Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Ghulam Qadir vs The State1983 SCMR 523 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-08
  murderrobberyretracted confessioncapital punishmentbenefit of doubteyewitness testimonyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from the conviction and death sentence of the appellant under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of two persons during a bus robbery, along with a conviction under section 392/34 for robbery. The core legal question was whether the appellant's conviction for murder could be safely sustained on a retracted, exculpatory judicial confession and insufficient eyewitness testimony where eyewitnesses did not state that the appellant fired the fatal shots. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the murder charge beyond reasonable doubt, as the retracted confession and eyewitness accounts did not implicate the appellant in the killings. Consequently, the Court set aside the murder conviction and death sentence while maintaining the conviction and sentence for robbery under section 392/34. The key principle laid down is that a retracted confession and eyewitness testimony failing to attribute the fatal act to the accused cannot sustain a capital conviction without reliable corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on a retracted confession that exculpates the accused from the fatal act?
  • Whether uncorroborated eyewitness testimony failing to attribute the fatal shots to the accused is sufficient to maintain a death sentence?
  • Is a conviction under section 392 of the Pakistan Penal Code sustainable when independent witnesses confirm the robbery despite the failure of the murder charge?
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• Ghulam Qadir vs J.Ahangir and Other1983 SCMR 533 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-11
  restoration of petitionnon-prosecutiondismissal of petitionsufficient causeadvocate-on-recordcriminal petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns an application for the restoration of a criminal petition that was previously dismissed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan for non-prosecution. The petitioner's criminal petition had been dismissed because neither the petitioner nor their counsel appeared when the case was called for hearing. In the restoration application, the Advocate-on-Record contended that they were delayed due to being stuck at a railway crossing while traveling to Islamabad, preventing their timely arrival at the court. The Supreme Court examined the sufficiency of this explanation and noted that the Advocate-on-Record admitted they were not prepared to argue the case on the date of dismissal, nor were they prepared to argue it at the time of the restoration application. The Court held that the explanation provided for the absence was insufficient and that, regardless of the delay, the lack of preparedness to argue the case rendered the appearance inconsequential. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for restoration, affirming that non-prosecution due to lack of preparedness and insufficient cause for absence warrants the dismissal of the restoration request.

  Questions settled

  • Is a delay caused by a railway crossing sufficient grounds to restore a petition dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Does the lack of preparedness to argue a case on the date of hearing justify the refusal to restore a dismissed petition?
  • Can a petition be restored if the counsel admits they were not prepared to argue the case on the date it was dismissed?
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• Ghulam Nabi and Others vs Seth Muhammad Yaqub and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-23
  specific performanceOrder II Rule 2 CPCres judicatalimitation periodbona fide purchasercontractual novationimmovable property
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The core legal questions concerned the maintainability of the suit under Order II Rule 2 and Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the applicability of res judicata regarding a previously withdrawn suit, and the limitation period for specific performance. The Supreme Court held that Order II Rule 2 does not bar a subsequent suit where the prior suit was incompetent, nor does Order XXIII Rule 1 bar a suit already pending at the time of the previous suit's withdrawal. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a mere withdrawal of a suit without adjudication on merits does not constitute res judicata. Regarding limitation, the Court affirmed that an extension of time for performance creates a fresh terminus a quo. The Court laid down the principle that a subsequent purchaser with notice of a prior contract cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser, and that specific performance is an appropriate remedy where the defendant's conduct does not justify abandonment or waiver.

  Questions settled

  • Does the withdrawal of a previous suit without permission of the court bar a subsequent suit that was already pending at the time of withdrawal?
  • Does Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 bar a subsequent suit for specific performance if the previous suit for injunction was incompetent?
  • Does an extension of time for the performance of a contract create a fresh terminus a quo for the purpose of limitation?
  • Can a subsequent purchaser with notice of a prior contract claim protection as a bona fide purchaser for value?
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• Ghulam Muhammad vs Ties Additional Settlement Commissioner and Ors1983 SCMR 1042 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-04
  evacuee propertyurban settlementconstitutional jurisdictionremand ordervertical divisionrevisional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a constitutional petition regarding the division of urban evacuee property. The petitioner, a claimant, challenged the vertical division of the property ordered by the Additional Settlement Commissioner following a remand from the High Court. The core legal questions were whether the division of the property was arbitrary and whether the Settlement Commissioner possessed the legal authority to remand the matter to the Additional Settlement Commissioner rather than deciding the revision petition personally. The Supreme Court held that the division of the property was not arbitrary, as it was based on a factual inspection confirming the property could be conveniently divided. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Settlement Commissioner acted within their competence and discretion in remanding the case to the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The key principle laid down is that the division of urban evacuee property, when based on factual findings of convenience, is not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction, and a Settlement Commissioner has the authority to remand matters to subordinate officers during revisional proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Settlement Commissioner remand a matter to an Additional Settlement Commissioner while exercising revisional jurisdiction?
  • Is the vertical division of urban evacuee property subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction when based on factual findings of convenience?
  • Does a Settlement Commissioner have the discretion to delegate the decision-making process to an Additional Settlement Commissioner upon remand from the High Court?
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• Ghulam Muhammad vs Suleman and 3 Other1983 SCMR 735 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-28
  Permanent Transfer DeedSettlement propertyfraudulent interpolationauction purchaserwrit jurisdictionconcurrent findingscancellation of transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the ownership of a property identified as Settlement Property No. 519, corresponding to Excise and Taxation Property No. 384. The petitioner, having purchased the property via public auction, obtained a Permanent Transfer Order (P.T.O.) and Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.). Subsequently, the first respondent claimed ownership, alleging the property was transferred to him. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner and Additional Settlement Commissioner concurrently found that the first respondent’s documents contained fraudulent interpolations regarding the property number and that the petitioner’s auction purchase was valid. However, the Settlement Commissioner later set aside these findings, directing a re-examination of possession. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petitioner's subsequent writ petition, suggesting the petitioner approach civil courts. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, noting that the Settlement Commissioner’s jurisdiction to cancel a P.T.D. and the failure to address the concurrent findings of fraud by lower authorities required judicial examination. The core legal question is whether the Settlement Commissioner acted within jurisdiction in cancelling a P.T.D. and disregarding concurrent findings of fraud.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Settlement Commissioner have the jurisdiction to cancel a Permanent Transfer Deed once it has been issued?
  • Can a Settlement Commissioner disregard concurrent findings of fact regarding fraud made by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and Additional Settlement Commissioner?
  • Is a writ petition the appropriate forum to challenge the cancellation of a property transfer where allegations of fraud and forgery are central to the dispute?
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• Ghulam Muhammad vs Mst. Khudijatul Kubra1983 SCMR 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-25
  special leave to appealgiftrevocation of giftmixed questions of law and factdower
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a dispute over agricultural land gifted by the petitioner to his wife, the respondent, via a registered deed in 1950, which the petitioner later attempted to revoke. The respondent successfully filed a suit for declaration and possession, which was decreed in her favor and upheld by both the District Judge and the High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could raise new mixed questions of law and fact regarding the marriage and dower for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that mixed questions of law and fact involving factual determinations, such as marriage consummation and dower fixation, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time at the leave to appeal stage if doing so would seriously prejudice the opposing party. The key principle laid down is that while pure questions of law may sometimes be allowed to be raised at a belated stage, questions requiring the determination of fresh factual controversies will not be entertained before the apex court.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise mixed questions of law and fact for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal?
  • Whether an appellate court should permit new factual controversies to be agitated when they were never raised in any of the courts below?
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• Ghulam Muhammad and Others vs Settlement & Rehabilitation1983 SCMR 193 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-21
  settlement authoritiesdisplaced persontransfer of propertycomposite propertyconstitutional jurisdictionfindings of factreview petition
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the High Court was justified in interfering with findings of fact recorded by settlement authorities regarding the transfer of composite property. The core legal question involved the competing entitlement of a claimant versus a non-claimant displaced person over property units, including a chowbara and shops, based on possession and statutory forms. The Supreme Court upheld the view that admissions of parties regarding independent possession and the initial treatment of the property by the Rehabilitation Department must govern the allotment, noting that the claimant held priority and the lower authorities had ignored material admissions and records. The Court concluded that the High Court's intervention was justified given the patent illegalities and misreading of evidence by the settlement authorities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact recorded by settlement authorities when such findings are contrary to the record and admissions of the parties?
  • Does a claimant displaced person enjoy priority over a non-claimant displaced person in the transfer of evacuee property?
  • What is the effect of an admission made in a memo of appeal regarding the independent possession of a disputed property unit?
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• Ghulam Muhammad and Others vs Member, Board of Revenue, N. W. F. P.1983 SCMR 562 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-11
  lease agreementejectmentarrears of lease moneyconcurrent findings of factconstitutional jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the order of the Peshawar High Court declining to interfere with the concurrent findings of the revenue authorities regarding their ejectment and recovery of arrears of lease money. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could be treated as defaulters despite having paid a security deposit of Rs. 3,000 under the lease agreement. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the lease agreement contained no provision for the adjustment of the advance security towards lease arrears, the concurrent factual findings of the revenue authorities and the High Court were unexceptionable. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition and refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming that findings of fact by revenue tribunals undisturbed by the High Court will not be interfered with in the absence of legal error or misreading.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in refusing to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by revenue authorities regarding default in lease payments?
  • Can an advance security deposit be adjusted towards lease arrears in the absence of an express stipulation in the lease agreement?
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• Ghulam Muhammad and Others vs Mehtab Beg and Other1983 SCMR 849 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-08
  occupancy tenancyinheritancepresumption of lawadmissibility of evidencesecondary evidencenecessary partiesfamily settlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a dispute over occupancy tenancy rights in agricultural land. The respondents, claiming to be collaterals of the deceased tenant, filed a suit for declaration of their tenancy rights by inheritance. The appellant-landlords resisted, arguing the tenancy became extinct upon the death of the tenant's widow. The trial and first appellate courts dismissed the suit, but the High Court reversed the decision, decreeing the suit to the extent of 5/6th share. The High Court relied on a family settlement compromise deed (Exh. P-1) from 1845 to invoke a presumption of law that the common ancestor had held the land. The Supreme Court examined whether the presumption of law was correctly applied and whether the copy of the compromise deed was admissible. The Court held that since the appellants failed to object to the admissibility and mode of proof of the document at the trial stage, they were precluded from raising such objections in appeal. The Court affirmed the High Court's findings and dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party object to the mode of proof or admissibility of a document for the first time in an appellate court if no objection was raised during the trial?
  • Does the presumption of genuineness under Section 90 of the Evidence Act apply to a certified copy of an ancient document when the original is not produced?
  • Whether the failure to implead the legal representatives of a co-owner with a defined share in an appeal renders the entire appeal incompetent for non-joinder of necessary parties?
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• Ghulam Mohyuddin vs Mst. Nazir Bibi1983 SCMR 715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-05-02
  rented premisesevictionbona fide requirementpersonal useconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged concurrent eviction orders passed against the petitioner by the Rent Controller, the District Judge, and the High Court. The primary legal question was whether the landlady’s requirement of the shop for her husband’s personal business use was bona fide, given that the husband was already operating a business in a rented premises. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the lower courts regarding the bona fide nature of the requirement were supported by evidence. The Court reasoned that the husband’s existing business experience and his desire to move from a rented shop to his own property to avoid the risk of eviction established a genuine and bona fide need. Consequently, the Court found no justification to interfere with the factual findings of the lower courts and dismissed the petition, while granting the petitioner four months to vacate the premises subject to the regular payment of rent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's requirement for a shop for her husband's personal business use constitute a bona fide need for eviction purposes?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by lower courts regarding the bona fide requirement of a landlord?
  • Does a tenant's desire to avoid the risk of eviction from a rented shop support a claim of bona fide requirement for personal use of their own property?
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• Ghulam Hussain vs Muhammad Saleh and Another1983 SCMR 357 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-31
  bail cancellationleave to appealcross-casejudicial discretioncriminal proceduremurder
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves two petitions for leave to appeal filed by the complainant, Ghulam Hussain, challenging orders of the Lahore High Court regarding the grant and refusal to cancel bail for respondents accused of murder and other offences under the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in its discretion by refusing to cancel the bail of certain respondents and by granting bail to another, given the existence of a cross-case and conflicting investigative reports. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s exercise of discretion was sound, noting that the existence of a prior cross-case involving injuries to the accused and the investigative officer's initial opinion in favour of one respondent were valid factors for consideration. The Court affirmed that bail decisions involve the exercise of judicial discretion based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case, and absent any violation of express law or established legal principles, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the High Court's discretionary orders regarding bail.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary order regarding bail if no express provision of law or legal principle has been violated?
  • Is the existence of a prior cross-case involving injuries to the accused a relevant factor for the court to consider when deciding on a bail application?
  • Does the initial opinion of an investigating officer in a report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 constitute a valid factor for the court to consider in bail proceedings?
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• Ghulam Hussain and Muhammad Tufail vs The State the State1983 SCMR 420 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-15Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider vs The State1983 SCMR 842 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-28
  attempt to commit ZinaOffence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinanceadverse inferencenon-production of witnessesconsentcriminal attemptleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction under Section 18 read with Section 10 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, for attempting to commit rape. The prosecution alleged the petitioner entered the victim's house at night, attempted to force himself upon her, and was interrupted by the victim's sister. The petitioner argued that the victim consented, that he was falsely implicated due to a property dispute, and that the non-production of certain eye-witnesses should create an adverse presumption. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, finding no evidence of a property dispute or consent. The Court held that the physical evidence—specifically the state of undress of both parties—clearly indicated an intent to commit sexual intercourse, thereby constituting an attempt to commit Zina rather than a lesser offence under Section 354 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The Court affirmed that the non-production of witnesses who were not present at the immediate scene does not create an adverse inference when natural witnesses have provided consistent testimony. Leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-production of eye-witnesses who were not present at the immediate scene of the crime create an adverse presumption against the prosecution?
  • Does the removal of clothing and physical contact in a sexual context constitute an attempt to commit Zina under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Can a conviction for an attempt to commit Zina be sustained when the accused claims the victim was a consenting party?
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• Ghulam Haider Shah and Another vs The Province of Punjab and 41983 SCMR 458 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-16
  constitutional jurisdictionpublic parkencroachmentTehbazariwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their writ petition regarding a disputed piece of land within the municipal limits of Faisalabad Town, which they occupied on a Tehbazari basis and sought to purchase. The Board of Revenue had previously refused the sale, noting the land was part of a public park under a sanctioned scheme and directed its public auction, while the High Court additionally ordered the Municipal Committee to dispossess the petitioners and restore the site. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had acquired a right to the sale of the land and whether the High Court acted beyond its competence in issuing further directions regarding the public park. The Supreme Court held that intra-departmental correspondence does not confer any legal right or entitlement to the petitioners, and declined to interfere with the High Court's directions since they accorded with public policy and the law relating to public amenities. The key principle laid down is that internal administrative correspondence does not constitute an adjudication or create enforceable rights for private parties over state land reserved for public amenities.

  Questions settled

  • Whether intra-departmental correspondence can constitute an adjudication creating a legal right to the sale of state land?
  • Can a municipal committee lawfully issue licences of encroachment on land reserved for a public park in a sanctioned scheme?
  • Whether the High Court can direct the dispossession of encroachers and the restoration of a public park when dismissing a writ petition filed by such encroachers?
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• Ghulam Haider and others vs Ghulam Muhammad and Othere1983 PLD Supreme Court 406 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-03
  limitationcourt-feemiscellaneous applicationstay orderprocedural irregularityland acquisitionSupreme Court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a Civil Miscellaneous Application filed by respondents in a pending land acquisition appeal, seeking three reliefs: rescission of the leave-granting order due to alleged time-barring of the initial petition; dismissal of the appeal for failure to pay court fees within the prescribed limitation period; and vacation of an existing interim stay order. The Supreme Court held that objections regarding limitation are more appropriately addressed during the final hearing of the appeal rather than through piecemeal applications, which are contrary to judicial practice. Regarding the court-fee issue, the Court ruled that such matters fall under the jurisdiction of the Registrar pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules, and the application was procedurally misconceived for misjoinder of causes. The Court refused to vacate the stay order but directed that the disputed funds be invested in a deposit account under the Registrar's name to protect the interests of the successful party. The Court emphasized that indiscriminate filing of miscellaneous applications causes unnecessary delays and administrative burdens, urging strict adherence to procedural rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a preliminary objection regarding limitation in a miscellaneous application before the hearing of the main appeal?
  • Does the Supreme Court have the authority to adjudicate court-fee disputes directly, or should they be addressed by the Registrar?
  • Is the joinder of multiple, distinct causes of action in a single miscellaneous application permissible under Supreme Court practice?
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• Ghulam Haider and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 790 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-27
  bailcancellation of bailtrial delayprosecution witnessescriminal procedurepost-arrest bail
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which had cancelled the bail previously granted to the petitioners by the Sessions Judge, Bahawalnagar. The petitioners were facing prosecution under sections 323, 325, and 393 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, read with section 34. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the continued detention of the accused was justified given the significant delay in the trial proceedings. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the circumstances, noted that despite the lapse of more than eight months since the registration of the case, not a single prosecution witness had been examined, with adjournments frequently occurring due to the absence of witnesses. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and directed that the petitioners be released on bail. The key principle laid down is that where the prosecution fails to proceed with the trial for a significant period due to the absence of witnesses, such delay constitutes a valid ground for the grant of bail to the accused.

  Questions settled

  • Does a significant delay in the examination of prosecution witnesses constitute a valid ground for the grant of bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court convert a petition for leave to appeal into an appeal for final disposal?
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• Ghulam Farid vs Manzur Ahmad and Another1983 SCMR 97 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-20
  criminal appealmurderacquittalpetition for special leave to appealSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court whereby the respondents were acquitted of the charge of murder. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court's acquittal judgment suffered from any legal infirmity, misreading of evidence, or ignored material aspects justifying interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that no principle of law or material aspect of the evidence or circumstance had been ignored by the High Court and no ground existed for interference. Consequently, the petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed, upholding the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court when no principle of law or material aspect of evidence has been ignored?
  • Does an appeal against acquittal warrant interference if the High Court has properly evaluated the evidence and circumstances of the case?
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• Ghulam Ali vs Rasab and Other1983 SCMR 1026 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-02-09
  leave to appealtriple murderright of private defensevicarious liabilityacquittalland disputecriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that modified convictions in a triple murder case. The respondents were initially convicted by the trial court under sections 148 and 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murders of three individuals arising from a land dispute. The High Court, upon re-evaluating the evidence, concluded that the disputed land was not in the possession of either party and that the accused had acted in excess of the right of private defense. Consequently, the High Court altered the convictions of two respondents to section 304, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and acquitted the remaining respondents. The petitioner challenged this acquittal, arguing that the nature and extent of the injuries sustained by the deceased indicated the participation of more individuals than the High Court acknowledged and questioned the applicability of the right of self-defense given the circumstances of the attack. The Supreme Court, finding that the case required re-examination regarding the vicarious liability of the acquitted respondents and the validity of the self-defense plea, granted leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defense can be claimed when the accused party chases and kills the deceased?
  • Does the nature and dimension of injuries sustained by the deceased preclude the possibility of exclusive participation by only two accused?
  • Can the vicarious liability of co-accused be excluded when the primary assailants are found to have exceeded the right of self-defense?
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• Ghulam Ahmad vs Muhammad Hussain and Other1983 SCMR 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-16
  pre-emption suitcourt-fee deficiencyrejection of plaintextension of timecivil procedurecontumacy
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner filed a pre-emption suit on 17-10-1975 with insufficient court-fee. The trial court directed the petitioner to make up the deficiency by 3-1-1976. The petitioner failed to comply within the prescribed timeframe, only rectifying the deficiency by 5-2-1976. Consequently, the trial court rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. After unsuccessful appeals and review proceedings before the District Judge and a subsequent dismissal of a civil revision by the High Court, the petitioner sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the plaint was rightly rejected for failure to make up the court-fee deficiency within the court-ordered time. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, noting that the petitioner neither sought an extension of time from the trial court nor demonstrated sufficient cause for the delay. The Court held that in the absence of a timely application for extension or a valid justification for non-compliance, the rejection of the plaint for failure to pay the requisite court-fee is legally sound and not subject to interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a plaint be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 if the plaintiff fails to make up the court-fee deficiency within the time granted by the court?
  • Does the mere acceptance of a court-fee payment by the court after the deadline without a formal application for extension constitute an implied extension of time?
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• Ghazi Shah Etc. vs The State1983 SCMR 727 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-14
  post-arrest bailsmugglinggold smugglingrule of consistencybail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court rejecting the petitioners' bail application in a case involving the alleged smuggling of gold from Dubai. The core legal question concerns the rule of consistency in bail matters, specifically whether accused persons alleged to be mere carriers of smuggled goods are entitled to bail on the same footing as a co-accused or where the primary beneficiary is not apprehended. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were entitled to the grant of bail based on the principle established in precedent where paid servants or carriers were released on bail while the principal offender remained untried or differently situated. The key principle laid down is that parity in treatment regarding bail should be extended to co-accused who stand on a similar footing, such as carriers compared to primary beneficiaries or principal accused who have already been granted relief.

  Questions settled

  • Are carriers of smuggled goods entitled to bail on the ground of consistency when the main accused or beneficiary is not in custody?
  • Whether petitioners alleged to be paid servants are at par with the principal accused in smuggling cases for the purpose of bail?
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• GH U Lam Muhammad and Others vs Malik Abdul Qadir Khan and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 68 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-13
  limitationwaqfcivil revisionappellate practiceabandonment of pleagraveyard dedicationleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had dismissed a civil revision petition regarding a land dispute involving a waqf (dedication for a graveyard). The petitioners challenged the lower court's decree, primarily arguing that the suit was time-barred. The core legal question was whether the High Court was legally obligated to adjudicate a plea of limitation that had been raised in the pleadings but was not pressed or argued during the hearing of the revision petition. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not under a legal obligation to examine the limitation plea if it was not pressed during the hearing. The Court affirmed that if a party raises a point in the memorandum of appeal or revision but fails to argue it at the hearing, it is presumed to have been abandoned. The key principle laid down is that while an appellate court must ensure proceedings before it are within limitation, it is not required to adjudicate limitation pleas regarding the trial court proceedings if those pleas are not actively pursued by the parties during the appellate hearing.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appellate court legally obligated to decide a plea of limitation if it was raised in the pleadings but not pressed during the hearing?
  • Does the failure to argue a point raised in a memorandum of appeal or revision create a presumption that the point has been abandoned?
  • Can a party challenge a judgment on the basis of a limitation plea that was not argued before the High Court?
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• GH I Jlam Ali vs Rasas and Another1983 PLD Supreme Court 135 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-22
  private defenseinterested witnessescorroborationculpable homicideland disputeappeal against acquittaltrespass
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns cross-appeals arising from a land dispute where the complainant challenged the acquittal of several respondents, while two convicted appellants challenged their conviction under Section 304(1) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court correctly acquitted the respondents due to a lack of corroboration for interested ocular testimony and whether the convicted appellants had exceeded their right of private defense. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly applied the principle that interested and inimical witnesses require strong, independent corroboration, which was absent for the acquitted respondents. Regarding the convicts, the Court held that while they initially possessed a right of private defense against the complainant party's intrusion, their subsequent disproportionate, retaliatory, and punitive violence demonstrated a lack of good faith and restraint. Consequently, the Court affirmed the convictions and sentences for exceeding the right of private defense, while enhancing the imposed fines and compensation to better meet the ends of justice. The principle established is that the right of private defense is not available to trespassers who fail to cease their trespass, and a response lacking restraint and good faith constitutes an excess of that right.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right of private defense of person and property accrue to a trespasser who has not ceased the act of trespass?
  • Is strong corroboration required for the testimony of interested and inimical witnesses in a criminal trial?
  • Can a response to a threat be considered an exercise of the right of private defense if it is disproportionate, retaliatory, and punitive in nature?
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• General Manager, Canteen Stores Department, Karachi vs Abdul Rashid and Another1983 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-09-12
  Canteen Stores Departmentconstitutional protectioncivil servantdefence servicetermination of servicewrit jurisdictionservice at pleasure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside the termination of the respondent's services from the Canteen Stores Department (CSD). The core legal questions were whether the CSD constituted a government department and whether the respondent, as an employee, was entitled to constitutional protection under Article 177 of the Constitution of 1962. The Supreme Court examined the historical status of the CSD, noting that while it originated as a government undertaking, it was later treated as a non-government commercial concern. The Court held that the respondent’s employment, being connected with the defence of the country—as the CSD was established to support the Armed Forces—placed him outside the category of civil servants entitled to the constitutional safeguards against summary dismissal. The Court determined that the respondent held a post connected with defence, not a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Federation. Consequently, the constitutional protection under Article 177 did not apply to him. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order reinstating the respondent was set aside, establishing that employees in posts connected with defence are excluded from the constitutional protections afforded to civil servants.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Canteen Stores Department a government department for the purpose of conferring civil servant status on its employees?
  • Does an employee holding a post connected with defence enjoy the constitutional protection against dismissal provided to civil servants?
  • Can an employee of a non-government commercial concern under the Ministry of Defence claim constitutional guarantees applicable to civil servants?
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• Gaulam Hussain and Othsrss vs Muhammad Raza Khan and Another1983 SCMR 1114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-28
  settlement propertytransfer of propertycompromise between partiesauction of propertysupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition directed against orders of the settlement authorities regarding the transfer and auction of property comprising shops and a residential portion. During the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the parties entered into a compromise settling their conflicting claims over portions of the property already transferred to them. However, the compromise also sought to set aside the settlement department's order to auction a portion of the commercial property. The Supreme Court summoned counsel for the Settlement Department, who stated that the department could not accept the compromise insofar as it sought to set aside the auction order, but had no objection to the mutual adjustment of portions already transferred. The parties conceded that the auction order could not be set aside merely by private compromise. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal in terms of the lawful compromise regarding the mutual adjustment of transferred portions, and directed the Settlement Department to issue fresh transfer orders accordingly, while leaving the un-auctioned double shop open for consideration of transfer in the light of current instructions.

  Questions settled

  • Can parties to a litigation set aside an administrative auction order of settlement authorities merely by entering into a private compromise?
  • Whether the Settlement Department can object to a private compromise between parties regarding the mutual adjustment of property portions already transferred to them?
  • How should settlement authorities deal with property available for transfer when parties reach a partial lawful compromise?
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• Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division vs Amjad Ahad Sheikh1983 SCMR 164 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-05-23
  compulsory retirementcivil servicegeneral reputationcompetent authorityadministrative actionservice recordServices Tribunal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Services Tribunal judgment that set aside the compulsory retirement of a civil servant. The core legal questions concerned whether the absence of a formal order from a competent authority invalidated the retirement, and whether 'general reputation' constitutes a valid basis for administrative action against public servants. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision to reinstate the respondent, confirming that the failure of the Establishment Division to produce a valid order from a competent authority was a fatal jurisdictional defect. However, the Court clarified the legal principle regarding 'general reputation,' holding that information concerning a public servant's reputation—such as allegations of corruption or living beyond known means—is a legitimate factor for administrative authorities to consider. The Court noted that such administrative assessments need not meet the strict evidentiary standards required in a court of law, thereby correcting the Tribunal's observation that general reputation should not outweigh recorded performance.

  Questions settled

  • Can a public servant be compulsorily retired without an order from a competent authority?
  • Is 'general reputation' a valid consideration for administrative action against a public servant?
  • Does the absence of a formal order from a competent authority render an order of compulsory retirement void?
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• Federation of Pakistan and 2 Others vs Abdul Razzaq1983 SCMR 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-28
  service tribunalinquiry reportreasonable opportunitydisciplinary proceedingsreinstatementadverse entries
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal which accepted the respondent employee's appeal against his removal from service. The respondent, initially joining as a Lower Division Clerk and later promoted as an Assistant, faced disciplinary proceedings involving adverse Annual Confidential Report entries and a departmental inquiry. Although an inquiry was conducted, a copy of the inquiry report was not provided to the respondent before adverse action was taken against him. The core legal question was whether failing to supply a copy of the inquiry report to the accused employee violates the principle of a reasonable opportunity of defense. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal correctly found that the mandatory requirement of providing the inquiry report had been ignored, thereby denying the employee a reasonable opportunity of defense. The Court affirmed the reinstatement order with the option for the authorities to proceed afresh in accordance with the law, upholding the established principle that failure to furnish an inquiry report vitiates the disciplinary proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide a copy of the inquiry report to an employee violate the requirement of a reasonable opportunity of defense?
  • Can authorities initiate fresh departmental proceedings after a removal order is set aside due to procedural non-compliance?
  • Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is justified in reinstating an employee when mandatory legal requirements of an inquiry are ignored?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Land Commission vs Mst. Gul Bibi and Other1983 SCMR 818 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1978-01-08
  constitutional petitionland reformsbenami transactionjudicial reviewsuo motu revisionconfiscatory provisions
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Federal Land Commission against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which had accepted a constitutional petition and declared an order of the Commission in suo motu revision to be without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether agricultural land gifted by a brother to his sister could be deemed to be the property of her husband, a retired government servant, under paragraph 10 of Martial Law Regulation No. 115, in the absence of evidence showing a benami transaction. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact based on no evidence or resulting from a misreading of evidence are open to correction by the High Court under its constitutional writ jurisdiction, and that confiscatory provisions of law taking away private property without compensation must be strictly construed. The Court laid down the principle that the Federal Land Commission cannot interfere with plausible appellate findings without proper evidence or valid grounds, and that statutory provisions regarding the resumption of excess land require a clear nexus between the government servant and the disputed property.

  Questions settled

  • Are findings of fact based on no evidence or misreading of evidence open to correction by the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution?
  • Whether confiscatory provisions of law regarding the resumption of land require strict construction?
  • Can the Federal Land Commission interfere with plausible appellate findings without proper evidence or legal grounds?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Land Commission vs Mian Ghulam Qadir and 10 Other1983 SCMR 867 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-18
  Martial Law Regulation 115land reformstatutory interpretationProduce Index Unitspenal provisiondeclaration of landstrict construction
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment interpreting paragraph 12(1)(b) of Martial Law Regulation 115. The core legal question concerned the obligation of landowners to file declarations under the Regulation. Specifically, the dispute centered on the interpretation of the phrase "whichever shall be greater" regarding the two thresholds for land ownership: 12,000 Produce Index Units (PIUs) or 150 acres of irrigated land. The petitioner argued that landowners were required to file declarations even if their holdings exceeded only one of these limits. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the statutory language is unambiguous. The Court affirmed that the phrase "whichever shall be greater" implies that a landowner is only required to file a declaration if their holdings exceed both the 12,000 PIU limit and the 150-acre irrigated land limit. Furthermore, the Court established that as a penal provision, the Regulation must be construed strictly and in favor of the subject, thereby dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the phrase 'whichever shall be greater' in paragraph 12(1)(b) of Martial Law Regulation 115 require a landowner to file a declaration if their holding exceeds only one of the two specified limits?
  • Should a penal provision in a statute be construed strictly in favor of the subject when ambiguity exists?
  • Are landowners required to file declarations under Martial Law Regulation 115 if their land holdings do not exceed both the 12,000 Produce Index Units limit and the 150-acre irrigated land limit?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Rasul vs Javaid Sayyed and Other1983 SCMR 1256 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-08
  evacuee trust propertystatutory delegationestoppeladministrative jurisdictiontransfer of propertywrit jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the rejection of the petitioner's application for the transfer of Evacuee Trust Property No. S-38-R-201, Lahore. The petitioner challenged the administrative decision on the grounds that the Federal Government, having received his initial application, could not delegate its authority to the Evacuee Trust Property Board, and that the subsequent disposal of the property by the Board's authorities was legally invalid. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Evacuee Trust Property Board is statutorily empowered to manage and dispose of evacuee trust property under the direction of the Federal Government. The Court further held that the petitioner, having actively participated in the proceedings before the Board's authorities without objection, was estopped from subsequently challenging their jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that where a party submits to the jurisdiction of a statutory body and participates in its proceedings, they cannot later challenge the validity of that body's authority, particularly when the body acts within its statutory mandate.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party who participates in proceedings before the Evacuee Trust Property Board later challenge the jurisdiction of that body?
  • Does the Evacuee Trust Property Board have the authority to manage and dispose of evacuee trust property under the direction of the Federal Government?
  • Is a petitioner estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of an administrative authority after having submitted to its proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Land Commission vs Dewan Ghulam Abbas Bokhari and Other1983 SCMR 894 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1977-09-14
  Martial Law Regulation 115land reformsalienation of landbona fide transactionFederal Land Commissionmutationspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns petitions for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which partially set aside an order of the Federal Land Commissioner regarding the validity of land alienations under Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The core legal question was whether the Federal Land Commissioner correctly declared certain land mutations void as mala fide transactions intended to evade land reform limits, particularly regarding alienations to family members. The High Court had upheld the validity of several mutations, finding the transactions bona fide based on evidence of consideration and market conditions, despite the Federal Land Commissioner's contrary finding. The Supreme Court held that the High Court did not err in its assessment of the bona fides of the transactions. The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the High Court improperly considered new material, noting that the petitioner failed to dispute the bona fides of the transactions in light of the High Court's reasoning. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petitions, affirming that the High Court's findings on the validity of the mutations were sound.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court uphold the validity of land mutations based on evidence of consideration and market conditions despite a contrary finding by the Federal Land Commissioner?
  • Does the deletion of an explanation in a statute regarding alienations to family members affect the validity of prior land transactions?
  • Is it an error for a High Court to consider material produced during a hearing rather than remanding the case to the Federal Land Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• Federal Government of Pakistan And 2 Others vs Muhammad Usman1983 SCMR 1277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-10
  break up valuecompensationtaken over establishmentwealth tax rulesdepreciationeconomic reforms
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from cross-petitions challenging an order of the Lahore High Court concerning the calculation of compensation for shares of an establishment taken over under the Economic Reforms Order, 1972. The core legal question was whether, in computing the 'Break Up Value' of shares under rule 8(2)(c) of the Wealth Tax Rules, the cumulative depreciation for years prior to the latest audited balance sheet—specifically during a tax holiday period—could be deducted by auditors from the company's total wealth. The Supreme Court held that the calculation must strictly follow the statutory formula provided in the Wealth Tax Rules, which relies on specified items such as paid-up capital, debentures, reserves, and the profit and loss account balance, without permitting auditors to go behind the accounts to deduct unprovided historical depreciation. The key principle laid down is that where the legislature prescribes a uniform, explicit formula for computing share value based on specific balance-sheet items, external adjustments not sanctioned by the text, such as retroactive depreciation calculations, cannot be imported into the computation.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the entire depreciation worked out cumulatively has to be taken into account in computing the Break Up Value of shares under the Wealth Tax Rules?
  • Can auditors go behind the audited annual balance sheet to deduct depreciation not claimed during a tax holiday period when calculating share compensation?
  • Does rule 8(2)(c) of the Wealth Tax Rules permit factors outside the specified items of paid-up capital, debentures, reserves, and profit and loss balance to be factored into the Break Up Value?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazlur Rahman vs Muhammad Siddique1983 SCMR 1189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-24
  ejectmentbona fide personal requirementlandlord and tenantcommercial tenancyfindings of factrent control
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerns a dispute between a landlord and a tenant regarding the ejectment of the tenant from a commercial shop. The appellant, a goldsmith, sought the respondent's eviction on grounds of default in rent payment and personal bona fide requirement of the premises. While the Rent Controller initially ordered ejectment based on the personal requirement ground, the District Judge reversed this decision, finding the landlord's claim of personal need lacked genuineness, particularly noting that the landlord had previously sold the business fixtures and instruments upon renting the shop. The Sind High Court upheld the District Judge's findings. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts correctly applied the law regarding the concept of personal need for commercial premises and whether the landlord was estopped from reviving a business he had previously abandoned. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the landlord failed to establish a bona fide personal requirement. The Court affirmed that findings of fact regarding the genuineness of a landlord's personal need, when cogent and legitimate, are not subject to interference.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a landlord's claim of bona fide personal requirement for a commercial shop is established when the landlord had previously sold the business fixtures and instruments?
  • Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact made by the lower appellate courts regarding the genuineness of a landlord's personal requirement?
  • Is a landlord estopped from seeking eviction on the ground of personal requirement if they have previously abandoned the business for which the premises were rented?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Khan and Another vs Ghulam Rabbani1983 PLD Supreme Court 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-08
  pre-emptionLand Reforms Regulation 1972improvement of statustenancy rightsdoctrine of mergersuperior right of pre-emptionvendee status
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a second appeal dismissed in limine by the Lahore High Court, affirming pre-emption decrees against the vendee-appellants. The appellants purchased suit land via a registered sale deed on 12-7-1971 while allegedly occupying it as tenants. The respondent filed a pre-emption suit on 2-7-1972 based on collateral kinship. The appellants argued that they had improved their status before the suit was instituted due to the first right of pre-emption conferred on tenants under Paragraph 25(3) of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 (MLR 115), which took effect from Kharif 1972. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under the doctrine of merger recognized in Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, the appellants' tenancy rights merged into ownership on 12-7-1971. Consequently, they ceased to be tenants prior to the enforcement of the Regulation and did not possess tenancy status when Paragraph 25(3) took effect, thereby failing to acquire or improve any superior right of pre-emption thereunder.

  Questions settled

  • Can a vendee who acquired ownership of land prior to the enforcement of Paragraph 25(3) of the Land Reforms Regulation 1972 claim a superior right of pre-emption as a tenant under that provision to defeat a pre-emption suit?
  • Does a tenant's tenancy right merge into ownership upon purchasing the demised property under Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act 1882, extinguishing their status as a tenant?
  • Whether a defendant-vendee is permitted under pre-emption law to improve their status after the date of sale but before the institution of a pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Din and 3 Others vs The State1983SCMR 648 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-13
  culpable homicideprivate defencefree fightself-inflicted injuriesspecial leave to appealland dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioners for culpable homicide not amounting to murder and allied offences. The core legal question involved whether the petitioners acted in the exercise of the right of private defence of person and property during a dispute over the forceful occupation of land and diversion of canal water. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the incident constituted a free fight, negating any right of private defence, particularly given that the injuries sustained by the petitioners were self-inflicted while members of the complainant party suffered severe and fatal injuries. The court laid down the principle that in situations characterized by a free fight over land and water rights where the accused party's injuries are self-inflicted and disproportionate to the fatal violence inflicted on the deceased, the plea of private defence is untenable, and concurrent findings of fact by lower courts regarding guilt will not be interfered with absent illegality or misreading of evidence.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the right of private defence can be claimed by an accused party in a case of a free fight arising from a dispute over land possession and water diversion?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the guilt of accused persons and self-inflicted nature of their injuries be interfered with by the Supreme Court without proof of misreading of evidence?
  • Whether an accused person inflicting a fatal blow during a sudden altercation can be convicted under Section 304 Part I of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Din Alias Muhammad Fazil and Others vs Mazhar Iqbal and Other1983SCMR 1017 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-02-07
  abatement of appeallegal representativescondonation of delayjoint interestappellate powersleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the abatement of an appeal in the High Court. The core legal questions involve whether an appeal can abate against certain co-appellants when another co-appellant remains on the record, whether delay in applying to set aside an abatement can be condoned if the legal representatives were misled by the belief that the appeal was saved, and whether a surviving co-appellant can represent the joint interest of the estate of deceased brothers. The Court granted leave to appeal, identifying that the High Court's decision regarding total abatement requires review in light of established precedents concerning the representation of joint interests and the powers of the appellate court under the Code of Civil Procedure. The key principle to be examined is the extent to which the presence of a surviving co-appellant prevents the total abatement of an appeal and the applicability of appellate powers to preserve the integrity of the proceedings despite the death of other parties.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appeal abate against specific co-appellants when another co-appellant remains on the record?
  • Can delay in applying to set aside an abatement be condoned if legal representatives were misled regarding the status of the appeal?
  • Does a surviving co-appellant have the capacity to represent the joint interest of the estate of deceased co-appellants?
  Read full judgment →
• Fazal Dad vs Settlement Authority and 3 Other1983 SCMR 925 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-11-25
  petition for leave to appealsettlement departmentproperty transferdelay and lachesbona fide purchaserwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning urban properties in Rawalpindi, originally transferred to the fourth respondent by the Settlement Department in 1960. The third respondent, who had initially filed a claim form, remained inactive and took no steps to prosecute his application for nearly fifteen years while protracted litigation ensued between other parties. After the property was sold to the petitioners by a registered sale deed in 1968, the third respondent belatedly sought to revive his pending form. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner dismissed his application, but a writ petition filed before the Lahore High Court was subsequently allowed. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in granting relief to a claimant who had slept over his rights for nearly fifteen years, as against a petitioner claiming to be a bona fide transferee for value without notice. Finding merit in the submissions, the Court granted leave to appeal to consider the applicability of relevant precedents regarding laches and bona fide purchasers.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a claimant who remains inactive and fails to prosecute an application for fifteen years is entitled to discretionary relief in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Does a bona fide transferee for value without notice acquire protection against a belated claim revived after protracted settlement proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• Fawwad & Fareen Enterprises Ltd. vs The Director of Industries,Government of Sind, Karachi and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-21
  government tenderconstitutional jurisdictionadministrative instructionswrit petitionlowest biddervested rightestoppel
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment dismissing a constitutional petition regarding a government tender process. The core legal questions were whether the Sind Purchase Manual, 1977, possesses statutory force enforceable through writ jurisdiction, and whether a bidder acquires a vested right to a contract solely by submitting the lowest tender. The Supreme Court held that the Sind Purchase Manual, 1977, constitutes mere departmental instructions for internal guidance, lacking statutory or constitutional backing, and thus cannot create enforceable legal rights. The Court affirmed that a bidder does not acquire a vested right to a contract merely by being the lowest bidder, especially when the tender conditions explicitly reserve the government's right to reject any tender. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner, having participated in the subsequent fresh tender process without demur, was estopped from challenging the validity of that process. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the principle that internal administrative instructions are not justiciable in a court of law.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sind Purchase Manual, 1977, have the force of statutory law?
  • Can a bidder acquire a vested right to a contract merely by submitting the lowest tender?
  • Is a government department's internal administrative manual justiciable in a court of law?
  • Does participation in a fresh tender process without objection preclude a party from challenging the initial tender cancellation?
  Read full judgment →
• Fauji Foundation and Another vs Shamimur Rehman1983 PLD Supreme Court 457 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-12-02
  Martial Law RegulationPresident's OrderConstitutional validityJudicial reviewMala fidesLegislative intentConstitutional validationPast and closed transactionPublic purposeEminent domainSeparation of powersCompany dissolutionFundamental rights suspensionArmy Welfare Funds
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal concerned the validity of Martial Law Regulation No. 103 and President's Order No. 22 of 1972, which led to the dissolution of Rehmania Fauji Sugar Mills Ltd. and the transfer of its assets and liabilities to Fauji Foundation. The High Court had declared these legislative instruments void, citing mala fides, lack of public purpose, and violation of natural justice. The Supreme Court, reversing the High Court's decision, held that the legislative instruments were validly made by competent authority and were immune from judicial challenge under Article 281(1) of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972 and Article 269(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The Court emphasized that legislative motives are not justiciable, and the constitutional validation clauses provided blanket protection, curing any defects in competency or validity. It further held that the transaction, being past and closed, was protected, and the concept of public interest was involved in the transfer of the mill, which was established with Army Welfare Funds for ex-servicemen.

  Questions settled

  • Can the motives of a legislative authority be inquired into by courts when examining the validity of a legislative instrument?
  • Do constitutional validation clauses, such as Article 281(1) of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan 1972 and Article 269(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, provide blanket protection to legislative instruments, curing all defects including mala fides?
  • Does the doctrine of 'past and closed transaction' apply to actions taken under legislative instruments that are subsequently challenged?
  • Is a legislative instrument that lacks generality and targets a specific entity or individual considered an executive fiat or a legislative judgment, rather than a law?
  • Can a legislative instrument be challenged on the ground that it is repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam, given constitutional provisions regarding Principles of Policy?
  Read full judgment →
• Fatima Textile Mills vs MRS. Surayya Begum1983 SCMR 297 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-16
  evictiondefault in payment of rentgrace periodlandlord and tenantfinding of factwritten agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan arose from a second appeal in a rent matter where the High Court upheld the eviction of the appellant-tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent. The core legal questions revolved around the computation of the default period, the effect of a grace period on the due date of rent, and whether a payment made in March could be treated as advance rent for April in the absence of explicit proof. The Supreme Court held that the rent for April and May was not paid within the contractually agreed dates or the grace periods, thereby constituting a default. The Court further ruled that the mere silence of the landlady in her pleadings regarding the tenant's assertion of advance payment was insufficient to overturn a finding of fact, especially since the landlady was not cross-examined on this point. Consequently, the Court found no justification to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact and dismissed the appeal, granting the tenant two months to vacate upon undertaking to surrender possession.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a payment made after the contractually fixed date but within an allowed grace period constitutes a legal default in payment of rent?
  • Can a tenant's assertion of advance payment of rent be accepted solely based on the landlord's silence in pleadings without supporting evidence or cross-examination?
  • Does the failure to formally place a written tenancy agreement on the record of the Rent Controller invalidate eviction proceedings if both parties were aware of its terms?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad vs The State1983 SCMR 963 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-14
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationvicarious liabilityunlawful assemblycriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by conversion arises from an order of the High Court which set aside the bail granted to the appellant by the Sessions Judge in a case registered under sections 502, 307 and 148 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in cancelling the post-arrest bail of the appellant on the ground of vicarious liability without considering the specific grounds evaluated by the Sessions Judge. The Supreme Court held that the Sessions Judge had allowed bail on cogent grounds—including discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular accounts, lack of motive, police finding of innocence, and advanced age—which the High Court failed to advert to or properly reverse. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that an appellate or revisional court reviewing a bail cancellation order must consider and address the specific factual and medical grounds that weighed with the trial court in granting bail, rather than relying solely on abstract propositions of vicarious liability.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail once granted by a trial court can be set aside without adverting to the cogent grounds that formed the basis of the bail order?
  • Does the mere invocation of vicarious liability under an unlawful assembly justify the cancellation of bail without examining individual circumstances and medical evidence?
  • Can discrepancies between ocular testimony and medical evidence serve as valid grounds for granting post-arrest bail in a murder case?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad vs Ghulam Sarwar and Another1983 SCMR 1116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-25
  pre-emptionsale deed cancellationdeed of retractioncause of actionsubsisting saleright of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the maintainability of pre-emption suits following the cancellation of a sale deed. The core legal question was whether a suit for pre-emption can be maintained when the underlying sale transaction has been rescinded by a registered deed of retraction prior to the institution of the suit. The Supreme Court held that the right of pre-emption is contingent upon the existence of a valid, subsisting sale. Since the trial court and the first appellate court concurrently found that the deed of retraction was a genuine and valid cancellation of the original sale—rather than a re-sale—and that this cancellation occurred before the pre-emption suits were filed, no cause of action existed. The Court affirmed that in the absence of a subsisting sale, the right of pre-emption cannot be exercised. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the lower courts' findings that the pre-emption suits were not maintainable.

  Questions settled

  • Can a suit for pre-emption be maintained if the underlying sale transaction has been cancelled prior to the institution of the suit?
  • Does a registered deed of retraction, found to be genuine, effectively extinguish the right of pre-emption?
  • Is a pre-emption suit maintainable in the absence of a subsisting sale?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Muhammad and Another vs Syed Afzal Hussain and Another1983 SCMR 1050 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-05
  leave to appealland settlementallotment cancellationspecial jamabandikhasra girdawaridisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two petitions for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which had set aside the cancellation of land allotments made to the respondents. The core legal question was whether the Settlement authorities could rely on Khasra Girdawaris instead of the Special Jamabandi to cancel land allotments made sixteen years prior on the allegation of excess entitlement. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of genuine efforts to secure the relevant Special Jamabandi from proper repositories such as the Record Room, District Headquarters, or Canal Department, reliance could not be placed on Khasra Girdawaris to interfere with long-standing allotments. The Court affirmed the High Court's view and dismissed the petitions, holding that allotments should not be lightly disturbed after a prolonged period without proper verification from the primary revenue records.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Settlement authorities rely on Khasra Girdawaris for cancelling land allotments without making proper efforts to secure the relevant Special Jamabandi?
  • Whether land allotments made to displaced persons can be interfered with after sixteen years merely on the basis of Khasra Girdawari entries?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Khan vs Abdul Rahman1983 SCMR 293 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-29
  pre-emptiontenant-at-willsuperior right of pre-emptionLand Reforms Regulationco-sharercivil revisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his civil revision by the Lahore High Court concerning a pre-emption suit over agricultural land comprising specific Khasra numbers. The core legal question revolved around whether a tenant-at-will cultivating a portion of land is entitled to a superior pre-emption right over the entire area under his tenancy or only to the extent of the vendor's share purchased. The Supreme Court held that the tenant's right as a tenant under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 is protected only to the extent of the fractional share purchased by the vendor in the specific tenancy land, rather than the entire cultivated area. The key principle laid down is that a tenant's pre-emption or protective right regarding tenancy land is proportionate to the vendor's share in the joint holding.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant-at-will is entitled to claim a superior right of pre-emption over the entire area of his tenancy or only in proportion to the vendor's share?
  • Does a tenant cultivating a portion of land possess a protected right under paragraph 25(3)(d) of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 extending beyond the purchased fractional share?
  Read full judgment →
• Fateh Khan Muhammad Yunus vs Muhammad Yunus and Other the State1983 SCMR 268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-17Read full judgment →
• Fateh Khan and 2 Others vs The State1983 SCMR 519 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  compromisesentence reductioncriminal appealprotracted trialinterest of peacecompensation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that had reduced, but maintained, the sentences of the petitioners convicted under sections 307/34 and 458 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether a compromise between the parties, reached after the conviction and during the appellate/revisional stages, justifies a further reduction of sentence to the period already undergone. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioners had already endured a protracted trial and significant periods of incarceration. Citing the precedent in Khurshid Ahmad v. The State, the Court held that where parties have compromised, it is desirable in the interest of peace and good relations to accept such a compromise to prevent further bitterness. Consequently, the Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, reduced the sentences to the period already undergone, and set aside the order for compensation under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The principle established is that a post-conviction compromise between parties can be a valid ground for the appellate court to reduce a sentence to the period already served.

  Questions settled

  • Can a post-conviction compromise between parties justify the reduction of a sentence to the period already undergone?
  • Does a compromise between parties in a criminal case warrant the setting aside of a compensation order passed under section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• Farzand Ali and Another vs The State1983 SCMR 517 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-19
  suspension of sentencecriminal appealdiscretion of High Courtmurdersupreme court jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners filed a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of their application for suspension of sentence pending their appeal before the Lahore High Court. They had been convicted under section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. The High Court had suspended the sentences of some co-accused whose injuries were simple, but dismissed the petitioners' application on the ground that their exact role could only be determined after appreciation of evidence. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretionary order refusing to suspend the sentences. The Supreme Court held that it would not interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in a matter still pending before it, while observing that the petitioners could approach the High Court again if advised. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to suspend a sentence pending appeal?
  • Can an accused whose sentence suspension was refused approach the High Court again for relief?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir. Muhammad and Others vs Muhammad Ismail and arms1983 PLD Supreme Court 451 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-17
  writ petitionrevisional jurisdictionacquittalretrialremandcriminal procedurecompetency of writ
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a writ petition. The petitioners, previously acquitted by a Magistrate, challenged an order by an Additional Sessions Judge, passed under Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for retrial. The core legal questions were whether a writ petition is competent against an order passed by a Sessions Judge in revisional jurisdiction, and whether an order for retrial based on existing evidence constitutes an improper direction to convict. The Supreme Court held that writ petitions against such revisional orders are generally incompetent, as they circumvent the legislative intent to curtail High Court jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court held that an order for retrial, even when involving a reappraisal of evidence or rehearing of arguments, does not amount to a direction to convict, provided the trial court is directed to decide the matter afresh with an open mind. The principle established is that retrial may be ordered from the stage of arguments without prejudicing the trial court.

  Questions settled

  • Is a writ petition competent against an order passed by a Sessions Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 439-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Does an order for retrial that directs a fresh decision based on existing evidence amount to a binding direction to convict the accused?
  • Can a court order a retrial from the stage of arguments after the evidence has already been recorded?
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• Faqir Muhammad and Others vs Deputy Commissioner and Other1983SCMR812 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-08-30
  Land Reforms Regulationalienation of landoral giftdelivery of possessionconstitutional petitionSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging orders passed under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, whereby certain oral gifts of land made by the petitioner Faqir Muhammad in favour of his sons and daughters were declared void by the Land Commissioner and affirmed through subsequent appellate, review, and revisional forums, concluding with the Federal Land Commission. The High Court of Sind dismissed the constitutional petitions filed against these orders, holding that there was no proof of the alleged gifts and that possession of the land remained with the donor. The core legal question addressed is whether unproven oral gifts of land can be validated as bona fide alienations under paragraph 7 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that in the absence of proof of the transactions and delivery of possession, the question of the bona fides of the alienations does not arise. The key principle laid down is that an oral gift under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, requires strict proof of the transaction and delivery of possession to be sustained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether oral gifts of land under the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 require proof of delivery of possession?
  • Can the bona fides of an alienation be examined when the underlying transaction of gift is not proved?
  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-proof of land alienations?
  Read full judgment →
• Faqir Hussain vs The State1983 SCMR 227 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-03
  criminal reviewdeath sentenceright of private defencerepresentation by counselconfessional statement
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for review of a judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a criminal appeal. The petitioner sought a review of his dismissed appeal and death sentence, contending that his chosen counsel was unable to attend the hearing due to official engagements in the Majlis-e-Shoora, and that the Advocate-on-Record representation prejudiced his case. The petitioner also argued that the benefit of exceeding the right of private defence extended regarding one deceased should have similarly applied to the murder of the other deceased in the same transaction, and that his confessional statement and statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 were not properly analysed. The Supreme Court held that the Advocate-on-Record was present, prepared, and permitted to argue, and that counsel must give preference to court duties over other engagements. The Court further found no error apparent on the record and that all points had been duly considered in the original judgment. Consequently, the review petition was dismissed as incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition is competent when the counsel of choice was absent but the Advocate-on-Record argued the case?
  • Does the failure of a petitioner's primary counsel to attend due to other engagements constitute a ground for reviewing a judgment?
  • Whether an error apparent on the record is established where all points in the grounds of appeal and leave granting order were considered?
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• Faqir and 2 Others vs The State1983 SCMR 938 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-19
  common intentionmurderocular testimonyimprovements in statementsbenefit of doubtcriminal appealligature mark
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a murder case where four persons were tried for the killing of Mukhtar A.I. The trial court convicted two accused under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 with death sentences, and two others with life imprisonment, while the High Court subsequently altered the death sentences to life imprisonment and acquitted one co-accused. Leave to appeal was granted to Muhammad Aslam alone regarding his specific role of throwing a noose and sharing a common intention. The core legal question was whether improvements in ocular testimony regarding the specific overt act of the appellant were sufficient to discard the testimony and warrant acquittal, and whether common intention was established. The Supreme Court held that despite omissions of detail in the initial report, the possession of the rope at the inception of the attack, corroborative recovery of the rope, and medical evidence establishing ligature marks sufficiently proved his participation and shared common intention, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal with the modification of extending the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The key principle laid down is that minor omissions or lack of detailed overt acts in the initial report do not vitiate a conviction where ocular testimony is corroborated by material and medical evidence establishing shared common intention.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor omissions in the initial police report regarding a specific overt act are sufficient to discard ocular testimony and warrant acquittal?
  • Does the possession and use of a rope at the inception of an attack establish common intention under Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can medical evidence corroborate the specific role assigned to an accused by eye-witnesses despite discrepancies in police statements?
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• Falak Sher Khan and Another vs Mukhtar Ahmad and Other1983 SCMR 453 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-31
  service tribunal jurisdictionpromotion criterialocus standinecessary partiesadministrative lawqualification equivalenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which set aside a 1978 notification amending the West Pakistan Agriculture Service (Class I) Rules, 1965. The amendment had restricted promotions to the rank of Agriculture Engineer (Grade 18) to those holding a B.Sc. degree in Agricultural Engineering, thereby disqualifying existing Assistant Agriculture Engineers who held only diplomas. The Service Tribunal had ruled in favor of the respondents, finding the Engineering Council's refusal to grant a grace period for qualification improvement unreasonable and unjust. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, primarily addressing whether the Service Tribunal had jurisdiction to challenge the notification, the limitation period for such challenges, the competence of the Tribunal to bypass decisions of the Pakistan Engineering Council, and the necessity of impleading the Council and affected parties. The Court affirmed that individuals adversely affected by a tribunal's judgment have standing to petition for leave to appeal, even if not originally impleaded, and identified that the case involves significant questions of law regarding service rules and administrative authority.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person adversely affected by a Service Tribunal judgment file a petition for leave to appeal if they were not impleaded as a party before the Tribunal?
  • Does a Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to set aside a departmental notification amending service rules if the challenge is brought years after the notification's issuance?
  • Is the Pakistan Engineering Council a necessary party in proceedings where its decisions regarding professional qualifications are challenged before a Service Tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Faizullah vs The State1983 SCMR 640 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-07
  Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Orderpossession of narcoticssentencing discretionenhancement of finereduction of sentencecriminal revision
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner for possession of 1,700 grams of charas, initially sentenced under Section 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. The petitioner challenged the conviction, arguing that mere possession of an intoxicant falls under Section 4, which carries a lesser maximum punishment of two years, rather than Section 3, which concerns manufacturing, importing, or selling and carries a higher penalty. The State conceded that the offence of possession is correctly categorized under Section 4. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the conviction must be under Section 4. Consequently, the Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment from two years to one year, determining that the original sentence was excessive. However, to serve the ends of justice and act as a deterrent, the Court exercised its discretion to enhance the fine from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 5,000. The judgment clarifies the distinction between the offences of possession and the more serious acts of manufacturing or trafficking under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979.

  Questions settled

  • Does the offence of possessing an intoxicant fall under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  • Can the Supreme Court reduce a sentence of imprisonment while simultaneously enhancing the fine imposed on a convict?
  • Is the offence of mere possession of an intoxicant subject to the same maximum punishment as the offence of manufacturing or trafficking under the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979?
  Read full judgment →
• Faizan Ali vs Ali Muhammad and Other1983 SCMR 1063 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-29
  settlement matterwrit petitionleave to appealconcurrent findingsSupreme Court
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from two petitions filed against the order of the High Court dismissing the petitioner's writ petitions in a settlement matter. The core legal question concerns whether grounds exist for interfering with the concurrent findings and judgments of the High Court and the Settlement Department rendered over a protracted period. The Supreme Court held that no good ground was urged to warrant interference with the impugned judgment, noting that numerous officers in the Settlement Department and the learned Judges of the High Court had thoroughly examined every aspect of the case over twenty years. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of lower forums and the High Court in settlement matters absent a compelling and valid legal ground.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against concurrent dismissal of writ petitions in settlement matters without a compelling ground?
  • Can a party successfully challenge concurrent findings of the High Court and Settlement Department without pointing out material legal infirmities?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz Uddin Ahmad vs Muhammad Yusuf and Other1983 SCMR 1192 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-02
  leave to appealcivil jurisdictionland settlementremand of caserejection of plaint
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arising from a dispute over the transfer of property under Land Settlement Law. The core legal questions presented for examination are twofold: first, whether the Civil Court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject matter of the suit, specifically regarding property transfers governed by Land Settlement Law; and second, whether the High Court, upon finding that the Civil Court had jurisdiction after the plaint was initially rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, erred by remanding the case for trial rather than deciding the matter itself and decreeing the suit in favour of the respondent. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address these jurisdictional and procedural issues, directing that the appeal be prepared for hearing on the existing record with liberty for parties to submit additional documentation.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Civil Court have jurisdiction to try a suit relating to the transfer of property under Land Settlement Law?
  • Should a High Court remand a case for trial or decide the matter itself when it determines the Civil Court had jurisdiction after an initial rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz and Others vs THF State1983 SCMR 76 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1932-06-27
  criminal appealprivate defenseSection 342 statementappreciation of evidenceexculpatory statementmurder convictionburden of proof
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had discarded all prosecution ocular evidence but convicted the appellants based solely on their statements recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, reasoning that they had exceeded the right of private defense. The core legal question was whether a court, in the absence of any other evidence, may selectively accept the inculpatory portion of an accused's statement while rejecting the exculpatory portion regarding self-defense. The Supreme Court held that where no other evidence exists to test the veracity of the accused's statement, the court cannot split the statement to accept only the incriminating parts while discarding the exculpatory parts as incredible. The Court affirmed the principle that in such circumstances, the statement must be accepted in its entirety. Consequently, the conviction was set aside, and the appellants were acquitted, as their version, which claimed self-defense, was the only material available on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Can a court convict an accused by accepting only the inculpatory part of their statement while rejecting the exculpatory part when no other evidence exists?
  • Must an accused's statement be accepted in its entirety when it is the only evidence available on the record?
  • Does the right of private defense extend to inflicting more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defense?
  Read full judgment →
• Faiz Ali vs Messrs Barkat Ali and Other1983 SCMR 1036 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-20
  settlement of propertywrit jurisdictiontransfer of propertypossession-based transferleave to appealadministrative discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed in limine a writ petition challenging the decision of a Settlement Commissioner regarding the transfer of a property. The parties, both in occupation of different portions of a house in Lahore, had engaged in multiple rounds of litigation. The Settlement Commissioner, relying on an inspection report by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, ordered the division and transfer of the property to the parties based on their actual physical possession. The High Court upheld this decision as a just and fair resolution. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner attempted to raise legalistic arguments challenging the Settlement authorities' order. The Supreme Court held that the Settlement Commissioner's decision, based on the physical division of the property according to possession, was fair and proper. Consequently, the Court ruled that the High Court correctly refused to interfere with the administrative order in its writ jurisdiction, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with a Settlement Commissioner's order that divides property based on actual physical possession?
  • Is a property division order based on an inspection report by an Additional Settlement Commissioner considered a fair and proper resolution?
  Read full judgment →
• Fahim Dad Khan and Others vs Mst. Zubaida Begum1983 SCMR 888 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-25
  settlement schemeletters patent appealabatement of appeallaw reforms ordinanceleave to appealtransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from proceedings relating to the transfer of a double-storied house in Sialkot under settlement laws. The Settlement Commissioner ordered the division of the house, transferring the ground floor to respondents' predecessor and the upper floors to the petitioners' predecessor. After writ proceedings and a Letters Patent Appeal, the LPA Bench restored the Settlement Commissioner's order. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court, contending that the LPA had abated upon the death of their predecessor and, having been restored after the promulgation of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, should be deemed a fresh institution and thus barred under section 3 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court observed that the restoration placed the appeal back on its original number as a pending appeal, and further declined to interfere on equitable grounds since the parties had occupied and been transferred their respective portions for decades. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. The key principle is that the setting aside of an abatement restores an appeal to its original number and pending status, and equitable considerations regarding long-standing possession may weigh against interference under settlement jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal restored after setting aside abatement is deemed a newly instituted appeal or a pending appeal?
  • Does the bar under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 apply to a Letters Patent Appeal pending at the time of its promulgation?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere under settlement jurisdiction where parties have been in long-standing possession of their respective portions for decades?
  Read full judgment →
• F. U. Mali K vs WAPDA and Another1983 SCMR 663 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-04
  civil servantservice tribunallimitationcondonation of delayWAPDA employeejurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal as time-barred. The petitioner, a permanent employee and Senior Budget and Accounts Officer of WAPDA, was removed from service following departmental proceedings regarding allegations of misconduct. After pursuing remedies through the Labour Court and High Court, where it was established that WAPDA employees are deemed civil servants under the law, the petitioner approached the Service Tribunal. The core legal question concerned the computation of limitation and the requirement of exhausting departmental remedies when an order of removal is passed by the authority itself. The Supreme Court held that WAPDA employees are deemed civil servants for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, and upheld the Service Tribunal's finding that the appeal was barred by limitation and that no adequate ground existed for condonation of delay. The key principle laid down is that statutory provisions declaring WAPDA employees to be civil servants apply strictly, and established periods of limitation for filing appeals before the Service Tribunal must be adhered to.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employees of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority are deemed civil servants for the purpose of the Service Tribunals Act?
  • Whether an appeal before the Service Tribunal is liable to be dismissed if it fails to comply with the limitation requirements provided under the Service Tribunals Act?
  • Whether the delay in filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal can be condoned without sufficient cause?
  Read full judgment →
• Executive Engineer, Peshawar vs Messrs Tour Muhammad & Sons and 4 Other1983SCMR619 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-16
  ex parte decreestriking off defencecivil revisionCode of Civil Procedureinterlocutory orderwritten statementadjournment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a civil revision against an ex parte decree. The petitioner had failed to file a written statement despite multiple adjournments, leading the trial court to strike off the defence and subsequently pass an ex parte decree. The core legal question was whether the interlocutory order striking off the defence remained challengeable after the final ex parte decree had been passed, and whether the trial court's procedure was legally sound. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Court reasoned that the interlocutory order striking off the defence ceased to exist upon the passing of the final ex parte decree. The Court affirmed that where a party is granted time to perform an act but fails to do so, the court may proceed under Order XVII, Rule 3, and that an interlocutory order's life effectively ends when a final decree is rendered, precluding separate revision against the interlocutory order once the final adjudication is complete.

  Questions settled

  • Does an interlocutory order striking off a defence survive the passing of a final ex parte decree?
  • Can a court proceed under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when a party fails to file a written statement after being granted time?
  • Is a revision petition competent against an interlocutory order after a final decree has been passed in the suit?
  Read full judgment →
• Ehsan Ali vs The State1983 SCMR 331 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-05
  sentence mitigationdeath penaltysudden quarrelhot bloodprovocationmalice aforethoughtlife imprisonment
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan concerns the appropriateness of a death sentence awarded to the appellant for a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the death penalty was justified given the circumstances of the offense, specifically the suddenness of the quarrel and the lack of premeditation. The appellant, provoked by a verbal confrontation following an offensive remark, retrieved a firearm from his home and killed the deceased. The Court held that the incident arose from a sudden quarrel where both parties contributed to the escalation of tempers, negating the element of cold-blooded malice aforethought. Consequently, the Court set aside the death sentence and substituted it with life imprisonment, while enhancing the fine and compensation payable to the heirs of the deceased. The key principle laid down is that crimes committed in 'hot blood' arising from a sudden quarrel, where the victim shares responsibility for the provocation, should not be visited with the same severity of punishment as deliberate, cold-blooded offenses.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a crime committed in 'hot blood' arising from a sudden quarrel warrants the imposition of the death penalty?
  • Does a sudden quarrel where both parties contribute to the escalation of tempers mitigate the sentence for murder?
  • Is the benefit of Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 applicable to a sentence of life imprisonment?
  Read full judgment →
• DR.Akhlaque Ahmed vs The State and Othsrss1983 SCMR 976 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-09
  bigamydissolution of marriageZinaacquittalinterim stay orderleave to appealcriminal liability
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the acquittal of the respondents in a criminal case involving charges of bigamy and Zina. The petitioner, having obtained a decree of dissolution of marriage, challenged it in the High Court and secured an interim stay order. The respondent wife subsequently remarried. The petitioner alleged this constituted a criminal offence, despite the dissolution decree. The trial court acquitted the respondents under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, a decision upheld by the Federal Shariat Court. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, holding that the marriage occurred after the statutory 90-day period following the original dissolution decree. The Court reasoned that the interim stay order merged into the final dismissal of the appeal, thereby restoring the original decree. Consequently, the marriage was legally valid, and no criminal offence was committed. The Court affirmed that where a challenge to a dissolution decree fails, the original decree retains its legal force and effect, precluding criminal liability for subsequent marriages contracted after the statutory period.

  Questions settled

  • Does a marriage contracted after the expiry of the statutory period following a decree of dissolution of marriage constitute an offence if the decree was temporarily suspended by an interim order that was later vacated?
  • What is the effect of the merger of an interim stay order into a final judgment dismissing an appeal against a decree of dissolution of marriage?
  • Can an acquittal under Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be sustained when the underlying criminal charge relies on a marriage being void due to a pending legal challenge that was ultimately dismissed?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. Shamsunnisa vs Mst. Firdaus Begum1983 SCMR 548 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-12-21
  rent evictionnuisancelandlord and tenantstatutory interpretationGeneral Clauses Actmulti-tenement building
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a rent dispute where the respondent-landlady sought the eviction of the appellant-tenant on grounds including nuisance, default in rent, and property damage. The Rent Controller initially dismissed the application, but the High Court allowed the respondent's appeal, ordering eviction. The Supreme Court granted leave to consider whether the alleged acts constituted 'nuisance' under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and whether such nuisance must affect occupants of buildings in the neighbourhood to qualify for eviction. The Court held that the appellant's conduct, including throwing rubbish and intercepting mail, constituted continuous nuisance rather than a solitary instance. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's interpretation that the statutory reference to 'occupants of buildings' includes occupants within the same building, as the General Clauses Act allows for singular terms to encompass the plural. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the eviction order, and reaffirmed that acts causing nuisance to any occupant in a multi-tenement building fall within the scope of the Ordinance.

  Questions settled

  • Does a single instance of misconduct constitute 'nuisance' sufficient to warrant eviction under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can a tenant be evicted for nuisance if the affected party resides in the same building rather than a separate neighbouring building?
  • Do statutory references to 'occupants of buildings' in the plural include a single occupant within a multi-tenement building?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. Iqbal Ahmad Chaudhry vs Government of the Punjab Etc.S1983 SCMR 339 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-10
  service tribunalseniority disputenecessary partiesnon-joinder of partiesleave to appealservice appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, an Assistant Professor of Dermatology, sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal regarding a seniority dispute as non-maintainable. The core legal question was whether the failure of the appellant to implead other professors whose seniority would be adversely affected by the success of the appeal warranted the dismissal of the service appeal under the Punjab Service Tribunal (Procedure) Rules of 1975. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal, holding that necessary parties who are likely to be affected by the outcome of an appeal must be impleaded as respondents. The key principle laid down is that an appellant before a service tribunal is obligated under procedural rules to implead all persons who would be adversely affected if the appeal succeeds, and failure to do so renders the appeal incompetent.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal is rendered incompetent by the failure to implead necessary parties who are likely to be affected by its outcome?
  • Does a modification of a promotion date affecting inter se seniority require other affected civil servants to be impleaded as respondents?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. Akhlaq Ahmad vs Mst. Kishwar Sultana and Others1983 PLD Supreme Court 169 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-07
  Khuladissolution of marriageFamily Courtreconciliationreturn of benefitsdowermatrimonial dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment affirming the dissolution of marriage by Khula granted by a Family Court. The petitioner contended that the Family Court improperly relied on events occurring after the institution of proceedings and that the wife should not benefit from her own misconduct. The core legal questions concerned the relevance of subsequent events in Khula proceedings, whether an errant spouse can obtain Khula, and whether the dissolution remains valid pending an inquiry into the return of benefits. The Supreme Court held that the Family Court’s discretion was properly exercised, noting that the conduct of parties during proceedings, including reconciliation efforts, is relevant to determining if spouses can live within the limits of God. The Court affirmed that the dissolution of marriage by Khula is not invalidated by a pending inquiry into the terms or consideration for such dissolution; rather, such inquiry merely establishes civil liabilities regarding the return of benefits. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.

  Questions settled

  • Can events occurring after the institution of proceedings in a Family Court be considered when determining whether to grant dissolution of marriage by Khula?
  • Does the failure to immediately pay the consideration for Khula invalidate the dissolution of the marriage?
  • Is the discretion of a Family Court to grant Khula subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction if not exercised arbitrarily?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. Abdul Waris vs Javed Hanif and Other1983 SCMR 716 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-01
  arbitration awardrule of the courtlimitation periodobjections to awardpartnership disputeleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the Lahore High Court's refusal to review its earlier order dismissing the petitioner's First Appeal against a Civil Court order making an arbitration award the rule of the court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could challenge the validity of an arbitration award—specifically the existence of a written arbitration agreement—after failing to file formal objections within the statutory limitation period. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had ample opportunity to inspect the agreement and file objections within the prescribed thirty-day period but failed to do so. The Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the trial court correctly made the award the rule of the court because no formal objections were filed within the time prescribed by law. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot circumvent mandatory statutory limitation periods for filing objections to an arbitration award by merely requesting the production of documents after the limitation period has expired, and the court is not obligated to revisit the validity of the arbitration agreement when no timely objection is raised.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party challenge the existence of an arbitration agreement after the statutory period for filing objections to an award has expired?
  • Is a request for the production of an arbitration agreement equivalent to filing a formal objection to an arbitration award?
  • Does a court have a duty to independently verify the existence of an arbitration agreement if no formal objection is filed within the prescribed time?
  Read full judgment →
• Dost Muhammad and Others vs Nazar Hussain Khan and Other1983SCMR 683 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-03
  pre-emption suitdeposit of pre-emption moneyad interim staydefault in depositpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court concerning a pre-emption suit decreed by the Senior Civil Judge, Vehari, on condition of depositing the sale price of Rs. 4 lacs by a specified date. Although the plaintiffs/respondents appealed the fixed price, they obtained an ad interim stay of the deposit requirement. Later, the stay application was dismissed in default, and the pre-emption money was deposited beyond the unexpired period allowed by the trial court. The petitioners sought a declaration that the suit stood dismissed and the decree inexecutable due to non-compliance with the deposit condition, which the High Court rejected. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether a pre-emption suit stands dismissed for non-performance of conditional deposit requirements during the pendency of an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a pre-emption suit stands dismissed and the decree becomes in-executable on account of the non-performance of deposit conditions during the pendency of an appeal?
  • Does the dismissal in default of a stay application regarding the deposit of pre-emption money revive the original time limit set by the trial court?
  • What is the legal character of a pre-emption decree when the pre-emptor commits a default in depositing the required amount?
  Read full judgment →
• District Controller of Stores (Shop Depot) Pakistan Railways, Lahore vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and 2 Other1983 SCMR 155 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-03-26
  labour court jurisdictioncivil servant statusreinstatementback benefitswrit jurisdictionestoppeldepartmental proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that upheld the reinstatement of an employee, respondent No. 3, by the Labour Court. The respondent, initially reverted from the post of ward-keeper to ledger-keeper, challenged his removal from service after failing to join the new post. The Labour Court set aside his removal and ordered reinstatement as a ward-keeper, a decision affirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. The core legal questions were whether the respondent, as a purported civil servant, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, and whether he should have been reinstated to the post of ledger-keeper rather than ward-keeper. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly declined to interfere, noting that the jurisdictional plea regarding civil servant status was not pressed before the Labour Appellate Tribunal and thus could not be reagitated. Furthermore, the Court found that the factual determination regarding the respondent's designation as a ward-keeper was settled by prior proceedings and was not open to challenge at this stage. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise the issue of a Labour Court's jurisdiction over a civil servant for the first time in constitutional jurisdiction if it was not pressed before the Labour Appellate Tribunal?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding an employee's designation, established by prior unchallenged proceedings, open to challenge in subsequent appellate proceedings?
  • Does the failure to press a legal contention before an appellate tribunal preclude its consideration in a subsequent writ petition?
  Read full judgment →
• Din Muhammad vs Settlement Commissioner (I), Sargodha Division, Sargodha and Other1983 SCMR 480 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-29
  displaced personagricultural land allotmentProduce Index Unitssettlement and rehabilitationadministrative discretionland entitlement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the allotment of agricultural land to a displaced person. The petitioner, having been allotted land equivalent to 35 Produce Index Units, sought to purchase an additional area of 37 Produce Index Units that had previously been cancelled from his possession due to being in excess of his entitlement. The core legal question was whether the petitioner possessed an enforceable right to purchase this excess land, despite it having been subsequently allotted to a third-party respondent. The Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner had declined to disturb the existing allotment to the respondent, reasoning that the land was already committed to a temporary allottee with a verified claim. The High Court upheld this decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner’s decision to prioritize the existing allotment to the respondent was just, equitable, and fair. The judgment establishes that administrative authorities possess the discretion to decline the disturbance of settled land allotments when doing so would unfairly prejudice third parties with verified claims, even if a claimant asserts a right to purchase excess land.

  Questions settled

  • Can a displaced person claim a right to purchase agricultural land that has already been allotted to another party with a verified claim?
  • Is a Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner justified in refusing to disturb an existing land allotment to a third party to accommodate a claim for excess land?
  • Does the High Court have the authority to uphold an administrative decision regarding land settlement that is deemed just and equitable?
  Read full judgment →
• Dildar vs The State1983 SCMR 1019 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-07
  leave to appealappreciation of evidenceocular accountdelay in FIRcriminal appealreduction of sentence
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 31-10-1982, which partly allowed the petitioner's criminal appeal by converting his conviction under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to one under section 325 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and reducing the sentence accordingly. The core legal question involved the appreciation of prosecution evidence, the credibility of eye-witnesses, the establishment of motive regarding illicit overtures, the delay in lodging the First Information Report, and the reliability of recoveries. The Supreme Court held that the High Court duly considered all vital defence circumstances and that the appreciation of evidence was in accordance with accepted principles of criminal justice. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence and evaluation of eye-witness testimony by the courts below will not be interfered with when conducted in accordance with accepted legal principles.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence by the courts below warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  • Does a delay in lodging the First Information Report vitiate the prosecution case when eye-witness testimony is found reliable?
  • Whether an offence originally charged under section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be altered to section 325 based on the established injuries and evidence?
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• Dhanjishaw Bbhramji Ghadially and Others vs Abdul Latif Khan1983 SCMR 1003 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-21
  ex parte decreesufficient causerestoration of suitcounsel negligencecivil procedureleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against an appellate bench decision of the High Court of Sind, which had refused to set aside an ex parte decree passed against them in a recovery suit. The core legal question was whether the failure of the petitioners' counsel to appear on the date of hearing, due to alleged health issues causing him to overlook the case in the court lists, constituted 'sufficient cause' under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to set aside the ex parte decree. The Supreme Court held that while the counsel's failure to notice the case was unusual given standard court notification procedures, his advanced age and documented health issues, which impaired his faculties and efficiency, suggested a human failing rather than willful negligence or a deliberate attempt to avoid professional responsibilities. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the ex parte decree, conditional upon the payment of costs. The principle established is that where a counsel's non-appearance is attributable to genuine, albeit partial, physical or mental impairment rather than gross negligence, the court may exercise discretion to restore the suit to prevent injustice.

  Questions settled

  • Does a counsel's failure to notice a case in the court list due to impaired health constitute sufficient cause to set aside an ex parte decree?
  • Can an appellate court interfere with the refusal to set aside an ex parte decree if the lower court failed to adequately consider the counsel's health condition?
  • Is the personal absence of a party from court proceedings excusable if the party relied on counsel who failed to appear due to health reasons?
  Read full judgment →
• Dewan Jairamdass and Others vs Syed Niamat Ali and Other1983 SCMR 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-07
  review petitioncivil appealcounterclaimlimitationjurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for review of a judgment of the Supreme Court dated 25-4-1982, which had allowed an appeal and set aside a judgment of the Baluchistan High Court dated 4-10-1981. The original proceedings originated from a civil suit filed in 1972 before the Deputy Commissioner, Karachi, which was referred to the Qazi at Lehari, where the suit was dismissed and a counterclaim was rejected under Order VIII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Subsequent appellate and revisional proceedings before the Majlis-e-Shoora and the High Court culminated in a decree for possession in favor of the petitioners, which was later reversed by the Supreme Court. The core legal question in the review petition was whether sufficient grounds existed to justify a review of the appellate judgment. The Supreme Court held that the arguments advanced merely sought to reagitate questions already considered and disposed of, and no valid ground for review was made out. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that a review cannot be used to reargue settled matters.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition is maintainable when it merely seeks to reagitate questions already considered and disposed of in the original judgment?
  • Can a counterclaim be maintained under Order VIII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in a suit before a Qazi?
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• Deputy Land Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan and Others vs Ch. Ghulam1983 SCMR 826 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1981-06-06
  Land Reforms Regulationmartial law regulationdeclaration of holdingsbenami transactionwrit petitionland resumption
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition challenging orders passed by land commission authorities under Martial Law Regulation 115 regarding land declared by a civil servant. The core legal question was whether land purchased in 1954, prior to the target date of January 1, 1959, and standing in the name of a third party who subsequently gifted it to the declarant's sons, could be scrutinized and resumed under paragraph 10 of the Land Reforms Regulation without a finding that the original purchase was made benami by the declarant. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that paragraph 10 requires the acquisition to be by the declarant and that transactions prior to the target date without a valid finding of benami acquisition cannot be sustained. The key principle laid down is that land acquisition scrutiny under the Land Reforms Regulation requires proof of acquisition by the declarant where transactions occurred prior to the prescribed target date.

  Questions settled

  • Whether land purchased prior to the target date of January 1, 1959, can be scrutinized under paragraph 10 of Martial Law Regulation 115?
  • Is a finding of a benami purchase necessary for land commission authorities to resume land standing in the name of persons other than the declarant?
  • Can orders passed by land commission authorities without establishing acquisition by the declarant be sustained?
  Read full judgment →
• Deputy Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore vs A. R.1983 SCMR 1240 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-13
  evacuee trust propertyconstitutional jurisdictionfinding of factlocus standileave to appealwrit jurisdictionproperty transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, Deputy Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property Board, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed in limine a constitutional petition challenging the Federal Government's decision to maintain a property transfer. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the Federal Government's finding that the disputed land was not evacuee trust property, and whether the petitioner had locus standi to challenge this. The Supreme Court held that the determination of the property's status as evacuee trust property was essentially a finding of fact, which the Federal Government had resolved. The Court affirmed that such factual findings are immune from interference under constitutional jurisdiction absent compelling reasons. Furthermore, the Court noted that the revenue record provided no evidence of the property's dedication or use as trust property. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, determining that the High Court's refusal to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction was appropriate and that the case did not present a substantial controversy warranting further review.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a finding of fact regarding the status of property as evacuee trust property is immune from interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Can the High Court decline to exercise constitutional jurisdiction when the petitioner challenges a factual determination made by the Federal Government?
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• Dawa Jan vs The State1983 SCMR 596 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-14
  dying declarationmurder convictionabscondencecommutation of sentencecorroborationcriminal appealillicit relations
  Summary & questions settled

  The appellant, Dawa Jan, was convicted for the murder of Hidayatullah and sentenced to death, a decision upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine the effect of eye-witnesses resiling from their statements recorded under section 164, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and to determine if the First Information Report could be treated as a dying declaration, corroborated by the accused's abscondence. The Court held that the dying declaration, recorded by the police immediately after the incident while the deceased was in full possession of his senses, remained unchallenged and credible. This declaration was further corroborated by the testimony of disinterested witnesses who heard the deceased name the appellant as the assailant immediately after the shooting. The Court found the prosecution case free from reasonable doubt. However, considering evidence of the deceased's illicit relations with the appellant's wife, the Court held that the death penalty was disproportionate. Consequently, the conviction was maintained, but the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, with the fine for compensation upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Can a First Information Report recorded by the police be treated as a dying declaration if the deceased was in full possession of his senses?
  • Does the abscondence of an accused provide corroboration to a dying declaration?
  • Can the death sentence be commuted to life imprisonment on the ground of grave and sudden provocation arising from illicit relations?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when eye-witnesses resile from their statements but the dying declaration remains credible?
  Read full judgment →
• Daulat Ali vs Mst. Barguzida Muntizar and Other1983SCMR 713 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-02-11
  writ petitiondismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of petitionlachesdiscretionary jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his constitutional writ petition which had challenged a transfer order of October 1960 and a Permanent Transfer Deed of May 1967. The petitioner's earlier writ petition filed in 1979 had been dismissed for non-prosecution in March 1980, and subsequent restoration applications were also dismissed due to non-compliance with court directions and delay. A fresh writ petition filed in 1981 was dismissed in limine by the High Court on the grounds that it was an attempt to review the previous order and suffered from gross laches. The Supreme Court observed that although a fresh petition might technically be permissible after a dismissal for non-prosecution, the challenge to a decades-old transfer order and Permanent Transfer Deed was excessively belated. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in refusing to exercise its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction, and the petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent writ petition can be filed after an earlier writ petition is dismissed for non-prosecution?
  • Does a constitutional petition challenging a transfer order and Permanent Transfer Deed issued decades ago suffer from laches?
  • Is the High Court justified in refusing to exercise discretionary jurisdiction in a belated challenge?
  Read full judgment →
• Dahla vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands) and Other1983 SCMR 1039 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-04-01
  land allotmentres judicatasettlement authoritiesexcess allotmentbona fide mistakecancellation of allotment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition challenging an order of the High Court, which had set aside a Settlement Commissioner's decision to cancel land allotments made to the respondents. The petitioner had initially failed to challenge the allotments through appeals and revisions but later succeeded in having a Settlement Commissioner cancel the allotments under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, alleging they were in excess of entitlement. The High Court reversed this, citing the principle of res judicata and the fact that the excess allotment resulted from a mistake by public authorities. The Supreme Court affirmed that while the principle of res judicata applies to proceedings before Settlement authorities, preventing them from contradicting earlier final decisions on the same issue, it clarified that allotments made in excess of entitlement due to a bona fide mistake by authorities are indeed subject to cancellation under Section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. Ultimately, the petition was dismissed because the Settlement Commissioner could not lawfully ignore the earlier binding decisions regarding the same entitlement dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to proceedings before Settlement authorities?
  • Can an allotment made in excess of entitlement due to a bona fide mistake by public authorities be cancelled under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  Read full judgment →
• Col. Amangir Shahzada and Others vs Habib Khan and Another1983 SCMR 847 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-19
  civil court jurisdictionouster of jurisdictionProvincial Regulation No. 11 of 1975land disputeMalakand protected areatribunal referenceconsent of parties
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a civil revision petition challenging the jurisdiction of the civil court in a representative suit regarding land ownership in District Malakand. The petitioners argued that under Provincial Regulation No. 11 of 1975, the civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Supreme Court examined the provisions of the Regulation, noting that disputes regarding land rights fall under Part 2 of the Schedule. Under paragraph 3(b), matters in Part 2 can only be referred to a tribunal if all parties consent. Since this condition was not met, the matter remained outside the tribunal's purview. Consequently, the bar on civil court jurisdiction under paragraphs 14 and 17 did not apply. Furthermore, the Court found that Provincial Regulation No. IV of 1976 was inapplicable to the area in question. The Court held that the civil court retained jurisdiction, finding no legal error in the lower courts' decisions, and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does the bar on civil court jurisdiction under Provincial Regulation No. 11 of 1975 apply to land disputes where the parties have not consented to a tribunal reference?
  • Is Provincial Regulation No. IV of 1976 applicable to the Malakand protected area?
  • Under what conditions can a matter falling under Part 2 of the Schedule to Provincial Regulation No. 11 of 1975 be referred to a tribunal?
  Read full judgment →
• Chuttan and 58 Others vs Sufaid Khan and 103 Other1983 SCMR 1107 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-07
  consolidation schemeboard of revenuereconstruction of recordjudicial decisionplenary powersleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from an order of the Lahore High Court setting aside a directive of the Board of Revenue for fresh consolidation in a village. A consolidation scheme was initially sanctioned in 1962, but subsequent litigation, lost records, and conflicting administrative and quasi-judicial orders led to prolonged disputes over whether to reconstruct the record or conduct a fresh consolidation. The High Court held that executive authority cannot be exercised to nullify prior judicial decisions. The core legal question is whether the Board of Revenue, in the exercise of its plenary powers, was competent to order fresh consolidation due to the unsatisfactory and unreliable nature of the reconstructed record and the failure of the field staff to demarcate the areas. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, holding that the contentions regarding the impracticability and unreliability of the reconstructed record needed detailed consideration, and directed that status quo regarding possession be maintained.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the exercise of executive authority can nullify the effect of prior judicial decisions regarding land consolidation?
  • Is the Board of Revenue competent in the exercise of its plenary powers to order fresh consolidation when the reconstructed record is found to be dubious and unreliable?
  • Whether fresh consolidation can be ordered when field staff fail to demarcate and identify the position of land given to right-holders under an earlier confirmed scheme?
  Read full judgment →
• Cholistan Co Operative Wool Development Marketing Union Ltd, Bahawalpur vs Bashir Ahmad and Another1983 SCMR 1105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-01-30
  land acquisitionlimitation periodnon-obstante clausestatutory interpretationappeal against awardreference court
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed an appeal against a land acquisition award on the grounds of limitation. The petitioner argued that Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which provides for appeals to the High Court, contains a non-obstante clause that excludes the application of the Limitation Act, 1908, specifically Article 156. The Supreme Court examined whether the non-obstante clause in Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, displaces the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court held that the non-obstante clause only displaces provisions in other enactments that are inconsistent with the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Since the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, does not provide a specific period of limitation for filing appeals, the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908, remain applicable. Consequently, the Court affirmed that Article 156 of the Limitation Act, 1908, governs the limitation period for appeals filed under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Does the non-obstante clause in Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 exclude the application of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is an appeal filed under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 subject to the limitation period prescribed by Article 156 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • To what extent does the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act 1894?
  Read full judgment →
• Chaudhry Iqbal Hussain and Another vs Sub Major Muhammad Amin1983 SCMR 876 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-03
  partition of propertyjoint propertyconcurrent findings of factinheritancepetition for leave to appealgift and will
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a civil suit for the partition of joint property originally belonging to Mst. Rehmat Jan. The plaintiffs, including a son, a daughter, and heirs of a deceased daughter, sought partition, which was resisted by the defendants claiming ownership through an alleged will and gift in favor of the third daughter's husband. The core legal question concerned the validity and proof of the alleged will and gift, and whether the concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts could be disturbed in second appeal. The Supreme Court held that no ground was made out to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the appellate court, and maintained by the High Court. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact on evidentiary matters will not be disturbed by the apex court in the absence of legal infirmity.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower courts in a partition suit?
  • Can a second appeal be maintained against concurrent factual determinations regarding a disputed will and gift?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, District Evacuee Trust Committee, Rawalpindi vs Muhammad Nawaz and 8 Other1983 SCMR 274 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-10
  evacuee propertyevacuee trust propertydemarcation applicationsettlement appealleave to appealKhasra number
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a settlement appeal regarding whether the property in dispute is evacuee property simpliciter or evacuee trust property. The petitioner argued that the High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction by not disposing of an application for demarcation of the property to determine its exact Khasra location. Upon requisitioning and examining the High Court record, the Supreme Court discovered that the demarcation application had indeed been taken up and rejected by the High Court on the ground that it was made at a belated appellate stage without prior diligence at the trial stage. Since the core factual assumption of the petitioner regarding the undecided application proved unfounded and the correctness of the High Court's rejection order was unchallenged, the Supreme Court held that the petition lacked force and dismissed it.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an appellate court can reject an application for property demarcation made at a belated stage when the party failed to get the demarcation done at the trial stage?
  • Whether the High Court fails to exercise jurisdiction when an application for property demarcation has in fact been considered and rejected on record?
  Read full judgment →
• Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore1983 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-05-04
  Discipline Committeewrit petitiondomestic tribunallachesjudicial reviewshow-cause noticeeducational malpractice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had accepted a respondent's writ petition challenging an order of disqualification passed by the Discipline Committee of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore. The respondent had been disqualified from appearing in three examinations for alleged copying. The High Court had set aside the Board's order primarily because the Board failed to file a written statement in response to the writ petition, citing the theft of relevant files. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the High Court erred in declaring the Discipline Committee's order to be without lawful authority solely on the assumption that the domestic tribunal failed to act judicially, despite the Board's contention that sufficient material existed to demonstrate that a show-cause notice had been served and a proper inquiry conducted. The Court also sought to examine whether the writ petition was barred by laches. Pending the final decision of the appeal, the Supreme Court suspended the operation of the High Court's impugned order.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court declare an order of a domestic tribunal to be without lawful authority solely because a written statement was not filed?
  • Does the failure of a domestic tribunal to file a written statement in a writ petition automatically imply that it did not act judicially?
  • Whether a writ petition challenging a disciplinary action by an educational board is barred by laches?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Zahoor Ahmad vs Dadu Khan and Other1983 SC M.R 746 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-06
  transfer of propertysettlement lawsdisplaced personsauction validityleave to appealopen plot transfer
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the High Court regarding the validity of the transfer of a plot. The core legal question is whether the transfer of an open plot to a local individual, Saroon Khan, was legally permissible under the prevailing settlement laws, and consequently, whether that plot remained available for subsequent auction to other respondents. The petitioner contends that the High Court erred in holding that the initial transfer was invalid because the transferee was not a claimant, thereby overlooking the provisions of paragraph 13 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, read with Settlement Scheme VI. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner's arguments regarding the validity of the 1960 transfer and the subsequent unavailability of the plot for auction in 1961 raised substantial questions requiring further consideration. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, directing that the matter be prepared for hearing on the existing record with liberty to file additional documents, noting the significant delay since the case's inception in 1976.

  Questions settled

  • Can an open plot be transferred to a local individual under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does a valid prior transfer of a plot render a subsequent auction of the same property illegal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Walayat Khan vs Assistant Commissioner, Gujrat1983 SCMR 1005 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-12-17
  no-confidence motionlocal governmentchairmanconstitutional petitionnotice periodSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioner's constitutional petition regarding a no-confidence motion. The petitioner, elected as Chairman of the Union Council, challenged the notice issued for convening a meeting to consider a third no-confidence motion against him, contending that he did not receive the mandatory seven clear days' notice under the relevant rules. The core legal question concerned the validity of the notice and the procedural requirements for tabling a no-confidence motion under the applicable local government laws. The Supreme Court held that the contention regarding the validity of the notice was not raised before the High Court and that under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, a motion could be tabled after six clear months within a prescribed thirty-day period. The petition was found to be without merit and was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that procedural objections not raised before the lower court cannot be entertained for the first time, and the statutory timelines provided under the local government framework for no-confidence motions must be strictly construed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party raise a new factual or legal contention regarding the validity of a notice for the first time before the Supreme Court without having raised it before the High Court?
  • Within what timeframe can a subsequent no-confidence motion be tabled under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
  • What is the consequence under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 if no motion is tabled within the stipulated thirty-day period after six clear months?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Rehmat Ali vs Haji Jan Muhammad and Other1983 SCMR 1109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-07-05
  evacuee propertyinheritance mutationrehabilitation authoritiesres judicataconstitutional jurisdictionbinding precedent
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court is directed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court arising from a dispute over the inheritance of evacuee agricultural land allotted to a displaced person who died in 1955. The core legal questions involved whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging inheritance mutations sanctioned by rehabilitation authorities, and whether a subsequent civil suit is barred by res judicata when the validity of the same orders was previously upheld by the High Court in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the subsequent civil suit was barred by the general principles of res judicata, as the validity of the mutations had already been conclusively determined by the High Court in a prior writ petition. Furthermore, decisions of the High Court on questions of law are binding on subordinate courts. The key principles laid down are that a party cannot reagitate the validity of orders of statutory authorities in a civil suit after an unsuccessful challenge in a constitutional petition, and that prior High Court judgments bind subordinate courts.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent civil suit to challenge orders of statutory authorities is barred by res judicata after an unsuccessful constitutional petition?
  • Is a decision of the High Court rendered in constitutional jurisdiction binding on subordinate civil courts?
  • Whether civil courts have jurisdiction to question inheritance mutations already upheld by the High Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Nazir Ahmad vs Settlement Commissioner, Multan and Other1983SCMR782 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-10-17
  Provisional Transfer OrderAuction saleSettlement DepartmentResumption of propertyDue processProperty rights
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that set aside an auction sale of a property. The core legal question was whether a property, for which a Provisional Transfer Order (PTO) had already been lawfully issued to an occupant, could be validly auctioned by the Settlement Department without first issuing a notice of demand or passing formal orders of resumption upon the occupant's failure to pay. The Supreme Court held that once a Provisional Transfer Order was lawfully issued in favor of the occupant, the property could not be put to auction unless the department had issued a notice of demand and subsequently passed proper orders of resumption, with due notification to the occupant. As these procedural requirements were not met, the auction was deemed to be without lawful authority. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the petitioner had no valid claim over the property, and dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a property subject to a Provisional Transfer Order be auctioned without issuing a notice of demand to the transferee?
  • Is an auction of property valid if the department fails to pass formal orders of resumption after a Provisional Transfer Order has been issued?
  • Does the issuance of a Provisional Transfer Order preclude the subsequent auction of the same property by the Settlement Department?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Ghulam Rasool vs Mahmood Khan and Other1983 SCMR 225 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-20
  local electionelection petitionstay ordersecrecy of ballotdiscretionary leave to appealclean hands doctrineelection dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a local election dispute where the petitioner and respondent No. 1 tied for the chairmanship, leading to the respondent's victory via drawing of lots. The petitioner challenged this result, alleging that a voter, Rehmat A.I, was disqualified by a stay order and that his vote for the respondent should be excluded. The Election Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, but the High Court overturned this, holding that the stay order did not preclude the voter's participation and that inquiring into his vote violated the secrecy of the ballot. The Supreme Court addressed whether the stay order effectively disqualified the voter and whether the petitioner had established the necessary facts. The Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to substantiate the validity or scope of the stay order and failed to present complete evidence. The Court emphasized that the grant of leave to appeal is discretionary and denied the petition because the petitioner did not approach the Court with clean hands.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to provide complete evidence regarding the nature of a stay order preclude a petitioner from challenging an election result?
  • Is the grant of leave to appeal by the Supreme Court a discretionary power?
  • Can an election result be challenged based on the alleged disqualification of a voter where the validity of the disqualifying order is not established?
  Read full judgment →
• Ch. Altaf Hussain and Others vs Mirza Azam Beg1983 SCMR 643 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-03-24
  stay of executionmoney decreerestitutionsecurity for restitutionirreparable losscivil appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought a stay of execution of a money decree passed by the High Court against them, pending the disposal of their appeal before the Supreme Court. The underlying dispute arose from an agreement to sell a house, which was subsequently rescinded, with the petitioners agreeing to refund a specific sum to the respondent. A clause in the rescission agreement stipulated that the respondent would forfeit the unpaid amount if he initiated legal proceedings against the petitioners. The respondent later filed a complaint against petitioner No. 1 with Martial Law authorities, which was ultimately found to be incorrect. The Supreme Court declined to grant an unconditional stay of execution, reasoning that the petitioners would not suffer irreparable loss by paying the decretal amount. Relying on the principle that a party appealing a money decree may obtain a stay by lodging the amount in court unless the decree-holder provides security for restitution, the Court held that the decretal amount could be paid to the respondent only upon his furnishing security to the satisfaction of the execution court for the potential restitution of funds should the appeal succeed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a stay of execution be granted against a money decree without the appellant lodging the decretal amount in court?
  • Under what conditions may a decree-holder receive payment of a decretal amount while an appeal against the decree is pending?
  • Is the provision of security for restitution a prerequisite for the execution of a money decree pending appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Central Board of Revenue and Another vs Messrs Kaghan Impex and Other1983 SCMR 316 (2) · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-22
  leave to appealimport policyregulatory interpretationsuspension of judgmentcustoms law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Central Board of Revenue against Messrs Kaghan Impex. The core legal question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan involves the interpretation, scope, and legal effect of paragraph 7(5) of the Import Policy Order dated 1-7-1979, specifically in light of the subsequent amendment introduced by S.R.O. 1040(1)/80, dated 13th October 1980. Upon hearing the parties, the Court determined that the case presented substantial questions of law worthy of further examination. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the regulatory provisions governing imports. As an interim measure to preserve the subject matter of the dispute pending final adjudication, the Court ordered that the operation of the impugned judgment be suspended. The Court further directed that the appeal be prepared on the existing record, with liberty for the parties to submit additional documentation, and prioritized the matter for an expedited hearing within the calendar year to ensure timely resolution of the regulatory dispute.

  Questions settled

  • What is the scope and effect of paragraph 7(5) of the Import Policy Order dated 1-7-1979?
  • What is the legal effect of the amendment introduced by S.R.O. 1040(1)/80 dated 13th October 1980 on the Import Policy Order?
  Read full judgment →
• Cbe Punjab Road Transport Board and Another s vs Mst. Naziran Bibi1983 PLD Supreme Court 340 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-05-16
  fatal accidentsdamagescivil liabilitycriminal convictionnegligent drivingleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners, Punjab Road Transport Board and its driver, sought leave to appeal against the concurrent judgments of the lower courts which decreed a suit for damages amounting to Rs. 30,000 in favour of the widow and minor daughter of a deceased individual killed in a traffic collision involving a Board bus. The core legal question was whether the civil court improperly based its findings on the judgment of a criminal court that had convicted the driver for rash and negligent driving. The Supreme Court held that the civil court had independently decided the matter based on ocular and local evidence produced before it, with only a passing reference made to the criminal conviction. The Court dismissed the petition, observing that the damages awarded were already derisory and deplored the conduct of a public body in prolonging the litigation against an unfortunate family. The key principle laid down is that a civil court's judgment in a damages suit is sustainable when founded on independent evidence adduced during the trial, notwithstanding incidental references to related criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Can a civil court decree a suit for damages based on a criminal court conviction without independent evidence?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact on the adequacy of damages in a fatal accident case?
  • Is a public transport board justified in challenging modest compensation awarded to the dependents of a traffic accident victim?
  Read full judgment →
• Capt. Hidayat Ali vs Ali Muhammad and Other1983 SCMR 1048 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1980-04-01
  settlement of propertywrit jurisdictionfinding of factspot inspectionproperty transferdistinct property unit
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's claim for the transfer of servant quarters associated with a larger bungalow. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in upholding the Settlement Commissioner's finding that the servant quarters constituted a distinct and separate property unit, given they were situated on a different Khasra number, separated by a dead wall, and accessed via a separate lane. The Supreme Court examined the site plan and relevant documents and concluded that the High Court's decision to uphold the Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact was just and fair. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the finding regarding the distinct nature of the property units was not subject to interference in the writ jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, affirming that findings of fact based on spot inspections by competent authorities, when reasonable, are generally uninterferable by the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact made by a Settlement Commissioner after a spot inspection?
  • Does a property separated by a dead wall and situated on a different Khasra number constitute a distinct unit for the purpose of transfer?
  Read full judgment →
• Canteen Stores Department Employees Welfare Union, Karachi vs Canteen Stores Department and Other1983 SCMR 1101 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-24
  Industrial Relations OrdinanceCanteen Stores DepartmentArmed ForcesDefence serviceTrade union registrationLabour CourtConstitutional jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether employment in the Canteen Stores Department (C.S.D.) is a service connected with the defence or with the Armed Forces and hence excluded under section 1(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance from the purview of that Ordinance. The appellants contended that the C.S.D. operated as a commercial organization funded privately rather than a service connected with the defence or armed forces. The Supreme Court held that the objective of the C.S.D., both as a government undertaking and subsequently, is to supply daily use articles and to form the basis of an efficient canteen organization for troops in peace and war, thereby connecting it indispensably with the Armed Forces. Consequently, the C.S.D. falls within the exclusion under section 1(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, rendering the Ordinance inapplicable to its employees. The appeal and petition were dismissed by the Court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether employment in the Canteen Stores Department is a service connected with the defence or with the Armed Forces?
  • Does the Canteen Stores Department stand excluded from the purview of the Industrial Relations Ordinance under section 1(3)?
  • Is the registration of a trade union for Canteen Stores Department employees lawful under the Industrial Relations Ordinance?
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• Boga Khan vs Rehmat Ali and Other1983 SCMR 206 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-21
  settlement disputepermanent transfer deedconstitutional jurisdictionpossessionproperty transfersupreme court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal examines whether the Lahore High Court lawfully set aside a Settlement Commissioner's order regarding the transfer of a disputed plot to the appellant. The appellant claimed possession and permanent construction on a portion of the plot since 1952, while respondents held a transfer and Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) for the whole plot. Following earlier remand proceedings that became final, the Settlement Commissioner had awarded the occupied portion to the appellant. The High Court set this aside, holding that the issuance of the P.T.D. barred belated claims. The Supreme Court held that since the appellant was in possession and had raised permanent construction before the target date, the respondents were not entitled to that portion, and the High Court erred in interfering with the Settlement Commissioner's decision in its constitutional jurisdiction. The appeal was accordingly accepted and the Settlement Commissioner's order restored, with a recorded compromise between the parties incorporated for complete justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a permanent transfer deed bars a party in prior possession and construction from claiming a portion of the plot?
  • Can the High Court interfere in constitutional jurisdiction with a factual determination of property entitlement made by a Settlement Commissioner after a final remand order?
  • Whether parties can adjust their property possession through a mutual compromise recorded before the Supreme Court to do complete justice?
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• Bhurey Khan and Others vs Muhammad Anwar and Other1983SCMR 1033 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-28
  settlement authoritiesP.I. Unitswrit petitioncancellation of allotmentimplementation of order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court in Writ Petition No. 1578-R of 1976. The core legal question concerns the proper implementation of the Settlement Commissioner's order dated 25-8-1976, which allowed the respondents to retain 288 P.I. Units previously excluded by subordinate authorities, and whether this implementation prejudices the petitioners by encroaching upon land not covered by the cancellation orders. The Supreme Court held that the orders of the Settlement Commissioner and the High Court are clear to the effect that the respondents are only to be restored the specific area that was cancelled from their names by the lower authority and subsequently set aside by the Settlement Commissioner, and no other area is to be taken from the petitioners. The key principle laid down is that execution and implementation of administrative or quasi-judicial settlement orders must strictly adhere to the explicit metes and bounds of the original cancellation and restoration orders without extending to extraneous properties.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the respondents are entitled to be restored land beyond the specific area cancelled by the lower settlement authorities?
  • Can settlement authorities encroach upon land not covered by cancellation orders to make up allotted P.I. Units?
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• Bashir vs The State1983 SCMR 1084 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-24
  leave to appealzina-bil-jabrbenefit of the doubtacquittal of co-accusedappreciation of evidencecorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Shariat Court upholding the conviction and sentence of the petitioner Bashir under sections 10(3) and 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance VII of 1979, while acquitting his co-accused brother on the benefit of the doubt. The core legal questions involved whether the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix could be relied upon despite the acquittal of a co-accused on the same evidence, and whether an acquittal based on the benefit of the doubt establishes the innocence of the co-accused so as to exonerate the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of a co-accused on the benefit of the doubt does not amount to a positive finding of non-participation or render the prosecutrix's testimony untruthful as to other accused, and that no corroboration was required in the absence of previous enmity. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix can be relied upon for conviction under the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 1979?
  • Does the acquittal of a co-accused on the ground of benefit of the doubt automatically entitle another co-accused to an acquittal?
  • Does an acquittal based on the benefit of the doubt constitute a positive finding that the acquitted accused did not participate in the crime?
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• Bashir Ahmed vs The State and Other1983SCMR633 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-06-01
  disciplinary proceedingscivil serviceenquiry reportshow-cause noticenatural justiceservice tribunalpresumption of regularity
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal which upheld the dismissal of the appellant, a civil servant, from service. The appellant, a Kanungo, was dismissed following disciplinary proceedings where charges were found proven against him. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant was prejudiced in his defense because he was allegedly not supplied with a copy of the enquiry report prior to the issuance of a show-cause notice. Upon examining the record, the Supreme Court found that the Collector had explicitly ordered the issuance of the show-cause notice along with the enquiry report. Furthermore, the case diary indicated that the appellant had participated in the proceedings over numerous dates without ever raising an objection regarding the non-receipt of the enquiry report. Consequently, the Court held that the appellant had been duly provided with the report and dismissed the appeal. The judgment reinforces the principle that in the absence of a contemporaneous objection on the record, it is presumed that official proceedings were conducted in accordance with the law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a civil servant is prejudiced in their defense if an enquiry report is not supplied along with a show-cause notice?
  • Can a court presume that an official order directing the supply of an enquiry report was complied with in the absence of an objection on the record?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Muhammad Umar1983 SCMR 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1976-01-20
  ejectmentlandlord and tenantexecution of decreeidentity of propertyconsent decreebona fide personal requirementDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an ejectment order passed in favor of a landlord regarding a commercial shop. The core legal question was whether a subsequent consent decree obtained by the tenant in a separate civil suit, declaring him the owner of a shop, could override and nullify an existing ejectment order concerning the premises in dispute. The Supreme Court held that the ejectment order specifically pertained to a shop identified by its survey number and boundaries, which were distinct from the property involved in the tenant's separate civil suit. The Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the executing court possesses the competency to determine the identity of the property subject to the ejectment order. The key principle laid down is that where there is a dispute regarding the identity of premises subject to an ejectment order versus a subsequent civil decree, the executing court is empowered under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to resolve such issues concerning the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree.

  Questions settled

  • Can an executing court determine the identity of property subject to an ejectment order when a subsequent civil decree creates confusion regarding the premises?
  • Does a consent decree obtained in a separate civil suit automatically nullify an existing ejectment order concerning different premises?
  • Is the question of property identity in an ejectment matter considered germane to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Jan Muhammad and Other1983 SCMR 1046 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-03-08
  evacuee propertyPermanent Transfer Deeddemarcation of propertyconstitutional jurisdictionquestion of factsettlement of claims
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the demarcation and identity of transferred evacuee properties in Dera Ghazi Khan. The petitioner, Bashir Ahmad, originally obtained a transfer of Property No. 137. Following unsuccessful attempts to demarcate his property, he obtained an order from the Deputy Settlement Commissioner in 1975 correcting his Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) to include properties previously transferred to other individuals, specifically Siraj-ud-Din and the respondent, Jan Muhammad. Upon a subsequent review of the revenue records, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner found the previous correction order to be void ab initio and rectified the records to reflect the correct evacuee owners and property boundaries. The petitioner challenged this decision through revision and a writ petition, both of which were dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the dispute was essentially a question of fact regarding the identity and extent of the transferred property, which had been definitively resolved by the revenue records. Consequently, the High Court correctly declined to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction, and the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere in a dispute regarding the identity and extent of transferred property when the matter is concluded by revenue records?
  • Does a Deputy Settlement Commissioner have the authority to correct a previous order if that order was void ab initio?
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• Bashir Ahmad vs Abdul Hamid and Another1983 SCMR 302 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1983-06-18
  ejectmentlandlord and tenant relationshipRent Restriction Ordinanceregistered sale deedRent Controller jurisdictionadverse possessionconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court challenging an order of ejectment passed against the petitioner under the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The respondent claimed ownership of the shop occupied by the petitioner through two registered sale deeds and sought eviction following non-payment of rent and repudiation of tenancy. The petitioner contested the relationship of landlord and tenant, asserting title defects and claiming adverse possession. The Rent Controller and appellate forum ruled against the petitioner, and the High Court affirmed the ejectment order. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that in previous litigation the petitioner's possession was determined to be that of a tenant. The Court held that the Rent Controller, as an authority of limited and exclusive jurisdiction, lacked power to look behind validly registered sale deeds to question their legal effect. Furthermore, the petitioner's failure to give oral evidence or produce witnesses supported adverse inferences. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Rent Controller has jurisdiction to go behind registered sale deeds to determine the validity of a landlord's title?
  • Can an occupant who entered possession as a tenant successfully assert adverse possession against a successor-in-interest claiming through registered deeds?
  • What is the effect of a party's failure to enter the witness box or produce witnesses to substantiate their defense in eviction proceedings?
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• Bashir Ahmad and Others vs Mirza Sultan Baig and Other1983 SCMR 277 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1982-11-15
  constitutional petitionsettlement propertytransfer of propertyPermanent Transfer DeedcompromiseSupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a civil dispute over the transfer of a residential property and open courtyard in Dharampura, Lahore, originally governed by settlement laws. The core legal question examined on leave to appeal was whether the High Court's judgment allowing a constitutional petition against the cancellation of a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) was in conformity with the applicable law, particularly regarding the powers of settlement authorities after issuing a P.T.D. and the effect of delay. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, the parties reached a compromise to divide the disputed property equally between the appellants and the respondent. The Supreme Court accepted the written compromise, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and allowed the appeal to the extent of the agreed half-share, directing the settlement authorities to give effect to the same. The principle laid down is that appellate courts may dispose of matters in terms of a lawful, amicable compromise arrived at between the parties to advance complete and full justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether settlement authorities become functus officio after the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed?
  • Can an appellate court dispose of a property dispute based on a written compromise between the parties?
  • Whether fraud and gross illegality in the transfer of settlement properties warrant suo motu revision by the Chief Settlement Commissioner?
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