesses, unconvincing recovery evidence, discrepancies in the First Information Report, and improbabilities concerning the time of the incident and visibility due to darkness and a sandstorm. The Supreme Court evaluated the evidence and concurred that the High Court's assessment was sound, noting that the acquittal was based on cogent grounds and was neither perverse nor arbitrary. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the acquittal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal that is based on cogent grounds and is neither perverse nor arbitrary?
  • Can the testimony of close relations of the deceased be relied upon without independent corroboration when found conflicting and improbable?
  • Does the presence of minor, self-suffered or uncorroborated injuries on an alleged injured witness create doubt regarding their presence at the crime scene?
  Read full judgment →
• KHUDA BAKHSH AND 4 Others vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERSs1971 P Cr. L J 388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-02-19
  Frontier Crimes Regulationconstructive liabilitySection 149 PPCSection 34 PPCJirgacriminal referencevalidity of conviction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment upholding convictions under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. The appellants were convicted for murder and attempted murder, with their liability established through Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question was whether the conviction was legally flawed because Section 149 was not explicitly included in the Second Schedule to the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, relying on established precedent. The Court held that Section 149, similar to Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, does not create a distinct substantive offence but merely prescribes a principle of constructive liability. Consequently, the omission of such constructive liability provisions from the schedule of referable offences does not invalidate a reference or a resulting conviction. The principle laid down is that where an offence is referable, the application of constructive liability provisions is permissible regardless of their specific inclusion in the schedule, as they do not constitute the offence itself.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 from the Second Schedule of the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 invalidate a conviction based on constructive liability?
  • Does Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 create a distinct offence or merely a principle of joint liability?
  • Can a conviction under the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 be sustained if the constructive liability provision used was not specifically enumerated in the Regulation's schedule?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja MUHAMMAD IQBAL BUTT vs MESSRS PAKISTAN SPORTS CO-1971 PLD Lahore 1 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-31Read full judgment →
• KHARAITEY AND 2 OTHERS vs BORDER ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-18
  Border Area Committeejudicial reviewallotment cancellationinheritance disputemutation1962 Constitutionevacuee property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition against the Border Area Committee's order, which had cancelled a portion of land allotted to the appellants (heirs of an original allottee, Pindu). The core legal questions were whether the High Court correctly held that the Committee's orders were immune from judicial review and whether the Committee possessed the jurisdiction to cancel the allotment and determine inheritance rights. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred on both counts. Regarding immunity, the Court clarified that only orders passed under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959, prior to the commencement of the 1962 Constitution (June 8, 1962) are immune from challenge; orders passed thereafter are subject to judicial review. Regarding jurisdiction, the Court held that the Committee lacks the authority to determine inheritance or modify mutations authenticated by competent Revenue Authorities. Paragraph 10(a) of the Regulation only empowers the Committee to cancel allotments made to ineligible persons, not to adjudicate succession disputes. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Are orders passed by the Border Area Committee under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959, after the commencement of the 1962 Constitution immune from judicial review?
  • Does the Border Area Committee have the jurisdiction to determine inheritance rights or modify mutations authenticated by Revenue Authorities?
  • Under what circumstances is the Border Area Committee empowered to cancel an allotment under Paragraph 10(a) of the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959?
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• KHANWADA vs THE STATE1971 PLD Peshawar 13 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-12-04Read full judgment →
• KHANI SHER vs SECRETARY POST WAR SERVICE RECONSTRUCTION FUND1971 PLD Peshawar 82 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-05-20Read full judgment →
• KHAN ZIA-UD-DIN KHAN vs I. G. P. WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND 3 OTHERS1971 P LC 47 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-10-19Read full judgment →
• Khan TARIQ ISMAIL KHAN AND Others vs HASSAN HABIB AND Other1971 SCMR 665 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-26
  limitationcondonation of delaybarred by timeSupreme Court vacationpetition for leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal which was filed five days beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The core legal question addressed by the court is whether the mistaken belief of the petitioners that the Supreme Court remained closed during vacation constitutes a sufficient ground for the condonation of delay under the limitation rules. The court held that the petition is barred by time, observing that the court remains open during vacations for the purpose of filing petitions and that a party's misconception regarding court vacations does not furnish sufficient cause for condoning delay. The key principle laid down is that ignorance or mistaken impression regarding the operational status of the court during vacations does not warrant the condonation of delay in filing proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does a mistaken impression that the Supreme Court remains closed during vacation constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
  • Does the Supreme Court remain open during vacation for the purpose of filing petitions?
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• Khan SHAUKAT ALI KHAN vs INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, PUNJAB1971 PLC 144 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-01-17Read full judgment →
• Khan RIAZ Ltaqat AND 10 Other vs PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB AND 4 OTHERS1971 PLC 152 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-04-30Read full judgment →
• Khan NABI AHMAD KHAN And 10 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 875 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-26Read full judgment →