Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Bashir Ahmed alias Mannu vs The State1996 SCMR 308 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-31
  criminal appealocular evidenceinterested witnessbenefit of doubtmedical evidencerecovery of weaponQanun-e-Shahadat Orderappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellant for the murder of the deceased under Section 302/34 PPC. The prosecution’s case rested on the ocular testimony of the deceased’s son and daughter-in-law, and the recovery of a blood-stained Chhuri. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of interested witnesses, the validity of recovery evidence after a significant delay, and the impact of medical evidence contradicting the ocular account. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It ruled that the ocular testimony, lacking independent corroboration, was insufficient, especially given the adverse inference drawn from the non-production of natural witnesses. Furthermore, the court found the recovery of the weapon after five days unnatural and unreliable. Crucially, the court established that witness credibility is not divisible; if testimony is discarded for an acquitted co-accused, it cannot be relied upon to convict the appellant. Additionally, the medical evidence suggesting a heavy weapon like a hatchet contradicted the prosecution’s claim of a Chhuri, entitling the appellant to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of interested witnesses be relied upon for conviction without strong independent corroboration?
  • Is the credibility of a witness divisible, allowing a court to rely on it for one accused while discarding it for another in the same incident?
  • Does the recovery of a weapon after a significant delay, such as five days, constitute reliable evidence in a criminal trial?
  • What is the legal effect when medical evidence contradicts the ocular account regarding the weapon used in a murder?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Muhammad Arshad and others1996 SCMR 474 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-16
  leave to appeallimitation periodcondonation of delayocular evidencecommutation of sentencecriminal revisionconviction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a consolidated judgment of the Lahore High Court, which maintained a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 but commuted a death sentence to life imprisonment, while also dismissing a criminal revision petition regarding the acquittal of co-accused persons. The core legal questions were whether the conviction and sentence modification were justified based on the evidence, and whether the petition filed by the complainant was maintainable given the significant delay in filing. The Supreme Court held that the ocular evidence was consistent and reliable, and there was no reason to interfere with the High Court's lenient view regarding the sentence. Regarding the complainant's petition, the Court found it barred by a 48-day delay without a satisfactory explanation for condonation. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with a High Court's assessment of evidence where ocular testimony is consistent and credible, and that petitions for leave to appeal must be filed within the prescribed limitation period absent sufficient cause for delay.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court's judgment where ocular evidence is found to be consistent and credible?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be entertained by the Supreme Court if it is filed beyond the limitation period without a satisfactory explanation for the delay?
  • Is the alteration of a death sentence to life imprisonment by the High Court a valid exercise of discretion when the evidence supports the conviction?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Abdul Razzaq and others1996 SCMR 536 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-18
  Canal and Drainage Actirrigation watercourserestoration of khalDivisional Canal Officersanctioning of new khalConstitutional jurisdictionstatutory compliance
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by leave arose out of a Constitutional petition filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 before the High Court, alleging the demolition of an existing watercourse (khal) and seeking directions for the Canal Authorities to decide their restoration application under Section 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act. The Canal Authorities maintained that a khal already existed, that the respondents sought a new khal passing through the appellant's lands, and that such relief could only proceed under Sections 20 to 23 of the Act. Without adjudicating the competency of the proceedings, the High Court directed the Divisional Canal Officer to supply water to the respondents from a new source within ten days. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that disputes concerning the supply or apportionment of water must be decided exclusively by Canal Authorities strictly under the relevant provisions of the Canal and Drainage Act, and the High Court cannot issue directions that bypass or violate statutory procedures.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction direct Canal Authorities to supply irrigation water in a manner that bypasses or violates statutory procedures under the Canal and Drainage Act?
  • Whether an application for sanctioning a new watercourse (khal) across another person's land can be entertained under Section 68-A instead of Sections 20 to 23 of the Canal and Drainage Act?
  • Must disputes regarding the supply and apportionment of canal water be resolved strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Canal and Drainage Act?
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• Barrister Ch. Muhammad Abdus Saleem and 4 others vs Mst. Tanveer1996 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-07
  evidence in rebuttalburden of proofspecific performancelimitationcivil procedurewitness examination
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld the lower courts' refusal to delete the second statement of a witness examined in rebuttal. The respondent had filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, which was resisted on the ground of limitation, with the burden of proof on that issue placed upon the petitioners. The core legal question was whether a witness who had already deposed during affirmative evidence could be re-examined in rebuttal on an issue where the onus of proof lay upon the opposing party. The Supreme Court held that where the burden of proving an issue lies on the opposing party and the plaintiff has reserved the right to lead evidence in rebuttal, the plaintiff is legally entitled to examine a witness in rebuttal, even if that witness previously gave evidence during the affirmative case. The Court laid down the principle that a party reserving its right under Order XVIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 may produce evidence in rebuttal after the opposing party discharges its burden on specific issues.

  Questions settled

  • Can a witness who has already given evidence in affirmation be subsequently examined in rebuttal on an issue where the burden of proof lies on the opposing party?
  • Whether a party reserving its right to produce evidence in rebuttal can examine the same witness twice under Order XVIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does a party failing to object to the framing of issues or the recording of evidence forfeit its right to challenge the procedure subsequently?
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• Barkat Ali vs The State1996 SCMR 1656 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-29
  post-arrest bailblasphemyprohibitory clauseabsconsion riskleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 5-1-1994, which declined post-arrest bail in a case registered under section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code. The High Court had refused bail on the grounds that the offense fell within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner was reasonably linked to the offense, there was a risk of absconding given that the petitioner was an Afghan refugee, and there were potential security risks upon release. The Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the discretionary order passed by the High Court and found no legal infirmity in the reasons provided for rejecting the bail plea. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal while directing the trial court to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an offense under section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code falls within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
  • Can the risk of abscondon of an Afghan refugee constitute a valid ground for refusing post-arrest bail?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a discretionary order of the High Court declining bail when no legal infirmity is shown?
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• Balochistan Development Authority (Bda) and another vs Babar Raza1996 SCMR 1243 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-11
  service lawback benefitsdepartmental inquirymisconductreinstatementprocedural irregularity
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellants, Balochistan Development Authority, challenged a High Court order that reinstated the respondent, a former employee, with full back benefits after his initial termination for misconduct was found procedurally flawed. The core legal question was whether the High Court, while setting aside a termination order due to non-compliance with the Baluchistan Development Authority (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1987, was correct in mandating full back benefits when it simultaneously permitted the employer to initiate a fresh departmental inquiry. The Supreme Court held that while the initial termination was rightly set aside for procedural irregularities, the automatic grant of back benefits was unjustified where the employer was granted liberty to conduct a fresh inquiry. The Court ruled that the entitlement to back benefits must be contingent upon the outcome of such a fresh departmental inquiry. Consequently, the Court modified the High Court's order, directing that the payment of back benefits should depend on the result of the fresh inquiry, rather than being awarded unconditionally upon reinstatement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether back benefits can be awarded automatically upon reinstatement when the employer is granted liberty to conduct a fresh departmental inquiry?
  • Does a procedural defect in a departmental inquiry automatically entitle an employee to full back benefits upon reinstatement?
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• Badar Din and anothers vs Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore1996 SCMR 534 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-17
  land resumptionauction defaultretrospective applicationconditional restorationadministrative memorandumleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a dispute over the resumption of land purchased by the petitioners in an open auction in 1961. The petitioners defaulted on payment, leading to the initial resumption of the land in 1967. Although the Commissioner conditionally set aside the resumption in 1971, the petitioners failed to clear the outstanding dues, resulting in subsequent rejections of their appeals and revision petitions by the Board of Revenue. The petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that a 1973 government memorandum regarding installment schedules should have protected them from the resumption. The core legal question was whether this 1973 memorandum could be applied retrospectively to validate the petitioners' default and resumption of land that occurred prior to its issuance. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the resumption was validly based on the petitioners' failure to comply with the 1971 conditional restoration order. The Court established the principle that administrative memoranda cannot be applied retrospectively to cases where legal action for resumption had already been finalized and acted upon.

  Questions settled

  • Can an administrative memorandum be applied retrospectively to invalidate a land resumption action that was already finalized?
  • Does a failure to comply with a conditional order for restoration of land justify the maintenance of a prior resumption order?
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• B.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd., Karachi vs Wealth Tax Officer and another1996 SCMR 1470 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1989-01-19
  wealth taxfiscal statutestatutory interpretationretrospective effecttypographical errorgazette notificationassets definitionconstitutional petitiontax liabilitybusiness of letting out
  Summary & questions settled

  The Supreme Court heard four appeals challenging the Sindh High Court's dismissal of constitutional petitions against wealth tax notices. The core legal questions concerned the retrospective application of Ordinance II of 1980, which amended the Wealth Tax Act, 1963, given a printing error in its gazette notification, and the interpretation of the term "assets" under the amended Section 2(e)(ii) of the Act. The Court held that an Ordinance's validity stems from the President's promulgation, not the printer's publication, and a typographical error in the Gazette could be corrected by corrigendum. Crucially, the Court ruled that fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly, and any ambiguity resolved in favor of the assessee. It was held that the definition of "assets" for wealth tax purposes, concerning immovable property, applied only to properties held for the *purpose of business of construction and sale or of letting out*, not merely occasional letting. Consequently, the appeals were accepted, and the wealth tax notices and assessments were declared without lawful authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a typographical error in the official Gazette regarding the effective date of an Ordinance be corrected by a corrigendum without re-authentication by the President?
  • How should a fiscal statute that imposes a pecuniary burden on citizens be interpreted when its language is ambiguous?
  • Does the definition of "assets" under Section 2(e)(ii) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1963, as amended by Ordinance II of 1980, apply to immovable property occasionally let out, or only to property held for the purpose of a business of construction and sale or letting out?
  • Are wealth tax notices and assessments valid if based on an interpretation of a fiscal statute that is ambiguous and not resolved in favor of the assessee?
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• Azizulhaque vs Muhammad Aslam and others1996 PLD Supreme Court 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-04
  pre-emptionTalb-i-Ishhadpostal facilitiesregistered noticeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two pre-emption suits filed by the petitioner, which were dismissed by the trial court, the appellate court, and the Lahore High Court on revision, on the ground that the petitioner failed to make Talb-i-Ishhad by sending registered notices by post to the respondents. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could validly make Talb-i-Ishhad orally in the presence of two truthful witnesses under Section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, on the pretext that no post office existed in the village. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a Branch Post Office had been functioning in the relevant Chak since 1927, meaning postal facilities were available at the time of the sales in 1989. Consequently, the alternative method of oral Talb-i-Ishhad in the presence of witnesses was not available to the petitioner. The Court reaffirmed that making the prescribed Talbs is a sine qua non for successfully pre-empting a sale, and dismissed the petitions for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emptor can make an oral Talb-i-Ishhad in the presence of two truthful witnesses when postal facilities for sending a registered notice are available in the area?
  • Is the performance of prescribed Talbs a mandatory requirement (sine qua non) for successfully pre-empting a sale under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991?
  • How does the availability of a local branch post office affect the mode of making Talb-i-Ishhad under Section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991?
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• Azim Khan and others vs The State1996 SCMR 1569 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-22
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationcross-caseabscondenceparity in bailmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-appeals arising from two separate First Information Reports (F.I.Rs) involving allegations of murder and physical assault. The appellants, Azim Khan and Nazim Khan, sought bail in a murder case, while the complainant, Dolat Khan, sought the cancellation of bail previously granted to the respondents in a separate assault case. The core legal question was whether the two incidents constituted a 'cross-case' scenario, thereby entitling the accused in the murder case to bail on the principle of parity, and whether the accused in the murder case were entitled to bail despite allegations of abscondence and specific eyewitness accounts. The Supreme Court held that the incidents were not cross-cases, as they occurred at different spots and involved distinct circumstances. The Court affirmed the refusal of bail to the murder accused, noting their abscondence and the strength of the prosecution's case, and upheld the refusal to cancel the bail of the respondents in the assault case, finding no grounds for interference. The judgment reinforces that bail parity is not automatic in the absence of a genuine cross-case relationship.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere existence of two F.I.Rs involving opposing parties automatically constitute a cross-case entitling the accused to bail?
  • Can bail be granted to an accused who has remained an absconder after the occurrence?
  • Is the principle of parity applicable to bail applications where the underlying incidents are not cross-cases?
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• Aurangzeb Khan and 6 others vs Fakharuz Zaman Khan and 29 others1996 SCMR 489 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-14
  land acquisitioncompensationapportionmentshamilat dehleave to appealtarbela dam
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal concerning the compensation and apportionment of improvements over acquired land comprised in Khasra Nos. 202 and 205 of village Kundriala, Tehsil Haripur, acquired for the Tarbela Dam project. The Land Acquisition Judge initially held that respondents were entitled to compensation according to their respective shares in Shamilat Deh. Upon appeal, the Peshawar High Court disposed of the regular first appeal by recording a compromise or adjusted award of Rs. 30,000 in favor of the respondents. The core legal questions involve whether the High Court acted arbitrarily in awarding the compensation and whether the private respondents were estopped by delay and an earlier final decree from claiming compensation. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine these contentions, holding that the matter warrants detailed examination, and ordered that status quo be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court acted arbitrarily and contrary to sound judicial principles in awarding compensation?
  • Whether respondents were estopped by their conduct and delay from claiming compensation?
  • Whether an earlier final decree passed by the Additional District Judge regarding re-classification and improvement remained unquestionable in law?
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• Attock Oil Co. Ltd. vs Dr. Ghaith R. Pharaon and others1996 SCMR 1803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-22
  compromisetransfer of suitscivil appealsconsolidation of suitssettlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves six appeals arising from disputes between Attock Oil Co. Ltd. and Dr. Ghaith R. Pharaon and others. The core legal question pertained to the resolution and management of multiple pending suits and related interim orders between the litigating parties. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the six appeals based on a compromise reached between the parties. The Court held that the subject suits shall be transferred to and decided by the District Judge, Islamabad, within a timeframe of six months, with the question of consolidation to be determined by the same judge, and directed the parties to appear before him on a specified date. Additionally, a related constitutional petition was scheduled for a future hearing by mutual consent. The key principle laid down is that appellate proceedings may be disposed of in terms of a lawful compromise between parties, facilitating the expeditious transfer and trial of related civil suits.

  Questions settled

  • Can pending appeals be disposed of on the basis of a compromise reached between the parties?
  • Whether the Supreme Court can order the transfer of suits to a District Judge for trial within a specified timeframe?
  • Who is empowered to decide the question of consolidation of transferred suits under a compromise order?
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• Atta Ullah and 5 others vs State through Custodian, Lahore and 11 others1996 PLD Supreme Court 234 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-16
  evacuee propertyCustodian of Evacuee Propertyrehabilitation allotmentmortgagee possessionconfirmation of salejurisdiction of civil court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over land ownership and its classification as evacuee property. The petitioners, claiming ownership through a 1946 sale deed and prior mortgage, challenged the allotment of the land to respondents by the Rehabilitation Department. The core legal question was whether the land, purchased from non-Muslim evacuees after March 1, 1947, constituted evacuee property under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957, absent confirmation by the Custodian. The trial court and appellate court had previously dismissed the petitioners' suit for lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of such confirmation. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that because the sale occurred after March 1, 1947, and lacked Custodian confirmation, the property fell within the statutory definition of evacuee property. The Court affirmed that the petitioners' possession as mortgagees did not alter the property's status or ownership character. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused, establishing that transfers of evacuee property post-March 1, 1947, require mandatory Custodian confirmation to be valid.

  Questions settled

  • Does a sale of land by a non-Muslim evacuee after March 1, 1947, require confirmation by the Custodian to avoid being classified as evacuee property?
  • Does the existence of a mortgage in favor of a purchaser alter the status of land as evacuee property under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act 1957?
  • Is the jurisdiction of a civil court ousted in matters concerning the confirmation of sales of evacuee property?
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• Atta Muhammad represented by Legal Heirs and others vs Matloob Alam1996 SCMR 601 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-29
  pre-emptioncross-examinationcontradiction of witnessnatural justiceconfronting witnessQanun-e-Shahadatadmissibility of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal arising from pre-emption suits, where the central dispute involved whether a transaction was an exchange or a sale. The petitioners sought to rely on a previous statement made by the respondent in a separate suit to contradict his testimony in the current proceedings. The core legal question was whether a party's prior statement can be used as evidence to contradict them without having confronted the witness with that statement during cross-examination. The Supreme Court held that, in accordance with Article 140 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and established precedent, a previous statement cannot be used to contradict a witness unless the witness is confronted with it while in the witness box, allowing them an opportunity to explain. The Court affirmed that failing to provide such an opportunity violates principles of natural justice. Consequently, the Court upheld the lower appellate court's decision to exclude the statement from consideration and dismissed the petitions, noting that the nature of the transaction was a concurrent finding of fact.

  Questions settled

  • Can a previous statement of a witness be used to contradict them without confronting them with that statement during cross-examination?
  • Is it a requirement of natural justice to allow a witness to explain a prior statement before an adverse inference is drawn?
  • Does the failure to confront a witness with their previous statement render that statement inadmissible as evidence against them?
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• Aslam vs The State1996 SCMR 1122 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-07
  leave to appealinterested witnessescriminal justice administrationmurder convictioncorroborationdeath sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the conviction and death sentence of the petitioner, Muhammad Aslam, for murder. The prosecution case, initiated by the father of the deceased, alleged that the petitioner killed the deceased by stabbing him, purportedly due to a dispute over a broken marriage engagement arrangement known as 'Warta Satta'. The trial court and the High Court relied heavily on the testimony of two prosecution witnesses—the father and brother of the deceased—and the recovery of a weapon at the instance of the accused. The core legal question before the Supreme Court is whether the High Court erred in sustaining the conviction based solely on the testimony of interested witnesses without independent corroboration, particularly given the existence of enmity and the timing of the incident. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the principles of criminal justice administration regarding the reliability of interested witnesses were correctly applied in the circumstances of this case.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of interested witnesses without independent corroboration?
  • Does the existence of enmity between the accused and the deceased's family necessitate independent corroboration of eyewitness testimony?
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• Ashf Aq Ahmad Malik vs Military Accountant-General, Government1996 PLC (C.S.) 666 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-05
  leave to appealremoval from serviceunauthorized absencedisciplinary proceedingsshow-cause noticemisconductproportionality of penalty
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed against the order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his removal from service. The petitioner, an Accountant under the Controller of Military Accounts, was removed from service following disciplinary proceedings initiated due to his unauthorized absence for approximately three years. The petitioner contended that the removal order was passed without a show-cause notice and that the penalty was disproportionately harsh given his twenty-two years of unblemished service. The Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that multiple attempts were made to serve the petitioner, including notices sent via registered post and publications in daily newspapers, which the petitioner failed to answer. The Court held that the petitioner was rightly found guilty of misconduct due to his prolonged unauthorized absence. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the choice of penalty falls within the discretion of the competent authority and the Service Tribunal's decision not to alter the penalty did not constitute an illegality. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can challenge a removal order on the ground of lack of notice when show-cause notices were sent via registered post and published in daily newspapers but ignored?
  • Does a prolonged unauthorized absence from duty for three years constitute sufficient grounds for misconduct and removal from service?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere with a penalty of removal from service if the Service Tribunal declines to convert it into compulsory retirement?
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• Asfand Yar Khan vs Chief Commissioner, Islamabad Capital Territory, Islamabad and 3 others1996 SCMR 1421 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-05-12
  mining leasewrit jurisdictioncontractual obligationconstitutional petitionenvironmental protectionlease revocationMargalla Hills National Park
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order dismissing a writ petition against the revocation of a mining lease for limestone quarrying in the Islamabad Capital Territory. The petitioner argued that the lease termination was unlawful, asserting that the Mining Concession Rules, 1960, framed under the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act, 1948, held overriding effect over the Islamabad Wild Life (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979. The Supreme Court held that the lease was validly terminated under clause 15 of the lease agreement, which permitted termination if the leased area was not legally available for mining. Consequently, the Court found the petitioner's argument regarding the overriding effect of the Mining Concession Rules inapplicable. The Court further affirmed that disputes arising from the violation of contractual terms in a lease agreement are matters for civil courts to resolve through damages, rather than through the extraordinary constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party invoke the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to resolve disputes arising from the violation of a contractual lease agreement?
  • Does the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Government Control) Act 1948 override the provisions of the Islamabad Wild Life (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance 1979 in all circumstances?
  • Is the determination of whether a specific area falls within the territorial limits of a National Park a question of fact that precludes interference in writ jurisdiction?
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• Arshad vs The State and another1996 SCMR 1270 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-05-08
  post-arrest bailattempted murderprohibitory clauseQatl-i-Amdfirearm injuriessudden fightbail refusal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the refusal of bail by the Peshawar High Court in a case involving attempted murder (Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860). The complainant alleged that the petitioner fired a shotgun at him, causing multiple injuries to his shoulder and face. The petitioner argued that the incident was a sudden fight, the injuries were minor, and the offense fell outside the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Supreme Court examined the amended Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which mandates that if hurt is caused during an attempt to commit Qatl-i-Amd, the offender is liable for both the ten-year imprisonment for the attempt and the additional punishment for the specific hurt caused. The Court held that the nature of the injuries and the application of the amended statute brought the offense within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the petitioner was not entitled to bail.

  Questions settled

  • Does the amended Section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 bring an offense involving firearm injuries within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can an accused claim the benefit of a sudden fight to avoid the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, when the evidence indicates an attempt to commit Qatl-i-Amd?
  • Does the punishment for an attempt to commit Qatl-i-Amd under Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, include additional liability for the specific hurt caused?
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• Arshad Mehmood and anothers vs Sarfraz and others1996 SCMR 861 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-02-11
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmedical groundsold age bailcriminal leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal concerning the grant and refusal of bail in a criminal case registered under sections 302, 324, 148, 149, and 337-F (ii) of the Pakistan Penal Code at Police Station Dhudial, District Chakwal. The High Court granted bail to one accused, Sarfraz, on medical grounds, while refusing bail to another accused, Muhammad Feroze. The complainant challenged the grant of bail to Sarfraz, and Muhammad Feroze sought leave to appeal against the refusal of his bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to interfere with the High Court's order granting bail to Sarfraz, noting that the decision was supported by a medical certificate showing physical disability and was not based on extraneous circumstances. However, regarding Muhammad Feroze, the Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to consider the medical officer's report regarding his advanced age of seventy-five years, poor physique, and the lack of treatment facilities in jail. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the complainant's petition for bail cancellation, converted Muhammad Feroze's petition into an appeal, and granted him bail subject to furnishing surety.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail granted on medical grounds by the High Court warrants interference by the Supreme Court when supported by a medical certificate?
  • Does the advanced age and poor health of an accused person suffering from ailments inadequately treatable in jail constitute sufficient ground for the grant of bail?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court in bail matters absent extraneous circumstances?
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• Arshad Mahmood vs Sher Rasool and 14 others1996 SCMR 1292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-12
  specific performanceremand of casecourt-feepecuniary jurisdictionoral agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 24-11-1992, which set aside a trial court decree in a specific performance suit and remanded the matter for fresh decision regarding a specific portion of land. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the High Court's remand order, the calculation of court-fee on the memorandum of appeal, and the effect of pursuing an appeal before a forum with improper pecuniary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly remanded the case for adjudication on merits and correctly determined that court-fee was payable only in respect of the 34 kanals of land directly under challenge rather than the entire decretal amount. The key principle laid down is that where a portion of a decree is contested, court-fee is to be assessed on the value of that specific portion, and appellate courts may properly remand a matter for trial on merits when initial proceedings lacked adjudication.

  Questions settled

  • Whether court-fee on an appeal challenging a partial decree must be paid on the total consideration of the original suit or only on the value of the property specifically contested?
  • Can an appellate court remand a matter for trial on merits when the trial court failed to adjudicate the dispute upon merits?
  • Whether an appeal filed before a wrong forum affects the computation of limitation for subsequent proceedings before the competent forum?
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• Anwar Khattak vs The State1996 SCMR 1119 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-02-09
  leave to appealcustoms offencecompetency of appealre-appraisal of evidencebail pending appealsentence of fine
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments of conviction and sentence under the Customs Act, 1969, where the petitioners were sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment and a heavy fine. The core legal question concerns the competency of a petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan in proceedings arising out of section 185-F of the Customs Act, read with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held that the question of competence of the appeal requires fuller examination and authoritative pronouncement, and prima facie the evidence brought on record requires re-appraisal for safe administration of criminal justice. Accordingly, the Court granted leave to appeal and directed the release of the petitioners on bail subject to the deposit of a portion of the fine and furnishing requisite security, given that they had already undergone their substantive sentence. The key principle laid down is that where substantial questions regarding statutory appeal mechanisms and the re-appraisal of evidence arise in criminal convictions under special legislation, leave to appeal is warranted, and bail may be granted upon partial satisfaction of fine penalties if the substantive sentence is already served.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan is competent in proceedings arising out of section 185-F of the Customs Act, 1969?
  • Can a convict be released on bail pending appeal after serving the substantive sentence upon depositing a portion of the fine?
  • Does the evidence in a conviction under the Customs Act require re-appraisal by the Supreme Court to ensure safe administration of criminal justice?
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• Anwar Ali and others vs Manzoor Hussain and another1996 SCMR 1770 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-15
  civil procedurepleadingsspecific relieftransfer of property actadmission of factsdeclaratory suitburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a civil dispute concerning the ownership and possession of agricultural land. The respondents, legal heirs of a mortgagee, filed a suit for declaration and injunction against the appellants, who claimed ownership of the same property. The Trial Court initially dismissed the suit, citing the Transfer of Property Act and Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. However, the Additional District Judge reversed this, holding that the Transfer of Property Act was inapplicable in the Punjab province and that the suit was maintainable under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The Lahore High Court upheld this decision. The Supreme Court addressed whether the appellants could challenge the identity of the suit property when such a plea was absent from their written statement. The Court held that under Order VIII, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, allegations not specifically denied are deemed admitted. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the Transfer of Property Act does not apply to the Punjab and dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that parties are bound by their pleadings.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Transfer of Property Act applicable to the Province of Punjab?
  • What is the legal consequence under the Code of Civil Procedure when a defendant fails to specifically deny an allegation of fact in the plaint?
  • Can a party challenge the identity of the suit property on appeal if such a plea was not raised in the written statement?
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• Anwar Ahmad Khan vs The State and another1996 SCMR 24 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-18
  custodial deathpolice tortureconstitutional petitionpolice investigationjudicial inquirysuo motu actionbailfundamental rights
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against High Court orders passed in a constitution petition initiated upon a letter complaining of custodial torture and death of the petitioner's son by police officials. The core legal question was whether the High Court, under its constitutional jurisdiction, could monitor, interfere with, or direct the course of police investigation and inquire into the conduct of investigating agencies and police officers during pending criminal proceedings. The majority of the Supreme Court held that while the High Court could examine the legality of proceedings and ensure fairness where investigations are mala fide, it cannot supervise or control ongoing police investigations. The court ultimately refused leave to appeal by majority, dismissing the petition, while a dissenting note favored granting leave.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court has the power under Article 199 of the Constitution to supervise or control police investigation?
  • Can the High Court interfere with the statutory right of the police to investigate a cognizable offence?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court examine the validity of criminal proceedings in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is an investigating officer's opinion binding on a court of law during criminal inquiries?
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• Ansar Ahmed vs The State1996 SCMR 1080 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-22
  leave to appealrecovery of weaponexclusive possessionprocedural complianceArms Ordinanceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which had upheld his conviction under the Arms Ordinance for the possession of a Kalashnikov, while slightly reducing his sentence and fine. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the conviction on two primary grounds: first, that the prosecution failed to establish that the weapon was recovered from a place within the petitioner's exclusive possession; and second, that the mandatory provisions of Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 were not complied with during the recovery process. The Supreme Court found that these contentions raised substantial legal questions regarding the appreciation of evidence and procedural compliance in recovery cases. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower courts erred in their assessment of the prosecution's evidence and the procedural requirements for recovery under the law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to comply with Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 vitiate a recovery of a weapon?
  • Must the prosecution prove exclusive possession of the premises where a weapon is recovered to sustain a conviction under the Arms Ordinance?
  Read full judgment →
• Anjum Shafi vs Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan and 3 others1996 SCMR 1782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  service appeallimitation perioddate of knowledgedepartmental appealFederal Service Tribunalseniority
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court challenges the order of the Federal Service Tribunal which dismissed the appellant's service appeal as barred by time. The core legal question concerns the computation of the period of limitation for filing a departmental appeal and a service tribunal appeal when the notification adversely affecting the appellant's seniority was not published and came to his knowledge later during judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period must be computed from the date of knowledge of the notification. The Court established the principle that where an official notification is not published and bears potential interpolations affecting seniority, time for filing a departmental appeal runs from the date the aggrieved party acquires actual knowledge of the said notification, rendering subsequent appeals before the tribunal within time if filed within the statutory period thereafter.

  Questions settled

  • From what date should limitation be computed for filing a departmental appeal against an unpublished notification?
  • Whether an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal is barred by time when the departmental appeal is filed within time from the date of knowledge of the impugned notification?
  • Does the absence of a formal reply to a departmental appeal within the statutory period entitle the aggrieved civil servant to approach the Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Anjum Hayat Mirza vs Rehmat Khan1996 SCMR 1230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-10-14
  evictiondefault in payment of rentrent receiptsburden of proofservice of noticepresumption of delivery
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal with leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which allowed the landlord's appeal and granted eviction of the tenant on the ground of default in the payment of rent, reversing the dismissal order of the Trial Court. The core legal question concerns whether the tenant successfully proved regular payment of rent or discharged the burden of establishing no default for the disputed period of seventeen months. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly applied the presumption of service under the Evidence Act regarding the statutory notice, and that the tenant's oral evidence and interpolated rent receipts failed to substantiate regular payment or explain the admitted default. Upholding the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal while granting the tenant four months to vacate the premises upon payment of rent. The key principle laid down is that a tenant alleging regular payment of rent despite the non-issuance of receipts must provide cogent and reliable evidence to rebut a proved period of default, and cannot rely on suspicious or inadequately explained documents.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can successfully disprove a claim of rent default without reliable evidence and explanation for interpolated receipts?
  • Does a presumption of delivery arise under the law when a notice is sent by registered post to the tenant's address?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Trial Court's finding on default in the absence of a legal infirmity?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Nawab vs Regional Manager, Agricultural Development Ban1k of Pakistan, Mardan and 4 others1996 SCMR 1425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-05-21
  lachesconstitutional petitiondisciplinary proceedingsdelay in filingwrit jurisdictionservice matter
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petitions challenging disciplinary penalties imposed by the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. The petitioner, an employee of the bank, was penalized with a reduction in pay scale following inquiries into allegations of gross negligence, inefficiency, and embezzlement. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly dismissed the constitutional petitions on the grounds of laches, given the four-year delay in filing. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to provide plausible or satisfactory explanations for the inordinate delay. The Court rejected the petitioner's arguments that departmental promises or the lack of a specific limitation period in constitutional jurisdiction justified the delay, characterizing the excuses as afterthoughts. The Court affirmed the dismissal, emphasizing that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to excuse unexplained, inordinate delay, especially when the petitioner's conduct is questionable. The principle laid down is that a petitioner seeking constitutional relief must provide reasonable and satisfactory grounds to explain any significant delay, and mere assertions of a continuing cause of action or departmental promises do not automatically condone laches.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court after an inordinate delay of four years without providing satisfactory grounds for such delay?
  • Does the absence of a specific period of limitation for filing constitutional petitions automatically entitle a petitioner to condonation of laches?
  • Are departmental promises of relief sufficient grounds to condone a significant delay in filing a constitutional petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Amir Ali vs The State1996 SCMR 999 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-11
  murderprivate defensefree fightcriminal appealvicarious liabilityleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and life sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of the deceased. The incident arose from a dispute over landed property, leading to a violent confrontation between two parties. The petitioner claimed he acted in the exercise of the right of private defense of person and property, asserting that the fatal shot was fired accidentally while attempting to frighten assailants. The trial court, however, characterized the incident as a free fight occurring without premeditation, rejecting the plea of self-defense and holding the petitioner individually liable for the fatal shot. The Supreme Court reviewed the findings of the lower courts, noting that the trial court had already acquitted the co-accused based on the evidence. Finding no error in the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the nature of the occurrence as a free fight and the petitioner's culpability, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Does a plea of private defense hold in a situation characterized as a free fight?
  • Can an accused be held individually liable for a fatal act in a free fight where co-accused are acquitted?
  • Is a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 sustainable when the occurrence is found to be a sudden, unpremeditated fight?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah vs District Judge, Gujranwala and 2 others1996 SCMR 411 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-31
  Khuladissolution of marriagerestitution of conjugal rightsfamily lawmarital discordwife's right to divorce
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dissolved a marriage on the ground of Khula'. The parties had a history of marital discord, with the wife previously seeking refuge in Darul Aman and alleging physical abuse by the husband. While the Family Court and the District Judge had initially dismissed the wife's suit for dissolution and decreed the husband's suit for restitution of conjugal rights, the High Court reversed this decision, granting the dissolution based on Khula'. The Supreme Court examined the District Judge's rejection of the Khula' plea, which had erroneously required 'objective proof' of the parties' inability to live within the limits prescribed by God. The Supreme Court held that given the intimate nature of the marital relationship and the difficulty of proving private grievances, a wife's assertion of hatred toward her husband cannot be summarily rejected. The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the wife's subjective assertion of hatred is sufficient for Khula' when the circumstances indicate an irreparable breakdown of the marriage. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can a wife's assertion of hatred towards her husband be rejected summarily in a suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khula'?
  • Is objective proof required to establish the grounds for Khula' in a dissolution of marriage suit?
  • Does the intimate nature of the marital relationship preclude a requirement for objective evidence when a wife claims hatred for her husband?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanullah Khan vs Chief Secretary, Government of N.-W.F.P. and 21996 PLC (C.S.) 81 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-24
  departmental inquiryInquiry Officersubstitution of Inquiry Officercasus omissusstatutory interpretationleave to appealwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a departmental inquiry initiated under the N.-W.F.P. Local Councils Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1980 against a municipal employee regarding missing funds. During the proceedings, the original Inquiry Officer was transferred in routine course and replaced by a new Inquiry Officer. The petitioner challenged this substitution via a writ petition, alleging it was unauthorized and mala fide, but the High Court dismissed the petition in limine. The petitioner contended before the Supreme Court that in the absence of an explicit rule permitting the substitution of an Inquiry Officer, such substitution must be deemed legally prohibited. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, relying on the doctrine of casus omissus and established principles of statutory interpretation. The Court held that courts cannot supply missing words or read prohibitions into a statute or rules unless compelling legislative intent exists. Finding no intention to prohibit substitution upon routine transfer, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court read a prohibition into statutory rules under the doctrine of casus omissus when the rules are silent on a specific procedure?
  • Is the substitution of an Inquiry Officer following a routine transfer impermissible in the absence of an explicit provision allowing it?
  • Does the silence of statutory service rules regarding the substitution of an Inquiry Officer prohibit such substitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Amanat Khan and 2 others vs Federal Land Commission, Government of Pakistan, and 5 others1996 SCMR 1878 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-12-10
  land reformsallotment of landMartial Law Regulation 115cultivating possessionKhasra Girdawariwrit jurisdictionresumed land
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenges a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a writ petition against an order of the Member, Federal Land Commission. The core legal question concerns the validity of the allotment of resumed land under Martial Law Regulation 115, specifically whether the appellants were entitled to the land based on their alleged cultivating possession versus the respondents, to whom the land was allotted. The appellants contended that they were in actual physical possession during the relevant period and that the Land Commission misread the Khasra Girdawaris. The Supreme Court held that the findings of the Land Commission regarding the possession of the respondents were based on a proper appraisal of both oral and documentary evidence, as well as a spot inspection. Consequently, the Court found no illegality in the High Court's refusal to interfere with these factual findings in its constitutional jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed, affirming that factual determinations by competent land authorities, supported by evidence and spot inspections, are generally not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with factual findings regarding land possession made by the Federal Land Commission in its constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Is an allotment of resumed land under Martial Law Regulation 115 valid when based on findings of actual physical possession supported by spot inspection and revenue records?
  Read full judgment →
• Alpha Insurance Company Ltd., Karachi and others vs United Insurance1996 SCMR 1668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-27
  self-incriminationtestimonial compulsionconstitutional protectioncorporationsproduction of documentscriminal investigationinsurance companies
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether an inquiry into the affairs of insurance companies could be undertaken without a formal First Information Report (FIR), and whether notices requiring them to produce company records violated Article 13(b) and Article 14(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Supreme Court examined the scope of protection against self-incrimination under Article 13(b) and the applicability of Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 does not exclude an accused from its purview, as an accused may voluntarily produce non-incriminating material or claim the privilege against self-incrimination regarding incriminating material. Furthermore, the Court held that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination under Article 13(b) is restricted solely to natural persons (human beings) and cannot be availed of by incorporated entities or companies. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does the protection against self-incrimination under Article 13(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan apply to incorporated entities and companies?
  • Can an accused person be ordered under Section 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to produce documents during a criminal investigation?
  • Whether the guarantee of protection against self-incrimination can be claimed by a corporate body as a 'person' under the Constitution?
  Read full judgment →
• Allied Bank of Pakitstan Limited vs Shabbir Ahmad1996 P.C.T.L.R. 364 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-04
  banking courtleave to appealreview applicationexecution of decreepowers of civil courtinterlocutory order
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court upholding the dismissal of a review application by the Special Judge, Banking Court, Lahore. The petitioner bank had filed a recovery suit against the respondent, which was decreed. During execution proceedings, disputes arose regarding the sale of pledged golden ornaments and insurance policies, leading to an ex parte order appointing a local commissioner. The petitioner's review application against this order was dismissed as time-barred, and a subsequent appeal to the High Court was dismissed on the ground that the Special Judge lacked jurisdiction to review its order. The core legal question concerns whether a Special Judge, possessing the powers of a Civil Court under section 6 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, can entertain and decide a review application against an interim order passed during execution proceedings. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to thoroughly examine this question and determine whether the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure extend to review in such proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Special Judge under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 has the power to review an interim order passed during execution proceedings?
  • Does clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 confer the power of review upon a Special Court?
  • Is an appeal competent against an interlocutory order that does not dispose of the entire case before a Special Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Yar and others vs Ghulam Jeelani and others1996 SCMR 662 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-06
  pre-emptionsuperior pre-emptive rightdivisible sale transactionprocedural irregularityoral evidence of ownershipacquiescencerebuttal evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' appeal against a trial court decree in favour of the respondents for possession through pre-emption of agricultural land. The core legal questions involved whether procedural irregularities regarding the timing of affirmative and rebuttal evidence vitiate a decree, whether ownership in an estate must be proved strictly by documentary evidence or can be established orally, and whether a sale transaction in favour of multiple vendees is divisible. The Supreme Court held that procedural irregularities acquiesced to without prejudice do not vitiate a decree under section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, that ownership can be established through oral evidence without an invariable rule requiring documentary proof, and that a sale transaction where the price is paid in a lump sum is indivisible. The Court laid down the principle that failure to object to evidence procedures at trial constitutes waiver, oral evidence suffices to prove estate ownership if unrefuted, and indivisibility of a pre-empted sale tainted by stranger vendees defeats the entire joint purchase.

  Questions settled

  • Does a procedural irregularity regarding the order of producing affirmative and rebuttal evidence vitiate a decree in the absence of prejudice and when the objecting party acquiesced?
  • Can ownership of land in an estate be established through oral evidence without the production of documentary revenue records?
  • What constitutes a divisible sale transaction for the purpose of a pre-emption suit where multiple vendees acquire property under a single sale deed?
  • Does joining a stranger vendee in an indivisible sale transaction defeat the superior pre-emption rights of co-vendees who are otherwise owners or tenants?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Rakha vs Mukhtar Ahmad Baig (deceased) through Legal Heirs1996 SCMR 1501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-18
  mortgage deedagreement to sellprovisional transfer orderpermanent transfer deedsale transactionredemption of mortgageintent of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which reversed the findings of the Additional District Judge and set aside his judgment. The core legal question revolves around whether the simultaneous execution of a mortgage deed and an agreement to sell in respect of property for which only a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) had been issued constituted a mortgage or a completed transaction of sale. The Supreme Court held that the contemporaneous execution of the mortgage deed served merely as collateral security for the sale transaction, and since full consideration was paid, possession delivered, and subsequent acts such as obtaining the Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) and reconstruction performed, the transaction was effectively a sale rather than a mortgage. The Court laid down the principle that where contemporaneous documents like a mortgage deed and an agreement to sell are executed, the true intention of the parties must be gathered by reading them together along with subsequent conduct, and the absence of a formal registered sale-deed due to pending official documentation does not negate an otherwise complete sale transaction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the contemporaneous execution of a mortgage deed and an agreement to sell indicates a transaction of sale or mortgage?
  • Can a mortgage deed executed alongside an agreement to sell be treated as collateral security for the sale?
  • Does the absence of a formal registered sale-deed render an otherwise complete sale transaction ineffective where full consideration and possession have passed?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Nawaz Sheikh vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and another1996 PLC 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-13
  constitutional petitionlachespremature retirementmaster and servantlabour disputemisreading of recordgrievance petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court is directed against an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's constitutional petition on the ground of laches, as it was filed after a lapse of thirteen months without any explanation tendered in the petition. The core legal question involved whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the constitutional petition on the ground of unexplained delay and whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal's finding regarding the premature retirement was sustainable. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the constitutional petition on the ground of laches was fully justified, as the explanation regarding an accident and obtaining certified copies was never pleaded before the High Court. Furthermore, upon examining the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed the view of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal that the appellant stood retired from service in accordance with his original application and that the documents relied upon by the appellant did not establish any valid extension of his retirement date. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a constitutional petition can be dismissed on the ground of laches when no explanation for the delay is provided in the petition filed before the High Court?
  • Can an employee unilaterally alter the date of voluntary retirement once an application for premature retirement has been submitted and acted upon?
  • Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Appellate Tribunal regarding the non-receipt of applications for extension of retirement can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta vs Additional District Judge, Chiniot and 3 others1996 SCMR 1779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-11
  evictionlandlord and tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantconcurrent findingsownership disputerevenue record
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Court arises from an eviction dispute concerning a house in Chiniot Town. The contesting respondents filed an eviction application before the Rent Controller alleging default in rent payment, damage to the property, and personal need. The appellant resisted, denying the relationship of landlord and tenant and claiming ownership of the house, asserting it was constructed on a graveyard site. The Rent Controller found in favor of the respondents and ordered eviction, a decision affirmed in appeal by the Additional District Judge and upheld by the High Court in a constitutional petition. The core legal question revolved around the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship and whether the appellant successfully established ownership through revenue records. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs, holding that the concurrent findings of fact regarding ownership and tenancy by the lower forums were based on proper appraisal of evidence and suffered from no legal infirmity, and reiterating that criminal courts cannot conclusively decide questions of civil title.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a criminal court's observation in a criminal case can conclusively decide a question of civil title?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact by rent tribunals regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant be interfered with under constitutional jurisdiction without showing grave illegality?
  • Does revenue record entries unsupported by linkage to the disputed property establish ownership?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta and anothers vs The State1996 SCMR 1651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-01-30
  murderocular evidencepresidential amnestydeath sentence commutationself-defencejail petitioncriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioners for murder and related offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the ocular evidence, supported by a prompt FIR and motive, was sufficient to sustain the convictions, and whether the petitioners were entitled to the benefit of a Presidential Amnesty Order. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, affirming that the prosecution successfully established guilt beyond reasonable doubt through credible eyewitness testimony and corroborating circumstances. The Court rejected the defense plea of self-defense as unreasonable. Regarding the sentence, the Court held that the petitioners were entitled to the benefit of the Presidential Amnesty Order dated 7-12-1988, as they were sentenced to death prior to the cutoff date. Consequently, the Court commuted the death sentences to imprisonment for life on each count, ordered the sentences to run concurrently, and granted the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, to the petitioners.

  Questions settled

  • Are convicts sentenced to death by a trial court before 6-12-1988 entitled to the benefit of the Presidential Amnesty Order dated 7-12-1988?
  • Can a conviction be sustained solely on the basis of an ocular account when the FIR is promptly lodged and the witnesses are credible?
  • Does the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to convicts whose death sentences are commuted to life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• Allah Ditta and 2 others vs The State1996 SCMR 985 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-07
  common intentionmurdercompromiseacquittalbailcriminal petitionappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal and petition arise from a murder and murderous assault case where the trial court convicted the accused persons under section 302/149 and section 307/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sentencing one to death and others to life imprisonment. Upon appeal, the High Court acquitted two co-accused, altered the death sentence to life imprisonment, and upheld the convictions of the remaining appellants under sections 302/34 and 307/34. During the proceedings before the Supreme Court, a compromise was accepted between two of the appellants and the legal heirs of the deceased, resulting in their acquittal. The core legal question regarding the remaining petitioner, Mushtaq Hussain, was whether his conviction for murder under section 302 read with section 34 was sustainable when he allegedly caused only an injury to an injured witness and made no direct attempt to injure the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner shared a common intention with the co-accused, as he arrived armed, participated in the attack, and injured a witness who tried to intervene. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the conviction of an accused under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 is sustainable when he caused injury only to an injured witness and not directly to the deceased?
  • Does a compromise between the legal heirs of the deceased and some of the appellants result in their acquittal in a murder case?
  • Whether the presence of injured eyewitnesses sufficiently supports the prosecution's case regarding common intention?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad vs The State and others1996 SCMR 501 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-30
  acquittalextra-judicial confessionmotiverecovery of weaponscriminal appealreappraisal of evidencemurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the High Court that acquitted two respondents of murder charges. The respondents were initially convicted by the trial court under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Muhammad Yar, based on allegations of illicit relations and motive. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in its reappraisal of the evidence, specifically regarding motive, recovery of weapons, and extra-judicial confession. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's acquittal, finding that the lower court had properly appraised the evidence. The High Court had correctly discarded the motive as unnatural, rejected the recovery of weapons from an open place as unreliable, and dismissed the extra-judicial confession because the witnesses failed to produce the accused before the police despite the alleged confession. The Supreme Court affirmed that the High Court's reasoning was sound and based on a proper perspective of the evidence, concluding that there was no merit in the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can an extra-judicial confession be discarded if the witnesses fail to produce the accused before the police after the alleged confession?
  • Is the recovery of crime weapons from an open place, not in the possession of the accused, sufficient to sustain a conviction?
  • Does evidence of motive that is deemed unnatural by the High Court warrant the rejection of that evidence in a criminal appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Muhammad and others vs Muhammad Shafi and ethers1996 PLD Supreme Court 292 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-14
  Suits Valuation ActPecuniary jurisdictionAppellate jurisdictionValuation of suitSpecific performancePrejudiceRemand of caseCivil Procedure Code
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a civil dispute over a land sale agreement, where the valuation of the suit was contested. The core legal question was whether an appellate court, upon determining that a suit was undervalued and thus exceeded its pecuniary jurisdiction, must return the appeal for presentation to a competent court, or whether it can proceed under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act provides a comprehensive procedure for handling jurisdictional objections based on valuation. The Court ruled that an appellate court should not be divested of jurisdiction merely because a suit was undervalued, provided no prejudice was caused to the merits of the case. The Court affirmed that a change in the forum of appeal does not, by itself, constitute prejudice under Section 11. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's order that had struck off specific issues and remanded the case, restoring the District Judge’s original order to proceed with the trial on all relevant issues.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appellate court lose jurisdiction over an appeal if it determines the suit was undervalued for pecuniary purposes?
  • What constitutes prejudice under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act regarding the disposal of a suit or appeal on its merits?
  • Can a change in the forum of appeal, resulting from a correction in suit valuation, be considered prejudice under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act?
  • Is an objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or under-valuation maintainable if it was not raised at the earliest opportunity?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Gohar vs The State1996 SCMR 1118 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-04
  leave to appealocular evidencemedical evidencefirearm injurymitigation of sentencecriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitions for leave to appeal were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan to challenge a criminal conviction. The core legal questions presented for consideration were whether a material conflict existed between the ocular account and the medical evidence regarding the distance from which the firearm was discharged, and whether prior insults directed at the victim constituted mitigating circumstances sufficient to warrant a reduction in the sentence. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these specific issues concerning the appreciation of evidence and the determination of the appropriate sentence. The Court did not finalize the merits of the appeal but established that arguable points of law and fact existed regarding evidentiary consistency and sentencing mitigation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conflict between ocular and medical evidence regarding the distance of a firearm shot warrants the grant of leave to appeal?
  • Whether preceding insults directed at a victim can be considered as a mitigating circumstance in the determination of a sentence?
  Read full judgment →
• Ali Gohar vs State1996 SCMR 549 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-25
  murdercommon intentionmedical evidenceocular evidencemitigating circumstancesgrave and sudden provocationcriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the judgment of the Lahore High Court maintaining the conviction and sentence of the appellants, Hukam Dad and Ali Gohar, for the murder of Ghulam Khan under section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions examined by the Supreme Court were whether there was a fatal conflict between the ocular and medical evidence regarding the distance from which the fatal shot was fired, and whether preceding insults offered to one of the appellants constituted a mitigating circumstance warranting a reduction in sentence. The Supreme Court held that the medical evidence corroborated the eyewitness testimony establishing that the shot was fired from close range, and that prior altercations involving fist and kick blows did not amount to grave and sudden provocation sufficient to mitigate a premeditated murder committed days later. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals, confirming the death sentence of Hukam Dad and the life imprisonment of Ali Gohar, thereby reaffirming the principles regarding the evaluation of medical versus ocular evidence and the strict thresholds for mitigating circumstances in capital cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence regarding the firing distance is sufficient to discredit eyewitness accounts?
  • Whether preceding insults and minor physical altercations occurring days prior to an incident constitute mitigating circumstances for reducing a death sentence?
  • Whether a co-accused whose firearm shot misses the target can be convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Alam Khan vs Swans Khan and 3 others1996 SCMR 1742 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-26
  appeal against acquittalbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidencecriminal jurisprudencemurder trialballistics report
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which acquitted the respondents of murder charges. The core legal question was whether the High Court's acquittal of the respondent, Swans Khan, was perverse, illogical, or unreasonable, thereby justifying interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning was sound and that the prosecution's case suffered from inherent weaknesses, including the failure to cite independent witnesses from the busy locality and the suspicious nature of the ballistics evidence, which cast doubt on the integrity of the investigation. The Court emphasized the settled principle that in an appeal against acquittal, the Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere unless the findings are perverse or wholly illogical. It reaffirmed that the benefit of every reasonable doubt must go to the accused and that the mere possibility of a different view of the evidence is insufficient to set aside an acquittal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal was maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal?
  • Is the mere existence of another possibility regarding the appreciation of evidence a sufficient ground for setting aside an acquittal?
  • Does the failure to cite independent witnesses from a busy locality in a criminal case weaken the prosecution's evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Akhtar Hussain vs Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and 31996 PLC 714 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-03
  workmanindustrial relationssupervisory statustermination of servicegrievance petitionlabour court jurisdictioncontract of employment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside an order of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal reinstating the petitioner. The petitioner, formerly a Junior Clerk promoted to Sales Officer, challenged the termination of his services, asserting he remained a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, despite his promotion, because he continued to perform ministerial tasks. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, holding a supervisory Sales Officer position at the time of termination, qualified as a workman entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was an officer with supervisory status and not a workman. The Court reasoned that performing occasional ministerial tasks, such as typing, to save time did not negate his official designation or supervisory responsibilities. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the termination was lawful, having been executed in accordance with the terms of his promotion, and dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the performance of occasional ministerial tasks by an employee holding a supervisory position alter their status to that of a 'workman' under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can an employee who has been promoted to a managerial or supervisory role claim the status of a workman based on their initial job description?
  • Is a termination of service lawful if it complies with the specific terms and conditions stipulated in the employee's promotion letter?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment1996 SCMR 1724 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-27
  service lawfederal service tribunalpersonal hearingremandamendment of appealdismissal from servicenatural justice
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of the petitioner, an Assistant In-charge at the Federal Service Tribunal, following allegations of accepting illegal gratification. After an initial inquiry and a remand for a fresh inquiry, the petitioner was dismissed from service. The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal. During the pendency of this appeal, the petitioner filed an application seeking to amend his Memorandum of Appeal to include additional grounds. The Federal Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal without first deciding or disposing of the petitioner's application for amendment. The petitioner challenged this dismissal before the Supreme Court, contending that he was denied a personal hearing after the remand and that the Tribunal erred by ignoring his pending application for amendment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the petitioner was entitled to a personal hearing after the remand, whether the failure to provide such a hearing denied him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, and whether the Tribunal was legally justified in deciding the appeal without disposing of the pending amendment application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee is entitled to a personal hearing by the Authorized Officer and the Authority after a case is remanded for a fresh inquiry?
  • Does the failure to provide a personal hearing after a remand constitute a denial of a reasonable opportunity to defend oneself?
  • Is the Federal Service Tribunal legally required to dispose of an application for the amendment of a Memorandum of Appeal before deciding the appeal on its merits?
  Read full judgment →
• Akbar Khan vs Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment1996 PLC (C.S.) 353 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-27
  leave to appealdismissal from servicepersonal hearingremandamendment of memorandum of appealdisciplinary proceedingsillegal gratification
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the dismissal of the petitioner, an Assistant Incharge in the Federal Service Tribunal, following disciplinary proceedings on charges of accepting illegal gratification. Initially remanded for a fresh enquiry by the Authority, the disciplinary process culminated in his dismissal from service. The petitioner appealed to the Federal Service Tribunal and subsequently filed an application to amend his memorandum of appeal to incorporate additional grounds. However, the Federal Service Tribunal dismissed his appeal without deciding his application for amendment. The petitioner contended that he was denied a reasonable opportunity of defense as no personal hearing was granted by the Authorised Officer or the Authority post-remand, and that the Tribunal erred in failing to rule on his amendment application. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider these core procedural questions regarding personal hearing after remand, defense rights, and the non-disposal of an amendment application.

  Questions settled

  • Whether after remand an employee is entitled to an opportunity of personal hearing by the Authorised Officer and the Authority?
  • Whether the failure to provide an opportunity of personal hearing post-remand denies reasonable opportunity to defend oneself?
  • Whether a service tribunal is legally justified in deciding an appeal without first disposing of an application for amendment of the memorandum of appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Sami and 2 others vs Saadia Ahmed and another1996 SCMR 268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-26
  custody of minorsSection 491 Cr.P.C.Guardians and Wards Actinterim custodyillegal detentionjurisdiction of High Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order passed under Section 491, Cr.P.C., which directed the restoration of two minor children to their mother (respondent No. 1) after they were allegedly illegally detained by their father (petitioner No. 1). The core legal question was whether the High Court possesses jurisdiction under Section 491, Cr.P.C. to order the custody of minors when proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act are already pending. The Supreme Court held that the High Court has jurisdiction to pass interim orders under Section 491, Cr.P.C. to restore a minor to the person who held lawful custody if that person was illegally deprived of it, notwithstanding the existence of parallel proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act. The Court affirmed that Section 491, Cr.P.C. and the Guardians and Wards Act operate in different spheres and do not exclude each other. The Court upheld the restoration of custody to the mother as an interim measure but clarified that the Guardian Court must decide the final custody merits independently.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction under Section 491, Cr.P.C. to order the restoration of a minor's custody while proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act are pending?
  • Can a court pass an interim order for the custody of a minor under Section 491, Cr.P.C. if the minor was illegally removed from the person who held lawful custody?
  • Do the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court to pass orders under Section 491, Cr.P.C. regarding the custody of minors?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Saeed vs The State and another1996 SCMR 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-17
  quashment of FIRinherent powers of High Courtcriminal breach of trustabuse of process of courtinvestigation stagecivil liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court whereby an F.I.R. registered under section 408, P.P.C. was quashed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. The core legal question was whether the High Court is competent to quash an F.I.R. under its inherent powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. before the submission of a police report or the commencement of proceedings in court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court erred in quashing the F.I.R., as no judicial proceedings were pending before any court at the time the quashment petition was filed, precluding any question of abuse of the process of any court. The key principle laid down is that the inherent powers of the High Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to quash an F.I.R. at the investigative stage where no proceedings are pending in any court, nor can an F.I.R. be quashed merely on grounds of mala fides or the existence of a civil liability prior to the completion of investigation and submission of a report.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court quash an F.I.R. under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. before the completion of investigation and submission of a report in court?
  • Does the inherent power under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. extend to preventing the abuse of the process of a police station during investigation?
  • Is an F.I.R. liable to be quashed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. solely on the ground that the dispute discloses a civil liability?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Jawad Sarwar vs Mst. Zenia1996 SCMR 1116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-10-18
  minor custodyhabeas corpusleave to appealinterim arrangementguardianship
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerning the custody of a minor. The core legal question is whether section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was rightly invoked to hand over custody of the minor to the mother in the absence of any observation or material indicating she had been illegally deprived of such custody. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider this question and modified the interim arrangement ordered by the High Court to permit the grandfather and grandmother, along with the father, to visit the minor. The principle laid down involves the proper scope and invocation of habeas corpus jurisdiction under section 491 in minor custody matters where illegal deprivation must be examined.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 can be invoked for handing over the custody of a minor in the absence of material indicating illegal deprivation?
  • Can the Supreme Court modify an interim custody arrangement passed by the High Court pending appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmed Bux & Sons vs Ismail1996 SCMR 533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-05
  leave to appealre-hearing of appealservice of noticeejectment applicationrented premisesprocedural fairness
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sindh High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's application for the re-hearing of an appeal. The petitioner had sought a re-hearing under Order XLI, Rule 21, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, read with Section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979, after the High Court decided an ejectment appeal against them in their absence. The core legal question is whether the High Court erred in dismissing the application for re-hearing when the record, specifically the bailiff's report, indicated that the petitioner had not been served with notice of the appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the issue of non-service of notice requires consideration to determine if the re-hearing application should have been granted. The Court further stayed the ejectment of the petitioner, subject to the regular payment of rent, pending the final adjudication of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an application for re-hearing of an appeal is maintainable when the appellant was not served with notice of the appeal?
  • Does the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to proceedings under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 regarding the re-hearing of appeals?
  Read full judgment →
• Ahmad and others vs The State1996 SCMR 996 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-27
  leave to appealappraisal of evidencenight occurrenceeye-witness credibilitybailable warrants
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from two criminal petitions seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a conviction. The incident in question occurred during the night at approximately 2:30 a.m., and the eye-witnesses claimed to have observed the event from a distance of 92 feet. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the courts below had correctly followed the established principles governing the appraisal of evidence in criminal matters, particularly concerning night occurrences and witness visibility. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both petitions to evaluate the evidentiary assessment of the lower courts. Additionally, the Court ordered the issuance of bailable warrants against the respondents in Criminal Petition No. 63/1993, setting the bail amount at Rs. 25,000 with two sureties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the established principles governing the appraisal of evidence are correctly followed by lower courts when dealing with a night occurrence witnessed from a significant distance?
  • Can leave to appeal be granted by the Supreme Court to review if lower courts properly evaluated eye-witness testimony in a night-time incident?
  Read full judgment →
• Agriculture Workers Union Balochistan through President_SecretaryGenerals vs Registrar of Trade Unions, Quetta and another1996 SCMR 468 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-22
  trade union registrationleave to appealworkman definitionindustryadministration of the StateIndustrial Relations Ordinanceagriculture workers
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Agriculture Workers Union Balochistan, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan dated 31-8-1994, which set aside the order of the 1st Labour Court, Quetta, and restored the Registrar of Trade Unions' refusal to register the petitioner union under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (IRO). The High Court had relied on an earlier unreported Supreme Court decision holding that certain staff of the Livestock and Agriculture Departments were not engaged in the running of an industry. The petitioner's counsel contended that a subsequent larger Bench ruling of the Supreme Court held that certain PWD employees were not engaged in state administration and qualified as workmen entitled to form a trade union under the IRO. The petitioner further argued that the earlier decision failed to consider the statutory definition of 'workman'. Finding that these contentions required further examination in light of the conflicting pronouncements, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of government departments are entitled to register as a trade union under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 where their functions do not pertain to the administration of the State?
  • Whether the failure to consider the statutory definition of 'workman' in prior precedent warrants reconsideration of the eligibility of departmental workers to form a trade union under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to resolve apparent conflict in Supreme Court precedents regarding the trade union registration rights of non-administrative departmental employees under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Jan' and 3 others vs Mst. TM Bibi and 59 others1996 SCMR 1535 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-12
  inheritancecustomary lawlife estatelimited ownerdevolution of propertyMuslim Personal Lawpredeceased son
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the inheritance of property originally owned by Amir Ali, who died in 1920. Upon his death, his estate was divided among his heirs, including Mst. Bagai, who held a life estate under customary law. Following Mst. Bagai's death in 1975, a dispute arose regarding the subsequent devolution of the property. The petitioners, descendants of a predeceased son of Amir Ali, sought a declaration and possession of their share, arguing that upon the termination of the limited estate, the property should devolve according to the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962. The trial court and the High Court dismissed their suit, leading to the current petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the contention that upon the opening of the inheritance following the death of the limited owner, the property reverts to the original owner and must devolve upon the heirs alive at the time of the original owner's death in accordance with the relevant Shariat Application Act.

  Questions settled

  • Does the property of a deceased owner held by a limited owner under customary law revert to the original owner's estate upon the termination of the limited interest?
  • Are the descendants of a predeceased son entitled to inherit from the original owner upon the termination of a life estate under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962?
  Read full judgment →
• Agha Ghazanfar Ali vs Shaukat Ali and another1996 SCMR 509 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-11-22
  quashing of criminal proceedingsmens reacheatingbreach of trustinherent powers of High Courtspecific performancecriminal liability in civil disputes
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that refused to quash criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner for alleged cheating and breach of trust. The petitioner, having received a substantial portion of the sale price for a house, failed to complete the sale or return the funds, leading the respondent to file a criminal complaint under the Pakistan Penal Code. The petitioner sought acquittal under the Code of Criminal Procedure, arguing a lack of mens rea, but the trial court and High Court declined to intervene. The core legal question was whether the High Court should exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings when the underlying dispute involves a contract and questions of intent. The Supreme Court held that the determination of mens rea and the commission of the offence of cheating are matters to be decided by the trial court upon the evaluation of evidence. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming that the criminal proceedings must be allowed to take their course.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings when the dispute is essentially of a civil nature?
  • Is the determination of mens rea in a cheating case a matter to be decided by the trial court after evidence, rather than at the stage of acquittal?
  • Can criminal proceedings be quashed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 when there is a factual dispute regarding the performance of a contract?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Mahmood vs Government of PAKISTANthrough Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and 241 others1996 PLC (C.S.) 1061 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1992-05-18
  constitutional petitionArticle 212 barservice tribunal jurisdictioneligibility for promotionfitness vs eligibilityterms and conditions of servicecivil servants
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition as barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The petitioner, an employee of Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation, challenged the eligibility of diploma-holders to hold or be promoted to professional engineering posts under the Pakistan Engineering Council Act 1976. The core legal question was whether a challenge regarding the eligibility of civil servants for promotion or appointment falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal or can be entertained by the High Court under Article 199. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that questions of eligibility relate directly to the terms and conditions of service. While section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 bars jurisdiction over questions of fitness or suitability, it does not bar determination of eligibility. Thus, Article 212 bars the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction, making the Service Tribunal the exclusive forum for testing civil servants' eligibility.

  Questions settled

  • Does Article 212 of the Constitution bar the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 regarding a civil servant's eligibility for promotion?
  • What is the legal distinction between 'eligibility' and 'fitness or suitability' under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the vires of service rules affecting terms and conditions of service?
  Read full judgment →
• Abid Hussain vs Pervaiz Iqbal and 3 others1996 SCMR 1025 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  leave to appealacquittalcommutation of sentencecriminal petitionmurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal seeking to examine the correctness of the High Court's judgment which resulted in the acquittal of Mumtaz Khan and the reduction of the death sentence of Pervaiz Iqbal to imprisonment for life. The core legal question involves evaluating the soundness of the reasons provided by the High Court for acquitting one co-accused and commuting the sentence of another. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these issues, directing that notice be issued to the incarcerated respondent and bailable warrants be issued against the acquitted respondent to secure his appearance.

  Questions settled

  • Whether leave to appeal should be granted to examine the correctness of an acquittal by the High Court?
  • Whether leave to appeal is warranted to review the conversion of a death sentence to imprisonment for life?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdus Salam vs Muhammad Firdous alias Babu Mohi and 2 others1996 SCMR 522 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-08-08
  Leave to appealPost-arrest bailAdverse remarksIllicit intercoursePregnancySection 161 Cr.P.C.Section 164 Cr.P.C.
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Peshawar High Court, Bench Abbottabad, which granted post-arrest bail to respondents Muhammad Firdous and Mst. Farzana Bibi, and also passed adverse remarks against the petitioner. The petitioner, who had married Mst. Farzana Bibi, discovered she was pregnant and suspected illicit intercourse, leading to a police case. Bail applications were initially rejected by the Ilaqa Magistrate and Sessions Judge but granted by the High Court based on Mst. Farzana Bibi's statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C., where she alleged the petitioner had sexual intercourse with her prior to Rukhsati. The Supreme Court, noting that no evidence other than her Section 161, Cr.P.C. statement connected the respondents to the offence, declined leave to appeal against the bail order. However, the Court found the adverse remarks against the petitioner to be prejudicial and unfair, thus ordering their deletion from the High Court's order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court grant bail based on a Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement where it contradicts an earlier Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement and is the only evidence connecting the accused to the offence?
  • Can adverse remarks passed against a party in a bail order be deleted by a higher court if they are found to be prejudicial and unfair?
  • Is leave to appeal against a High Court's bail order warranted when the only evidence against the accused is a Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement and a subsequent Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement provides a different account?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdur Rahim and anothers vs Mst. Rooh Afza and 6 others1996 SCMR 1213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-02-22
  inheritance rightsSharia sharebona fide purchaserleave to appealalienation of propertyremand order
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court which remanded a civil suit back to the trial court for a fresh decision. The original suit was filed by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, claiming her Sharia share in land inherited from her father, Kabirullah, which had been alienated by her brothers to the defendants-vendees without her consent. The trial court and the district court had initially decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff. However, the High Court set aside these judgments, suggesting the vendees were bona fide purchasers without notice. The petitioners contended that the defendants never denied the plaintiff's lineage or her entitlement to a 1/3rd share of the property, making the alienation by the brothers legally ineffective. The Supreme Court found that the contentions raised regarding the evidence on record and the status of the vendees required further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowing the trial court proceedings to continue but prohibiting a final order until the appeal is decided.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property alienation by brothers be held valid if it infringes upon the Sharia share of their sisters?
  • Does a finding of a 'bona fide purchaser without notice' require a re-evaluation of evidence regarding the plaintiff's established lineage and share?
  • Is a trial court permitted to proceed with a case while an appeal against a remand order is pending before the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah vs Haider Khan and others1996 PLD Supreme Court 599 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-02-27
  pre-emptionTalabsPATA Regulationconstitutional jurisdictionconcurrent findings of factleave to appealIslamic Law of Pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a Peshawar High Court order that dismissed his review petition regarding a pre-emption suit. The dispute originated in the Court of the Extra-Assistant Commissioner, Timargera, under the PATA Regulation No. II of 1975, where the petitioner's suit was decreed by a Jirga. Following unsuccessful appeals and revisions, the respondent challenged the decree in the High Court, which set aside the decree citing the Supreme Court's decision in Said Kamal's case (PLD 1986 SC 360), holding that no pre-emption decree could be passed after 31-7-1986 without compliance with the requirements of 'Talabs'. The petitioner contended that the High Court erred by applying this principle despite the non-extension of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act (X of 1987) to the area, and further argued that the High Court exceeded its constitutional jurisdiction by setting aside concurrent findings of fact regarding the performance of 'Talabs'. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the issues raised regarding the applicability of pre-emption laws and the scope of constitutional jurisdiction in reviewing concurrent findings of fact were of public importance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction set aside concurrent findings of fact regarding the performance of 'Talabs'?
  • Does the principle laid down in Said Kamal's case (PLD 1986 SC 360) regarding the necessity of 'Talabs' apply to areas where the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act (X of 1987) has not been extended?
  • Is a pre-emption decree passed after 31-7-1986 legally sustainable if the requirements of 'Talabs' were not complied with?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdullah Khan vs Abdul Qayyum and another1996 SCMR 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-17
  post-arrest bailabetmentmurderbelated statementsdiscretion of High Courtpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court granting post-arrest bail to Abdul Qayyum respondent, who was implicated under sections 302 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for allegedly abetting a murder. The core legal question was whether bail was properly granted to a co-accused charged with abetment where his presence at the spot was not alleged, divergent investigation reports existed, and statements supporting the allegation of abetment were recorded belatedly. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion properly in granting bail, noting that bail cannot be withheld solely on the basis of belated statements supporting abetment. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that bail will not be refused merely due to belated statements alleging abetment when the accused was found innocent in initial investigations and was not present at the scene of the crime.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be withheld simply on the basis of statements supporting an allegation of abetment made at a very belated stage?
  • Does the absence of the accused from the spot and conflicting police investigation reports constitute valid grounds for granting post-arrest bail?
  • When can the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in granting bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul, Aziz vs The State1996 SCMR 1693 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-01-22
  post-arrest bailprinciple of consistencycriminal appealmurderattempted murder
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from the refusal of post-arrest bail to the appellant, Abdul Aziz, who was booked under sections 302, 324, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in respect of F.I.R. No. 14 dated 9-5-1994. The core legal question was whether the appellant was entitled to post-arrest bail on the principle of consistency, given that a co-accused attributed with a similar role of causing simple injuries had already been granted bail. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal and held that since the appellant did not cause any injury to the deceased and his role regarding the prosecution witness was identical to that of the co-accused who was already enlarged on bail, the appellant was entitled to bail on the principle of consistency. The key principle laid down is that where co-accused persons share similar imputations resulting in simple injuries and one has been admitted to bail, the principle of consistency dictates that bail should also be extended to the remaining co-accused.

  Questions settled

  • Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail on the principle of consistency when a co-accused with a similar role has already been granted bail?
  • Does a role attributed with causing simple injuries to a witness warrant the withholding of post-arrest bail when the co-accused similarly situated is admitted to bail?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rehman vs Fateh Sher and 8 others1996 SCMR 176 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-15
  petition for leave to appealacquittalocular evidencemedical evidence contradictiondishonest improvementrule of prudencecorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal against the judgment of acquittal passed by the Lahore High Court in a double murder and attempted murder case under Sections 302/149, 307, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The trial court had convicted and sentenced eight respondents based on ocular testimony from related witnesses, medical evidence, and alleged weapon recoveries. The High Court acquitted all respondents, holding that the prosecution failed to prove motive, weapon recoveries without empty shells lacked evidentiary value, and the ocular evidence was untrustworthy. Crucially, eye-witnesses dishonestly improved their statements by substituting accused persons and weapons to align with medical evidence showing a pellet injury rather than a bullet wound. The Supreme Court affirmed the acquittal, holding that where eye-witnesses make a dishonest departure from previous statements under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, rule of prudence mandates independent corroboration regarding each accused, which was absent. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does a material contradiction between ocular testimony and medical evidence justify the rejection of eye-witness testimony?
  • Whether dishonest improvements made by eye-witnesses to align their statements with medical evidence render them unreliable without independent corroboration?
  • Is the recovery of a weapon of offense admissible or consequential if no empty cartridge shells were recovered from the spot?
  • Can a judgment of acquittal be interfered with if the view taken by the High Court is supportable from the evidence on record and not perverse?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid vs Bashiran and another1996 SCMR 808 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-03-05
  pre-emptionwaiverestoppelsecond appealconcurrent findingslimitation period
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal under Article 185(2)(e) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 arose from a pre-emption suit filed by the appellant based on co-ownership and collateral relationship. The respondents resisted the suit, claiming the appellant was estopped from pre-empting because he was present at and participated in the sale transaction. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently decreed the suit, finding no estoppel or waiver. However, the High Court in second appeal reversed these findings, inferring waiver from the appellant's alleged presence and the filing of the suit near the end of the limitation period. The Supreme Court of Pakistan set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the concurrent decrees. The Court held that the mere presence of a pre-emptor at the time of a sale transaction does not constitute estoppel or waiver. Furthermore, the Court ruled that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal merely because an alternative view of the evidence is possible.

  Questions settled

  • Does the mere presence of a pre-emptor at the time a sale bargain is struck constitute estoppel or waiver of the right of pre-emption?
  • Can a pre-emption suit be dismissed as a device or on grounds of delay solely because it was filed near the end of the statutory limitation period?
  • Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Rashid Khan vs Muhammad Saleem Akhtar and others1996 SCMR 1163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-11-13
  seniorityad hoc serviceservice tribunalrule relaxationleave to appealservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which had allowed appeals filed by the respondent challenging the petitioner's seniority determination. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could lawfully count their prior ad hoc service period with the Engineering University towards their seniority in the department, specifically through a relaxation of the relevant rules. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no case on the merits. The Court determined that allowing an employee to count ad hoc service towards seniority in the department through a relaxation of rules is neither legal nor proper. Consequently, the Court found that no legal question of general importance arose from the impugned judgment and refused to grant leave to appeal. The decision reinforces the principle that seniority benefits cannot be derived from ad hoc service periods via rule relaxation, as established in previous jurisprudence.

  Questions settled

  • Can an employee count a period of ad hoc service with a university towards their seniority in a government department?
  • Is the relaxation of rules to allow the counting of ad hoc service for seniority purposes legally permissible?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Qayum and 15 others vs Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and another1996 SCMR 1820 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-22
  compulsory acquisitioncompensation enhancementmarket valuecompulsory acquisition chargesland acquisitionDefence of Pakistan Ordinance
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the determination of compensation for land acquired by the District Magistrate, Sialkot, in 1972 under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1971. The core legal questions concerned the appropriate market value of the acquired land at the time of acquisition, the entitlement to a 25% compulsory acquisition premium versus 15%, and whether the appellants were entitled to enhanced compensation due to the passage of time and inflation. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court correctly identified the relevant date for valuation, the compensation rate required enhancement to Rs. 1,500 per Marla, considering the upward trend in land prices. However, the Court rejected the claim for a 25% premium, noting the appellants failed to prove the Market Committee qualified as a 'company' under the relevant statutory provisions. The Court upheld the existing 15% premium and 8% interest rate, directing the respondents to pay the difference in compensation immediately. The judgment reaffirms that compensation must reflect the market value at the time of acquisition while adhering to specific statutory limitations regarding compulsory acquisition charges.

  Questions settled

  • Is a Market Committee considered a 'company' for the purpose of claiming a 25% compulsory acquisition premium under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  • Can the Supreme Court enhance the rate of compensation for acquired land based on the upward trend in market prices?
  • Does the failure to prove the status of an acquiring body as a 'company' preclude the award of a 25% compulsory acquisition premium?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majid alias Jaidu and 2 others vs The State1996 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-10-30
  murderocular testimonymedical evidencecorroborationinterested witnessessentencing discretioncompensationcommon intention
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld the convictions of three petitioners for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners, who were sentenced to death and life imprisonment respectively, challenged the reliance placed on the ocular testimony of interested witnesses related to the deceased. The core legal question was whether the ocular testimony, given the background of enmity, required corroboration and whether the sentences and compensation amounts were appropriate. The Supreme Court held that the extensive medical evidence, detailing numerous incised wounds, provided strong corroboration for the ocular account, thereby justifying the convictions. The Court further affirmed the High Court’s decision to reduce the sentences of two petitioners to life imprisonment, noting their participation under the influence of their elder brother, while maintaining the death sentence for the primary assailant. The Court also upheld the trial court's discretionary determination of compensation. The key principle laid down is that medical evidence corroborating ocular testimony sufficiently establishes guilt, even when witnesses are related to the deceased.

  Questions settled

  • Can ocular testimony from witnesses related to the deceased be relied upon without corroboration in a murder case?
  • Does medical evidence showing multiple injuries provide sufficient corroboration for ocular testimony?
  • Is the determination of compensation for legal heirs a matter of judicial discretion for the trial court?
  • Can the appellate court maintain different sentences for co-accused convicted under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 based on their roles and influence?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Majeed vs Wazir Begum and 5 others1996 SCMR 1681 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-18
  ejectment petitionarrears of rentrent controllerdeposit of rentlimitation of arrears
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition against an order passed by the Rent Controller under the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The core legal question was whether a Rent Controller is competent to direct a tenant to deposit arrears of rent for a period exceeding three years prior to the institution of the ejectment petition. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and accepted it, holding that the Rent Controller was not competent to direct the deposit of arrears of rent for a period of more than three years, in accordance with previously established precedent. The Court laid down the principle that arrears of rent ordered to be deposited in ejectment proceedings cannot exceed the three-year period preceding the filing of the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Rent Controller can direct a tenant to deposit arrears of rent for a period exceeding three years prior to the institution of the ejectment petition?
  • Can a petition for leave to appeal be converted into an appeal by the Supreme Court when a clear error of law is established?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Khaliq vs The State1996 SCMR 1553 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-14
  murderocular evidencemedical evidence conflictdelayed FIRsection 161 Cr.P.C.criminal appealSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of Baluchistan which dismissed the appellant's appeal against his conviction and sentence under Section 302/34, P.P.C., for the murder of Abdul Wahab. The core legal questions involved the reliability of ocular evidence, the evidentiary value of delayed statements recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., and the material discrepancies between ocular testimony and medical evidence. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence. The Court held that late recording of Section 161, Cr.P.C., statements without plausible explanation reduces their evidentiary value to nil, and that serious conflicts between ocular testimony showing the victim being chased from behind and medical evidence showing entry wounds from the front cannot be ignored. The key principle laid down is that contradictory ocular evidence that is irreconcilable with medical findings, coupled with unexplained delays in recording witness statements, is fatal to the prosecution's case.

  Questions settled

  • Does an unexplained delay in recording witness statements under Section 161, Cr.P.C., reduce their evidentiary value to nil?
  • Can a conviction be sustained when there is a direct and irreconcilable conflict between ocular evidence and medical evidence?
  • Is an accused bound by admissions made by defense counsel during cross-examination?
  • When may concurrent findings of fact by lower courts be interfered with in an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Janan vs University of Peshawar through ViceChancellor and others1996 PLD Supreme Court 709 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-05-20
  educational institutionunfair meansdisciplinary actionappellate committeebiasconstitution of committeecancellation of examinationnatural justicewrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal was filed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by an M.B.,B.S. student challenging disciplinary decisions by the University of Peshawar. The Unfair Means Committee (U.F.M. Committee) and the Appellate Committee of the University had penalized the appellant for allegedly using unfair means during an examination. The core legal questions pertained to whether an unintelligible disciplinary penalty order violates statutory rules, and whether the inclusion of an original adjudicator as a member of the Appellate Committee vitiates the appellate proceedings. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the decisions, holding that disciplinary orders affecting a student's career must be intelligible and demonstrate application of mind. Furthermore, the Court held that the Appellate Committee was defectively constituted and its proceedings were vitiated because the Controller of Examinations, who was a member of the original U.F.M. Committee, sat on the appellate tribunal, and unauthorized members participated prior to their official appointment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the inclusion of an original adjudicator as a member of an appellate tribunal vitiate the appellate decision?
  • Are disciplinary orders issued by university authorities against students required to be intelligible and demonstrate an application of mind?
  • Can a disciplinary order imposing penalties on a candidate be upheld if it contradicts the statutory penalty rules prescribed for the alleged misconduct?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Jabbar Khan vs Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary, Karachi and 5 others1996 SCMR 850 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-12-19
  service lawseniorityadverse ACRlimitationservice tribunal jurisdictionpromotioncivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant challenged the Sindh Service Tribunal's dismissal of his appeal regarding seniority in Grade-18. The Tribunal had dismissed the appeal as time-barred and barred by section 4(b) of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Supreme Court addressed whether the appeal was time-barred, whether the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction, and whether uncommunicated adverse ACR remarks could justify supersession. The Court held that the appeal was within time, as the respondents failed to prove the communication of the impugned order. It further ruled that the Tribunal possessed jurisdiction because the dispute involved seniority determination under Rule 13 of the Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, rather than a challenge to 'fitness for promotion.' The Court established that uncommunicated adverse ACR remarks are ineffective and cannot form the basis for adverse administrative orders. Additionally, under Rule 13, a civil servant not considered for promotion for reasons other than unfitness is entitled to seniority parity with their batch mates if the competent authority failed to pass a specific order regarding inter se seniority. The appeal was allowed.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal before the Service Tribunal be considered time-barred if the department fails to prove the communication of the impugned order?
  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine seniority disputes under Rule 13 of the Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975?
  • Can uncommunicated adverse remarks in an Annual Confidential Report (ACR) be used as a valid basis for superseding a civil servant's promotion?
  • Under Rule 13 of the Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, is a civil servant entitled to seniority parity with their batch mates if they were not considered for promotion for reasons other than unfitness?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hayee and 2 others vs The State1996 SCMR 555 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-01-15
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurdercapital chargefurther inquiryocular and medical evidenceSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order passed by the Sindh High Court, which cancelled the post-arrest bail granted to the petitioners by the Additional Sessions Judge in a murder case registered under section 302/34, P.P.C. The core legal question was whether the trial court was justified in granting bail on the ground of alleged conflict between ocular and medical evidence, and whether the High Court rightly interfered with that discretion. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the petitioners were specifically named in the F.I.R. with clear roles in a capital crime, and at the bail stage, evidence should not be assessed in depth to avoid prejudicing the merits. Affirming the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had acted illegally in granting bail in a heinous crime without proper grounds, and thus dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, upholding the cancellation of bail.

  Questions settled

  • Can bail be granted in a capital case on the ground of alleged conflict between ocular and medical evidence at the preliminary stage?
  • Whether the High Court is justified in interfering with a bail-granting order passed by the trial court in violation of settled principles?
  • Is a case involving prompt naming of accused with specific firearm roles in the F.I.R. considered a case of further inquiry under section 497(2), Cr.P.C.?
  • What is the scope of evaluation of evidence by criminal courts at the bail stage in heinous offenses?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Haque vs The State and another1996 SCMR 1566 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-02
  grave and sudden provocationdiminished liabilityQatl-i-Amdsentencing proportionalitycriminal law amendmentculpable homicidestatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, convicted of murder under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, challenged his conviction and the subsequent enhancement of his life imprisonment sentence to death by the High Court. The appellant admitted to the killing but argued it occurred under grave and sudden provocation after the deceased threatened to sexually assault his wife and female relatives. The High Court, relying on the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1990, held that because the new section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 lacked the previous exceptions, the defense of grave and sudden provocation was no longer available. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court identified a fundamental legal question regarding whether the 1990 Ordinance intended to abolish the long-standing principle of diminished liability for crimes committed under grave and sudden provocation. Given the significant impact on pending cases and the importance of the principle of proportionality in sentencing, the Court determined that the matter required consideration by a larger bench of seven judges to resolve whether the preferential treatment for such offenders remains valid under the current statutory framework.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1990 abolish the defense of grave and sudden provocation for murder charges?
  • Is the plea of diminished liability for crimes committed under grave and sudden provocation still available under the current Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can an accused who kills under grave and sudden provocation be treated differently in sentencing than a cold-blooded murderer?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Hanan and 10 others vs Ahmad and others1996 PLD Supreme Court 833 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-06-03
  leave to appealsuccessioncustomary lawShariat Application Actlimitationinheritance mutationMuslim Personal Law
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Peshawar High Court maintaining the appellate court's decree which had reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit and declared them owners in possession of the property left by Sher Baz. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were not entitled to any share under Shariah as their father had predeceased Sher Baz. The trial court had dismissed the suit applying Customary Law, but the appellate and high court held that under the retrospective amendments of the N.-W.F.P. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, succession must be determined in accordance with Muslim Personal Law. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the High Court erred in ignoring settled precedents holding that the Shariat Application Act did not intend to re-open closed successions where absolute vested estates had been acquired under custom, and whether such claims remain subject to the law of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether succession to the estate of a Muslim who died before the enactment of the N.-W.F.P. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1935 is to be governed by Shariah or Customary Law in light of subsequent retrospective amendments?
  • Does the retrospective operation of the N.-W.F.P. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1935 permit the re-opening of closed inheritances where heirs had taken an absolute vested estate under custom?
  • Are claims by Muslim law heirs preferred after the enactment of the N.-W.F.P. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1935 subject to the law of limitation?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani vs Abrar Hussain1996 SCMR 1836 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-04
  landlord and tenantrelationship of landlord and tenantPermanent Transfer Orderrent proceedingsscope of jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  These three petitions for leave to appeal arise from a common judgment of the High Court concerning rent disputes over properties transferred via Permanent Transfer Order in 1959. The core legal questions involve the sufficiency of a Permanent Transfer Order to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, the scope of inquiry by a Rent Controller when a tenant disputes title, and whether a High Court in rent proceedings can direct a landlord to obtain a Permanent Transfer Deed and demarcate the property. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine whether a P.T.O. suffices for claiming rent, whether the High Court's directions exceeded the scope of rent proceedings, and the legal effect of a tenant claiming ownership without proper pleadings. The Court held that arguable points of law were raised regarding the interpretation of landlord-tenant definitions and the proper scope of rent jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Permanent Transfer Order is sufficient to entitle a landlord to claim rent under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979?
  • Can the High Court direct a landlord in rent proceedings to obtain a Permanent Transfer Deed and have the property demarcated?
  • What is the legal effect when a tenant disputes the relationship of landlord and tenant and claims title to the property?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Ghani Chaudhry vs Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others1996 SCMR 1723 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-29
  leave to appealpromotionseniorityexpunged adverse remarkscivil servant
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by Abdul Ghani Chaudhary against the Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others, reported as 1996 SCMR 1723. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the petitioner could lawfully be denied his promotion and seniority on the grounds stated in the impugned order, particularly given the fact that the adverse remarks recorded against him had already been expunged. Granting leave to appeal, the Court decided that the matter required closer examination regarding the legality of denying promotion and seniority after the expungement of adverse remarks. The key principle laid down is that adverse remarks which have been expunged cannot serve as a valid legal basis for denying an eligible civil servant his due promotion and consequential seniority.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant can be denied promotion and seniority on the basis of adverse remarks that have already been expunged?
  • Does the expungement of adverse remarks entitle a government employee to reconsideration for promotion and seniority?
  Read full judgment →
• Abdul Akbar alias Pakh vs The State1996 SCMR 1111 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-04
  murder convictionocular evidenceabscondencesentence enhancementmedical evidence contradictionalibicriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves criminal petitions for leave to appeal filed by the convict, Abdul Akbar, and the complainant, Mst. Nawab Jana, challenging a Peshawar High Court judgment that maintained the petitioner's conviction and sentence for the murder of Mir Ajab Khan. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of ocular evidence, the impact of alleged contradictions between medical and eyewitness testimony, and the evidentiary value of the petitioner’s abscondence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly appraised the evidence, finding the eyewitness testimony credible and corroborated by the petitioner's prolonged abscondence. The Court rejected the defense's arguments regarding medical contradictions, noting that the defense failed to cross-examine the medical officer on these points. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the burden of proving an alibi, such as the petitioner's claim of being in Iran, rests on the accused. Consequently, the Court dismissed both the convict's appeal against conviction and the complainant's petition for sentence enhancement, ruling that the original sentence met the ends of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to cross-examine a medical officer on alleged contradictions between medical and ocular evidence weaken the prosecution's case?
  • Is the abscondence of an accused person a relevant factor for corroborating ocular evidence in a murder trial?
  • Does the burden of proving an alibi lie upon the accused when the prosecution has established a prima facie case?
  • Can an appellate court enhance a sentence in a criminal case based on a revision petition filed by the complainant?
  Read full judgment →
• Abbasia Cooperative Bank Now Punjab, Provincial Cooperative Bank1996 P.C.T.L.R. 1440 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1996-07-10
  Civil Court jurisdictionouster of jurisdictionauction salecooperative loan recoveryWest Pakistan Land Revenue Actjudicial reviewstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment restoring a trial court decree that declared an auction of property illegal. The core legal question was whether the Civil Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of an auction conducted by cooperative authorities, given the ouster clauses in the West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loan) Ordinance 1966 and Martial Law Order No. 241. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Court retains jurisdiction to examine the validity of actions taken by executive authorities or special tribunals where such actions are mala fide, in excess of jurisdiction, or in violation of the governing statute and principles of natural justice. The Court found that the auction was conducted in violation of the procedural requirements of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967, and that Martial Law Order No. 241 was inapplicable due to the loan amount being below the statutory threshold. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision, establishing that statutory ouster clauses must be construed strictly and do not shield illegal actions from judicial review.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to challenge an auction conducted by cooperative authorities despite an ouster clause in the governing Ordinance?
  • What are the conditions under which a Civil Court can review the actions of a special tribunal or executive authority despite a statutory bar on jurisdiction?
  • Is a loan obtained by a family member automatically recoverable from another person without a finding of a benami transaction?
  • Does the procedure for recovery of loans under the West Pakistan Cooperative Societies and Cooperative Banks (Repayment of Loan) Ordinance 1966 require compliance with the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967?
  Read full judgment →
• Abason Industries Public Ltd. vs Suprintendent Of Customs, Central Excise(PTCL 1996 CL. 101) · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  customs arrearsrecovery of government duesbonded warehouseattachment and saleconstitutional petitionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition against notices issued by the Customs authorities for the recovery of unpaid import duties and charges. The petitioner, a manufacturer of raw materials, defaulted on warehousing arrears despite being granted installments. The core legal question concerns whether the Customs authorities have the lawful authority under Section 202 of the Customs Act to stop the clearance of finished goods or take recovery steps for unpaid dues when such goods are no longer under direct customs control. The Supreme Court held that under Section 202(3) and (4) of the Customs Act, the appropriate officer is empowered to recover arrears through attachment and sale of movable or immovable property, possessing powers akin to a civil court executing a decree. Furthermore, an otherwise lawful action by an authority is not vitiated merely because the specific provision of law was omitted from the notice. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether Customs Authorities can stop the clearance of goods or take coercive recovery steps under Section 202 of the Customs Act for unpaid duties?
  • Does the failure to cite a specific statutory provision in a recovery notice invalidate an otherwise lawful action taken by the Customs Authorities?
  • What powers does an appropriate officer possess for the recovery of duties and levies under Section 202 of the Customs Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Abason Industries Public Limited vs Superintendent of Customs, Central Excise and Sales Tax, Gadoon Amazai and 3 others1996 SCMR 93 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-08-08
  customs duty recoverybonded warehousestatutory interpretationrecovery of government duesattachment of propertyvalidity of notice
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a manufacturer, failed to clear arrears of import duties and taxes on raw materials stored in a private bonded warehouse. Despite being granted an installment plan, the petitioner defaulted, leading the Customs authorities to issue notices threatening action to recover the outstanding dues. The petitioner challenged these notices in the Peshawar High Court, arguing that authorities lacked the power to stop the clearance of finished goods. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that Section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969, empowered the authorities to recover dues. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed this position, ruling that Section 202(3) and (4) of the Customs Act, 1969, provides broad powers for the recovery of government dues, including the attachment and sale of movable or immovable property, akin to the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court further held that a notice is not invalidated merely by the failure to explicitly cite the specific statutory provision, provided the action itself is legally authorized.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to cite a specific statutory provision in a notice invalidate the action if the action is otherwise authorized by law?
  • Do Customs authorities have the power to recover outstanding duties by attaching and selling a defaulter's movable or immovable property?
  • Are the powers of recovery granted to Customs officers under Section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969, equivalent to the powers of a Civil Court for executing a decree?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar alias Bhutto vs The State1995 SCMR 1668 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-05-30
  capital punishmenttender agemitigating circumstanceseye-witness testimonycriminal appealmurdersentencing discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged a High Court judgment that sentenced the appellant to death for murder. The core legal questions concerned the reliability of testimony from related, inimical witnesses and whether the appellant’s 'tender age' constituted a mitigating factor warranting the reduction of the death sentence. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the eye-witnesses' testimony was credible and sufficiently corroborated by medical evidence and the prompt registration of the FIR. Regarding sentencing, the Court held that while tender age is a relevant consideration, it is not an absolute ground for leniency, particularly in heinous or premeditated offenses. The Court emphasized that sentencing requires a holistic assessment of the nature of the crime, the circumstances of its commission, and the underlying enmity. Finding that the motive remained somewhat obscure and considering the appellant's age, the Court exercised its discretion to convert the death sentence into life imprisonment, while maintaining the fine and granting the benefit of Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of related and inimical witnesses require corroboration to sustain a conviction for murder?
  • Is 'tender age' an absolute mitigating factor that mandates the reduction of a death sentence in murder cases?
  • What factors must a court consider when determining whether to reduce a death sentence based on the age of the accused?
  Read full judgment →
• Zulfiqar Ali and others vs Mst. Sajida Begum1995 SCMR 911 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-06-15
  pre-emptioncourt-feeinsufficiently stamped plaintleave to appealdeficiency in court-fee
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court upholding the decision of the District Judge, which decreed the respondent's suit for pre-emption. The core legal question was whether a suit could be dismissed solely on the ground of an insufficiently stamped plaint where the deficient court-fee was subsequently made up during the trial. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was bound to determine the exact amount of court-fee and afford reasonable time to the plaintiff to make up any deficiency, and since the deficient court-fee was indeed paid during the trial, no illegality was committed by the lower appellate court. The petition was accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal refused, reinforcing the principle that procedural deficiencies regarding court-fees remedied during trial do not warrant the dismissal of a suit.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a suit can be dismissed on the ground of an insufficiently stamped plaint if the deficiency is made up during the trial?
  • Is the trial court bound to determine the exact amount of court-fee and afford reasonable time to the plaintiff to make up any deficiency?
  Read full judgment →
• Ziauddin Shaikh and others vs Muhammad Rafique and others1995 SCMR 320 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-27
  Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979ejectmentremand orderadditional evidencejurisdiction of Rent Controllerhotel premisesrent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the High Court of Sindh remanding a rent case to the Rent Controller to determine whether the demised premises constituted a hotel under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979. The petitioners had initially obtained an ejectment order on the ground of default. In appeal before the High Court, the respondents raised a jurisdictional question claiming the premises was a hotel. The High Court had earlier directed the Rent Controller under Section 21(3) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 to record additional evidence on this point and submit a report. After the Rent Controller recorded the evidence of five witnesses and submitted the report, the High Court inadvertently overlooked the evidence on record and issued another order remanding the case to the Rent Controller for the exact same inquiry. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that under Section 21(3) of the Ordinance, once the High Court selects the option to remit an inquiry to the Rent Controller and receives the evidence report, it cannot remand the case again for the same purpose. The case was remanded to the High Court for fresh disposal taking into account the recorded additional evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court remand a case to the Rent Controller for an inquiry after having already received the additional evidence recorded pursuant to a previous order under Section 21(3) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • Whether premises used as a hotel fall outside the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979?
  • What options are available to the High Court under Section 21(3) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance 1979 when further inquiry is required in an appellate proceeding?
  Read full judgment →
• Zakiya Khatoon vs Roomi Enterprises1995 SCMR 753 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-07-21
  pre-emption suitinterim reliefproperty alterationleave to appealundertakingprotection of interest
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had declined to grant interim relief regarding alterations to a property currently subject to pre-emption litigation. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in refusing to restrain the respondent from making alterations to the disputed property, or whether the respondent's undertaking to proceed at their own cost and risk provided adequate protection to the petitioner's interests. The Supreme Court held that the respondent's undertaking to carry out any improvements or alterations at their own cost and risk constituted sufficient protection for the petitioner's rights in the property. Consequently, the Court found no legal basis to interfere with the High Court's order and concluded that no further examination was required. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly refused, affirming the principle that a formal undertaking by a party to assume financial risk for property alterations during pending litigation can serve as a sufficient safeguard against potential prejudice to the opposing party's interests.

  Questions settled

  • Does a respondent's undertaking to perform property alterations at their own cost and risk provide sufficient protection in a pre-emption suit?
  • Is an appellate court required to interfere with an interim order when the respondent has provided an undertaking to mitigate potential prejudice?
  Read full judgment →
• Zakir Mahmood Abbasi vs M.G.O., Mgo Branch, GHQ, Rawalpindi and 51995 SCMR 1028 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-19
  service lawpromotionfitness for promotionservice tribunal jurisdictionsenioritydepartmental promotion committeeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his seniority and promotion. The petitioner, a Supervisor (B) in BPS-8, sought to challenge the promotion of his juniors and claimed seniority over them. The respondents contended that promotion decisions are the exclusive domain of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) and that the petitioner was not recommended due to adverse remarks in his Annual Confidential Reports. The Tribunal, while dismissing the appeal, examined the petitioner's fitness for promotion on its merits. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address a critical legal question regarding the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Specifically, the Court seeks to determine whether, notwithstanding the statutory bar contained in the proviso to section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, a Service Tribunal possesses the authority to adjudicate upon the fitness or suitability of a civil servant for appointment or promotion to a higher post.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar contained in section 4(1)(b) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, preclude a Service Tribunal from determining the fitness or suitability of a civil servant for promotion?
  • Can a Service Tribunal adjudicate upon the merits of a promotion decision made by a Departmental Promotion Committee?
  Read full judgment →
• Zakir Mahmood Abbasi vs M.G.O. Mgo Branch, GHQ, Rawalpindi and 51995 PLC (C.S.) 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-19
  service lawpromotionfitness for promotionService Tribunal jurisdictionseniority disputecivil servantleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal regarding his seniority and promotion. The petitioner, a Supervisor (B) in BPS-8, challenged the promotion of respondents Nos. 4 to 6 to Supervisor (A) in BPS-11, claiming seniority over them. The Tribunal had dismissed the appeal after examining the petitioner's fitness for promotion, noting he had received average Annual Confidential Reports and was not recommended by the Departmental Promotion Committee. The core legal question is whether the Service Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction to determine the fitness of a civil servant for promotion, notwithstanding the statutory bar contained in the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to specifically address this jurisdictional issue. The principle at stake is the extent of the Tribunal's authority to adjudicate on matters of promotion and fitness, particularly in light of the explicit legislative restrictions placed on the Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction regarding the suitability of a person for appointment or promotion.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to determine the fitness of a civil servant for promotion?
  • Does the bar contained in the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, preclude the Tribunal from adjudicating on the fitness of a person for promotion?
  Read full judgment →
• Zakir Khan and others vs The State1995 SCMR 1793 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-07-12
  kidnapping for ransomidentification paradeSection 103 Cr.P.C.Article 40 Qanun-e-Shahadatrecovery Mashirsinterested witnessesmaterial contradictionsco-accused disclosure
  Summary & questions settled

  Criminal appeals were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which maintained the conviction and life imprisonment sentences of the appellants under Section 365-A read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for kidnapping for ransom. The appellants contended that the prosecution witnesses were interested and inconsistent, the mandatory search provisions under Section 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were violated, disclosures leading to arrests were inadmissible under Articles 38 and 39 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, and no test identification parade was conducted. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that minor omissions in witness statements do not impair credibility where core facts are corroborated. It ruled that Section 103 Cr.P.C. is a procedural rule whose strict compliance may be dispensed with under urgent or midnight circumstances, Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order acts as an exception allowing disclosures leading to the discovery of incriminating facts, and an identification parade is unnecessary when an abductee remains in prolonged captivity with the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-compliance with the locality requirements of Section 103 Cr.P.C. render a search and recovery invalid when strict adherence was not practically possible?
  • Is information provided by an accused person in police custody that leads to the discovery of connected incriminating facts admissible under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order?
  • Is a formal test identification parade legally mandatory when an abductee remained in prolonged captivity with the accused and had ample opportunity to identify them?
  • Does a mere omission by a witness during police investigation render their subsequent ocular testimony before the court unreliable?
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• Zakir Hussain vs The State1995 SCMR 1170 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-04-17
  leave to appealmurdercapital punishmenteyewitness testimonyrelated witnessescommutation of sentencepresidential amnesty
  Summary & questions settled

  This jail petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the petitioner's conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentence of death for the murder of Mst. Parveen. The prosecution case rested on an eyewitness account by related witnesses, including the deceased's daughter, supported by motive and medical evidence. The core legal question was whether the testimony of related witnesses, some belonging to another village, was sufficient to sustain a capital conviction. The Supreme Court held that the eyewitness testimony was consistent, natural, and corroborated by medical evidence and motive, leaving no room for false substitution. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal on the merits of the conviction. However, noting a presidential amnesty notification, the Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life and granted the benefit of section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of related witnesses, when natural and consistent, is fully reliable to sustain a conviction, and subsequent presidential amnesties can commute death sentences in appropriate cases.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of related witnesses can be relied upon to sustain a capital conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Does the presence of related witnesses at the scene of a crime in a village appear unnatural merely because they belong to another village?
  • Whether a presidential amnesty notification can convert a death sentence into imprisonment for life?
  • Is the benefit of section 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable for computing the period of imprisonment upon commutation?
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• Zahoor Akhtar Raja vs Mst. Rubia Jilani and another1995 SCMR 1062 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-11
  custody of minorsGuardians and Wards Actexpeditious disposalinterim arrangementFamily Court proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arose from custody proceedings pending before a Family Court under the Guardians and Wards Act 1890. The core legal question concerned the expeditious resolution of the custody dispute and the continuation of interim arrangements regarding the minors. Upon the consent of the parties, the Supreme Court directed the Family Court to conclude the pending proceedings within one month from the scheduled hearing date of 14-12-1994, specifically noting the parties' agreement to limit evidence to the testimony of the petitioner, her mother, and the father of the minors. The Court further ordered that the interim arrangement established by its previous order dated 21-9-1994 remain in effect until the final disposal of the matter by the Family Court. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as not pressed, with the Court emphasizing the necessity of timely adjudication in family matters to ensure the welfare of the minors involved.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court direct a Family Court to conclude custody proceedings within a specified timeframe based on the consent of the parties?
  • Does an interim arrangement regarding the custody of minors continue until the final disposal of the main petition by the Family Court?
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• Zahid Hussain Shah vs The State1995 PLD Supreme Court 49 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-07
  statutory baildelay in trial3rd proviso to section 497 Cr.P.C.4th proviso to section 497 Cr.P.C.mandatory rightconduct of accused
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged an order of the Lahore High Court declining post-arrest bail under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.) in a case registered under Sections 324/34 and 337-F of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions were whether release on bail due to statutory delay in trial under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. is mandatory or discretionary, and whether delay caused by procedural steps or the severity of the alleged injury can defeat such entitlement. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and granted bail. The Court laid down that grant of bail under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. is a mandatory statutory right governed by the word 'shall', rather than a discretionary concession. Bail under this provision can only be refused if trial delay is attributable to an act or omission of the accused or someone acting on his behalf, or if the accused falls within the specific exceptions set out in the 4th proviso.

  Questions settled

  • Is the grant of statutory bail under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. a mandatory statutory right or a matter of judicial discretion?
  • Can statutory bail under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. be refused on the ground of the nature or severity of the injury?
  • Does trial delay caused by summoning a co-accused count as delay attributable to the accused under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1) Cr.P.C.?
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• Zahid Hussain Shah and others vs Ghulam Murtaza Asghar and others1995 SCMR 1713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-06-11
  speedy trialde novo trialtransfer of casesrepeal of statutecriminal revisionevidence recorded by predecessor
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a criminal case originally initiated before a Special Court for Speedy Trial, which was subsequently abolished by the Special Courts for Speedy Trials (Repeal) Ordinance, 1994. Following the repeal, the case was transferred to the Court of Sessions, Islamabad. The core legal question was whether the Sessions Court was required to proceed with the trial de novo or could rely upon evidence already recorded by the defunct Special Court. The Sessions Court initially opted for a fresh trial, but the High Court, in revision, set aside that order and directed the trial to conclude based on the existing material. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioners' leave to appeal, noting that the petitioners' counsel had previously conceded before the High Court that there was no legal bar to the Sessions Court acting upon the evidence already recorded and that his clients desired an early conclusion to the trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's order, affirming the procedural path taken for the trial's conclusion.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Sessions Court, upon receiving a case transferred from a defunct Special Court, rely on evidence already recorded by that Special Court?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to direct a trial court to proceed on the basis of existing evidence rather than conducting a de novo trial?
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• Zahid Akhtar vs Government of Punjab through Secretary, Local1995 PLD Supreme Court 530 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-19
  service mattersconstitutional petitiontransfer of government servantRules of BusinessArticle 212 baradministrative disciplinebureaucratic accountability
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a government servant, challenged his frequent transfer orders in a Constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, citing the bar under Article 212 regarding service matters. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner contended that the transfers were malicious, passed by an incompetent authority, and violated the Punjab Civil Servants Act, thus bypassing the Article 212 bar. The Supreme Court, while observing that the frequent transfers were irregular, politically motivated, and contrary to the established transfer policy and the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 1974, ultimately dismissed the petition as not maintainable. The Court held that despite the illegality of the transfers, the constitutional bar under Article 212 remains applicable to service matters. The Court emphasized that bureaucrats have a duty to provide correct legal guidance to elected representatives and must not comply with illegal orders, as good governance requires an upright and strong bureaucracy that adheres strictly to the prescribed Rules of Business and established transfer policies.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution apply to the transfer orders of a government servant?
  • Are transfer orders of a government servant valid if they are issued by a Minister instead of the competent authority designated in the Rules of Business?
  • Can a government servant justify the compliance of an illegal order on the ground that it was issued by a superior authority?
  • What are the legal requirements for the transfer of a government servant under the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 1974?
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• Zafar Iqbal vs WAPDA through Chairman and 3 others1995 SCMR 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-10-17
  limitationService Tribunals Actdepartmental appealcommunication of orderWAPDAcondonation of delayservice law
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil appeal by special leave was filed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the appellant's appeal as time-barred. The appellant, a Line Superintendent under WAPDA, was penalized with recovery of Rs. 1,25,000 for alleged negligence. He filed a departmental appeal which was initially unaddressed until the Wafaqi Mohtasib intervened, leading to its rejection on 30-9-1986, which was communicated to the appellant on 21-11-1986. The appellant subsequently appealed to the Tribunal on 4-12-1986. The core legal question was whether the appeal to the Service Tribunal was barred by limitation under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Supreme Court held that Section 4 offers two options: filing an appeal after waiting 90 days for a departmental decision, or filing within 30 days of the communication of the final departmental order. Since the appellant appealed within 30 days of receiving the rejection order, the appeal was within time. The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and remanded the matter for decision on merits.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal to the Service Tribunal filed within 30 days of communication of the final departmental order is within limitation under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Can an aggrieved employee choose to wait for the final decision on a departmental appeal rather than filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal immediately after 90 days?
  • How is the limitation period calculated under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 when a departmental rejection order is communicated on a date later than its issuance?
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• Zafar Iqbal vs M.G.O., M.G.O. Branch, GHQ Rawalpindi and 3 others1995 SCMR 881 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-12-19
  leave to appealpromotionseniorityjurisdictionfitness for promotionAnnual Confidential Reportscivil service
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's service appeal on jurisdictional grounds. The petitioner, despite being senior to the private respondents, was denied promotion by the departmental authority based on unfavorable entries in his Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). After exhausting departmental remedies, the petitioner sought a direction from the Service Tribunal for his promotion on the basis of seniority. The Service Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the fitness of a civil servant for promotion. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld this decision, ruling that the question of fitness for promotion is expressly barred from the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under the relevant statutory provisions. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Service Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine the fitness of a civil servant to hold a particular post or be promoted?
  • Can a civil servant challenge a denial of promotion based on ACR entries before the Service Tribunal under Section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973?
  • Whether the statutory bar on promotion-related questions under the Service Tribunals Act 1973 applies when a senior civil servant is bypassed for promotion by a departmental promotion committee?
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• Zafar Hayat vs The State1995 SCMR 896 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-03-22
  murdereye-witness testimonychance witnesscriminal appealacquittalburden of proofcorroborative evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged a High Court judgment that had modified the appellant's death sentence to life imprisonment for a murder conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question concerned the reliability of eye-witness testimony in an alleged night-time occurrence where the presence of witnesses was contested. The Supreme Court scrutinized the testimony of the complainant and a chance witness, noting significant inconsistencies regarding their presence at the scene, the lack of independent corroboration for the alleged source of light, and the unconvincing nature of their reasons for being present at the late hour. Furthermore, the Court noted that the recovery of the weapon was not supported by forensic examination. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The principle laid down is that where the presence of eye-witnesses is doubtful and lacks independent corroboration, conviction cannot be sustained solely on their testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained based on the testimony of eye-witnesses whose presence at the scene of the crime is doubtful?
  • Is the testimony of a chance witness sufficient to support a conviction in the absence of independent corroboration?
  • Does the failure to send a recovered weapon for forensic examination weaken the prosecution's case?
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• Zafar Abbas vs The State1995 SCMR 1809 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-04-19
  narcotics possessionbenefit of doubtsentencing thresholdweight of contrabandProhibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979criminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court, which upheld the petitioner's conviction and sentence for possession of 11 grams of heroin under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order 1979. The core legal question was whether the prosecution sufficiently proved that the heroin, including its container, exceeded the 10-gram threshold required for a more severe sentence, given the absence of evidence regarding the weight of the container itself. The Supreme Court held that since the prosecution failed to establish that the heroin was weighed exclusive of its container (a waxed envelope), the possibility existed that the actual weight of the contraband was 10 grams or less. Consequently, the Court extended the benefit of the doubt to the appellant regarding the weight of the narcotics. The principle laid down is that in cases involving threshold quantities of narcotics for sentencing purposes, the prosecution must provide positive evidence that the contraband was weighed without its container; failure to do so creates a reasonable doubt that must be resolved in the accused's favor.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to weigh narcotics exclusive of their container create a reasonable doubt regarding the quantity possessed?
  • Should the benefit of the doubt be extended to an accused when the weight of recovered narcotics is borderline regarding statutory sentencing thresholds?
  • Is the prosecution required to prove that the weight of recovered heroin was calculated without its container to justify a sentence exceeding the threshold for 10 grams?
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• Yar Muhammad vs Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman and 2 others1995 SCMR 46 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-03-28
  civil servicedisciplinary rulesstatutory interpretationdelegated legislationterms and conditions of serviceWAPDA
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the competency of the Managing Director and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) to amend Rule 12 of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978. The petitioner contended that such an amendment fell outside the scope of Section 18 of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958, and that Section 29 of the Act only envisaged the framing of regulations, not rules, by the Authority with the approval of the Government. The Supreme Court analyzed Sections 18 and 29 of the Act, noting that Section 29 is of a general nature, whereas Section 18 specifically empowers the Authority to prescribe the terms and conditions of service of its employees. The Court held that because rules regulating disciplinary proceedings relate directly to the terms and conditions of service, the Authority is fully competent to make or amend them under Section 18 without requiring government approval under Section 29. Consequently, the amendment to Rule 12 was declared valid, and the petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Water and Power Development Authority has the exclusive competency to amend its employees' disciplinary rules under Section 18 of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958 without government approval?
  • Does Section 29 of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958 restrict the Authority's specific power under Section 18 to prescribe terms and conditions of service?
  • Are rules regulating disciplinary proceedings of WAPDA employees considered part of their terms and conditions of service under the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act 1958?
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• Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore and another vs Javaid Ahmed and others1995 PLC (C.S.) 642 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1994-05-04
  service appeallimitationmala fide terminationretrenchmentleave to appealFederal Service Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which accepted the respondent's appeal, setting aside his termination from service and ordering reinstatement with consequential benefits on the ground of mala fides. The core legal question involved whether the Service Tribunal committed an illegality by failing to explicitly record a finding on the question of limitation raised by the petitioner, and whether the termination of the respondent while retaining his juniors was lawful. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal, being conscious of the limitation objection, had impliedly rejected it by deciding the matter on merits, and that the termination was indeed mala fide as junior employees appointed on the same day were retained. The Court laid down that an omission to write a formal finding on limitation does not vitiate a judgment where the circumstances show the objection was consciously considered and overruled, and refused to grant leave to appeal as no question of legal or general public importance was raised.

  Questions settled

  • Whether failure of the Tribunal to explicitly record a finding on limitation vitiates its judgment when the objection was raised and considered?
  • Can the termination of an employee during probation be held mala fide when junior employees appointed on the same day are retained in service?
  • Does a petition for leave to appeal lie against a factual finding of mala fides where no question of public importance is involved?
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• Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore and 3 others vs Shan1995 PLC (C.S.) 104 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1993-12-21
  service tribunaldismissal from serviceunauthorized absenceshow-cause noticesubstitution of penaltyleave to appealWAPDA employees
  Summary & questions settled

  The respondent, an Assistant Line Man employed by WAPDA, applied for extraordinary leave without pay which was refused by the competent authority. Due to his continued absence and inability to serve notice personally, a notice was published in the official gazette. Acting under Rule 8(b) of the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1978, the competent authority dismissed him from service without a formal show-cause notice under Rule 5, deeming personal service impracticable. After his departmental appeal failed, the respondent approached the Service Tribunal, which partly accepted the appeal and substituted the dismissal with a reduction to the lowest stage in the time scale for two years. WAPDA petitioned for leave to appeal, arguing that once the merits were not pressed before the Tribunal, reduction of penalty was unjustified, and that Rule 5(a) applies differently. The Supreme Court granted leave to examine these contentions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Service Tribunal is justified in substituting an order of dismissal with a lesser penalty when the appeal was not pressed on merits?
  • Whether Rule 5(a) of the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1978 applies to an inefficient worker or habitual malingerer in cases of unauthorized absence?
  • Under what circumstances can a competent authority dispense with a show-cause notice under Rule 8(b) of the WAPDA Employees (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1978?
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• Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman/Chief1995 PLD Supreme Court 631 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1995-07-26
  civil servantservice tribunaljurisdictionleave to appealindustrial relationsWAPDA employeeback benefits
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises from a service dispute concerning the dismissal of an employee of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) following a criminal conviction, and subsequent proceedings under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and constitutional jurisdiction. The core legal question is whether an employee of WAPDA falls within the definition of a civil servant of the Federal Government under section 17(1B) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958, thereby barring jurisdiction of the Labour Courts in favor of the Federal Service Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the legal status of a WAPDA employee under section 17(1B) raises a question of law rather than a mere question of fact, and granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower forums and the High Court erred in assuming jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that the status of WAPDA employees under the relevant statutory provisions involves a pure question of law regarding jurisdictional competence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee of the Water and Power Development Authority is a civil servant of the Federal Government under section 17(1B) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958?
  • Does the question of whether a WAPDA employee falls within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal constitute a question of law or a question of fact?
  • Can a grievance petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 be maintained by a WAPDA employee governed by section 17(1B) of the WAPDA Act?
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