Latest Judgments
Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.
- KHAN MOHAMMAD AND 11 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 762 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- Khan IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN KHAN OF MAMDOT (REPRESENTED BY 6 HEIRS) vs MESSRS GHULAM NABI CORPORATION LTD., LAHORE1971 PLD Supreme Court 550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-31Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is a civil appeal arising from a suit for the recovery of the price of a cold storage plant. The central legal question is whether the suit was competently instituted by the respondent-company's representative, Mr. Khurshid Mahmood, and whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to admit additional evidence to cure a defect in the plaintiff's case regarding authorization. The Supreme Court held that the High Court improperly exercised its discretion to allow additional evidence, as the purpose of the rule is not to fill lacunas in a party's evidence. Furthermore, upon review, the evidence failed to establish that a valid meeting of the Board of Directors was convened to authorize the suit, as proper notice was not served on the appellant. The key principle laid down is that a meeting of directors is not duly convened unless due notice is given to all directors; business conducted at an improperly convened meeting is invalid. Consequently, the suit was not competently instituted.
Questions settled- Can an appellate court permit the production of additional evidence under Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to fill a lacuna in a party's case?
- Is a meeting of a board of directors valid if due notice has not been given to all directors?
- What is the effect of a suit being instituted by a person who lacks proper authorization from the company?
- KHAN AND 6 Others vs THE CROWN1971 SCMR 264 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-10-28Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.These criminal appeals by special leave challenged an order of retrial passed by the Lahore High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, setting aside an acquittal. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in ordering a retrial from an acquittal based on a priori reasoning and manifestly perverse conclusions by the trial magistrate. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeals, holding that an order of acquittal can be interfered with in revision and a retrial ordered when the trial court's findings are manifestly wrong, perverse, or based on extraneous and conjectural reasoning rather than the evidence. The key principle laid down is that while an appellate or revisional court will not lightly interfere with an acquittal merely due to a disagreement with the findings, it may validly order a retrial where the judgment of acquittal is based on perversity and a priori reasoning that disregards the evidence and established legal principles.
Questions settled- Under what circumstances can the High Court interfere with an acquittal and order a retrial in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does an order of retrial passed by a High Court offend against the rule in Khairdi Khan v. The Crown when the trial court's reasoning is manifestly wrong and perverse?
- KHALIL ASGHAR AND Another vs Sh. SANA ULLAH AND Another1971 SCMR 778 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-05Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a decision of the Lahore High Court upholding concurrent decrees in favor of the respondents for the specific performance of an agreement to sell a plot of land with structures in Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether the underlying document constituted a completed sale-deed requiring compulsory registration or merely an agreement to sell. The Supreme Court held that the document was an agreement to sell rather than a sale-deed, noting that the petitioners had not yet acquired ownership rights from the Settlement Department at the time of execution, rendering a direct transfer impossible, and that the parties intended for a regular sale-deed to be executed subsequently. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether a document reciting the receipt of full consideration and delivery of possession constitutes a completed sale-deed or an agreement to sell?
- Is a document inadmissible in evidence for lack of registration if it is construed as an agreement to sell rather than a sale-deed?
- Can a person transfer ownership rights in property which they do not yet possess at the time of the transaction?
- KHALID LATIF Alias GOGA vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1313 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-28Read full judgment →
- KHALID AHMAD vs Mst. NISHAT AFROZ AND 2 OTHER1971 PLD Karachi 22 · Sindh High Court · 1967-10-10Read full judgment →
- KHAIR DIN AND 3 Others vs JAMAL DIN1971 SCMR 704 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-27Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a revision application by the High Court, which upheld an order directing the petitioners to restore the respondent to possession of a disputed site after he was illegally dispossessed during the pendency of a permanent injunction suit. The respondent had filed a suit for permanent injunction before the Civil Judge, Lyallpur, where a temporary injunction was granted under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The core legal question concerned the propriety of restoring a party to physical possession who was dispossessed in violation of an existing temporary injunction. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent orders of the courts below suffered from no defect, noting that the respondent's actual physical possession of running a sweetmeat shop was rightly protected, with the High Court adequately safeguarding the petitioners' financial interests by ordering monthly compensation deposits pending the final adjudication of the suit.
Questions settled- Whether a court can order the restoration of possession to a party illegally dispossessed in violation of a temporary injunction?
- Does the concurrent exercise of discretion by lower courts regarding interim injunctions warrant interference in special leave to appeal?
- Can a court direct a party in possession to deposit monthly compensation as a condition for protecting interim physical possession pending suit adjudication?
- KHADIM HUSSAIN vs THE STATE Respondent1971 P Cr. L J 268 · Lahore High Court · -Read full judgment →
- KHADIM HUSSAIN vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD1971 PLD Lahore 529 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-02Read full judgment →
- KHADIM alias KHOONI vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 776 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-15Read full judgment →
- KHADIM ALI SHAH AND 3 Other vs VICE-CHAIRMAN, P. W. R. HEADQUARTERS1971 P LC 114 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-11-11Read full judgment →
- Kh. GULZAR AHMAD AND 6 OTHERS vs Haji ATA MUHAMMAD AND 15 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 570 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-18Read full judgment →
- KEVALDAS RANCHHODAS vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY CITY-I1971 PTD 115 · Bombay High Court · 1971-09-19Read full judgment →
- Kazi MOHAMMAD HASHEM vs PROJECT MANAGER, GAMMON (EAST PAKISTAN)1971PLC29 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
- Kazi HARUNUR RASHID vs MESSRS CONTINENTAL TRADERS, CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 554 · Labour Court · 1970-09-05Read full judgment →
- Kazi FAZLUL KARIM vs TILE DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BANK OF.1971 PLC 53 · Labour Court · 1970-08-05Read full judgment →
- Kazi FAZLUL HUQ vs PARSONS CORPORATIONS, CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 552 · Labour Court · 1970-09-08Read full judgment →
- Kazi FAZLUL HUQ vs MANAGER, PARSONS CORPORATION; CHITTAGONG1971PLC31 · Labour Court · 1970-03-25Read full judgment →
- KARNAPHULI RAYON, & CHEMICALS LTD., CHITTAGONG vs KARNAPHULI RAYON1971PLC105 · Labour Court · 1970-07-18Read full judgment →
- KARIMI INDUSTRIES WORKERS' UNION vs KARIM INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES' UNION, NOWSHEARA AND ANOTHER1971 PLC 178 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 1970-06-09Read full judgment →
- KARACHI SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS LTD. KARACHI vs MESSRS1971 PLD Karachi 501 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-01Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking to stay a civil suit in favor of arbitration. The plaintiffs sued for the return of M.S. billets or their price, arguing that a subsequent promise by the defendants to return the billets created a new contract outside the scope of the original agreement. The defendants contended that the dispute remained governed by the arbitration clause in the original contract. The Court held that the dispute was essentially connected to the original agreement, which already provided for the supply and adjustment of M.S. billets. Furthermore, the Court ruled that even if the original contract were modified or novated, the arbitration clause, being drafted in broad terms, remained severable and survived such changes. The Court distinguished the present case from instances where a subsequent agreement explicitly establishes a different forum for dispute resolution. Consequently, the Court stayed the suit, directing the parties to resolve the dispute through the arbitration mechanism provided in their original agreement.
Questions settled- Does an arbitration clause in a contract survive the alleged novation or modification of that contract?
- Is a dispute regarding the return of materials supplied under a contract covered by an arbitration clause contained within that same contract?
- Under what circumstances does a subsequent agreement supersede an existing arbitration clause?
- KARACHI ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION LTD. vs FAZAL BROTHERS LTD. AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 583 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- KAMIL NOOR KHAN vs CONTROLLING AUTHORITY, UNION COMMITTEE NO. 60, KARACHI AND 3 Other1971 SCMR 29 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-07Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition by the High Court, which challenged his removal from the office of Chairman, Union Committee No. 60 (Martin Quarters), Karachi, following a no-confidence resolution passed under the West Pakistan Basic Democracies (Vote of No-confidence against Chairman) Rules, 1963. The core legal questions involved whether the failure to give seven clear days' notice to certain members vitiated the meeting and whether the participation of a member whose election was later set aside invalidated the proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the members who attended and participated waived any objection regarding the notice period, that the provisions of rule 3(2) are directory rather than mandatory as no penalty is prescribed, and that a member only vacates a seat upon official gazette notification. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Whether the requirement of seven clear days' notice under rule 3(2) of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies (Vote of No-confidence against Chairman) Rules, 1963 is mandatory or directory?
- Does the participation of members who received short notice in a no-confidence meeting amount to a waiver of their right to object?
- When does a member of a Union Committee legally vacate their seat in relation to an election dispute?
- Does the subsequent setting aside of a member's election invalidate no-confidence proceedings in which they previously participated?
- KAMAL MUSTAFA vs SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, COMMUNICATION1971 PLC 261 (C.S.T.) · Service Tribunal · 1971-05-31Read full judgment →
- KAMAL KHAN vs KHALID AZIZ1971 PLC 416-- · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
- KAMAL KHAN AND ANOTHER vs ABDUL KHALIQ AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Quetta 121 · Balochistan High Court · 1971-05-29Read full judgment →
- KALVA SURYANARAYANA vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, A-3 WARD, HYDERABAD1971 PTD 875 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-23Read full judgment →
- KALOO vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1105 · Sindh High Court · 1971-04-12Read full judgment →
- KALIMUDDIN ANSARI., Haji AHMED AND 3 OTHERS., S. M. ASKARI AND ANOTHER vs DIRECTOR, EXCISE AND TAXATION, KARACHI AND ANOTHER., KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 114 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-10-22Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.These three appeals by special leave before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenged the legality of municipal tax demands under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 and property tax demands under the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. The appellants, plot-holders and sub-licensees in Karachi housing societies who built permanent structures on land allotted by the Federal Government, argued that Karachi was not validly declared a municipality by the Central Government following its renaming from 'Federal Capital' to 'Federal Territory of Karachi' under the Seat of Government Order, 1960. They further asserted that the lands were exempt from property tax under Section 4(a) of the 1958 Act as land vesting in the Federal Government without a lease in perpetuity. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the mere change of nomenclature did not affect the Central Government's authority over the territory, validly constituting the Karachi Municipal Corporation. The Court further ruled that because the sub-licensees constructed permanent structures with entitlement to registered leases and held valid defense under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the lands were in substance leased in perpetuity and not exempt from property tax.
Questions settled- Whether a statutory change in nomenclature from 'Federal Capital' to 'Federal Territory of Karachi' deprives the Central Government of its competency to declare an urban area a municipality under the Municipal Administration Ordinance 1960?
- Whether property holders who erect permanent structures under land allotment agreements entitling them to registered leases can claim exemption from tax under Section 4(a) of the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act 1958 as land vesting in the Federal Government?
- Can a statutory tax exemption for government-vested lands be invoked by occupiers who intentionally omit to execute formal lease deeds while enjoying permanent rights of occupation?
- KALA MIAH AND 6 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 373 · Dhaka High Court · 1970-05-05Read full judgment →
- KAKA KHAN vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1971 PLC 188 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 1970-06-10Read full judgment →
- KAIM vs The STATE1971 SCMR 88 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-17Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld his convictions under sections 325, 365, and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, with sentences directed to run concurrently. The core legal question concerns the appreciation of evidence and whether the Supreme Court should interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the courts below regarding the petitioner's conviction based on direct testimony, medical evidence, and corroborative circumstances, including the recovery of the abducted victim from the petitioner's custody and forensic findings. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to present any valid ground for re-examining the evidence, as the courts below properly applied their minds and adhered to established rules of appraisal. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentences.
Questions settled- Will the Supreme Court re-examine evidence in a petition for leave to appeal based solely on grounds going to the mere appreciation of evidence?
- Does the recovery of an abducted person from the custody of the accused along with incriminating forensic evidence support a conviction under sections 325, 365, and 376 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- KAFILUDDIN CHOWDHURY vs DR. ABDUS SATTAR AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Dacca 1 · Dacca · 1968-10-23Read full judgment →
- KABIR AHMED vs IBRAHIM MATCH WORKS, CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 533 · Labour Court · 1970-08-30Read full judgment →
- K. S. ABDUL LATIF vs THE REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Quetta 77 · Balochistan High Court · 1971-04-06Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arises from the dismissal of a civil suit and the subsequent rejection of a restoration application as time-barred. The core legal questions were whether the dismissal of the suit, occurring in the presence of the plaintiff's counsel, constituted a dismissal for default under Order IX, Rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the restoration application was governed by the 30-day limitation period under Article 163 of the Limitation Act 1908 or the residuary Article 181. The Court held that since the plaintiff's counsel was present, the dismissal could not be categorized as a default under Order IX, Rule 8, and thus the specific limitation period of Article 163 did not apply. The Court affirmed that when a suit is dismissed in circumstances not covered by the specific provisions of Order IX, the court retains inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to entertain a restoration application. Consequently, the application was governed by the three-year limitation period under Article 181, rendering it timely. The case was remanded for a decision on the merits of the restoration application.
Questions settled- Does the presence of a party's counsel in court prevent the dismissal of a suit for default under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- When a suit is dismissed in circumstances not covered by Order IX, under which provision can a restoration application be filed?
- Is a restoration application filed under the inherent powers of the court governed by the limitation period prescribed in Article 163 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- Can a court proceed under Order XVII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the case was not adjourned at the instance of the party in default?
- K. P. D. ALDRIDGE vs MESSRS VINNEL-ZACHRY-PERINI, DACCA1971 PLC 486 · Labour Court · 1970-10-29Read full judgment →
- K. M. RAHMATH BIBI vs FIRST INCOME-TAX OFFICER, NAGAPATTINAM1971 PTD 508 · Madras High Court · 1968-01-29Read full judgment →
- K. M. ASLAM MALIK vs THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, PUNJAB, LAHORE1971 PLC 204 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-05-24Read full judgment →
- K. D. H. SRAMIK UNION vs K. D. H. LABORATORIES LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 70 · Labour Court · 1970-07-24Read full judgment →
- K. D. H. SRAMIK UNION (REGD.) vs MESSRS K. D. H. LABORATORIES LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 19 · Labour Court · 1970-05-02Read full judgment →
- K. A. HAI vs THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, BENGAL RUBBER INDUSTRIES LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 496 · Labour Court · 1970-10-27Read full judgment →
- JUMMA vs Maulvi MUBARAK1971 SCMR 779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-11Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition for special leave to appeal was directed against a second appeal decision of the Lahore High Court (Bahawalpur Circuit). The petition was filed 68 days after the expiry of the prescribed 60-day limitation period. The petitioner sought condonation of delay under Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908, contending that because the Supreme Court was closed for its long vacation, the period of vacation should be excluded, and that the offices of the Court, even if open, were separate from the Court itself. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the offices of the Court constitute an administrative and adjunctive judicial wing of the Court and remained open during the vacation for routine business, including the receipt and registration of petitions. The Court ruled that the closure of the Court for vacations does not extend the limitation period if the offices remain open to receive petitions. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as time-barred.
Questions settled- Whether the period of court vacation can be excluded under Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908 if the offices of the Court remain open for receiving petitions?
- Are the offices of the Supreme Court considered separate from the Court itself for the purposes of filing petitions during vacations?
- Does a notification directing the offices of the Court to remain open during vacations for routine business include the reception of petitions for special leave to appeal?
- JUAN SULLIVAN vs The STATE1971 SCMR 618 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1964-09-04Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal appeal arises from the conviction of the appellant under section 167(8)(u) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, read with Ordinance No. 58 of 1962, for smuggling gold. The High Court had upheld the conviction, reduced the substantive prison sentence to time served, and ordered the fine to be satisfied solely out of eleven hundred U.S. Dollars seized from his person. Subsequently, when it was discovered that these funds had been released to the appellant's wife for passage money with official permission and were thus unavailable, the High Court declined to review its judgment citing section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The core legal question was whether the High Court or the Supreme Court could modify the sentence of fine under such circumstances. The Supreme Court held that while the High Court was barred by section 369 from reviewing its judgment, the Supreme Court, in the interests of justice and noting the appellant's impecunious circumstances and the discretionary nature of the fine under the statute, could reduce the fine to a nominal sum. The key principle established is that appellate courts may adjust discretionary fines in light of factual impossibilities regarding the designated source of payment to prevent miscarriage of justice.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court has the power to review its own criminal judgment under section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
- Does section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to orders passed by the High Court itself?
- Can the Supreme Court reduce a fine when the specific funds intended for its payment are shown to be unavailable?
- JOY KUMAR DAS AND 3 OTHERS -Accused vs THE STATE1971 PLD Dacca 94 · Dacca · 1969-06-18Read full judgment →
- JOAHER MALLIK vs LI HUA DRY CLEANERS, DACCA1971 PLC 470 · Labour Court · 1970-11-10Read full judgment →
- JHANDU MAL TARA CHAND RICE MILLS vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, PATIALA1971 PTD 969 · Punjab and Haryana High CourtRead full judgment →
- JHABARMULL AGARWALLA vs KASHIRAM AGARWALLA AND OTHERS1971 PTD 452 · Calcutta High Court · 1968-03-15Read full judgment →
- JAY SHREE TEA & INDUSTRIES LTD. vs FIRST ADDITIONAL INCOME-TAX OFFICER, CIRCLE II, COIMBATORE1971 PTD 952 · Madras High Court · 1968-10-30Read full judgment →
- JAWAHAR LAL MANI RAM vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1971 PTD 521 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-05-24Read full judgment →
- JARDINE HENDERSON LTD., CALCUTTA vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DACCA1971 PLD Dacca 185 · Dacca · 1969-10-30Read full judgment →
- JANNO AND 2 Others vs THE BORDER ALLOTMENT COMMITTEE, LAHORE AND Another1971 SCMR 649 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-04Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal arose from the cancellation of land allotments by the Border Allotment Committee, which had cited the departure of a co-allottee and failure to pay the purchase price as grounds for its decision. The appellants challenged this cancellation via a writ petition in the High Court, arguing that the order was passed without notice or hearing, violating Martial Law Regulation 9-13, and that the Committee lacked authority to interfere with a previously confirmed allotment. The High Court dismissed the petition in limine, citing a statutory bar to jurisdiction under Section 15 of Martial Law Regulation 9. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether this statutory bar could override the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Relying on the precedent established in Mehr Din v. Border Area Committee, the Supreme Court held that orders passed by the Border Allotment Committee after the enforcement of the 1962 Constitution are subject to judicial review under Article 98. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal, and remanded the case to the High Court for a decision on the merits.
Questions settled- Whether Section 15 of Martial Law Regulation 9 bars the High Court from exercising jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962?
- Are orders passed by the Border Allotment Committee after the enforcement of the 1962 Constitution subject to review by the High Court?
- JAN MUHAMMAD vs The STATE1971 SCMR 351 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-04-09Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's order refusing pre-arrest bail to the petitioner, who was charged alongside eight others for offences under the Pakistan Penal Code, including murder. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing bail after the case was committed to the Sessions Court, and whether the previous Supreme Court decision in Mohd. Shafiq v. Mohd. Hanif required reconsideration regarding the criteria for bail in non-bailable offences. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that at the bail stage, the court is only concerned with determining whether reasonable grounds exist to believe the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life, based on unrebutted material. The Court affirmed that disputed questions of fact, such as the credibility of witnesses or pleas of self-defence, are exclusively for the trial court to determine. Furthermore, the Court held that bail orders do not constitute a final opinion on guilt and should not influence the trial court's independent assessment of evidence.
Questions settled- What is the scope of inquiry for a court when considering a bail application for a non-bailable offence?
- Should a court decide disputed questions of fact, such as the credibility of witnesses or pleas of self-defence, during bail proceedings?
- Does a High Court's observation in a bail order regarding the nature of the offence bind the trial court's independent assessment of evidence?
- Jamot GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 3 OTHERS vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 937 · Sindh High Court · 1970-07-22Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought the quashing of criminal proceedings pending before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jacobabad, based on a private complaint under Sections 406 and 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The complainant alleged that the petitioners, who were fishermen, received Rs. 3,000 for supplying fish but failed to deliver the goods or refund the money. Service upon the complainant proved impossible, as official reports indicated he was a fictitious person who had never resided at the given address. The core legal questions were whether a mere breach of contract or default in performance without dishonest intent constitutes a criminal offense, and whether the High Court should exercise its inherent powers to quash proceedings that constitute an abuse of process. The High Court held that the complaint revealed at best a civil cause of action for breach of contract, devoid of any mens rea or criminal liability. Holding that criminal proceedings initiated to harass parties and misuse the judicial process must be guarded against, the court allowed the petition and quashed the pending proceedings.
Questions settled- Whether a mere breach of contract or refusal to refund money without criminal intent constitutes an offense under Section 406 or 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Under what circumstances can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings?
- Whether criminal process can be quashed when the complaint appears to be fictitious and instituted solely to harass the accused?
- JAMIL DAD KHAN vs DIVISIONAL CANAL OFFICER, KHANWAH DIVISION1971 SCMR 787 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-25Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter concerns an appeal against the levy of special charges imposed by the Divisional Canal Officer for the unauthorized use of canal water. The appellant was caught using a rubber syphon to pump water from a canal minor during his designated turn. The core legal question was whether special charges under section 33 of the Canal and Drainage Act could be levied against an identified person responsible for the unauthorized irrigation, or if the provision was limited to unidentified persons or those whose land merely benefited from the water. The Supreme Court held that the levy was legally maintainable, rejecting the argument that section 33 only applied to unidentified offenders. The Court reasoned that it would be illogical to exempt an identified perpetrator while holding an unidentified beneficiary liable. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Canal and Drainage (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 1971, which substituted section 33 with retrospective effect, clarified the liability for unauthorized irrigation. The Court affirmed that rules 32 and 33, framed under section 75 of the Act, validly authorized the imposition of special charges at six times the crop rate.
Questions settled- Can special charges for unauthorized canal water use be levied against an identified person under section 33 of the Canal and Drainage Act 1873?
- Are rules 32 and 33 of the Canal and Drainage Act 1873, which permit the levy of special charges at six times the crop rate, validly framed under section 75 of the Act?
- Does the Canal and Drainage (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance 1971 apply retrospectively to determine liability for unauthorized irrigation?
- JAMAL DIN vs The STATE1971 SCMR 800 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-05Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The appellant, Jamal Din, was convicted by the trial court for murder and attempted murder. On appeal, the High Court altered the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, holding that while the appellant acted in the right of private defence, he exceeded that right by firing multiple shots. The Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if the appellant had exceeded his right of private defence. The evidence established that the complainant party initiated the aggression by assaulting the appellant's brother, Shamsuddin, with blunt weapons, causing him injuries. The Court found that the appellant fired his weapon while his brother was being beaten and surrounded by the complainant party. The Supreme Court held that in such a volatile situation, the appellant could not be expected to modulate his defence with precision or measure it in golden scales. Since the appellant acted under a reasonable apprehension of grievous harm to his brother, he was entitled to the full right of private defence. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant.
Questions settled- Can an accused be held to have exceeded the right of private defence when firing multiple shots to protect a brother under attack?
- Is an accused required to modulate their defensive actions with precision when facing an immediate threat of grievous harm?
- Does the fact that an assailant was armed with a firearm preclude the right of private defence if the complainant party initiated the physical assault?
- JALAL AHMED vs ALI JAN JUTE MILLS LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 168 · Labour Court · 1970-10-15Read full judgment →
- JAHANGIR KHAN vs MUHAMMAD HANIF1971 SCMR 195 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-04Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the defendant against concurrent judgments and decrees of the lower courts and the High Court of West Pakistan, which decreed the respondent-plaintiff's suit for specific performance of a contract of sale dated 2nd January 1961. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was denied adequate opportunity to prove a secondary alleged contract under which the earnest money was liable to be forfeited upon failure to pay the balance consideration. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact rejecting the defence plea were unexceptionable, as the petitioner failed to produce valid secondary evidence or properly examine the scribe regarding the lost document despite being granted an opportunity. The ratio is that a party seeking to rely on secondary evidence of a lost document must establish foundational requirements properly and cannot claim inadequate opportunity when failing to avail of procedural steps within their knowledge. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Questions settled- Can a party rely on secondary evidence of an alleged lost contract without properly examining available witnesses regarding its execution?
- Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding the non-proof of a secondary contract can be interfered with in a petition for special leave to appeal?
- Is a party entitled to claim inadequate opportunity to produce secondary evidence when failing to bring forth the document or raise the plea at the earliest stage?
- JAGDEV AND 12 Others vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 162 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-17Read full judgment →
- JAGANNA TH ROY--Plaintiff vs RADHAKANTA ROY AND OTHERS1971 PLD Dacca 52 · Dacca · 1969-12-16Read full judgment →
- JAFFER vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1971 P Cr. L J 391 · Sindh High Court · 1970-05-25Read full judgment →
- JAFAR AHMED vs THE CROWN1971 SCMR 276 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1956-02-17Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court at Dacca, which dismissed the appellant's appeal against his conviction under section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code but altered the conviction to one for an attempt to obtain illegal gratification, reducing the sentence accordingly. The core legal question concerns the sufficiency and reliability of accomplice testimony and the requirement of independent corroboration to sustain a conviction when the primary charge of actual payment of money has been disbelieved. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, holding that where prosecution witnesses are accomplices or active participants whose evidence is contradictory and lacks independent corroboration connecting the accused to the crime, a conviction cannot be safely sustained. The key principle laid down is that tainted evidence of accomplices requires reliable, independent corroboration connecting the accused with the offense, and an appellate court cannot alter a conviction to one for an attempt based on the same discarded primary testimony without independent proof.
Questions settled- Whether a conviction for an attempt to commit an offense can be sustained when the primary evidence regarding the actual payment of money has been disbelieved?
- What degree of independent corroboration is required for the testimony of witnesses who are accomplices or active participants in the alleged transaction?
- Can a criminal conviction be safely sustained on the uncorroborated and tainted evidence of prosecution witnesses whose conduct shows complicity in the misapplication of funds?
- JABANUDDIN CHOWDHURY vs The STATE1971 SCMR 57 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-25Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The petitioner, a Union Council Chairman, sought special leave to appeal against his conviction under section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for criminal misappropriation of public funds. The core legal question was whether the failure to produce Union Council funds upon demand by a supervising officer constitutes criminal misappropriation, even in the absence of direct evidence of conversion to personal use. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding that the petitioner's inability to produce the funds when demanded by the Circle Officer established a breach of trust and criminal intent. The Court held that a public official entrusted with funds has a duty to produce them upon lawful demand, and failure to do so, even temporarily, constitutes criminal misappropriation. The principle laid down is that the temporary retention or failure to produce public funds upon demand by a superior authority, regardless of whether the funds were mixed with personal assets, suffices to establish the necessary criminal intent for misappropriation under the relevant penal statutes.
Questions settled- Does the failure to produce public funds upon demand by a supervising officer constitute criminal misappropriation?
- Is temporary retention of public funds by a public official sufficient to establish criminal intent for misappropriation?
- Can a conviction for criminal misappropriation be sustained if there is no direct evidence that the accused converted the funds to their own use?
- J. R. PATEL & SONS (PRIVATE) LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, GUJARAT1971 PTD 184 · Gujarat High CourtRead full judgment →
- J. M. ZAIDI vs SETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, KARACHI AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 806 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- J. K. COMMERCIAL CORPORATION LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U.1971 PTD 1022 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-10-24Read full judgment →
- IZHAR ALAM RAZVI vs THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST1971 PLD Karachi 45 · Sindh High Court · 1970-04-17Read full judgment →
- ISMAIL vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1971 P Cr. L J 1042 · Sindh High Court · 1971-02-22Read full judgment →
- ISIIARAT HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI AND ANOTHER vs NIZAMUDDIN QURESHI AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 715 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- ISHFAQ AHMAD vs NAZAR HUSSAIN AND 4 Other1971 SCMR 733 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-01Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the dismissal in limine by the High Court of the State's appeal against the acquittal of four respondents. The respondents were originally charged under Section 302/307/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for causing the death of one Muhammad Nawaz and making a murderous assault on others, but were acquitted by the Sessions Judge, Jhelum. The core legal question concerned whether the concurrent findings of acquittal by the courts below, based on the plausibility of the defence version of self-defence and failure of the prosecution to establish its case, warranted interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the view adopted by the High Court in concurrence with the trial court suffered from no infirmity, and accordingly dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of acquittal based on a plausible defence of self-defence and evidentiary gaps in the prosecution case will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court absent any legal infirmity.
Questions settled- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal by the courts below?
- Does a plausible defence of self-defence warrant the dismissal of an appeal against acquittal?
- Can a petition for special leave to appeal be maintained against the dismissal of an acquittal appeal in limine by the High Court?
- IRSHAD Alias SHADA vs The STATE1971 SCMR 655 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-12Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal appeal by special leave was directed against the judgment of the High Court maintaining the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and the sentence of death for the murder of the deceased. The core legal question was whether the High Court acted upon principles consistent with the safe dispensation of criminal justice in relying upon the uncorroborated testimony of a solitary eye-witness who was a chance witness and possessed only one weak eye. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the solitary eye-witness was natural, independent, and disinterested, and his presence at the scene in broad daylight was satisfactorily explained. Furthermore, his testimony received full corroboration from the recovery of blood-stained incriminating articles and a blood-stained knife at the instance of the appellant. The key principle laid down is that the testimony of a single eye-witness, even if a chance witness with impaired vision, can safely form the basis of a conviction if found reliable, trustworthy, and corroborated by convincing circumstantial evidence such as recoveries.
Questions settled- Whether the testimony of a solitary eye-witness who is a chance witness can form the basis of a murder conviction?
- Can the evidence of an eye-witness with impaired vision be relied upon for sustaining a conviction under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- What is the evidentiary value of the recovery of a blood-stained weapon at the instance of the accused in a murder case?
- IQBAL KHAN vs SARKAR1971 PLD Azad J & K 44 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1971-03-20Read full judgment →
- IQBAL HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 404 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-05Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The appellants, customs officials (Deputy Superintendent, Inspector, and Sepoy), were challaned under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the alleged murder of a person during checking duty. The trial magistrate discharged them for lack of government sanction under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, holding they were removable by the Collector of Customs. The District Magistrate and High Court set aside the discharge, concluding section 197 did not apply. On special leave, the Supreme Court considered whether the appellants were appointed by the Central Government and thus protected by section 197. The Supreme Court held that the appellants were appointed as Land Customs Officers directly by notifications of the Central Government issued under section 3 of the Land Customs Act 1924, and were therefore removable only by the Central Government, attracting the protection of section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court and District Magistrate orders, and remanded the matter to the trial magistrate to take evidence on whether the appellants were acting in the discharge of their official duties.
Questions settled- Whether customs officials appointed via notifications issued by the Central Government under the Land Customs Act 1924 are public servants removable only by the Central Government for the purposes of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does the requirement of previous sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 apply to public servants alleged to have committed an offence while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty?
- What is the proper procedure for a trial court to follow when determining whether an accused public servant is entitled to the protection of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- IQBAL HUSSAIN SHAH vs FAZAL SHAH AND Another1971 SCMR 377 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition was filed by a private complainant to challenge the reduction of the sentence of respondent No. 1 by the Lahore High Court from death to transportation for life for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in reducing the sentence of the respondent on the ground that the complainant-party were the aggressors and had provoked the incident by refusing to stop using a disputed watercourse. The Supreme Court held that the High Court did not act perversely or contrary to principles, as the complainant-party had adopted a defiant attitude, provoked the respondent, and contributed towards the incident. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the reduction of sentence and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that provocation and aggressive conduct by the complainant-party in a property dispute can constitute a mitigating circumstance justifying the reduction of a death sentence to transportation for life.
Questions settled- Whether provocation and aggressive conduct by the complainant-party can justify reducing a death sentence to transportation for life?
- Does the Supreme Court interfere with the reduction of a sentence by the High Court when the lower court has provided valid mitigating reasons?
- IQBAL AHMED vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 127 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-17Read full judgment →
- IQBAL AHMAD AND OTHERS vs THE STATE AND OTHERS1971 PLD Rev. (Punjab) 37 · Board of Revenue · 1970-11-14Read full judgment →
- INSAF HUSSAIN SHAH vs Rana ALLAH DAD, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ITTEHAD1971 PLC 375 · Labour Court · 1971-01-16Read full judgment →
- INCOME-TAX OFFICER, DISTRICT II (II), KANPUR AND OTHERS vs MANI RAM AND OTHERS1971 PTD 831 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-08-20Read full judgment →
- INCOME-TAX OFFICER vs ADARSH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (DISSOLVED1971 PTD 66 · Allahabad High Court · 1967-05-18Read full judgment →
- INAYATULLAH vs THE STATE1971 PLD Peshawar 175 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-08-13Read full judgment →
- INAYAT AND OTHERS vs NAWAB KHAN1971 PLD Lahore 938 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-29Read full judgment →
- INAYAT AND 3 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 312 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-17Read full judgment →
- In re : SUO MOTO REVISION No, 1293 OF 1969-70 vs N/A1971 PLD (Rev.) Punjab 1 · Board of Revenue · 1971-01-14Read full judgment →
- IMPERIAL DYEING AND PRINTING MILLS, KARACHI vs SAFDAR ALI1971 PLD Karachi 778 · Sindh High Court · 1971-04-12Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This second appeal arose from an ejectment application filed by a landlord against a proprietary concern under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The proprietor died, but the landlord failed to bring legal representatives on record for two years. The Rent Controller dismissed the application as having abated. The Additional District Judge reversed this, allowing the landlord time to implead the legal representatives. The core legal question was whether rent proceedings abate upon the death of a necessary party and whether the landlord's failure to act justified dismissal. The High Court held that while the specific provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 might not strictly apply to rent proceedings, the fundamental principle of abatement is inherent in judicial procedure. A tribunal cannot adjudicate a dispute involving a deceased party without their legal representatives. Since the landlord failed to act with reasonable promptness despite knowledge of the death, the Rent Controller correctly dismissed the application. The High Court set aside the appellate order and restored the Rent Controller’s dismissal.
Questions settled- Does the principle of abatement apply to proceedings under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959?
- Can a Rent Controller proceed with an ejectment application after the death of a sole proprietor without bringing legal representatives on record?
- Are the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 strictly applicable to rent control proceedings?
- IMAN ALI vs THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, BENGAL ELECTRIC ENGINEERING LTD.,1971 PLC 290 · Labour Court · 1970-08-29Read full judgment →
- IMAMDAD KHAN AND 7 Others vs Syed MOHAMMAD ILYAS AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 581 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-29Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This appeal challenges a High Court order that vacated a stay on proceedings initiated under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question is whether a Magistrate retains jurisdiction under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to initiate proceedings or appoint a receiver regarding property that is already the subject of pending civil litigation where a civil court has issued interim injunctions or status quo orders. The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 are subordinate to the orders of a civil court. Once a civil court is seized of a dispute and has issued orders regulating possession or granting injunctions, a Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to interfere with that possession or appoint a receiver for the property. The principle laid down is that a Magistrate must cease to deal with the possession of land or water in dispute as soon as a civil court is seized of the matter and has passed an order regulating possession, as any contrary action would be an abuse of the process of law.
Questions settled- Does a Magistrate have jurisdiction under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to initiate proceedings regarding property that is the subject of a pending civil suit?
- Can a Magistrate appoint a receiver for property when a civil court has already issued an injunction or status quo order regarding the same property?
- What is the appropriate course of action for a Magistrate when a breach of peace is apprehended concerning property already subject to a civil court's order?
- IMAM DIN AND OTHERS vs MANGIA AND OTHERS1971 PLD Azad J & K 108 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1971-06-24Read full judgment →
- IDRIS ALI AND 7 OTHERS vs THE STATE--Opposite-Party1971 PLD Dacca 254 · Dacca · 1970-05-29Read full judgment →
- IBRAHIM vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 448 · Lahore High Court · 1971-01-27Read full judgment →
- IBRAHIM AND Another vs BASHIR AHMAD AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 152 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-08Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning a property dispute over land situated within the municipal limits of Lyallpur, which was claimed by the petitioners as urban land and by the respondents as agricultural land transferred through allottees. The core legal question involves the validity of two successive and inconsistent orders passed by the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner regarding the same disputed property without proper impleadment of necessary parties. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was entirely correct in setting aside both inconsistent orders and remanding the case to the settlement authorities for a fresh decision in accordance with the law. The key principle laid down is that contradictory adjudications affecting property rights rendered without hearing necessary parties cannot be sustained and warrant remand for a de novo determination.
Questions settled- Whether the High Court can remand a case to settlement authorities when inconsistent orders have been passed regarding the same disputed property?
- Does an order passed by a settlement authority without impleading necessary contesting parties suffer from legal infirmity?
- Can two successive and contradictory orders passed by the same appellate settlement authority be sustained in writ jurisdiction?
- IBRAHIM AND 3 Others vs The STATE1971 SCMR 25 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-25Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.The petitioners sought special leave to appeal against their convictions under sections 447 and 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, following an incident where they entered the complainant's land with the intent to dispossess him, subsequently causing injuries with a dao. The core legal question was whether the petitioners' actions constituted criminal trespass under section 447, given the lower appellate court's finding that the initial entry was merely a civil trespass, and whether the conviction under section 324 was justified despite the nature of the injuries. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the intent to dispossess a person by force constitutes criminal trespass from the initial entry under section 441 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The Court further held that the severity of injuries is immaterial for a conviction under section 324, provided the use of a cutting weapon is established. The principle laid down is that an entry upon property with the intent to dispossess the occupant, or remaining thereon after being asked to leave, satisfies the requirements for criminal trespass.
Questions settled- Does an entry onto land with the intent to dispossess the occupant constitute criminal trespass under section 441 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Is the severity of injuries a material factor for a conviction under section 324 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 when a cutting weapon is used?
- Can a trespasser be held liable for criminal trespass if they remain on the property after the occupant protests their presence?
- HYESONS STEEL MILLS LTD., KARACHI vs TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN1971 PLD Karachi 492 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
- HYDERABAD MEMON ANJUMAN vs DIVAN KEWALRAM1971 SCMR 82 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-20Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This petition arises out of a suit for possession decreed against the petitioner, which was subsequently compromised on appeal, allowing the petitioner to retain possession until a specified date upon payment of rent and an undertaking to vacate. Upon the petitioner's failure to vacate, execution proceedings were initiated by the respondent. The core legal question is whether a compromise decree in a possession suit that provides for the payment of rent and an undertaking to vacate creates a relationship of landlord and tenant, thereby attracting the bar against ejectment under urban rent restriction laws. The Supreme Court held that the compromise merely granted time to the petitioner to remain in possession and did not create a tenancy relationship, leaving the decree for possession fully executable. The key principle laid down is that terms of a compromise providing time to vacate and payment of rent in lieu thereof do not alter the underlying nature of a possession decree or create a landlord-tenant relationship.
Questions settled- Does a compromise in a possession suit creating an obligation to pay rent establish a landlord and tenant relationship?
- Is a decree for possession executable when a judgment debtor fails to vacate the premises by the date agreed upon in a compromise?
- Do urban rent restriction laws apply to a judgment debtor granted time to vacate under a compromise decree?
- HUSSAIN BAKHSH vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1331 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-11Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and death sentence of the appellant, Hussain Bakhsh, who was found guilty of the murder of a co-convict under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by the Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur. The prosecution alleged that during an altercation over an earthen pitcher inside a jail cell, the appellant struck the deceased on the head, causing fatal injuries. Upon appeal and a death reference before the High Court, the ocular witnesses resiled from their previous statements, claiming coercion by jail officials during the inquiry proceedings. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to satisfy the legal prerequisites under section 33 of the Evidence Act 1872 for transferring an absent witness's previous statement to the sessions file. The Lahore High Court held that the prosecution case suffered from serious legal infirmities and reasonable doubt. Consequently, the High Court accepted the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the appellant, declining to confirm the death sentence.
Questions settled- Whether the statement of an absent witness recorded by a committing magistrate can be transferred to the sessions file under section 33 of the Evidence Act 1872 without proving reasonable and diligent search for the witness?
- Can a conviction for murder be sustained when the eyewitnesses resile from their statements at the trial and claim coercion by jail authorities during earlier proceedings?
- What are the legal consequences when a counsel for a pauper accused is appointed at state expense on very short notice without adequate time to prepare the defense?
- HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER vs MUHAMMAD RAFIQ AND 4 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 129 · Sindh High Court · 1970-02-27Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This matter involves a claim for compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, filed by the parents of a deceased individual following a fatal road accident involving a bus. The core legal questions concerned whether the defendants were liable for negligence, whether the plaintiffs suffered pecuniary loss, and whether the insurance company was liable under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The court held that while the bus driver was negligent, the plaintiffs failed to prove actual pecuniary loss. The court determined that the plaintiffs, as sole heirs, inherited the deceased's estate, which exceeded any potential loss, thereby negating the claim for damages. Furthermore, the court held that the bus owner was not vicariously liable as the vehicle was under a hire agreement, and the insurance company could not be held liable in the absence of proven loss. The key principle laid down is that in assessing damages under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, courts must balance the loss of future pecuniary benefit against any pecuniary advantage derived by the claimants from the death of the deceased.
Questions settled- Does the inheritance of a deceased's estate by his parents constitute a pecuniary benefit that must be deducted from compensation claims under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855?
- Is the owner of a motor vehicle vicariously liable for the negligence of a driver when the vehicle has been hired out to another party?
- Can an insurance company repudiate liability under Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, based on an inadmissible copy of an insurance policy?
- Does the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, remain a valid source of law in Pakistan despite constitutional changes?
- HUMERA SATWAT YUSUF vs THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF THE HEALTH DEPARTMENT, LAHORE1971 PLD Lahore 641 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-23Read full judgment →
AI summary & questions settled
AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.This judgment disposes of four constitutional petitions filed under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962 by female students challenging the restrictions imposed by the Government on the admission of girls to medical colleges in the Punjab. The core legal questions involved whether the executive government had the lawful authority to restrict admissions and allocate seats on the basis of sex and place of birth, particularly in light of the Medical Colleges (Governing Bodies) Ordinance 1961, and whether such restrictions violated Fundamental Rights. The Lahore High Court held that although the Medical Colleges (Governing Bodies) Ordinance 1961 was repealed during the pendency of the proceedings and the executive orders lacked statutory force, the petitions must fail because the petitioners had no enforceable legal right to admission, and the Constitution did not prohibit discrimination based on sex regarding educational admissions while the equality right (Article 15) remained suspended under the Provisional Constitution Order 1969. Furthermore, the court held that permanent residence is distinct from place of birth. The petitions were dismissed with no order as to costs against the petitioners due to the intervening legislative repeal.
Questions settled- Whether the right to apply for admission to an educational institution carries with it an enforceable legal right to be admitted under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962?
- Whether executive orders regulating medical college admissions possess statutory force in the absence of enabling primary legislation?
- Does the prohibition against discrimination on the ground of place of birth under Fundamental Right 12(3) equate to a prohibition against discrimination based on permanent residence?
- Whether the State can lawfully restrict the admission of female students to certain public medical colleges on the ground of sex when the equality provisions of the Constitution stand suspended?
- HUMAYUN MIRZA vs THE CHAIRMAN, M. M. ISPAHANI LTD.,1971 PLC 22 · Labour Court · 1970-06-30Read full judgment →
- HOSSAIN ALI KHAN --Defendant vs FIROZA BEGUM--Plaintiff1971 PLD Dacca 112 · Dacca · 1968-06-05Read full judgment →
- HIDAYATULLAH AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1971 PLD Karachi 817 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-23Read full judgment →
- HEKIM ALI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 338 · Dhaka High Court · 1970-04-27Read full judgment →
- HAZAR KHAN AND ANOTHER vs Mst. SHAHNAZ1971 PLD Quetta 39 · Balochistan High Court · 1970-11-11Read full judgment →