Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 37,514 judgments in total from the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

• Muhammad Abdullah Butt vs Mst. Iqbal Begum and Another1975 SCMR 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-04-01
  evacuee propertysettlement authoritiestransfer of propertyclaimant non-allotteepossessionPermanent Transfer Deed
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of evacuee property, specifically a house in Lahore that was vertically divided by Settlement Authorities. The appellant, a non-claimant allottee, occupied the upper portion, while the respondent, a claimant non-allottee, occupied the ground floor. The litigation arose from conflicting orders by various Settlement Commissioners regarding the eligibility of the parties for the transfer of the premises. The High Court had ruled in favour of the respondent, leading to the current appeal. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the respondent, alleged to be in occupation of only a garage, could be deemed in possession and thus entitled to the transfer of the disputed portion. Upon review, the Court found the appellant's factual contention regarding the respondent's limited occupation to be incorrect, as she occupied the ground floor comprising three rooms and a garage. Ultimately, the parties reached a settlement in Court to retain their respective portions, and the appeal was disposed of accordingly, with directions for the issuance of fresh Permanent Transfer Deeds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the occupation of a garage and three rooms on the ground floor of an evacuee property constitute sufficient possession for the purpose of transfer to a claimant?
  • Can parties to a property dispute reach a settlement in the Supreme Court to retain their respective portions of the disputed premises?
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• Mubarak and 3 Others vs The State1975 SCMR 156 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-04
  post-arrest bailcommittal proceedingsdelay in trialprisoner productioncriminal procedurebail application
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, which had dismissed the petitioners' application for post-arrest bail in a murder case. The petitioners, facing charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought bail primarily on the grounds of inordinate delay in the committal proceedings, noting that no witnesses had been examined despite the passage of fourteen months. The Supreme Court considered whether the delay in proceedings, caused by the failure of jail authorities to produce the accused for hearings, warranted the grant of bail. The Court held that since the delay was not attributable to the Magistrate but rather to administrative lapses in prisoner escort, bail was not immediately justified. Instead, the Court directed the jail authorities to ensure the production of the petitioners at future hearings and ordered the Magistrate to conclude the committal proceedings within six months. The Court established the principle that administrative delays in prisoner production do not automatically entitle an accused to bail, provided that procedural directions can remedy the underlying cause of the delay.

  Questions settled

  • Does a delay in committal proceedings caused by the failure of jail authorities to produce the accused automatically entitle the accused to bail?
  • Can the Supreme Court issue specific directions to jail authorities and trial courts to expedite committal proceedings instead of granting bail?
  • Is it appropriate to grant bail when the delay in trial is not attributable to the fault of the Magistrate?
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• Mst. Zohra Begum vs Abdul Rashid and 5 Others1975 SCMR 257 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-05
  bail cancellationmurdercommon objecteye-witnessespetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenges the order of the High Court granting bail to five respondents charged under section 302 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question concerns the propriety of granting bail in a murder case where eye-witness testimony implicates the accused and the High Court allegedly misconstrued the sequence of incidents and the weapon possession of the accused. The Supreme Court found substance in the petitioner's contentions that the incidents were distinct and the accused were already armed, holding that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused are guilty of an offense punishable with death. However, instead of granting leave and recalling the bail, the Supreme Court disposed of the petition with the observation that the inquiry magistrate and trial judge shall not be influenced by the bail-granting order, and that upon committal to the Court of Sessions, the bail granted by the High Court would stand cancelled. The key principle laid down is that trial courts must independently assess evidence without being influenced by tentative observations made in bail orders.

  Questions settled

  • Whether bail can be granted under section 302 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when eye-witnesses implicate the accused in a murder?
  • Does the cancellation of bail naturally follow upon committal to the Court of Sessions under specific circumstances?
  • Are trial judges and inquiry magistrates bound by tentative observations made in an order granting bail?
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• Mst. Zarmina and Others vs Munjawar and Another1975 SCMR 487 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-04-25
  limited estatecustomary lawMuslim Personal Lawsuccessiontermination of life estateWest Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave involves the interpretation of section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act V of 1962, concerning the termination of limited estates held by Muslim females under customary law. The core legal question was whether an heir who had already succeeded to more than his due share in the estate of the last male owner under custom was entitled to a further share in the property held by a female as a limited owner upon its termination under the 1962 Act. The Supreme Court held, following its earlier precedent, that the succession opened only in respect of the limited estate itself and not the entire original estate of the last male owner. The key principle laid down is that the termination of a limited estate under the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act V of 1962 is confined strictly to the property held under the limited estate, and distribution according to Muslim Personal Law applies solely to that specific portion rather than reopening the entire inheritance previously settled under custom.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an heir who has already succeeded to more than his share in the estate of a last male owner under custom is entitled to a further share in the property held by a female as a limited owner?
  • Does the termination of a limited estate under section 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1962 reopen the entire inheritance or only the property held under the limited estate?
  • How is the succession to be calculated upon the termination of a limited estate held by a Muslim female under customary law?
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• Mst. Tasnim Akhtar vs Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra and Others1975 SCMR 515 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-05-23
  writ jurisdictionselection boardappointment of headmistressestoppelspecial leave to appeallocal body
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the appointment of the petitioner as Headmistress of an upgraded Primary Girls School at Gojra and declared it to be without lawful authority. The core legal question concerned the validity of successive selection processes conducted by the Municipal Committee and the competence of the Administrator to make an appointment without a properly constituted Selection Board, as well as whether a candidate participating in a subsequent selection is estopped from challenging it. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly found the second selection void because the Administrator alone could not constitute the Selection Board, and distinguished earlier precedent regarding estoppel since no appointment had materialized from the first selection. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that authorities may hold a fresh selection in accordance with service rules.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an Administrator alone can constitute a valid Selection Board for making appointments under the Municipal Committee Service Rules?
  • Does a candidate who participates in a second selection process lose the right to challenge its validity when no appointment resulted from the first selection?
  • Can a High Court in writ jurisdiction set aside an illegal appointment order and leave it open to the authorities to hold a fresh selection?
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• Mst. Sohni vs Sharaf Khan and Others1975 SCMR 335 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-20
  compromise decreeres judicatafraudauthority of counselspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal of the petitioner's second suit challenging a compromise decree passed in an earlier suit. The core legal questions involve whether a subsequent suit challenging a compromise decree on the grounds of fraud and lack of counsel's authority is barred by res judicata or otherwise unsustainable when no issue of fraud was framed or tried. The Supreme Court held that although the High Court erred in applying the principle of res judicata since the causes of action in the two suits were different, the petition must nevertheless fail because the petitioner deliberately avoided setting up or leading evidence on the issue of fraud in the lower courts, and both courts concurrently found that the counsel had the necessary authority to enter into the compromise. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot raise a new question of fraud for the first time in the final court when no such issue was framed, pressed, or supported by evidence in the courts below, and a correct ultimate decision will not be interfered with despite erroneous legal reasoning by a lower appellate court.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a subsequent suit challenging a compromise decree on the ground that counsel lacked authority is barred by res judicata?
  • Can a party raise the question of fraud for the first time before the Supreme Court when no issue regarding fraud was framed or tried in the lower courts?
  • Does an incorrect reference to res judicata by the High Court warrant interference if the ultimate decision of the lower courts is correct on the merits?
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• Mst. Shamim Akhtar vs Syed Alam Hussain and Others1975 SCMR 16 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-24
  review jurisdictionleave to appealscope of reviewinherent powers of courtpractice and procedureerror apparent on the face of the record
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition sought a review of a Supreme Court judgment, contending that the Court erred by deciding the appeal on a point not included in the original leave-granting order. The petitioner argued that the Court was debarred from considering issues outside the scope of the leave order, citing established practice. The Supreme Court held that while it generally adheres to the practice of restricting arguments to the points on which leave was granted, this is not an inflexible rule. The Court possesses the inherent power to depart from this practice in the interests of justice, as demonstrated by prior precedents where the Court allowed new points to be raised. Furthermore, the Court clarified that even if it had misapplied a previous legal precedent, such an error in application does not constitute a valid ground for review, as review is not an appeal. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that misapplication of a decision is not an error apparent on the face of the record warranting review.

  Questions settled

  • Is the Supreme Court's practice of restricting arguments to the points on which leave to appeal was granted an inflexible rule?
  • Can the Supreme Court depart from its established practice of restricting arguments to the scope of the leave-granting order?
  • Does the alleged misapplication of a legal precedent constitute a valid ground for review of a judgment?
  • Is a departure from the practice of restricting arguments to the leave-granting order an error apparent on the face of the record?
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• Mst. Rahmat B. James vs C. John1975 SCMR 388 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-11
  special leave to appealejectmenttenant evictionrent disputeevacuee propertyprovisional transfer order
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Sind and Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed a second appeal and upheld the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge ordering the ejectment of the petitioner from the disputed premises. The respondent, having obtained a Provisional Transfer Order in respect of the property, sought the eviction of the petitioner, who was his tenant under a registered rent deed, due to default in the payment of rent and failure to vacate upon notice. The lower forums ruled against the petitioner on various contentions concerning the validity of the notice, the transfer of the property, and its classification. During the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the petitioner's Advocate-on-Record requested time to obtain his discharge so the petitioner could engage new counsel. The Supreme Court granted an adjournment for this purpose, noting that the petitioner had already been evicted in the absence of a stay order, and stipulated that no further adjournments would be granted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a tenant can contest the validity of a landlord's transfer of property and notice in ejectment proceedings?
  • Does the failure to obtain a stay order during appellate proceedings render a petition for leave to appeal against eviction infructuous upon execution?
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• Mst. Kishawar Sultan Jehan Begum vs Government of Pakistan and Others1975 SCMR 218 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-22
  petition for leave to appealtemporary injunctionlimitationcivil revisionpublic auctionSettlement Authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court which allowed a civil revision filed by the Government of Pakistan and set aside the District Judge's order dismissing the respondents' appeal on the ground of limitation against the issuance of a temporary injunction. The core legal question concerns the propriety of setting aside the dismissal of an appeal on limitation grounds regarding a temporary injunction in a civil suit arising from the cancellation of a public auction sale of a cinema by Settlement Authorities. The Supreme Court held that no fault could be found with the revisional order of the High Court, noting that the petitioner's civil suit and separate writ petition challenging the actual cancellation of the sale were still pending and she would not suffer any prejudice. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the District Judge's order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation against the issuance of a temporary injunction?
  • Does a party suffer prejudice when a temporary injunction matter is remanded or entertained while their substantive civil suit and writ petition challenging the cancellation of a sale remain pending?
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• Mst. Khatoon Begum vs Mst. Chand Bibi and Others1975 SCMR 433 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-13
  evacuee propertysettlement schemeproperty transferauction salebenami transactionwrit jurisdictionspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the ownership of property premises No. 276/2 in Hyderabad, which was originally transferred to the respondent, Mst. Chand Bibi, under Settlement Scheme No. 5 in 1959. The petitioner, Mst. Khatoon Begum, claimed rights through her deceased husband, Ibne Ali, who had purchased a portion of the property at an auction after it was misrepresented as an undisposed evacuee shop. The core legal question was whether the property had been validly transferred in its entirety to the respondent in 1959, rendering the subsequent auction of a portion of the same premises unlawful. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the premises constituted a single residential unit transferred to the respondent in 1959, and that the subsequent auction was a 'managed show' based on misrepresentation. The Court held that since the property was already transferred, there was no legal basis for a separate auction or further inquiry, as such proceedings would constitute unnecessary harassment and a waste of public time. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a property already transferred under a settlement scheme can be separately auctioned as an undisposed evacuee property?
  • Does the acknowledgment of a landlord's title by an occupant preclude the occupant from later claiming the property as an undisposed evacuee asset?
  • Can a court dismiss a petition for further inquiry when the underlying property dispute has already been conclusively determined by the transfer of the entire premises?
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• Mst. Kamli vs Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and 81975 SCMR 70 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-06-20
  land allotmentsettlement and rehabilitationfard-e-haqiatbogus claimconditional orderrevisional jurisdictionwrit petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of land in village Man Singhwala, where Mst. Kamli’s entitlement was challenged by Mirza Muhammad Beg on allegations of a bogus claim. Previous settlement authorities had dismissed Beg’s revisions but included conditional observations stating that if Kamli’s fard-e-haqiat (entitlement) were proven cancelled or bogus, Beg’s claim could be considered. A later settlement authority quashed proceedings against Kamli, but the High Court set aside that order, allowing the inquiry into the status of Kamli’s allotment to proceed. Before the Supreme Court, Kamli argued that the High Court’s order prejudiced her. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that no prejudice was caused. The Court clarified that the earlier revisional orders were strictly conditional; the respondents could only benefit if they successfully proved, through a competent inquiry, that Kamli’s fard-e-haqiat had indeed been cancelled. If the allotment remained intact, the respondents would derive no benefit from the conditional observations. Consequently, the Court found no grounds for interference with the High Court’s decision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conditional observation in a revisional order be executed without satisfying the underlying condition?
  • Does a High Court order allowing an inquiry into the status of a land allotment constitute prejudice to the allottee?
  • Can a party rely on a conditional order of a settlement authority if the condition precedent has not been met?
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• Mst. Kabirunnisa and Another vs Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Lahore and 3 Others1975 SCMR 493 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-05-02
  evacuee propertyallotment cancellationRehabilitation Settlement Schemeland mutationfraud and misrepresentationverified claims
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order dismissing a Constitution petition against the cancellation of excess evacuee agricultural land allotments. The petitioners, mother and son, had secured allotments exceeding their verified claims for land abandoned in India. The Settlement Commissioner, exercising powers under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, found the petitioners had obtained excess land through fraud and misrepresentation. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that their unrecorded land purchases from 1932 should have been recognized under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners failed to raise these facts before the Settlement Commissioner. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Paragraph 29 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, intended to address hardship regarding pre-partition revenue entries, did not apply to transactions dating fifteen years prior to Partition where no explanation for the failure to mutate records was provided. Additionally, Paragraph 52 was found inapplicable as it had been omitted from the scheme in 1959 and pertained to registered deeds, not oral transactions. The petition was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Does Paragraph 29 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme apply to land transactions occurring fifteen years prior to the Partition of the subcontinent?
  • Can a party rely on Paragraph 52 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme after its omission from the scheme on 14th January 1959?
  • Is a claimant entitled to the benefit of Paragraph 29 of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme for oral transactions that were never mutated in revenue records prior to Partition?
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• Mst. Jehan Ara Begum vs Chief Settlement & Rehabilitation1975 SCMR 279 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-15
  displaced personstransfer of propertydivisible buildingsettlement authoritiescondonation of delayletters patent appealresidential unit
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a property dispute concerning the transfer of Pahuja Building in Karachi under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant sought transfer of the entire building as a single residential unit, whereas various occupants applied separately for individual flats. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner initially treated the building as a single unit, but the Settlement Commissioner and Chief Settlement Commissioner set aside that order, holding the building to be divisible into multiple flats and transferring them to respective occupants. A Single Judge of the High Court allowed the appellant's writ petition, but a Division Bench reversed that decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that each flat constituted a separate residential unit under Section 2(4) of the Act, making the transfer of the entire building to the appellant illegal. The Court further clarified that orders passed by subordinate settlement authorities are subject to appeal and revision, and affirmed the High Court's condonation of delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal based on bona fide confusion caused by frequent legislative changes regarding appellate forums.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a building consisting of multiple flats can be transferred as a single residential unit under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Are orders passed by subordinate settlement authorities open to appeal and revision under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does a change in law regarding appellate jurisdictions constitute sufficient cause for the condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
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• Mst. Jehan Ara Begum vs Bashir Ahmad and Others1975 SCMR 401 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-03-28
  permanent transfer deedsettlement authoritieslimitationfraud and misrepresentationevacuee propertyspecial leave appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing an intra-court appeal in limine regarding the transfer of a evacuee property. The core legal questions involved whether an appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner was barred by limitation and whether Settlement authorities retained the power to set aside a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held that the appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner was clearly barred by time by four years without sufficient grounds for condonation, and the High Court erred in remanding the matter instead of deciding the limitation issue on record. Furthermore, following established precedent, the Court held that after the deletion of rule 7 of the Permanent Transfer (Houses & Shops) Rules, 1961, Settlement authorities no longer possessed the power to cancel a P.T.D. on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation, leaving the aggrieved party to seek remedy before a civil court. The appeal was accordingly accepted.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court should decide the question of limitation itself on the material on record rather than remanding the case to the Settlement Commissioner?
  • Whether an appeal filed before the Additional Settlement Commissioner barred by limitation can be entertained without sufficient grounds for condonation of delay?
  • Whether Settlement authorities have the power to cancel a Permanent Transfer Deed on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation after the deletion of rule 7 of the Permanent Transfer (Houses & Shops) Rules, 1961?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a party seeking to set aside a Permanent Transfer Deed on the ground of fraud?
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• Mst. Inayat Bibi and Others vs Ghulam Moinuddin and Others1975 SCMR 84 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-12-12
  composite propertytransfer of propertysettlement lawsdisplaced personjoint agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises out of a dispute over the transfer and valuation of a composite property between a claimant displaced person and a local under settlement laws. The core legal question concerns the legality of transferring portions of a composite property to the respective occupants based on a joint compromise agreement and the correct determination of the property's value. The Supreme Court held that the parties' voluntary agreement to divide the property and pay proportionate prices, which aligned with the factual valuation showing the property was valued below the statutory threshold of Rs. 10,000, was lawful and reasonable. The Court accordingly allowed the appeal, set aside all subsequent conflicting orders, and restored the initial order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner that gave effect to the parties' original joint agreement. The key principle established is that settlement authorities' initial transfers based on reasonable joint agreements of parties, consistent with the true valuation of properties, ought to be upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a joint agreement between claimants for the division of a composite property can be acted upon by settlement authorities?
  • Does an order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferring property based on a compromise agreement suffer from legal defect when the property value is within statutory limits?
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• Mst. Fazal Bibi vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities and Another1975 SCMR 73 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-14
  settlement of claimsagricultural land allotmentdisplaced personsfraudulent claimsleave to appealrehabilitation authorities
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court order that upheld the rejection of her claim to purchase agricultural land by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who had secured land allotments based on false claims regarding the death of her father and uncle, qualified for the purchase of land under the specific concessions provided by the Memorandum dated January 25, 1960, and the subsequent Memorandum dated January 8, 1961. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not qualify for the purchase of land because her claims were fraudulent, as her father and uncle were alive and in possession of lands in India at the relevant time, contrary to her representations. The Court affirmed that the concessions were intended for displaced persons whose parents were in possession of land in India or who were allotted land in anticipation of succession, neither of which applied to the petitioner. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, finding no legal or factual grounds to interfere with the Settlement authorities' decision.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claimant who obtains land allotments based on false representations regarding the death of their relatives qualify for the purchase of land under the Memorandum dated January 25, 1960?
  • Are displaced persons who obtained land allotments based on false claims entitled to the concessions provided under the Memorandum dated January 8, 1961?
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• Mst. Fatima and Others vs Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Lyallpur1975 SCMR 381 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-12-13
  settlement lawstransfer of propertydivisibility of housereview orderwrit jurisdictiondelegatee power
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a property dispute concerning the transfer of a house under settlement laws. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, Mohammad Din, along with other occupants, was initially granted portions of the house by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, which was later modified in review with Mohammad Din's consent to transfer portions to respective occupants. Although the Additional Settlement Commissioner dismissed appeals against this division, a subsequent revision by the Settlement Commissioner favored Mohammad Din by declaring the property indivisible and transferring it entirely to him. Mst. Hamida successfully challenged this in the High Court through a writ petition, which held Mohammad Din bound by his earlier consent. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's view, ruling that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order validly transferred the property with consent, and that the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the delegatee's order prior to the statutory amendment introduced by Ordinance XVIII of 1965. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party who consented to the transfer of a portion of a house to another occupant can subsequently challenge that transfer in appeal?
  • Whether the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner had jurisdiction to interfere with an order passed by a delegatee prior to the enactment of Ordinance XVIII of 1965?
  • Can the High Court in writ jurisdiction enter into the question of the practicability of dividing a property?
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• Mst. Faizunnisa Begum vs The Additional Settlement Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, Tharparkar and Others1975 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-08
  land allotmentfraudulent allotmentforged documentcancellation of allotmentsettlement claimdue processfinding of fact
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the allotment of 112 acres of land in Tharparkar. The land was originally allotted to the respondent, but this allotment was cancelled based on a letter purportedly from the Central Record Office, Lahore, claiming the respondent's prior claim had been satisfied elsewhere. The land was subsequently allotted to the petitioner. Upon discovery that the letter was a forgery, the petitioner's allotment was cancelled. The core legal question was whether the cancellation of the respondent's original allotment, based on a fraudulent document, was valid, and whether the petitioner's subsequent allotment could be sustained. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the Additional Settlement Commissioner and the High Court, which determined that the cancellation of the respondent's allotment was procured through fraud and an under-hand process without due process. The Court affirmed that findings of fact regarding the forgery of documents, based on signature comparisons, are conclusive. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, confirming that an allotment obtained through fraudulent means cannot be sustained against a rightful original allottee.

  Questions settled

  • Can an allotment of land procured through a forged document be sustained?
  • Is a finding of fact regarding the forgery of a document, based on signature comparison, conclusive in appeal?
  • Does the cancellation of an allotment without providing the affected party an opportunity to be heard constitute an under-hand process?
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• Mst. Bibi Bai and Others vs Abdul Shakoor and Another1975 SCMR 430 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-11
  evacuee propertytrust propertytransfer of propertyauction purchasesettlement proceedingsspecial leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises from a property dispute concerning a shop in Jodia Bazar, Karachi, previously treated as evacuee trust property. The respondent, a displaced person in possession, had initially filed a transfer form which was rejected on the ground that the property was trust property, yet the property was subsequently auctioned to third parties who transferred it to the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest. The respondent successfully challenged the auction through an appeal, though a subsequent revision restored the auction. The High Court ultimately set aside the auction and remanded the matter to settlement authorities, prompting the present petition. The core legal question addresses whether an auction of property previously categorized as trust property can stand when the original claimant in possession held a preferential right. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the petition, holding that if the property was trust property at the time of auction, the auction was totally void, and if it was not, the claimant in possession was entitled to its transfer. The key principle laid down is that an auction of purported trust property without proper determination of its status is void, and a claimant in possession retains preferential entitlement upon the removal of the trust bar.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an auction of property conducted while it was categorized as trust property is void if the property's status is subsequently challenged?
  • Does a claimant in possession retain a preferential right to the transfer of property once the bar relating to its trust status is removed?
  • Can a subsequent purchaser claim a better title through an auction that is found to be void ab initio?
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• Mst. Allah Rakhi vs Settlememt Commissioner Etc.1975 SCMR 271 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-14
  settlement and rehabilitationcomposite propertymisreading of evidenceleave to appealtransfer of propertydemarcation proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the transfer of a basement in a composite property by Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities. The core legal question is whether the Settlement Authorities erred in treating the basement as a separate, transferable unit more than a decade after the original transfer order in favor of the petitioner, and whether a respondent who had previously surrendered her rights in the property to her son could legally re-agitate for the transfer of the basement. The petitioner contends that the lower courts' findings were based on a misreading of the evidence and that the basement had already been transferred to her. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, determining that the contentions regarding the misreading of evidence and the legal standing of the respondent to claim the property require a detailed examination. The Court ordered that the stay previously granted shall continue pending the final adjudication of these issues.

  Questions settled

  • Can Settlement Authorities treat a portion of a property as a separate unit for transfer purposes more than a decade after the original transfer order?
  • Does a party who has previously surrendered rights in a property to a third party retain the legal standing to re-agitate for the transfer of a portion of that same property?
  • Is a finding by the High Court based on a misreading of evidence subject to reappraisal by the Supreme Court in a petition for leave to appeal?
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• Mohammad Ilyas Qureshi vs Khan Muhammad Sarfraz Khan, Settlement1975 SCMR 213 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-21
  settlement lawfinality of ordersChief Settlement Commissionerwrit jurisdictiondelay and lachestransfer of property
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a dispute over the transfer of property under settlement laws, specifically regarding the allocation of the back portion of shops in Multan Cantt. The core legal question was whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a miscellaneous petition challenging final orders passed by subordinate settlement authorities years after those orders had attained finality. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, which had set aside the Chief Settlement Commissioner's order as being without lawful authority. The Court held that once a transfer order passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had been affirmed through the appellate and revisional hierarchy, it attained finality. The Chief Settlement Commissioner lacked the authority to reopen these settled matters through an incompetent miscellaneous petition filed years later, particularly without any explanation for the significant delay. The key principle laid down is that settlement authorities cannot exercise revisional or review jurisdiction to reopen matters that have already attained finality through the exhaustion of statutory remedies, especially after an inordinate and unexplained delay.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Chief Settlement Commissioner reopen a matter after the finality of orders passed by subordinate settlement authorities?
  • Is a miscellaneous petition competent to challenge an order that has already been affirmed by appellate and revisional authorities?
  • Does an inordinate and unexplained delay preclude the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by a Settlement Commissioner?
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• Mistri Ahmed Din vs Muhammad Munir1975 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-06-12
  landlord and tenantrent assessmentDisplaced Persons ActRent Controlleroverriding effecttransferee of propertyejectment
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court concerning the right of a landlord, who acquired property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, to charge rent based on the latest municipal assessment. The core legal question was whether such a landlord is required to seek the approval of the Rent Controller under Section 9 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 before increasing rent based on municipal assessments. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the relationship between the parties is governed by Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958. The Court held that Section 30, which contains an overriding effect clause, expressly permits a transferee to charge rent according to the latest assessment by a local authority without needing prior approval from the Rent Controller. Consequently, the provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 regarding rent increases do not restrict the specific rights granted to transferees under the 1958 Act. The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 override the provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 regarding rent increases?
  • Is a transferee of property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 required to obtain Rent Controller approval before charging rent based on the latest municipal assessment?
  • Can a landlord charge rent based on the latest municipal assessment without recourse to Section 9 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  Read full judgment →
• Miss E. Andrews vs Niaz Ahmad and Others1975 SCMR 356 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-07
  rent evictiondefault in rentstriking off defenceleave to appealcondonation of delaylachestenant-landlord dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner, a tenant, sought leave to appeal against an eviction order passed due to her default in depositing rent as directed under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Rent Controller had initially ordered the petitioner to deposit arrears in installments and pay future rent, but upon her failure to comply, her defence was struck off, leading to an eviction order. The petitioner argued that the default was not deliberate, citing her counsel's failure to inform her of the specific payment details, and requested condonation of delay. The Supreme Court observed that the petitioner admitted her counsel had instructed her to deposit rent, yet she failed to inquire about the specific amount or deadline, and further neglected to pay current rent for over six months. The Court held that the petitioner was guilty of laches and that the Controller's action of striking off the defence was justified under the law. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts.

  Questions settled

  • Does a tenant's failure to inquire about the specific amount or deadline for rent deposit after being instructed by counsel constitute a valid excuse for default?
  • Is a Rent Controller justified in striking off a tenant's defence upon default in complying with an order under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959?
  • Can a tenant claim lack of deliberate default when they have failed to pay current rent for a period exceeding six months?
  Read full judgment →
• Miran Bux vs Niaz and Others1975 SCMR 337 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-04
  special leave to appealbenefit of doubtunexplained injuriescounter-reportmurderprivate defenceacquittal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, which set aside the convictions and death/life imprisonment sentences of the respondents for murder and attempt to murder under sections 148, 302/149, and 307/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question involved whether the High Court was justified in granting the benefit of the doubt and acquitting the respondents due to unexplained injuries on the accused, discrepancies in the prosecution's version regarding the distance of firing, and a plausible counter-version. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's appreciation of evidence was neither perverse nor arbitrary, noting that the prosecution failed to explain injuries sustained by the accused and that a reasonable doubt was successfully cast on the prosecution's case. The key principle laid down is that the accused are not bound to set up a specific positive defence and that the prosecution's failure to explain injuries on the accused persons can form a valid basis for extending the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the failure of the prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused persons entitles them to the benefit of doubt?
  • Is it mandatory for an accused person to establish a definite defence case, or is it sufficient to cast a doubt on the prosecution's case?
  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal order passed by the High Court based on a reasonable appreciation of evidence and material discrepancies?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Hyder Bux vs Raees Muhammad and Others1975 SCMR 358 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-07
  oral giftdelivery of possessionproperty rightsconcurrent findings of factgift validity
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against concurrent findings of the lower courts, which had dismissed the petitioner's claim of ownership over certain plots of land based on an alleged oral gift from his late uncle, Mir Ilahi Bux. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had established a valid gift, specifically regarding the essential requirement of the delivery of possession. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the record, affirmed the lower courts' findings. The Court held that the evidence, including letters relied upon by the petitioner, did not constitute a valid gift but rather expressed a pious wish. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that even if a gift were intended, the absence of delivery of possession rendered it ineffective. The Court also noted that the property had subsequently been sold to a third party for valuable consideration, creating new property rights that could not be displaced by an unproven oral gift. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, upholding the principle that an oral gift is incomplete and invalid without the actual delivery of possession.

  Questions settled

  • Is an oral gift valid under law if it is not accompanied by the delivery of possession?
  • Can letters expressing a pious wish be construed as a valid gift of property?
  • Do concurrent findings of fact regarding the absence of delivery of possession warrant interference by the Supreme Court?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir and Another vs The State1975 SCMR 175 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-04
  suspension of sentencecriminal appealdiscretionary orderbail after convictionspeaking orderSupreme Court interference
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, Karachi, whereby the petitioners' application for suspension of sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was rejected, while their co-accused was admitted to bail. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court's brief order refusing to suspend the petitioners' sentence was legally deficient for want of reasons and whether the Supreme Court should interfere with such discretionary orders. The Supreme Court held that although the order was brief, the High Court had applied its mind and exercised its discretion, and since the matter of suspending a sentence is discretionary, it is not open to challenge before the Supreme Court absent compelling grounds. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a brief order by the High Court refusing bail or suspension of sentence under section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, does not warrant Supreme Court interference where it reflects application of mind and exercise of judicial discretion.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an order of the High Court refusing to suspend a sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is open to interference by the Supreme Court when it is brief?
  • Does a brief order rejecting an application for suspension of sentence necessarily render it a non-speaking order if judicial mind is applied?
  • Is the matter of suspending a sentence pending appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 discretionary?
  Read full judgment →
• Mir Akbar vs The State1975 SCMR 281 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-30
  illegal possession of ammunitionArms Ordinancequantum of sentenceleave to appealappreciation of evidencepolice recovery
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the conviction of the petitioner, Mir Akbar, by the S.D.M. Swabi under Section 14 of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, for the illegal possession of 14,500 rounds of .22 bore ammunition found in his vehicle. The conviction and a sentence of five years' rigorous imprisonment, along with the confiscation of the vehicle, were upheld by the Peshawar High Court. The core legal questions before the Supreme Court were whether the conviction was sustainable despite the absence of public witnesses and whether the sentence imposed was excessive. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was sound, noting that the petitioner's plea regarding the alleged misconduct of a police witness was not raised at trial and actually implied his culpability. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the recovery of such a substantial quantity of ammunition negated claims of fabrication. Regarding the sentence, the Court held that it would not interfere with the quantum of punishment given the gravity of the offense, dismissing the petition for lack of merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of public witnesses in a midnight recovery of ammunition invalidate a conviction under the Arms Ordinance 1965?
  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with the quantum of a sentence that is within the legal limits prescribed by statute?
  • Can a defense plea regarding the misconduct of a prosecution witness be raised for the first time during a petition for leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Rehmatullah vs Muhammad Akram and Others1975 SCMR 188 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-12-03
  lacheswrit petitiondelaysettlement commissionerleave to appealadministrative order
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order that dismissed a writ petition on the grounds of laches. The petitioner challenged an order passed by a Settlement Commissioner on 8th August 1961, which had transferred a disputed house to the respondent. The petitioner filed the writ petition in 1974, claiming ignorance of the 1961 order. The High Court rejected the petition, finding no justification for the twelve-year delay. The Supreme Court addressed the core question of whether a delay of over twelve years in challenging an administrative order could be condoned based on a claim of ignorance. The Court held that the petitioner's claim of ignorance was untenable, noting that the Settlement Commissioner's order explicitly stated the parties and their counsel were present when the decision was announced. Furthermore, the Court established the principle that a reasonable person would not wait nearly thirteen years to ascertain the outcome of their own legal proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition due to laches and refused leave to appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Can a writ petition be maintained after a delay of twelve years based on a claim of ignorance of the impugned order?
  • Is a statement in a judicial or quasi-judicial order that parties were present during the announcement of the decision sufficient to refute a claim of ignorance?
  Read full judgment →
• Mian Fazal Muhammad through His Legal Heirs vs Province of West Pakistan and Others1975 SCMR 312 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-12-05
  arbitrationremoval of arbitratorfunctus officiojurisdictioncivil procedureinfructuous appealgovernment liability
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arises from a dispute regarding the non-payment of funds for construction work performed by the appellant under an agreement with the respondents. The agreement included an arbitration clause, and the matter was referred to the Superintending Engineer. Alleging the arbitrator failed to proceed with reasonable dispatch, the appellant filed an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore, seeking the arbitrator's removal. The trial court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, a decision upheld by the High Court, which ruled that the Government does not 'carry on business' under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, it was revealed that the arbitrator had rendered an award during the pendency of the removal application and had become functus officio. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the application for removal had become infructuous. The appeal was dismissed as the underlying issues were no longer live, rendering the jurisdictional questions moot.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Government 'carry on business' within the meaning of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does an application for the removal of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act 1940 become infructuous if the arbitrator renders an award while the application is pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Pakistan Rubber Products vs Joint Secretary to the Government of Pakistan and Another1975 SCMR 44 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-12
  limitationcondonation of delayreview petitionspecial leave to appealtime-barred
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from an office objection that a petition for special leave to appeal was barred by 432 days. The High Court delivered its judgment on 31st October 1972, and a review petition filed on 7th November 1972 was dismissed on 11th February 1974. The petition for special leave to appeal was subsequently filed on 7th March 1974. The core legal question concerns whether the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal starts afresh from the date of the dismissal of a review petition or whether only the time spent pursuing the review can be excluded, and whether an unexplained delay after the dismissal of the review warrants condonation. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period does not start afresh from the date of the review order; at best, the time spent pursuing the review may be excluded, but an unexcused delay between the dismissal of the review and the filing of the petition remains fatal. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time for filing a petition for special leave to appeal start running afresh from the date of the order dismissing a review petition?
  • Can the time spent in pursuing a review petition be excluded for the purpose of condoning delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Nauring Rice Syndicate through Its Sole Proprietor, Karachi1975 SCMR 520 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-05-23
  execution proceedingsdiscretionary ordersuretyextension of timespecial leave to appealconsent decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court refusing to grant further extension of time for furnishing surety in execution proceedings. The petitioner-syndicate had consented to a decree for the recovery of money but subsequently defaulted on payments. During execution proceedings, the High Court ordered the petitioner to furnish surety. After failing to comply within the initial timeframe and receiving multiple extensions, the petitioner sought further time, which the High Court rejected. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretionary order refusing further extension of time. The Supreme Court held that the order was neither unjust, unreasonable, nor arbitrary, noting that the petitioner had already been granted multiple opportunities. The Court affirmed that the refusal of a discretionary extension, absent evidence of arbitrariness, does not warrant interference. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with a High Court's discretionary order regarding procedural extensions unless the order is shown to be unjust, unreasonable, or arbitrary.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court's discretionary order refusing an extension of time to furnish surety?
  • Can an objection regarding the validity of an order under Order XXI Rule 23-A of the Code of Civil Procedure be entertained if the petition is time-barred?
  • Is a discretionary order rejecting a prayer for extension of time subject to interference by the Supreme Court if it is not shown to be arbitrary or unreasonable?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs National Steel Mills Ltd. vs National Steel Employees' Union and comes1975 SCMR 438 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-14
  industrial disputecollective bargaining agentillegal strikereinstatementwrit jurisdictionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan which set aside an order of the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal and restored a Labour Court decision ordering the reinstatement of 55 dismissed employees of the petitioner-company. An industrial dispute had led to a strike declared illegal by the Provincial Government, followed by the dismissal of the workers. Respondent No. 1 trade union filed an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which was initially dismissed for non-prosecution and later refiled. The Labour Court ordered reinstatement, but the Appellate Tribunal allowed the company's appeal, holding that respondent No. 1 lacked the status of a Collective Bargaining Agent at the relevant time. The High Court set aside the Tribunal's order under writ jurisdiction to prevent injustice. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the High Court erred in overlooking the jurisdictional defect regarding the representative character of the respondent trade union under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a trade union lacking Collective Bargaining Agent status is competent to maintain an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
  • Can the High Court in writ jurisdiction interfere with an order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal based on a concession of counsel regarding jurisdictional facts?
  • Whether the lack of representative character of a trade union constitutes a jurisdictional defect going to the root of the matter in industrial adjudication?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Hindustan Sanitary and Drainage Works vs Hakimuddin and Others1975 SCMR 285 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-14
  ejectmentrent restrictionretrospective operationsubstantive lawreconstructionrestoration of possession
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals arising from ejectment proceedings initiated by a landlord against tenants under the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question was whether the amendments introduced by West Pakistan Ordinance No. XXI of 1965, specifically regarding the landlord's requirement for reconstruction and the tenant's right to restoration of possession under section 13(5-B), applied retrospectively to pending ejectment applications. Relying on the principle that substantive law changes are generally prospective unless a clear legislative intent to the contrary exists, the Court held, consistent with its precedent in 'Hassan and others v. Fancy Foundation', that the amendment to section 13(2)(vi) was substantive and prospective, thus not governing pending cases. However, it clarified that section 13(5-B) could be invoked by tenants post-reconstruction, as its application is prospective in nature. The Court declined to adjudicate on the issue of subletting, as no findings had been recorded by the lower courts, leaving the determination of eligibility for restoration of possession to the Rent Controller.

  Questions settled

  • Are the amendments to section 13 of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, introduced by Ordinance XXI of 1965, retrospective in operation?
  • Does the amendment to section 13(2)(vi) of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, govern pending ejectment applications?
  • Can a tenant invoke the provisions of section 13(5-B) of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, in proceedings initiated prior to the enactment of the subsection?
  Read full judgment →
• Messrs Bundial Bus SERVICEs vs Mst. Sanjeeda Afzal and Others1975 SCMR 203 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-11-08
  stay of executionmoney decreespecial leave to appealdamagesjudicial discretionexecution of decree
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court, which refused to stay the execution of a money decree awarded as damages and compensation for a fatal accident caused by rash and negligent driving. The petitioners, against whom the decree was passed, sought a stay of execution pending the disposal of their appeal. The core legal question was whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in denying the stay, thereby allowing the decree-holders to realize the decretal amount. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the High Court had balanced the interests of both parties by allowing the decree-holders to receive the funds while requiring them to furnish sufficient security for reimbursement should the appeal succeed. The Court emphasized that decree-holders should not be deprived of the fruits of their decree, particularly when the breadwinner had been lost years prior, and that the petitioners' interests were adequately safeguarded by the security requirement. The petition was dismissed as lacking merit.

  Questions settled

  • Does the refusal to stay the execution of a money decree pending appeal constitute a valid exercise of judicial discretion?
  • Should a decree-holder be permitted to execute a money decree while an appeal is pending if the interests of the judgment-debtor are protected by security?
  • Is the potential for a 'paper-decree' a relevant consideration for a court when deciding whether to stay the execution of a judgment?
  Read full judgment →
• Meraj Din vs Mian Fazal Ahmad and 2 Others1975 SCMR 255 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-12-02
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertywrit jurisdictionleave to appealfindings of factsettlement scheme
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a service and settlement matter concerning the transfer of evacuee property, specifically a shop in Civil Lines, Sargodha. The petitioner, a pre-partition tenant, sought transfer of the property in 1966, leading to revisional proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner, which were challenged via a writ petition in the Lahore High Court by the respondents. The High Court accepted the writ petition, holding that the property in dispute had already been validly transferred to the respondents in 1960 as part of an industrial concern and that this finding was confirmed in prior ejectment proceedings. The core legal question involves whether concurrent findings of fact regarding property identity and transfer can be reopened in constitutional or appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that questions of fact properly decided on available material and local inspection cannot be challenged in writ or special leave jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Can concurrent findings of fact regarding the identity and dimensions of transferred evacuee property be challenged in writ jurisdiction?
  • Whether special leave to appeal can be granted to examine a pure question of fact properly decided by lower authorities?
  • Does a property number discrepancy override clear physical dimensions and local inspection findings in property transfer matters?
  Read full judgment →
• Mehtab Beg and 2 Others vs Chiragh Ali Represented by (Heirs)1975 SCMR 54 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-07
  abatement of appeallegal representativesclerical errorcondonation of delayduty of counselimpleadment
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had dismissed an application to implead the legal representatives of a deceased respondent in a second appeal. The petitioners had failed to include the legal representatives of the deceased respondent, Chiragh Ali, in their memorandum of appeal, citing a typist's error as the cause for this omission. The High Court rejected this explanation, finding it inadequate to condone the delay, and consequently declared the appeal abated against those legal representatives. The core legal question was whether a failure to implead legal representatives due to a clerical error constitutes sufficient grounds to condone delay and allow the amendment of the appeal memorandum. The Supreme Court held that the responsibility for the accuracy of court filings lies with the counsel, who must verify the memorandum against the decree-sheets. The Court affirmed that the petitioners must bear the consequences of their counsel's failure to perform this duty, thereby refusing leave to appeal and upholding the abatement of the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Does a clerical error by a typist in a memorandum of appeal constitute sufficient grounds to condone the failure to implead legal representatives?
  • Is a counsel responsible for verifying the accuracy of a memorandum of appeal against the decree-sheets filed?
  • Can an appeal be declared abated if the legal representatives of a deceased respondent are not impleaded in a timely manner?
  Read full judgment →
• Matinuddin Ahmad vs Mst. Moor Afshan1975 SCMR 229 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-05
  minor custodyvisitation rightscompromise decreespecial leave to appealfamily lawcustody dispute
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the High Court regarding the custody of a minor child, Miss Samar Amin. The dispute arose between the petitioner (the father) and the respondent (the mother) following a compromise agreement reached in the High Court, which stipulated that custody would remain with the mother while providing specific visitation and temporary custody rights to the father, including arrangements for the child's education at Queen Mary College and during school vacations. The petitioner sought clarification of the High Court's order, which was subsequently reiterated by the learned Single Judge. The core legal question was whether the High Court's clarification of the custody arrangement was consistent with the original compromise order and legally sound. The Supreme Court held that the clarification provided by the High Court was in accordance with the original order and found no error in the lower court's decision. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with custody arrangements where the lower court's clarification aligns with the parties' initial compromise and serves the minor's interests.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a High Court's clarification of a custody order based on a compromise agreement is subject to interference if it aligns with the original order?
  • Can a father challenge a custody arrangement that was previously agreed upon via a compromise in the High Court?
  • Does a court have the authority to regulate visitation rights and temporary custody during school vacations in a minor custody dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• Mass Amtul Naseer Sami vs Secretary, Health, Government of Baluchistan and Others1975 SCMR 265 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-08
  medical college admissionreserved seatdoctors childrendomicilebona fide residenteligibility criteriaconstitutional petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan dismissing a Constitution petition regarding admission to Bolan Medical College, Quetta. The petitioner, daughter of a Provincial Health Department doctor in Baluchistan, claimed entitlement to a reserved seat for doctors' children based on a Chief Minister's announcement and the college prospectus. The admission authorities allocated the seat to respondent No. 3, who secured higher marks in the F.Sc. (Med.) examination and whose father was a registered medical practitioner with a Baluchistan domicile. The core legal questions involved the interpretation of eligibility categories under rule 13 of the prospectus and whether those categories established an order of preference. The Supreme Court held that the respondent fell within the eligible categories and that rule 13 specified categories of eligibility rather than an order of preference. Consequently, the authorities acted properly in awarding the seat to the candidate with higher marks. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the categories specified in rule 13 for admission to Bolan Medical College lay down an order of preference among doctors' children?
  • Does the acquisition of a domicile certificate suffice to establish a person as a bona fide resident of Baluchistan for college admission purposes?
  • Can admission authorities prefer a candidate with higher academic marks when competing applicants fall under eligible categories without a statutory order of preference?
  Read full judgment →
• Mashal Khan vs The State1975 SCMR 80 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1959-02-26
  private defenseunlawful arrestculpable homicideexcess of private defensepolice highhandednesscriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for the murder of a police constable. The core legal questions concerned whether the police possessed legal authority to arrest the appellant, whether the appellant held a right of private defense, and if that right was exceeded. The Supreme Court held that the police acted without legal authority in attempting to arrest the appellant, as their actions were retaliatory against the appellant’s prior legal efforts to protect his property. Consequently, the appellant possessed a right of private defense against the unlawful arrest. However, the Court ruled that the appellant exceeded this right by using lethal force, shooting the deceased in the face, when he could have used less force to escape. The Court established that while one may resist an unlawful arrest, the force employed must be proportionate; using lethal force when unnecessary constitutes an excess of the right. Accordingly, the Court set aside the conviction for murder and substituted it with a conviction under Section 304, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, Part I, sentencing the appellant to five years' rigorous imprisonment.

  Questions settled

  • Does a citizen have a right of private defense against an unlawful arrest by police officers?
  • Can a conviction for murder be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder when the accused exceeds the right of private defense?
  • Is the use of lethal force justified when resisting an unlawful arrest if less force could have been used to escape?
  Read full judgment →
• Maqbul Cotton Factory vs Government of Punjab through Secretary, ExcisE & Taxation Department, Lahore and Another1975 SCMR 189 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  interim orderdiscretionary reliefstay of recoveryspecial leave to appealwrit petitioncotton control
  Summary & questions settled

  These petitions for special leave to appeal were filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan to challenge the interim orders of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court. The underlying writ petitions, which challenged the validity of Rule 12 of the West Pakistan Cotton Control Rules 1966, remained pending before the High Court. The High Court had admitted the petitions, stayed the recovery of dues prior to the notification date of December 3, 1973, but declined to stay prospective recoveries after that date. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the impugned orders were purely discretionary in nature, did not adjudicate upon any substantive rights, and did not finally decide any legal questions. Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the interim orders, observing that the petitioner's proper remedy was to request the High Court to expedite the hearing of the pending writ petitions. The petitions for special leave to appeal were accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Will the Supreme Court interfere with an interim discretionary order of the High Court where no substantive rights have been finally adjudicated?
  • What is the appropriate remedy for a petitioner aggrieved by a High Court's refusal to grant a full interim stay while the main writ petition remains pending?
  Read full judgment →
• Manzoor Ahmad Khan vs Mst. Minhajunnisa1975 SCMR 167 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-09
  arrears of rentmartial law regulationspecial leave to appealpersonal liabilityadmissibility of documentsadditional evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a money suit for the recovery of arrears of rent of a building used for running a secondary school, which was decreed by the Court of Small Causes and upheld in revision by the High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioner's past rental liability stood transferred to the Provincial Government under Martial Law Regulation No. 118 upon the purported takeover of the school. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a required official notification proving that the management and control of the school was taken over by the Government, the petitioner remained liable for the arrears. The Court further laid down that a party cannot be permitted to produce new evidence at the leave stage to fill an obvious lacuna arising from gross indifference, that personal liability under tenancy agreements is a question of fact not open to agitation in the Supreme Court, and that an objection to the admissibility of a document based on stamp deficiency cannot be raised after the document has been exhibited on the record.

  Questions settled

  • Whether past liability for rent is transferred to the Provincial Government under Martial Law Regulation No. 118 without proof of a notification specifying the date of takeover?
  • Can a party be permitted to produce new evidence at the Supreme Court stage to fill an obvious lacuna in evidence resulting from gross indifference?
  • Whether an objection to the admissibility of a document on the ground of insufficient stamping can be raised after the document has been exhibited on the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Mangharam and Another vs The Settlement Commissioner, Khairpur1975 SCMR 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  evacuee propertypublic auctionpermanent transfer deedconcurrent findings of factsettlement authoritiesleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a writ petition dismissed by the High Court regarding the transfer of an evacuee property. The petitioners had purchased evacuee shop No. D/384 at a public auction in 1960, and a Permanent Transfer Deed was issued to them in 1962. Subsequently, the predecessor-in-interest of private respondents filed an L.S. Form for the transfer of an attached room, claiming it to be a separate shop. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner rejected the application, holding it was an integral part of the shop sold to the petitioners. However, on appeal, the Additional Settlement Commissioner held that there were separate tenements and remitted the matter for consideration, a view affirmed in revision by the Settlement Commissioner. The High Court dismissed the subsequent writ petition on the ground that the dispute involved a question of fact concluded by concurrent findings. The Supreme Court held that the case was rightly decided by the High Court based on findings of fact reached within the jurisdiction of the settlement authorities, and consequently dismissed the petition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the question of identification of a property sold at a public auction constitutes a question of fact?
  • Can concurrent findings of fact recorded by settlement authorities be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
  • Whether an attached room can be treated as a separate tenement for transfer under settlement laws?
  Read full judgment →
• Malik Ahmad Khan and 315 Others vs Iqbal and 8 Others1975 SCMR 275 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-13
  intra-court appealLaw Reforms Actwrit jurisdictionconsolidation of holdingscompetence of appealLetters Patent Appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against an order of a Single Judge of the High Court. A preliminary objection was raised regarding the competence of the petition, arguing that the petitioners failed to first exhaust the remedy of an intra-court appeal to a Bench of two or more Judges. The core legal question was whether, following the amendments introduced by the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act VIII of 1972, such an intra-court appeal was maintainable. The Court held that the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act VIII of 1972 barred the appeal because the underlying proceedings originated from a statute—the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance VI of 1960—which already provided for at least one appeal and subsequent revisions. Consequently, the intra-court appeal was not competent, and the petition for leave to appeal directly to the Supreme Court was maintainable. The Court further affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition on merits, noting the failure to implead necessary parties and the binding nature of a prior compromise decree.

  Questions settled

  • Does an intra-court appeal lie against an order of a Single Judge of the High Court under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan if the underlying proceedings provided for at least one appeal?
  • Does the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act VIII of 1972 bar an intra-court appeal where the original proceedings allowed for appeals and revisions?
  • Is a compromise decree regarding land title binding on consolidation authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Makhdoom Syed Nazar Hussain vs The Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha Division and 7 Others1975 SCMR 147 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-05
  displaced personsevacuee propertypartitiontransfer of propertyleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of writ petitions and a Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court, concerning the partition and transfer of properties bearing No. P-173 and P-175 Ward No. 6 in Lyallpur, which are partly owned by the petitioner and partly evacuee. The core legal question is whether a co-owner out of possession is entitled to the transfer of the evacuee portion of an indivisible property under paragraph 16(c) of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. The Supreme Court held that under the Schedule to the Act, houses and shops were to be transferred only to persons in possession thereof or whose spouse, son, or daughter was in possession, and therefore the petitioner's claim was rightly rejected. The court laid down the principle that eligibility for transfer under paragraph 16(c) requires compliance with possession requirements and submission of proper forms as mandated by the statute, while dismissing the leave petition with observations regarding the manner of partition.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-owner out of possession is entitled to the transfer of an indivisible property under paragraph 16(c) of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act?
  • Is possession a mandatory prerequisite for submitting forms and claiming transfer of houses or shops under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Makha vs Din State1975 SCMR 394 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-21
  RapeMurderCircumstantial evidenceExtra-judicial confessionLast seen evidenceRecovery of dead bodyAbsence of struggle marksCriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenged the conviction of the appellant for offences under Section 376 and Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code, for rape and murder, where the conviction was based purely on circumstantial evidence. Leave was granted to consider the effect of the absence of injury marks on the deceased or the appellant, normally considered concomitants of rape and strangulation. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the circumstantial evidence, including last seen evidence, extra-judicial confession, and recovery of the dead body at the appellant's instance, was sufficiently corroborated by medical and chemical evidence. The Court held that the absence of struggle marks was not a fatal flaw, as no hard and fast rule could be laid down, especially considering the significant age and physique difference between the robust assailant and the 10/11-year-old victim, who would be incapable of offering resistance. The Court emphasized that circumstantial evidence, when cogent and consistent, can form a safe basis for conviction.

  Questions settled

  • Can a conviction for rape and murder be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence?
  • Does the absence of struggle marks on the victim or assailant necessarily negate charges of rape and strangulation?
  • What is the evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession corroborated by other circumstantial evidence?
  • Is the 'last seen' evidence sufficient to establish guilt when corroborated by other facts?
  • How does the relative age and physique of the victim and assailant affect the expectation of struggle marks in a rape and murder case?
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• M.Moosa vs Muhammad and Others1975 SCMR 115 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-02-26
  review petitionqualified privilegedefamationrejection of plaintcause of actionfraud by counsel
  Summary & questions settled

  This is a review petition filed against a judgment of the Supreme Court arising out of a defamation suit. The core legal questions involved whether defamatory statements made in pleadings or notices against third parties attract absolute or qualified privilege, whether Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to defamation suits where privilege is established, and whether an alleged fraud by a party's own counsel in drafting a plaint can constitute a ground for reviewing a judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that an advocate enjoys a qualified privilege for words spoken or written in a professional capacity, that Order VII Rule 11 applies to reject a plaint disclosing no cause of action where statements are privileged, and that a review is not a rehearing of an appeal or a remedy for alleged fraud by one's own counsel against the client. The key principles laid down are that advocates have qualified rather than absolute privilege regarding professional statements, that review jurisdiction is strictly confined to discovery of new evidence, errors apparent on the face of the record, or overlooked material questions, and cannot be used to reopen a case or act as an appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an advocate is entitled to absolute or qualified privilege for words spoken or written in a professional capacity?
  • Does Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to a defamation suit where the statements are covered by qualified privilege?
  • Whether an allegation that a party's own counsel practiced a fraud by inserting a specific paragraph in the plaint constitutes a valid ground for the review of a judgment?
  • What are the permissible grounds for seeking a review of a judgment of the Supreme Court?
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• Lila Ram vs Ghulam Ali and Others1975 SCMR 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  specific performanceexecution of decreeevacuee propertyland alienationlimitation periodMartial Law Regulationcivil procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land. The appellant challenged the execution of the decree, arguing that the sale violated the Sind Rural Credit and Land Transfer Act, 1947, which prohibited the alienation of land below a minimum area, and that the execution petition was time-barred. The core legal questions were whether the 1947 Act barred the specific performance decree and whether the execution proceedings were time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the decree was valid and enforceable. The Court determined that the 1947 Act did not impose an absolute bar on alienation, as the Collector could authorize such sales. Furthermore, the Court held that Martial Law Regulation No. 64, which came into force subsequently, superseded the restrictive provisions of the 1947 Act regarding land alienation. Consequently, the execution was deemed lawful and within time. The Court also refused to entertain a belated plea that the land was evacuee property, noting the appellant's prior inconsistent position. The judgment affirms that subsequent regulatory frameworks can override prior statutory restrictions on land alienation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Sind Rural Credit and Land Transfer Act, 1947, impose an absolute bar on the permanent alienation of agricultural land?
  • Does Martial Law Regulation No. 64 supersede the provisions of the Sind Rural Credit and Land Transfer Act, 1947, regarding land alienation?
  • Can a party raise a new ground of appeal regarding the status of property as 'evacuee' if it contradicts their previous litigation stance and was not raised in lower courts?
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• Lal Muhammad vs Muhammad Usman and Others1975 SCMR 409 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-12-17
  election petitiondisqualification of candidateage qualificationthrown away votesnotorious disqualificationadmissibility of foreign documentfresh electionpresumption of genuineness
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment addresses two connected petitions for special leave to appeal arising from an election dispute regarding a seat in the Sind Provincial Assembly. The primary issues concerned whether the winning candidate was disqualified due to being under twenty-five years of age at the time of nomination, the admissibility of a foreign birth certificate offered to prove his age, and whether the candidate securing the next highest number of votes should be declared elected upon the winner's unseating. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Election Tribunal and High Court, rejecting the candidate's reliance on an unauthenticated copy of a foreign birth certificate and affirming his disqualification based on his prior written admissions. The Court held that since the winner's disqualification on grounds of age was not notorious to the electorate prior to voting, the votes cast for him could not be regarded as thrown away or void. Consequently, the runner-up candidate could not be automatically declared elected, and a fresh election was properly ordered.

  Questions settled

  • Is a copy of a foreign public document admissible without proper certification or seal of an official as required by evidentiary standards?
  • When a winning candidate is unseated for an age-related disqualification that was not notorious to the electors, can the runner-up candidate be automatically declared elected?
  • Does the voting for a disqualified candidate result in thrown-away votes if the electors had no notice of the disqualification before casting their ballots?
  Read full judgment →
• Khawaja Riffat Ali vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and 2 Others1975 SCMR 322 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-06-09
  settlement and rehabilitationtransfer of propertydivision of propertyreview powerdelegation of powersconstitutional petitionletters patent appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arises out of a dispute regarding the division and transfer of a bungalow in Gujranwala between two competing refugee claimants and allottees. The core legal questions involved whether the settlement authorities made a fair and equitable vertical division of the property and whether a Settlement Commissioner was competent to review his earlier order without proper delegation of review powers. The Supreme Court held that the division of the property into independent vertical units was fair, equitable, and within the competence of the settlement authorities. Furthermore, the Court held that a Settlement Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain a review and pass an order prior to the date when review powers were formally delegated by notification, rendering subsequent proceedings based on such review illegal and restoring the prior valid orders. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Settlement Commissioner is competent to review an earlier order without a valid delegation of review powers?
  • Can settlement authorities modify the division of a property to ensure a complete and independent vertical division between claimants?
  • Does the transfer of a portion of a property not explicitly asked for by a party invalidate the division if it results in a fair and equitable allocation?
  Read full judgment →
• Khan Muhammad vs Muhammad Ishaque and Another1975 SCMR 471 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-04-01
  legitimacyvalid marriageconclusive proofrevision petitionconcurrent findingsnon-access
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's revision petition in limine against concurrent findings of lower courts. The petitioner had filed a suit for a declaration that the respondents were not his sons and were illegitimate, despite being born during the subsistence of his marriage to Mst. Kalsum. The trial court and the district judge both dismissed the petitioner's claim, finding the respondents to be his legitimate sons. The High Court declined to interfere under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, holding that the dispute involved a pure question of fact without jurisdictional error. The Supreme Court addressed the core question regarding the conclusiveness of legitimacy under the law during a subsisting valid marriage. The Court held that under Section 112 of the Evidence Act 1872, birth during the continuance of a valid marriage is conclusive proof of legitimacy unless non-access is proven. The petition was dismissed as no question of law or public importance was involved.

  Questions settled

  • Whether birth during the continuance of a valid marriage serves as conclusive proof of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 where no jurisdictional defect is involved?
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• Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan vs Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana1975 SCMR 311 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  transfer of criminal casedefamationHigh Court original jurisdictionacademic questionsinfructuous appealpolitical statusjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave arose from an order of a learned Single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan, which transferred a defamation complaint filed by Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana against Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan from the Court of the Assistant Commissioner to the High Court's original side. The transfer was granted based on the high political and social status of the parties involved. The appellant challenged this order, questioning whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to transfer the complaint before the issuance of summons to the accused and whether the parties' social status constituted a valid legal ground for such a transfer. However, during the pendency of the appeal, both parties assumed high-ranking government positions, rendering them disinterested in pursuing the litigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Pakistan declined to adjudicate the legal questions raised, noting that the complaint had likely been abandoned. The appeal was dismissed as infructuous, with the Court determining that no useful purpose would be served by deciding the abstract questions of law under the changed circumstances.

  Questions settled

  • Can a criminal complaint be transferred to the High Court before the issuance of summons to the accused?
  • Does the high political or social status of the parties constitute a valid ground for transferring a criminal case to the High Court?
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• Khalil Ahmad vs The State1975 SCMR 145 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-04
  special leave to appealmurderconvictionre-appraisal of evidencecriminal appealmedical evidencerecoveries
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal and maintained his conviction and sentence under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question involved the evaluation of concurrent findings of fact relating to a murder charge, including eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, dying declarations, and weapon recoveries. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court rightly maintained the conviction based on the available evidence, reiterating that the Supreme Court does not function as a court of criminal appeal for the mere re-appraisal of evidence where no substantial question of law is involved. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Supreme Court will re-appraise evidence in a criminal petition when concurrent findings of fact have been recorded by the courts below?
  • Does a petition for special leave to appeal lie against the dismissal of a criminal appeal where no question of law is involved?
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• Khalil Ahmad alias Khalil and Another vs The State1975 SCMR 442 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-19
  murderacquittal appealeye-witness testimonyinjured witnessprompt FIRblood-stained recoveriescriminal appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal arises from an order of the Lahore High Court setting aside the acquittal of the appellants, Khalil and Ashiq, and convicting them under sections 302, 323, and 324 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Wazir Ali and causing injuries to his son, Maqbul Ahmad, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the injured eye-witness, Maqbul Ahmad, was present at the scene and whether his testimony regarding the daylight assault, corroborated by medical evidence and blood-stained weapon recoveries, was trustworthy enough to sustain a conviction after a trial court acquittal. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the trial court's rejection of the eye-witness's presence on the ground that his injuries were self-suffered was fanciful and incorrect. The Court reaffirmed that prompt lodging of the First Information Report, natural presence of witnesses, and corroborative medical and forensic evidence sufficiently establish guilt. The convictions and sentences imposed by the High Court were upheld.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the testimony of an injured eye-witness can be discarded on the mere conjecture that his injuries were self-suffered?
  • Does prompt lodging of the First Information Report eliminate the possibility of fabrication and false implication in a murder case?
  • Whether incriminating recoveries of blood-stained weapons supported by serologist reports furnish reliable corroboration to ocular testimony?
  Read full judgment →
• Khalid Sharif vs The State1975 SCMR 178 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-16
  pure foodadulterationcriminal petitionleave to appealnew pleapublic analyst
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal petition arises out of a conviction and sentence under section 6(1)(a) and (c) read with section 23 of the West Pakistan Pure Food Ordinance, 1960, for storing adulterated Atta containing less than the prescribed percentage of Gluton. The petitioner's conviction and sentence were upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge on appeal and subsequently maintained by the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan in revision. The petitioner challenged the findings before the Supreme Court, raising new contentions regarding the legal appointment of the Public Analyst and the potential deterioration of the sample due to the damp climate of Karachi. The Supreme Court held that since these points were never raised before the High Court, they could not be permitted to be raised for the first time before the apex court. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no substance in it, and directed the petitioner to surrender to his bail bond to serve the remainder of his sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can a new contention not raised before the High Court be permitted to be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court?
  • Does the storage of Atta containing less Gluton than prescribed constitute an offence under the West Pakistan Pure Food Ordinance, 1960?
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• Khalid and Others vs The State1975 SCMR 500 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-05-06
  murdersingle blowiron-shod sticksudden flare upcompensationcriminal appealculpable homicide
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from the judgments of the trial court and the High Court convicting Khalid under Section 302 and Section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and Muhammad Hussain and Khalil Ahmad under Section 323 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an altercation during an Eid-i-Milad-un-Nabi procession that resulted in the death of Muhammad Ishaque and simple injuries to others. The core legal questions pertained to whether the convictions could be maintained despite the acquittal of co-accused and rejection of part of the ocular evidence, whether the offence of the principal appellant fell under Section 302 or a lesser provision like Section 325 or Section 304 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and the mandatory application of Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding compensation. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a single savage blow with an iron-shod stick on a vital part of the body (head) fracturing the skull sufficiently establishes murder under clauses secondly or thirdly of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, regardless of the lack of premeditation. The Court affirmed the convictions and sentences while invoking the mandatory provisions of Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to impose a fine as compensation to the heirs of the deceased.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 can be sustained when death is caused by a single blow resulting from a sudden flare-up without premeditation?
  • Does the use of an iron-shod stick on the head of a victim bringing about a fractured skull attract clauses secondly or thirdly of Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Are the provisions of Section 544-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 regarding the imposition of fine and compensation to the heirs of the deceased mandatory upon conviction?
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• Kashmir vs Bakht Zamir and Another1975 SCMR 478 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-04-17
  possessionco-ownershipevacuee propertylimitationpartition mutationsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This is an appeal by special leave arising from a civil suit for possession of land instituted by the respondent Bakht Zamir in December 1959, based on a 1959 partition mutation. The trial court decreed the suit, and after partial modification by the Additional District Judge, a Division Bench of the High Court accepted a second appeal and restored the trial court's decree in its entirety. The core legal question was whether the High Court rightly held the respondent to be the exclusive owner of a disputed khasra number despite being a co-owner only to the extent of a half share and ignoring decades of adverse possession and transfers dating back to 1905. The Supreme Court of Pakistan allowed the appeal with costs, holding that the High Court erred in overlooking the respondent's prolonged inaction, the law of limitation, and the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1957, thereby improperly upsetting long-standing property transactions. The key principle laid down is that courts must consider long-standing revenue entries, limitation periods, and prior transfers when evaluating co-ownership claims and partition mutations.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a co-owner can challenge long-standing property transfers and secure exclusive possession after prolonged inaction and in disregard of the law of limitation?
  • Can a partition mutation subsequently cancelled by the Custodian serve as a valid basis for decreeing a suit for possession?
  • Did the High Court err in restoring a trial court decree that upset property transactions spanning several decades without lawful grounds?
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• Karam Khan and 5 Others vs Muhammad Issa and 12 Others1975 SCMR 36 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-06
  criminal law special provisionstaking cognizance of offencefunctus officiowrit jurisdictionboard of revenuearmed clash
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal is directed against an order of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which set aside an order of the Member, Board of Revenue, passed under section 25 of the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968. The core legal question was whether a direction given by the Assistant Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner to the Tehsildar to investigate an apprehended armed clash amounted to taking cognizance of the offence, thereby rendering the authority functus officio regarding a subsequent complaint implicating additional petitioners. The Supreme Court held that directing a preliminary investigation is not equivalent to taking cognizance, and that the Deputy Commissioner has a statutory duty under section 5 of the Ordinance to refer the question of guilt or innocence to a tribunal. The Court laid down that cognizance is taken of an offence rather than specific persons, and an erroneous revisional order suffering from an error patent on the face of the record is amenable to constitutional writ jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does a direction given to a Tehsildar to investigate an incident amount to taking cognizance of an offence under the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968?
  • Whether cognizance is taken of an offence or against a particular person or set of persons?
  • Can the High Court interfere in writ jurisdiction under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution against a revisional order that suffers from an error patent on the face of the record?
  Read full judgment →
• Karam Din vs Muhammad Ashraf and 2 Others1975 SCMR 230 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-09
  cancellation of bailpre-arrest bailinvestigation reportcriminal inquirydiscretionary powerfresh grounds for bail cancellation
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged the High Court's refusal to cancel the bail granted to the respondents in a criminal case registered under sections 302, 307, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in declining to cancel bail where the complainant alleged fresh grounds, despite prior investigating agencies having found the respondents innocent and placed them in column 2 of the police report. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the complainant had failed to establish sufficient grounds for cancellation, particularly as a previous order refusing to cancel bail for one of the respondents remained unchallenged and the alleged new grounds had already been considered. The Court emphasized that in the absence of compelling new evidence or circumstances, the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to cancel bail would not be interfered with. The petition was dismissed, with a directive for the expeditious conclusion of the pending inquiry proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.

  Questions settled

  • Does the finding of innocence by investigating agencies constitute a valid ground for maintaining bail?
  • Can a court cancel bail based on grounds that were previously considered and rejected in an earlier, unchallenged order?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere with a High Court order refusing to cancel bail when no fresh grounds are established?
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• Karachi Parsi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. vs Karacht Municipal Corporation1975 SCMR 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-13
  limitation periodaccrual of cause of actionrefund of expensesmunicipal liabilitycooperative housing societyArticle 120 Limitation Actreimbursement
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from a suit filed by a Cooperative Housing Society seeking a refund of expenses incurred for street lighting and cleaning services, which the Karachi Municipal Corporation was legally obligated to provide after the society's area was incorporated into municipal limits. The core legal question was determining the accrual of the cause of action for a refund claim under Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908: whether the limitation period commenced from the date of each payment or the date the Corporation refused the refund. The Supreme Court held that the right to claim a refund arose as and when each payment was made, as the appellant was essentially seeking reimbursement for expenses paid on behalf of the defendant. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's decision that the claim was time-barred for payments made more than six years prior to the institution of the suit. The key principle established is that in suits for the refund of money paid on behalf of a defendant, the cause of action accrues at the time of each payment.

  Questions settled

  • Does the right to sue for a refund of money paid on behalf of a defendant accrue at the time of payment or at the time of refusal to refund?
  • Is a suit for the refund of money paid for services that a municipal corporation was legally obligated to provide governed by Article 62 or Article 120 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a party recover expenses incurred for services that a statutory body was legally required to perform if those expenses were paid more than six years before the suit?
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• Karachi Industrial Corporation and 3 Others vs The Commissioner of Incometax and Another1975 SCMR 154 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-04
  transfer of income-tax casenatural justicenotice requirementincome-tax assessmentleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the transfer of their income-tax assessment case from one Income-tax Officer to another by the Commissioner of Income-tax. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner was required under the principles of natural justice to issue a notice to the assessees before transferring their case under subsection (7-A) of section 5 of the Income-tax Act, when the statute itself prescribed no such notice. The Supreme Court held that the transfer order merely enabled the same officer to continue processing the assessment and resulted in no inherent prejudice to the assessees, thereby not attracting the rule of audi alteram partem. The Supreme Court laid down the principle that an administrative transfer of a tax case to allow ongoing processing by a specific officer does not cause per se prejudice and does not necessitate a prior notice or hearing under principles of natural justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Commissioner of Income-tax is required to issue a notice to assessees before transferring an assessment case under subsection (7-A) of section 5 of the Income-tax Act?
  • Does an administrative order transferring an income-tax case from one officer to another result in per se prejudice to the assessee requiring a prior hearing?
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• Kamran Hotel Employees Union vs Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal1975 SCMR 407 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-12-09
  industrial disputelabour court jurisdictionmemorandum of settlementappellate tribunalarbitrationtermination of servicelabour law
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld the maintainability of an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The dispute arose when the Kamran Hotel terminated six kitchen employees, leading to a Memorandum of Settlement where the parties agreed to seek a decision from the Labour Court regarding the discharge. The Labour Court ruled the termination illegal, but the Labour Appellate Tribunal subsequently allowed the employer's appeal. The petitioner-Union contended that the Labour Court acted as an arbitrator under the settlement, rendering its decision final and non-appealable. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the Labour Court's adjudication was an exercise of its statutory jurisdiction under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, rather than private arbitration. Consequently, the decision was subject to the appellate process provided by law. The Court affirmed that when parties agree to submit a dispute to a Labour Court, the resulting adjudication remains a judicial act subject to statutory appeal, unless specifically excluded by law, thereby ensuring the appellate mechanism under the Ordinance remains intact.

  Questions settled

  • Does a decision by a Labour Court, reached pursuant to a Memorandum of Settlement between parties, constitute an arbitration award that is immune from appeal?
  • Is an adjudication by a Labour Court regarding the termination of employees subject to appeal under Section 37 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance?
  • Can a Labour Court's decision be considered an award under Section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance if it arises from a settlement agreement?
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• Jamshed Ahmad vs Muhammad Akram Khan and Another1975 SCMR 153 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-07
  registration of criminal casesecond FIRLetters Patentdiscretionary jurisdictionprivate complaintSupreme Court appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed under Clause 22 of the Letters Patent read with Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking a direction to the Station House Officer for the registration of a criminal case and preliminary investigation by a higher police officer. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition in limine on the ground that a case regarding the same transaction had already been registered wherein the petitioner was arrayed as an accused. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the police are obligated under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to register a second FIR reflecting a counter-version of the same transaction. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the High Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction properly and that the petitioner was not left remediless as he could initiate criminal proceedings through a private complaint. The Court laid down that extraordinary interference is unwarranted where discretionary orders of the High Court do not occasion grave injustice and alternative remedies such as direct complaints remain available.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the police are under an absolute obligation to register a second case reflecting a counter-version of the same transaction under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the High Court dismiss in limine a petition seeking a direction for the registration of a criminal case?
  • Does the dismissal of a petition for the registration of a case under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude the aggrieved party from initiating criminal proceedings through a private complaint?
  Read full judgment →
• Jamil Hussain and Others vs Azizullah Khan and 7 Others1975 SCMR 283 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-28
  ejectmentdefault in payment of rentlandlord and tenantrent restrictionpetition for leave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal in limine of a second appeal by the High Court, which upheld the ejectment of the tenant-petitioners for default in payment of rent. The core legal question concerned whether the landlord's continuous acceptance of a lesser rent amount negated the default or excused the non-payment, and whether the benefit of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (North-West Frontier Province Amendment) Act of 1972 applied. The Supreme Court held that the landlord's acceptance of a lesser amount due to the adjustment of a previous advance did not constitute a waiver or contribute to a wilful default, and that the statutory benefit under the amendment could not be claimed as the tenants had failed to admit their liability and deposit the arrears on the first date of hearing. The Court established that a landlord's acceptance of reduced rent pursuant to a bona fide adjustment does not prejudice their right to seek ejectment for non-payment of the actual stipulated rent.

  Questions settled

  • Does a landlord's continuous acceptance of a lesser rent amount on account of an advance adjustment preclude a claim of default?
  • Can a tenant claim the benefit of the second proviso to Section 13(2) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959 without admitting liability and depositing arrears on the first date of hearing?
  Read full judgment →
• Jaffar Khan vs The Settlement Commissioner and Others1975 SCMR 385 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-06
  transfer of propertycommon passagesettlement authoritiesevaluation basisindependent unitdisplaced persons
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a dispute regarding the transfer of a common passage in a composite property in Karachi under settlement laws. The core legal question was whether a common passage could be transferred as an independent residential unit to a person who had not filed a settlement form. The Supreme Court held that a common passage does not constitute a separate unit or house capable of independent transfer under the relevant statute, and therefore the purported transfer in favour of the petitioner was rightly cancelled by the settlement authorities. The key principle laid down is that common passages of composite properties do not qualify as independent residential units for transfer on evaluation basis.

  Questions settled

  • Does a common passage of a composite property constitute a separate unit for the purpose of transfer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958?
  • Can a transfer of a property made without filing a settlement form and not constituting an independent unit be set aside?
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• Izzat Bakhsh vs Nazeer Ahmad and Others1975 SCMR 141 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-29
  review petitionadditional evidencepre-emptionfraudulent concealmentlimitationadmission
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a review petition seeking reconsideration of an order dismissing a previous petition for special leave to appeal, which had upheld the High Court's finding that the registration of the sale in a pre-emption suit was not fraudulently concealed, thereby disentitling the petitioner from invoking section 18 of the Limitation Act. The core legal question is whether additional evidence, specifically a certified copy of a sale-deed and a fresh affidavit, can be permitted at the review stage under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure to alter admissions made at trial regarding the date of knowledge of the sale. The Supreme Court held that the additional evidence cannot be allowed as it was within the petitioner's knowledge during the trial and fails to meet the criteria for additional evidence on appeal or review. The key principle laid down is that a party cannot introduce new evidence at the review stage to overcome admissions made during the trial when such evidence was already accessible.

  Questions settled

  • Can additional evidence be produced at the review stage to override an admission made at the trial?
  • Does the failure to exercise due diligence in presenting evidence during the trial preclude its admission under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether the invocation of Section 18 of the Limitation Act 1908 is permissible when fraudulent concealment of a sale-deed is not established?
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• Ishrat Hussain and Another vs Subedar alias Suba1975 SCMR 19 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-17
  EjectmentLandlord-tenant relationshipStatutory noticeRent arrearsRemand orderProvisional transfer orderUrban Rent RestrictionDisplaced Persons Act
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order remanding an ejectment case to the Rent Controller. The dispute involved an evacuee shop, where the transferee-landlord sought ejectment of the tenant for default in rent payment and other grounds, after serving notice under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal questions revolved around the validity of the Section 30 notice, the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, and the Rent Controller's power to order deposit of rent arrears under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's remand order. It held that a provisional transfer order entitled the transferee to claim rent and seek ejectment, and the validity of the Section 30 notice was not affected by claims of excessive rent or pending settlement appeals. The Court restored the Rent Controller's order, modifying it to limit the demand for rent arrears to three years from the ejectment application date.

  Questions settled

  • Is a provisional transfer order sufficient to establish a landlord-tenant relationship and entitle the transferee to claim rent and seek ejectment?
  • Does a demand for excessive rent or the pendency of settlement appeals affect the validity of a statutory notice served under Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • What is the maximum period for which a Rent Controller can order the deposit of rent arrears under Section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
  • Can a High Court remand a case for fresh decision on points it has already decided against the tenant?
  Read full judgment →
• International Press through Its Manager vs Presiding Officer, Junior1975 SCMR 392 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-13
  industrial relationsgrievance noticetermination of servicetrade union activityleave to appealjurisdiction of labour courtredundancy
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the reinstatement of an employee by the Junior Labour Court. The petitioner, an employer, terminated the respondent's services, claiming redundancy due to technological conversion of their printing press and asserting that the establishment employed fewer than twenty workers, thus excluding the respondent from invoking the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The Labour Court found the establishment employed over twenty workers and that the termination was motivated by the respondent's trade union activities. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner raised a new legal contention: that the respondent failed to serve a grievance notice as mandated by Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which constitutes a condition precedent to invoking the court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the absence of such notice bars the jurisdiction of the Junior Labour Court, while ordering the continued employment of the respondent and payment of costs by the petitioner.

  Questions settled

  • Is the service of a grievance notice under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, a condition precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of a Junior Labour Court?
  • Does the failure to provide a grievance notice to an employer bar an employee from seeking redress under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
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• Inayatullah vs Muhammad Aslam Khan and 2 Others1975 SCMR 314 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-11
  general power of attorneymortgageredemptionmutationjamabandipresumption of correctnessrevenue recordsdeclaratory suit
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment deals with two civil appeals arising from declaratory suits filed by the plaintiffs challenging various mutations relating to the sale and mortgage of land executed through a general power of attorney. The core legal questions involved the extent of authority conferred by the general power of attorney regarding the disposition of property, whether the presumption of correctness attached to revenue entries in jamabandis was displaced, and issues regarding the maintainability of the appeal and the doctrine of merger of the equity of redemption. The Supreme Court held that the power of attorney merely authorized the attorneys to sign and authenticate instruments rather than alienate property, that the presumption of correctness of the jamabandi entries stood rebutted on the facts, and that the failure of one appellant to appeal did not automatically bar the other's appeal as mortgagee. The Court dismissed both appeals, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower appellate court and the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a general power of attorney authorizing an agent to sign and authenticate documents necessarily include the power to alienate or dispose of the principal's property?
  • Can the presumption of correctness attaching to entries in the jamabandi be displaced by the evidence on record in a declaratory suit?
  • Does the doctrine of merger of the equity of redemption apply automatically when legal and equitable estates are held by different persons under distinct transactions?
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• Inamullah Hashmi vs Irfan Qureshi1975 SCMR 249 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-17
  ejectmentbona fide personal needlandlord and tenantfindings of factsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises out of an application for ejectment filed by the respondent-landlord on the ground of bona fide personal need. The trial court allowed the ejectment application, but the appellate court reversed this decision. Upon a second appeal, the High Court restored the trial court's order for ejectment, concurring with the finding of bona fide personal use. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether findings of fact regarding bona fide personal need and the validity of the landlord's title could be challenged in the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that concurrent findings of fact regarding bona fide personal need cannot be reopened, and that the tenant was precluded from challenging the sale of the property after explicitly acknowledging the change of ownership and agreeing to pay rent to the new landlord through counsel. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact on personal need are final, and a tenant who acknowledges a new landlord and undertakes to pay rent cannot subsequently contest the validity of the landlord's title in ejectment proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding a landlord's bona fide personal need can be challenged in a petition before the Supreme Court?
  • Is a tenant permitted to challenge the sale and ownership of a house after acknowledging the change of ownership and agreeing to pay rent to the new landlord?
  • Does a petition for ejectment raise a question of law when the contentions are solely based on concluded questions of fact?
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• Imtiaz Ullah vs Ram Ahmad and Others1975 SCMR 130 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-12-04
  bailleave to appealabductioncriminal procedureSupreme Court of Pakistan
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the order of the High Court granting bail to the respondents who were charged under Section 363 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether bail granted by the High Court should be set aside in light of the subsequent recovery of the petitioner's son, who allegedly corroborated the abduction and forced labour. The Supreme Court held that the grounds upon which the High Court granted bail continued to hold good despite the appearance of the complainant's son, and that the grant of bail does not reflect on the innocence or guilt of the accused, which must be determined on the merits of the prosecution evidence. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the interlocutory grant of bail does not prejudice the ultimate trial.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the subsequent recovery of an abducted person warrants the cancellation of bail previously granted to the accused?
  • Does the grant of bail by a superior court reflect upon the innocence or guilt of the accused?
  • When will the Supreme Court interfere with the discretion of the High Court in granting bail?
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• Imdad Hussain vs Noor Hassan and 2 Otehrs1975 SCMR 163 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-04
  habeas corpuswrongful confinementlocus standicriminal procedureextraordinary jurisdictionbona fide petition
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing an application filed under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner sought the production of a woman, Mst. Kamal Khatoon, alleging she was wrongfully confined. The High Court dismissed the petition on two grounds: first, that the petitioner lacked standing as he was neither a relative nor a friend of the alleged detenu; and second, that the petitioner was an accused in a criminal case involving the alleged abduction of the same woman, making it inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 491. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that the petitioner failed to challenge the standing objection before the High Court and that the petition lacked bona fides given the petitioner's status as an accused in a related criminal proceeding. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to entertain the petition, emphasizing that such extraordinary remedies should not be invoked by parties with conflicting interests in related criminal trials.

  Questions settled

  • Can a person who is an accused in a criminal case regarding the abduction of an alleged detenu maintain a habeas corpus petition for her production?
  • Is a High Court's refusal to exercise discretion under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, justified when the petitioner fails to establish standing?
  • Should a High Court entertain a habeas corpus petition when the underlying matter is already subject to trial in an ordinary criminal court?
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• Hussain Khan vs The State1975 SCMR 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-28
  dying declarationcircumstantial evidencemurder convictiondeath sentencecriminal appealcorroboration
  Summary & questions settled

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for the murder of the deceased, Farhad. The core legal question is whether the conviction can be sustained based on a dying declaration and circumstantial evidence, particularly when the trial court had previously acquitted the appellant of a related murder charge and the defense questioned the procedural integrity of the dying declaration's recording. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the dying declaration was reliable, as it was free from external prompting and contained intrinsic indicators of truthfulness, such as its brevity and omission of details regarding a separate incident. The Court ruled that when a dying declaration is corroborated by circumstantial evidence—such as the victim being found mortally wounded in a location where he was forcibly taken by the accused—it is sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The principle laid down is that a dying declaration, even if recorded without independent witnesses, remains admissible and credible if the circumstances eliminate the possibility of fabrication and the defense fails to provide a motive for false implication.

  Questions settled

  • Is a dying declaration admissible and reliable if recorded by an investigating officer without independent witnesses present?
  • Can a conviction for murder be sustained primarily on a dying declaration when corroborated by circumstantial evidence?
  • Does the acquittal of an accused on one charge necessarily invalidate evidence used to support a conviction on a separate charge in the same trial?
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• Hashmat Ali and Another vs Faizan Ali and Others1975 SCMR 59 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-15
  agricultural land allotmentcompromiserehabilitation proceedingsremandleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This civil petition for special leave to appeal arises from a long-standing dispute over agricultural land allotments under rehabilitation laws. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were bound by a compromise entered into by their counsel before the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner during remand proceedings, despite prior claims that the original allotment had attained finality. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were indeed bound by the compromise as recorded by the counsel and that there was no denial of the factum of compromise in the revision petitions filed before the Rehabilitation Commissioner. The key principle laid down is that where a party's counsel enters into a lawful compromise during remand proceedings and the compromise is acted upon without an initial denial of authority in the revision stage, the resulting order cannot be subsequently challenged or varied at the instance of the aggrieved party.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a party is bound by a compromise entered into by their counsel during remand proceedings before a rehabilitation authority?
  • Can an order based on a compromise be varied at the instance of a party who failed to deny the factum of compromise in revision petitions?
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• Hamas Ali vs Custodian of Evacuee Property, Sind And Other1975 SCMR 39 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-16
  evacuee propertyconstitutional petitionpermanent transfer deedcustodian of evacuee propertyjurisdictionfindings of factsettlement department
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arose from a petition for special leave to appeal against a High Court order dismissing a constitutional petition. The dispute concerned whether specific land in Badah Town constituted "evacuee property" under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act XII of 1957. The core legal questions were whether the issuance of a permanent transfer deed by the Settlement Department could convert non-evacuee property into evacuee property, whether such issuance ousted the Custodian's jurisdiction to determine the property's nature, and whether the High Court could re-examine the Custodian's findings of fact in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the issuance of a permanent transfer deed does not transform non-evacuee property into evacuee property, nor does it oust the Custodian's jurisdiction to determine the property's status. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that findings of fact by the Custodian, when supported by evidence such as oral testimony and documentary records, are not subject to re-evaluation by the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, upholding the Custodian's determination that the property was not evacuee.

  Questions settled

  • Does the issuance of a permanent transfer deed in respect of property convert it into evacuee property if it was not previously so?
  • Does the issuance of a permanent transfer deed oust the jurisdiction of the Custodian of Evacuee Property to determine the nature of the property?
  • Can a High Court in a constitutional petition re-evaluate findings of fact made by the Custodian of Evacuee Property when such findings are supported by evidence?
  Read full judgment →
• Hakim Khan and Another vs The State and Another1975 SCMR 1 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-04-22
  enhancement of sentenceState counselright of appealspecial leave to appealcapital punishmentconstitutional appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a criminal case where the petitioners' sentences were enhanced from transportation for life to death by the High Court. The core legal questions involved whether an accused person represented by State-appointed counsel is denied a fair trial if the counsel does not interview them in jail or file a vakalatnama, and whether an appeal lies as of right to the Supreme Court against the enhancement of sentence by the High Court under the relevant constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court held that the petition was not maintainable as an appeal of right, finding that State-appointed counsel are not required to file a vakalatnama or mandatorily interview the accused in jail unless necessary, and that an appeal as of right does not lie in cases of sentence enhancement unless specific statutory criteria (such as setting aside an acquittal) are met. The court established that a prisoner adequately represented by competent counsel at State expense cannot claim constitutional prejudice merely because counsel relied on the record without a jail interview, and reaffirmed the restrictive interpretation of appeals as of right from High Court sentencing decisions.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an accused person has a right to an appeal as of right when the High Court enhances a sentence from transportation for life to death?
  • Is a counsel engaged at State expense legally required to obtain a vakalatnama and interview the accused in jail?
  • Does the Supreme Court grant special leave to appeal solely on a question of sentence when the sentence is legal?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Sultan Yousaf vs Haji Sher Afzal Khan and 4 Others1975 SCMR 253 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-27
  land redemptionmortgageRiwaj-e-Aamcustomary lawwrit jurisdictionMalakand Divisionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed a writ petition challenging the redemption of mortgaged land. The core legal question was whether a mortgage agreement, which extended a redemption period to 1987, precluded the subsequent redemption of the land by a new purchaser, and whether the lower courts erred in allowing such redemption. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the mortgage arrangement imposed an absolute prohibition on redemption before the agreed date. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the High Court's reliance on the local Riwaj-e-Aam, which prohibits land mortgages exceeding four years. Since the subject mortgage exceeded twenty years, it was legally invalid under local custom. Consequently, the Court found no error in the lower courts' exercise of jurisdiction in permitting the redemption. The petition was dismissed, establishing the principle that contractual terms regarding mortgage duration are subject to, and cannot override, established local customary laws (Riwaj-e-Aam) governing land tenure and redemption rights.

  Questions settled

  • Does a private agreement extending a mortgage period override local customary law (Riwaj-e-Aam) regarding maximum mortgage duration?
  • Can a mortgage exceeding the duration permitted by local custom be enforced to prevent redemption?
  • Is a High Court order dismissing a writ petition in limine sustainable if the underlying decision is based on valid local custom?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Noor Muhammad and 2 Others vs Syed Muhammad Naqvi and Another1975 SCMR 52 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-04
  evacuee propertytransfer of propertydefault of appearanceauction purchasewrit petitionleave to appealsettlement proceedings
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld the Settlement Commissioner's order rejecting the petitioners' N. C. H. Forms for transfer of an evacuee property under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The core legal question concerned the validity of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order dismissing the forms for default of appearance and the effect of an alleged lack of intimation of said order. The Supreme Court held that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner's order was legally correct and that the failure to send intimation of the order did not impact its validity, particularly since third-party rights had accrued to the auction-purchaser in the meantime due to the petitioners' default. Consequently, the Court laid down that a legally valid order of dismissal for default is not vitiated by a failure to formally intimate the defaulting party, and a bona fide auction-purchaser's vested property rights cannot be disturbed to accommodate a negligent party. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

  Questions settled

  • Does the failure to send intimation of an order dismissing a transfer application for default affect the legal validity of that order?
  • Can property rights acquired by a bona fide auction-purchaser be disturbed due to subsequent indulgence shown to a defaulting applicant?
  • Whether an appellate authority can set aside a legally correct order of a Deputy Settlement Commissioner merely on the ground of lack of formal intimation of the order to the applicant?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Muhammad Sharif vs Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, and Others1975 SCMR 86 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-06-05
  restoration of petitiondismissal for defaultcivil petition for special leave to appealnon-appearancesupreme court practice
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a miscellaneous application for the restoration of Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 319 of 1973, which had been dismissed for default due to the non-appearance of the learned counsel and the learned Advocate-on-Record. The core legal question is whether sufficient cause has been shown for the restoration of a dismissed leave petition where the Advocate-on-Record fell ill but no explanation was provided for the absence of the engaged counsel or office staff, and where the matter was called only after being passed over and notice was sent. The Supreme Court held that no justification exists for restoration, noting that the applicant's counsel and Advocate-on-Record failed to exercise due diligence or have the proceedings watched. The key principle laid down is that negligence and lack of diligence in attending court proceedings or ensuring representation do not warrant the indulgence of restoring a petition dismissed in default.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a petition dismissed for default can be restored when the Advocate-on-Record falls ill but no explanation is provided for the absence of the engaged counsel?
  • Does failure to have court proceedings watched constitute sufficient ground for the restoration of a dismissed leave petition?
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• Haji Hashmatullah and Others vs Karachi Municipal Corporation and Others1975 SCMR 359 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-15
  writ jurisdictionmunicipal propertypublic interestcontrolling authorityvested rightevacuee trust propertyjudicial review
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal arose from the dismissal of a constitutional petition challenging the order of the Commissioner, Karachi, acting as the Controlling Authority under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960. The Commissioner had quashed a resolution of the Karachi Municipal Corporation that proposed leasing a plot of land to the appellants, on the grounds that the transaction was against public interest. The core legal question was whether the Commissioner’s determination of public interest was reviewable in writ jurisdiction and whether the appellants possessed a vested right to the property. The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner acted within his statutory jurisdiction under Section 111 of the Ordinance. The Court affirmed that it is not the function of the High Court in writ proceedings to substitute its own opinion for that of the administrative authority regarding public interest, provided the decision was not mala fide or patently erroneous. Furthermore, the Court established that a prospective lessee acquires no vested right in municipal property until the lease is formally confirmed by the competent authority. The appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the Controlling Authority's determination of 'public interest' under Section 111 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 is subject to judicial review?
  • Does a prospective lessee of municipal property acquire a vested right before the lease is confirmed by the relevant authority?
  • Can a High Court in writ jurisdiction substitute its own opinion for that of the Controlling Authority regarding what constitutes public interest?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ghulam Sarwar vs Daya Ram1975 SCMR 179 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-17
  special leave to appealdismissal for non-prosecutionrestoration of appeallimitation periodprivilege of senatordate of knowledge
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against an order of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court, which refused to re-admit an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution. The core legal question concerns the computation of the limitation period for filing an application to restore an appeal dismissed in default, and whether a counsel's engagement in the Senate constitutes a privilege extending to professional work to excuse non-appearance, as well as whether limitation runs from the date of knowledge or the date of dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the privilege of a Senator cannot be extended to professional work, that no proper intimation of unavailability was given, and that limitation under Article 168 of the Limitation Act begins to run from the date of dismissal, not from the date of knowledge. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming that statutory limitation periods and rules of procedure must be strictly adhered to.

  Questions settled

  • Does a counsel's pre-occupation or participation in a session of the Senate extend as a privilege to professional court work?
  • Does the limitation period for applying to restore an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution run from the date of the dismissal or the date of knowledge?
  • Can time under Article 168 of the Limitation Act be computed from the date the petitioner came to know about the dismissal?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji Ahmad vs The State1975 SCMR 69 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-11-28
  rapestepdaughtermedical evidencechemical examiner reportspecial leave to appealcredibility of prosecutrix
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the conviction of the petitioner under Section 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for committing rape on his stepdaughter, which was upheld by both the Sessions Judge and the Lahore High Court. The core legal question addressed by the courts was whether the absence of external marks of injury or violence on the person of the prosecutrix falsifies the charge of rape. The Supreme Court held that the lack of external violence does not negate the occurrence of rape, particularly where medical evidence confirms internal trauma and the presence of semen, and the victim was overpowered and rendered helpless through threats. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of a young prosecutrix, when corroborated by medical findings such as vaginal tears and chemical examiner reports confirming semen stains, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape even in the absence of bodily injuries.

  Questions settled

  • Does the absence of external marks of injury or violence on the person of the prosecutrix falsify a charge of rape?
  • Is the testimony of a prosecutrix sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape when supported by medical evidence of internal trauma and semen stains?
  Read full judgment →
• Gulzada and Others vs Raza Khan and Others1975 SCMR 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-07
  pre-emptionsuperior right of pre-emptionvillage immovable propertypersonal residence exemptionco-sharersecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioners purchased a house in Peshawar, which was subsequently subjected to a pre-emption suit by the respondent, a co-sharer. The petitioners resisted the suit claiming statutory exemption under section 5 of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, asserting they purchased it for personal residence and owned no other house or vacant site in the village. The trial and first appellate courts decreed the suit against the petitioners, with the point not being pressed in the first appeal based on an earlier Peshawar High Court Full Bench ruling. Following a subsequent authoritative judgment by the Supreme Court altering the legal landscape, the High Court permitted the petitioners to withdraw their concession and re-argue the matter. Upon review of the evidence, the High Court concurred that the petitioners owned considerable landed property and multiple houses in the village, thus disqualifying them from claiming the exemption under the 1950 Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for leave to appeal, holding that the lower courts and the High Court correctly decided the matter.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a vendee who owns other residential property in the village can claim exemption from pre-emption under section 5 of the N.-W. F. P. Pre-emption Act 1950?
  • Can an appellate court permit a party to withdraw from a concession made before a lower appellate court in light of a subsequent authoritative judicial pronouncement?
  • Does a fractional share in a house preclude a finding that the vendee owns a house or vacant site exceeding the statutory limit under the Pre-emption Act?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Murtaza vs The State1975 SCMR 244 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-31
  enhancement of sentencerevisional jurisdictioncorruptionpublic servantsplea of guiltysentencing discretionSingle Judge jurisdiction
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns eight petitions for leave to appeal against the enhancement of sentences by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioners, public servants and a private drug store owner, had pleaded guilty to submitting bogus medical reimbursement claims, for which the trial court initially imposed lenient sentences of imprisonment until the rising of the court. Upon the District Magistrate's motion, the High Court enhanced these sentences to six months' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions were whether the sentences were excessive given the protracted trial duration and whether a Single Judge of the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to enhance sentences. The Supreme Court held that the sentences were not excessive, noting the alarming prevalence of such corruption and the resulting loss to the public exchequer. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that a Single Judge lacked the authority to enhance sentences, finding no statutory rule or provision prohibiting such an order in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The petitions were dismissed, affirming that the High Court's discretion in sentencing matters, when exercised reasonably, is generally not subject to interference.

  Questions settled

  • Can a Single Judge of the High Court enhance a sentence in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
  • Is a sentence of imprisonment until the rising of the court appropriate for corruption offenses involving public funds?
  • Does the length of a trial and the threat of job loss justify a lenient sentence for corruption-related offenses?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Muhammad vs Muhammad Hayat and Another1975 SCMR 446 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-20
  murderacquittal appealinterested witnessescorroboration of evidenceocular evidencemedical evidenceappreciation of evidence
  Summary & questions settled

  This appeal by special leave challenged the High Court's order acquitting the respondent of murder charges under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court’s acquittal was based on a sound appreciation of evidence, particularly regarding the testimony of interested, related witnesses and the consistency of ocular evidence with medical findings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly identified the need for corroboration of the testimony provided by the interested prosecution witnesses, especially given the lack of independent corroboration and the absence of a proven motive. Furthermore, the Court noted significant discrepancies between the prosecution’s version of the incident and the medical evidence, which indicated the shots were fired from behind, contradicting the witnesses' claims. The Court affirmed the principle that an appellate court should not interfere with an acquittal unless the decision is perverse or unreasonable. Finding the High Court’s reasoning sound and consistent with established principles of evidence, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, thereby maintaining the acquittal of the respondent.

  Questions settled

  • Does the testimony of interested witnesses in a murder case require independent corroboration?
  • Under what circumstances should the Supreme Court interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court?
  • Is a conviction sustainable when ocular evidence is contradicted by medical evidence regarding the direction of the fatal shot?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Hussain Zair vs Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, Lahore and 2 Others1975 SCMR 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-16
  settlement proceedingstransfer of propertyclaimant displaced personearmarking schemeconcurrent findingsleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which upheld the concurrent findings of the settlement authorities. The petitioner had sought the transfer of an Ihata in Dera Ghazi Khan, but his LH form was rejected on the ground that he was a local in possession of his own house, and no appeal was initially filed against that rejection. Subsequently, the property was transferred to a claimant displaced person under the Earmarking Scheme. The petitioner's subsequent challenges through appeals, a revision, and a constitutional writ petition were all dismissed by the lower forums and the High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the concurrent findings regarding the nature of the property as a house and its lawful transfer under the Earmarking Scheme warranted interference. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact were well-founded and that the petitioner failed to substantiate any claim of prior transfer by evidence. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether concurrent findings of settlement authorities regarding the nature of a property as a house can be interfered with without appropriate grounds?
  • Does a local person whose LH form has been rejected have a preferential right over a claimant displaced person under the Earmarking Scheme?
  • Is an unproven claim of property transfer sufficient to overturn concurrent adverse orders by settlement authorities?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider vs Muhammad Nawaz and 4 Others1975 SCMR 491 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-05-02
  special oathcompromise decreeappellate procedurecivil appealminor defendantsarbitration awardbinding agreement
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil suit concerning the ownership of land, which was initially dismissed by the trial court. During the subsequent appeal, the parties entered into a compromise agreeing to abide by a statement made on the Holy Qur'an by a third party, Jewan. The Additional District Judge, after granting permission for the compromise regarding minor defendants, recorded Jewan's statement on special oath, which affirmed the sale of the land by the petitioner. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. The petitioner challenged this, arguing that Jewan had previously issued a contradictory private arbitration award that the court failed to consider. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had voluntarily agreed to the special oath procedure and failed to raise the existence of the prior award during the appellate proceedings. The Court affirmed the decision, ruling that parties are bound by their agreement to a special oath when they have explicitly consented to be so bound, and a court is not obligated to consider evidence not presented or relied upon by the parties during the adjudication of such a compromise.

  Questions settled

  • Is a party bound by a statement made on special oath if they explicitly agreed to be bound by it during appellate proceedings?
  • Can a party challenge a court's decision based on a special oath by relying on a prior private award that was not presented or pressed during the hearing?
  • Does a court have the discretion to ignore a prior private award when the parties have specifically requested the court to decide the appeal based on a statement made on special oath?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Haider (Represented by 9 Heirs) vs Mst. Raj Bhari and 4 Others1975 SCMR 252 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1973-10-19
  abatementsecond appealprocedural lawretrospective operationvested rightpre-emptionleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition arises from a judgment and order of the Lahore High Court declaring a second appeal as abated due to the death of the petitioner, Ghulam Haider, during its pendency. The core legal questions involve whether the procedural amendments introduced by the Law Reforms Ordinance No. XII of 1972 apply retrospectively to cure abatement in pending matters, and whether a litigant possesses a vested right in procedural law. The Supreme Court held that procedural law amendments operate retrospectively and no litigant has a vested right in procedure, rendering the High Court's refusal based on accrued rights of respondents erroneous. Furthermore, the refusal to permit the deposit of the decretal amount after the alleged abatement was questioned. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these important questions of law, while maintaining the status quo as to possession and permitting respondents to withdraw deposited money upon furnishing security.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an amendment to procedural law introduced by the Law Reforms Ordinance No. XII of 1972 applies retrospectively to pending appeals?
  • Does a litigant have a vested right in procedural law so as to prevent the retrospective application of procedural amendments?
  • Whether the High Court was justified in declaring a second appeal abated after the lapse of ninety days from the death of the appellant before the promulgation of the Law Reforms Ordinance?
  • Is a party entitled to deposit the decretal amount determined by the lower appellate court notwithstanding the abatement of an appeal?
  Read full judgment →
• Ghulam Farid and 2 Others vs Member, Board of Revenue1975 SCMR 263 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-07
  consolidation of holdingsland disputeTariqa-e-Taqsimsoil classificationconsensual schemeadministrative instructionsstatutory interpretation
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns a petition challenging consolidation proceedings under the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance 1960. The petitioners alleged that the consolidation resulted in an unfair reduction of their landholdings and that the scheme was illegal for lacking proper soil classification or evaluation, contrary to alleged instructions. The Supreme Court examined whether the consolidation scheme, formulated with the consensus of village landowners and the Mushawarti Committee, was legally valid despite the absence of soil classification. The Court held that the petitioners' factual claims regarding land reduction were incorrect and had not been raised before the High Court. Furthermore, the Court determined that the consolidation scheme was valid because it was based on the agreement and consent of all landowners. The Court established the principle that while rules may contemplate soil classification, neither the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance 1960 nor the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Rules 1960 precludes parties from arriving at a mutually beneficial, consensual arrangement. Administrative instructions cannot override the statutory provisions of the Ordinance and Rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can a consolidation of holdings scheme be validly framed based on the mutual agreement of landowners without formal soil classification?
  • Do administrative instructions regarding land consolidation override the provisions of the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance 1960?
  • Is a consolidation officer legally required to classify soil if all landowners have consented to a different method of distribution?
  Read full judgment →
• Firdous Textile Mills vs Government of Pakistan1975 SCMR 132 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-09-05
  central excise dutyman-made fibermixed yarnretrospective legislationpast and closed transactionshort levy
  Summary & questions settled

  This judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the High Court at Karachi, which dismissed writ petitions concerning the assessment of central excise duty on mixed yarn containing cotton and man-made fibers. The core legal questions involved whether the recovery of short-levied excise duty constituted a past and closed transaction, and whether the retrospective explanation added to the Finance Act regarding man-made yarn could be legally applied. The Supreme Court held that the recovery of short-levied duty within the statutory three-year period under the Central Excises and Salt Rules, 1944, did not constitute a past and closed transaction, and that the legislative amendment enacted via the Finance Act operated validly with retrospective effect as a declaratory provision. The Court laid down the principle that statutory amendments by primary legislation explicitly given retrospective effect can govern prior assessments, and short-levied duties are recoverable within the prescribed limitation period.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the payment of central excise duty subsequently found to be short-levied constitutes a past and closed transaction?
  • Can a statutory amendment introduced by the Finance Act operate retrospectively to assess mixed yarn?
  • Does the Central Excises and Salt Rules, 1944 empower the government to recover short-levied duty within a period of three years?
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• Fida Hussain vs The State1975 SCMR 150 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-07
  special leave to appealocular evidencecriminal convictionevidentiary discrepanciesmurderwitness credibilityinvestigating officer omissions
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a conviction and death sentence under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Mst. Aisha. The petitioner contended that the trial court failed to consider various evidentiary discrepancies, specifically the failure to recover a blood-stained sheet, the failure to seize the cot where the incident occurred, inconsistencies regarding the location where the First Information Report was recorded, and conflicting testimony regarding the date of a marriage. The Supreme Court addressed whether these omissions and discrepancies were sufficient to discredit the ocular evidence provided by the deceased's brother and an independent witness. The Court held that the petition lacked substance. It reasoned that the alleged omissions by the investigating officer and minor discrepancies in collateral facts did not undermine the credibility of the eyewitnesses, who provided valid reasons for their presence at the scene. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that such minor discrepancies do not warrant interference with the conviction based on reliable ocular testimony.

  Questions settled

  • Do minor omissions by an investigating officer regarding the recovery of evidence necessarily invalidate ocular testimony?
  • Does a discrepancy regarding the location of the recording of a First Information Report automatically discredit eyewitness accounts?
  • Can a conviction be sustained despite minor discrepancies in collateral facts such as the date of a marriage?
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• Feroz vs The State1975 SCMR 232 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-01-31
  death sentenceleave to appealvendetta killingmitigating circumstancesprerogative of mercycriminal appealjudicial discretion
  Summary & questions settled

  The petitioner sought leave to appeal against his conviction and death sentence for the murder of Nooran Shah, committed within the precincts of a court. The petitioner admitted the act, which was motivated by a series of vendetta killings involving the deceased, who had allegedly murdered the petitioner’s brother, father, and two witnesses. While counsel argued that these mitigating circumstances warranted a reduction in sentence, the Supreme Court examined whether it should interfere with the discretion exercised by the lower courts. The Court held that the death sentence was legally imposed and, while acknowledging the tragic background, declined to grant leave to appeal. The Court affirmed the principle that it will not normally interfere to reduce a sentence that is otherwise legal and within the discretion of the trial and appellate courts. It observed that matters of clemency based on the peculiar circumstances of a case are more appropriately addressed by the Executive in the exercise of its prerogative of mercy rather than through judicial intervention.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Supreme Court interfere with a legal sentence solely because a lesser sentence might have been appropriate?
  • Is the existence of a vendetta background sufficient ground for the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal against a death sentence?
  • Which branch of government is appropriate for addressing clemency based on the peculiar circumstances of a criminal case?
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• Feroz Shah (Represented by 9 Others) vs Muhammad Ismail and Another1975 SCMR 250 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-05-14
  adverse possessionsuit for possessionjamabandi entriesrevenue recordburden of proofconcurrent findingssecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for possession of agricultural land in Tehsil Swabi, District Mardan. The respondents claimed ownership through successive sales originating from the original owner, whereas the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, who was in possession of the land, contested the suit by pleading title acquired through adverse possession. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, rejecting the plea of adverse possession as it had not matured into ownership. On appeal, the first appellate court affirmed the findings on ownership and adverse possession while modifying the decree regarding compensation for improvements. In second appeal, the High Court re-examined the successive jamabandi entries and upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts that adverse possession was not established. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that any alleged conflicting entries in the revenue record did not advance the petitioners' case, as the onus of proving title by adverse possession rested heavily on the party asserting it.

  Questions settled

  • On whom does the onus of proof lie when establishing title by adverse possession?
  • Whether conflicting entries in the revenue record are sufficient to establish a claim of adverse possession by a party in possession?
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• Fazal Muhammad vs Abdur Rashid and Others1975 SCMR 251 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-11-13
  writ petitionreview jurisdictionmisreading of evidenceappellate interferenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from an order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, who refused to review a previous order allowing a writ petition. The petitioner challenged the refusal, contending that the High Court failed to consider certain documents favorable to his case and misread other evidence. The Supreme Court addressed the core legal question of whether a petitioner can introduce new arguments or claims of misreading evidence in a review petition that were not properly raised or substantiated before the original forum. The Court held that since the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the overlooked documents were presented to the learned Single Judge, and because the specific instances of alleged misreading were already considered and rejected by the High Court with supporting factual reasoning, there was no ground for interference. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate or review jurisdiction cannot be invoked to raise points not previously agitated before the lower court, nor can it be used to re-litigate findings of fact that were adequately addressed by the original judge.

  Questions settled

  • Can a petitioner raise new arguments in a review petition that were not presented before the original court?
  • Is the Supreme Court required to interfere when a High Court has already considered and rejected claims of misreading evidence with supporting reasons?
  • Does the failure to raise a point before the original forum preclude a party from raising it in a subsequent petition for leave to appeal?
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• Fazal Karim and Another vs Ghulam Jilani and Others1975 SCMR 452 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-21
  limitation periodsummer vacationcomputation of timestatutory interpretationcivil appealcourt office
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter concerns civil appeals regarding the limitation period for filing an appeal in the High Court. The core legal question was whether an appeal filed after the expiry of the limitation period, but during the High Court's summer vacation, was time-barred, given a notification stating the 'Office' would remain open to receive petitions during the vacation. The appellants argued that the notification rendered the Court effectively open, thereby negating the extension of time under Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908. The Supreme Court held that the appeal was not time-barred. The Court reasoned that the statutory right conferred by Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908, which allows for the filing of an appeal on the day the Court reopens if the limitation period expires while the Court is closed, cannot be overridden by an administrative notification. Furthermore, the Court distinguished between the 'Office' remaining open for optional filings and the 'Court' being closed for judicial business, affirming that the notification did not equate to the Court being open for the purposes of limitation.

  Questions settled

  • Does an administrative notification allowing the 'Office' to receive petitions during a court vacation override the statutory right to extend limitation under Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Is the 'Office' of a court synonymous with the 'Court' for the purposes of computing limitation periods when the Court is closed for vacation?
  • Can an optional facility to file petitions during a court vacation be construed to take away the statutory right to file an appeal upon the reopening of the Court?
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• Fazal Hussain vs Mst. Musharraf Sultana1975 SCMR 333 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-13
  review petitionnon-prosecutionremand orderpre-emptionsecond appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a review petition filed against the Court's earlier judgment dated 7 November 1973, which had dismissed Civil Appeal No. 190 of 1969. The core legal questions involve whether the previous judgment failed to provide necessary directions to the first appellate court and whether it could be misconstrued as a final decree for possession in favour of the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the petition is liable to be dismissed for non-prosecution due to the absence of the petitioner's counsel and Advocate-on-Record. Furthermore, on merits, the Court found no substance in the review grounds, clarifying that the judgment merely upheld the High Court's remand order concerning pre-emptibility under Act XII of 1957 and the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, without deciding the pre-emption suit on its merits. The key principle laid down is that a review petition cannot be sustained on unfounded apprehensions when the original judgment does not interfere with a pending remand order or decide the merits of the underlying dispute.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a review petition can be dismissed for non-prosecution when the petitioner and counsel fail to appear after due notice?
  • Does a judgment upholding a remand order on the question of pre-emptibility amount to a final adjudication on the merits of the suit?
  • Can a judgment of the Supreme Court be reviewed on the apprehension that it might be misconstrued by the lower court?
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• Fateh Muhammad and Others vs Malik Qadir Bakhsh1975 SCMR 157 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-10-23
  limitationspecial leave to appealtime requisitecertified copycondonation of delaydue diligencetime-barred
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for special leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging an order of a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court. The petition was barred by 41 days after accounting for the period spent obtaining a certified copy of the order. The petitioners sought exemption for the time between when the copy was ready for delivery and when they actually collected it, arguing they were not informed of the ready date. The core legal question before the Court was whether the interval between the date a certified copy is ready for delivery and the date it is received by the applicant constitutes 'time requisite' under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908, and whether the overall delay could be condoned under Section 5. The Supreme Court held that 'time requisite' means only the interval between applying for the copy and when it is ready. Time lost after the copy is ready due to applicant's lack of due diligence cannot be excluded, nor was any valid explanation offered under Section 5. The petition was dismissed as time-barred.

  Questions settled

  • Does the time between the date a certified copy is ready for delivery and the date the applicant takes delivery count as 'time requisite' under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • What constitutes due diligence on the part of a litigant when applying for and obtaining certified copies of court orders?
  • Can delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 without a satisfactory day-to-day explanation?
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• Fateh Mohammad and Another vs The State and Another1975 SCMR 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-14
  bail cancellationcriminal procedurediscretion of High Courtdelayed trialfirearm injuries
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter arises from a petition filed by Fateh Muhammad and Nawaz challenging an order of the Lahore High Court dated 5-2-1975, which cancelled the bail previously granted to them by the lower courts. The core legal question concerns the propriety of the High Court's exercise of discretion in cancelling bail where the petitioners were specifically charged in the F.I.R. with being armed with guns and causing injuries. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court did not act in an illegal or improper manner in exercising its discretion under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and accordingly dismissed the petition while observing that the petitioners could renew their bail application before the concerned court if the trial is unduly delayed. The key principle laid down is that interference with the High Court's discretionary cancellation of bail is unwarranted absent illegality or impropriety, subject to remedies for delayed trials.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion under section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 in cancelling bail?
  • Are petitioners entitled to renew their application for bail before the trial court if the trial is unduly delayed?
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• Fateh Ali vs Pir Muhammad and Another1975 SCMR 221 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-02-06
  pre-emptionexchange deedremand of caseOrder XLI Rule 24Section 103 CPCMartial Law Regulation No. 64superior right of pre-emption
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from pre-emption proceedings initiated by the petitioner regarding a land sale. To defeat the petitioner's pre-emption suit, the respondent purchaser had acquired a small land parcel via exchange prior to the filing of the pre-emption suit. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first Appellate Court allowed the appeal on the ground that the exchange transaction violated Martial Law Regulation No. 64. On second appeal, the High Court reversed this finding and, rather than remanding the case, exercised its power under Order XLI Rule 24 read with Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to determine the remaining issues itself, ultimately dismissing the suit. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the High Court was under no obligation to remand the matter and was fully competent to determine the unconsidered issues directly. It further affirmed that the exchange transaction was not barred by paragraph 25(4) of Martial Law Regulation No. 64.

  Questions settled

  • Is a High Court required to remand a case to the lower appellate court when reversing a finding on an issue, or may it determine the remaining unconsidered issues itself under Order XLI Rule 24 read with Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the direct determination of unconsidered issues by the High Court under Order XLI Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 improperly deprive a party of a right of appeal?
  • Whether an exchange transaction conducted to improve a purchaser's status against a prospective pre-emptor was hit by paragraph 25(4) of Martial Law Regulation No. 64?
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• Falak Sher vs The State1975 SCMR 231 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1974-05-09
  suspension of sentencejudicial discretioncriminal appealexcessive sentenceleave to appeal
  Summary & questions settled

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had previously dismissed the petitioner's application for the suspension of a seven-year sentence and a fine of Rs. 1,000 imposed under Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in refusing to suspend the petitioner's sentence, particularly given the petitioner's argument that the sentence was excessive and that a standard sentence in such cases should be three years. The Supreme Court held that the decision to suspend a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion. Finding that the High Court had exercised its discretion properly under the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the lower court's order and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that the suspension of a sentence pending appeal is a discretionary exercise by the High Court, and the Supreme Court will not interfere with such discretion unless it has been exercised improperly or arbitrarily.

  Questions settled

  • Is the suspension of a sentence pending appeal a matter of right or judicial discretion?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's refusal to suspend a sentence?
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• Fakir Shah and Others vs Mehtab Shah Pir Bokhari Masjid Committee1975 SCMR 425 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1975-03-07
  public trustwakfperpetual injunctionmanagement of mosquerepresentative suitmaintainability of suitCode of Civil Procedure
  Summary & questions settled

  This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court at Karachi, which affirmed the decisions of the trial and first appellate courts granting a perpetual injunction against the petitioners. The dispute concerned the management of a mosque and the shrine of a Muslim divine, Hazrat Mehtab Shah Bokhari, between the Sunni and Shia communities. The trial court, based on evidence and site inspection, determined the divine was of the Sunni faith and the premises were constructed by Sunni contributions, thus restraining the petitioners from interfering with Sunni management. The petitioners challenged the suit's competency, arguing that the subject matter involved a public trust (wakf) and therefore fell under the mandatory requirements of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, which requires the consent of the Advocate-General for such litigation. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the suit was defective for failing to comply with Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, while maintaining the status quo between the parties.

  Questions settled

  • Does a suit concerning the management of a mosque and shrine, alleged to be a public trust, require compliance with Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Is a suit for perpetual injunction regarding the management of a religious property maintainable without the consent of the Advocate-General if it involves a public trust?
  • Can a suit be considered defective if it seeks relief related to the management of a wakf property without following the procedure prescribed in Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
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