Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• GENERAL SECRETARY, FINLAY EMPLOYEES'union, DACCA vs Messe JAMES1971 PLC 81 · Labour Court · 1970-07-03Read full judgment →
• GENERAL SECRETARY, F. P. TEXTILE MILLS WORKERS' UNION, PESHAWAR vs F. P.1971PLC198 · Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue · 1970-06-10Read full judgment →
• GARAHI KHAN vs THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND COLLECTOR, KARACHI AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 676 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• G. M. KHAN vs THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE1971 PLD Karachi 613 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• FIRE SERVICE SRAMIK UNION, CHITTAGONG vs THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE1971 PLC 358 · Labour Court · 1970-10-21Read full judgment →
• FEROZE KHAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1063 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-11Read full judgment →
• FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI vs MESSRS MUHAMMAD SHAFI & SONS, PESHAWAR CANTT1971 PLD Peshawar 93 · Peshawar High CourtRead full judgment →
• FEROZE AND 9 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 525 · Lahore High Court · 1969-12-08Read full judgment →
• FAZAL-U R-RAHMAN AND 2 OTHERS--Convict vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 883 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-03
  culpable homicide not amounting to murdergrave and sudden provocationappreciation of evidenceself-defensecommon intentionocular evidencecriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from convictions and death sentences imposed by the Sessions Judge for the murder of the deceased. The appellants claimed self-defense, asserting the deceased initiated the violence. The High Court examined whether the prosecution's ocular evidence, which contained improvements to align with medical findings, remained credible. The Court held that while the prosecution witnesses modified their statements, their testimony was not entirely unreliable, as the court must sift the grain from the chaff. Rejecting the defense's plea of self-defense as a fabrication, the Court nonetheless found that the deceased had initiated the altercation by striking one appellant, thereby causing grave and sudden provocation to the others. Applying the principle that courts must evaluate probabilities when direct evidence is partially inconsistent, the Court held the appellants' actions were covered by Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code. Consequently, the Court set aside the death sentences, convicting two appellants under Section 304(I) and one under Section 334 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentencing them accordingly.

  Questions settled

  • Does the modification of witness statements to align with medical evidence necessitate the total rejection of their testimony?
  • Can a court convict an accused under Section 304(I) of the Pakistan Penal Code when the defense of self-defense is rejected but grave and sudden provocation is established?
  • Is it permissible for a court to sift the grain from the chaff in witness testimony when parts of the evidence are found to be unreliable?
  • Does the act of an unjustified attack on one family member by the deceased constitute grave and sudden provocation for the other family members to retaliate?
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• FAZAL MOHAMMAD KHAN AND Another vs Mst. MOHAMMAD JAN AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 138 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-20
  refugee right-holdersinheritanceRehabilitation Settlement Schememutationsuccessiondisplaced persons
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal regarding the inheritance of refugee right-holders, specifically Chhaju Khan and Maula Bakhsh, who died during the 1947 disturbances. The core legal question was whether the inheritance of property claims by refugee right-holders who died before filing claims should be determined by the law of the place where the property was originally situated (India) or by the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. The petitioners challenged mutations sanctioned in 1954, which included the deceased's widow and daughter as heirs, arguing for the exclusion of female heirs under Indian law. The Supreme Court held that the inheritance of such refugee right-holders is governed by the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, specifically paragraph 46, rather than the law of the place of origin. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioners had previously consented to the mutations in 1954 and could not challenge them years later. The key principle laid down is that for refugee right-holders who died before filing claims, the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme applies in its entirety, overriding the law of the place of origin.

  Questions settled

  • Does the law of the place where property was originally situated govern the inheritance of a deceased refugee right-holder who died before filing a claim?
  • Are the heirs of a deceased refugee right-holder who died before filing a claim entitled to inherit under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme?
  • Can a party challenge a mutation order after having consented to it for many years?
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• FAZAL KARIM vs The STATE AND Other1971 SCMR 721 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-07
  transfer of criminal casesSection 526 CrPCjurisdiction of High Courtexhaustion of remediescriminal procedurejudicial discretion
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged a High Court order that dismissed an application under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, directing the petitioner to first approach the District Magistrate under Section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question was whether the High Court's jurisdiction to transfer cases is concurrent or conditional upon exhausting remedies in subordinate courts. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction under Section 526 is an independent statutory right, not contingent upon prior exhaustion of remedies under Section 528. The Court reasoned that the statutory requirement to furnish a bond upon intimating an intention to move the High Court implies a direct right of access. Furthermore, the High Court erred by directing the petitioner to the District Magistrate when the specific relief sought involved a transfer outside the district, and where the case had previously been transferred by the High Court itself, rendering lower courts unable to interfere. The principle established is that the right to move the High Court for transfer is an independent statutory right that cannot be curtailed by administrative practice.

  Questions settled

  • Is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 conditional upon the prior exhaustion of remedies under Section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge override a previous transfer order passed by the High Court?
  • Does the statutory requirement to furnish a bond upon intimating an intention to move the High Court for transfer imply an independent right to access the High Court directly?
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• FAZAL KARIM AND 2 Others vs THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH, HOME SECRETARY1971 SCMR 294 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-19
  return of seized propertycriminal trial acquittaldisposal of propertywrit petitionconstitutional jurisdictioncivil court remedy
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing a writ petition filed under Article 170 of the Constitution of 1956. The appellants sought the return of certain articles seized from their possession during a criminal prosecution under sections 408, 409, 380, and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which ended in their acquittal. Although magistrates previously ordered the return of the seized articles, they were never restored as they had allegedly been disposed of. The core legal question concerns whether the provisions of Chapter XLIII of the Criminal Procedure Code provide an adequate remedy for property disposal after trial and whether magistrates acted illegally in refusing jurisdiction, alongside the effect of the articles never being produced before a court of law. The Supreme Court held that since the articles were never produced before a court of law, provisions under Chapter XLIII of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding property disposal were inapplicable, and a writ petition was an inappropriate remedy where property was disposed of or wrongfully detained, leaving civil proceedings as the proper recourse. The appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions in Chapter XLIII of the Criminal Procedure Code are adequate enough to provide for the disposal of property after the conclusion of a trial in a criminal court?
  • Can a magistrate make an order under Chapter XLIII of the Criminal Procedure Code for the disposal of articles that were never produced before a court of law?
  • Is a writ petition an appropriate proceeding for the recovery of seized articles that have already been disposed of or wrongfully detained?
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• FAZAL HUSSAIN AND ANOTHER vs ABDUL HAMID1971 PLD Lahore 89 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-10
  regular second appealorder of remandimmovable propertydescription by boundariesownership titleconcurrent findings of factinjunction suit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This regular second appeal arises from a suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff claiming ownership of the suit land against the defendants who contested title. The trial court initially dismissed the plaintiff's suit upon deciding the issue of ownership against him, having erroneously refused certain documents. Upon appeal, the Additional District Judge remanded the case for retrial on the sole ownership issue after admitting the documents. Following remand, both the trial court and the first appellate court concurrently found the plaintiff to be the owner and decreed the suit, leading to the present second appeal. The Lahore High Court held that an appealable order of remand not challenged becomes final and cannot be re-agitated in subsequent appeals, pursuant to section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Furthermore, minor discrepancies in area descriptions do not vitiate a suit where boundaries and identity of the immovable property are clearly established, and description by boundaries prevails over area. The High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the concurrent findings of fact regarding ownership.

  Questions settled

  • Can an appealable order of remand, if not challenged by way of appeal, be called in question in an appeal from the final decree passed after remand?
  • Does a misdescription or variation of area in the plaint invalidate a suit for immovable property when the boundaries clearly identify the land?
  • Whether description by boundaries should prevail over area in cases of inconsistency within title documents and plaints?
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• FAZAL ELAHI HABIB KHAN vs ALI AZMAT AND Another THE STATE1971 SCMR 647 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-03-04
  criminal appealleave to appealcommon intentionmurderacquittallesser sentencesudden quarrel
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This judgment disposes of three consolidated petitions for special leave to appeal arising from a criminal trial concerning the murder of Nazir Ahmad. The core legal questions involved the propriety of the acquittal of one co-accused charged under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, the conviction of the other co-accused for murder, and the adequacy of the sentence awarded. The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the first respondent was justified as he shared no common intention and did not know his brother was armed with a knife during a sudden quarrel arising from a dispute over a public sewer. It further held that the conviction of the petitioner who inflicted the fatal knife blow was well-founded given the medical and physical evidence disproving his plea of accidental injury, and that the lesser sentence of transportation for life was properly awarded due to the lack of premeditation and single blow nature of the attack. The petitions were consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether common intention can be inferred when one co-accused is unaware that the other is armed with a weapon during a sudden quarrel?
  • Does a single knife blow delivered without premeditation during a sudden quarrel justify the award of the lesser sentence of transportation for life?
  • Can a plea of accidental injury during a scuffle be sustained when contradicted by deep penetrating medical evidence and corresponding cuts on the victim's clothing?
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• FAZAL DIN vs WALI MUHAMMAD AND 5 Other1971 SCMR 186 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-02-10
  review petitionconsent decreespecial leave to appealwrit jurisdictioncompromiseestoppel
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had previously dismissed the petitioner's civil petition for special leave to appeal. The petitioner sought review on the ground that the Supreme Court failed to address whether the High Court was legally correct in disposing of a writ petition based on a compromise, rather than adjudicating the merits regarding the legality of orders passed by Settlement authorities. The core legal question was whether a party who consents to a compromise decree in the High Court can subsequently challenge that order through an appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the petitioner was disentitled to relief because he had invited the High Court's order through a voluntary compromise and could not subsequently repudiate it. The Court affirmed the established legal principle that no appeal is admissible against a consent decree. By agreeing to the compromise, the petitioner effectively withdrew the writ petition from the High Court, precluding any further judicial determination of the underlying legal issues.

  Questions settled

  • Is an appeal admissible against a consent decree?
  • Can a party who invites an order through a compromise subsequently challenge that order in appeal?
  • Does a compromise in a writ petition effectively withdraw the petition from further judicial adjudication on the merits?
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• FAZAL DIN AND 14 OTHERS vs THE CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, LAHORE1971 PLD Supreme Court 779 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1911-08-20
  evacuee propertycustodianrehabilitation authoritiesres judicatabarrage landsallotmentspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellants' writ petition regarding the status of certain disputed land originally held by Sukkur Barrage authorities and subsequently claimed as evacuee property. The core legal questions involved whether the disputed land constituted evacuee property under the relevant laws and whether the appellants could claim protection under section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957. The Supreme Court held that the property was indeed evacuee property which had vested in the Custodian and that the appellants, holding merely as lessees under the Barrage authorities without proprietary title, could not evade this status. Furthermore, the Court held that the principle of res judicata barred the re-litigation of the matter, and that section 3(1) of the Act XII of 1957 was inapplicable by virtue of exceptions relating to properties managed without the Custodian's approval. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether property originally allotted by Barrage authorities to Hindu evacuees constitutes evacuee property vesting in the Custodian?
  • Does the principle of res judicata apply to bar successive writ petitions involving the same question of property status between the same parties?
  • Whether the protection under subsection (1) of section 3 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 applies to property occupied or managed without the Custodian's approval?
  • Can a subordinate rehabilitation officer change the legal character of evacuee property by a simple administrative declaration?
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• FAZAL Alias FAJA vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 602 · Lahore High Court · 1970-05-28Read full judgment →
• FAZAL AHMAD Alias PHALLU vs The STATE1971 SCMR 222 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-02
  murderdying declarationbenefit of doubtmedical evidencecriminal appealcapital sentence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which dismissed the appellant's appeal and confirmed his death sentence for lurking house trespass and the murder of Mst. Rajan. The prosecution case was built on eyewitness testimony and two dying declarations made by the deceased. The High Court had rejected the eyewitness testimony due to darkness and distance, but relied upon the dying declarations to uphold the conviction. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the conviction of the appellant could be safely sustained solely on the basis of the dying declarations. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the dying declarations suffered from material omissions, discrepancies, and a lack of corroboration from medical evidence regarding injuries on the hands, raising doubts as to their truthfulness. The Court laid down the principle that dying declarations which contain significant discrepancies and are uncorroborated by medical evidence cannot form the basis of an implicit reliance leading to a capital conviction, entitling the accused to the benefit of the doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction can be sustained on dying declarations that contain material discrepancies and omissions?
  • Is implicit reliance to be placed on a dying declaration when it lacks corroboration from medical evidence?
  • Whether an accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt when the prosecution fails to establish guilt through consistent and reliable evidence?
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• FAYYAZ ALI KHAN vs THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT AND Another1971 SCMR 454 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-07-03
  civil serviceconstitutional protectiongovernment servantdeputationstatutory interpretationwrit jurisdictionRoad Transport Corporation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arises from the dismissal of a writ petition challenging a show-cause notice issued under the Road Transport Corporation (West Pakistan) Removal of Undesirable Employees Ordinance, 1965. The appellant, originally appointed by the Government as a Traffic Manager, continued serving through various organizational transitions involving the Road Transport Board and later the Road Transport Corporation. The core legal question was whether the appellant, despite his service in the Corporation, retained his status as a Government servant entitled to constitutional protections, or if he became an employee of the Corporation subject to the 1965 Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the appellant remained a Government servant because no formal order transferred his services from the Government to the Board or Corporation, and the relevant legislative amendments did not automatically convert his status. Consequently, the Court ruled that the 1965 Ordinance did not apply to him, as he fell within the exclusion for persons on deputation from a Government Department. The Court established that statutory provisions deeming Board employees as non-Government servants do not retroactively alter the status of those originally employed by the Government without a specific transfer order.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee originally appointed by the Government automatically become an employee of a Road Transport Board upon its creation in the absence of a specific transfer order?
  • Are employees of a Road Transport Board deemed to be Government servants under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939?
  • Does the Road Transport Corporation (West Pakistan) Removal of Undesirable Employees Ordinance 1965 apply to a Government servant serving in the Corporation on deputation?
  • Is a person serving in connection with the affairs of the Road Transport Corporation, who was originally a Government servant, entitled to the constitutional protections afforded to Government servants?
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• FATTA vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 1054 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-04Read full judgment →
• FATEH SHER vs SARANG1971 PLD Lahore 128 · Lahore High Court · 1969-09-22
  habeas corpuscustody of wifeillegal detentionIslamic lawperjurysection 491 CrPC
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition filed under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking the release and custody of Mst. Naziran, alleged by the petitioner to be his wife, but claimed by the respondent Sarang to be his lawfully wedded wife. The core legal question concerns whether a woman who is sui juris can be allowed to leave her husband to accompany her paramour in habeas corpus proceedings, when weighed against Islamic law and marital rights. The court held that the petitioner failed to establish his marriage, finding the woman to be the lawful wife of the respondent, and declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under section 491 to facilitate an illicit liaison or frustrate the husband's right of guardianship. The key principle laid down is that discretionary habeas corpus remedies under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 will not be invoked to enable a collusive circumvention of marital obligations and Islamic injunctions regarding a husband's lawful custody.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a woman who is sui juris can be allowed to accompany her paramour in preference to her husband in habeas corpus proceedings?
  • Can the discretionary jurisdiction under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to facilitate an illicit connection?
  • Is a husband entitled to the custody and guardianship of his wife under Islamic law in proceedings seeking her release?
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• FATEH MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 221 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-02Read full judgment →
• FATEH MUHAMMAD AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 347 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-25Read full judgment →
• FATEH ALI KHAN vs Subedar MUHAMMAD KHAN1971 SCMR 354 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-16
  review petitionlimitationcondonation of delayspecial leave to appealvacationcourt practice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This review petition challenged the Supreme Court's previous order dismissing a petition for special leave to appeal as time-barred. The petitioner argued that the delay should be condoned under Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908, claiming the Court was closed for summer vacation, and under Section 5, citing the High Court practice of not accepting civil appeals during vacations. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court's vacation period constitutes a 'closed' court under Section 4 and whether High Court practices regarding vacation closures apply to Supreme Court filings. The Court dismissed the review petition, holding that no error was apparent on the face of the record. It affirmed that a court is not deemed 'closed' under Section 4 if its office remains open for business during vacation. Furthermore, the Court clarified that High Court practices regarding vacation closures are irrelevant to filings in the Supreme Court. The principle established is that the Supreme Court remains open for business during vacations, precluding the application of Section 4, and that High Court practices do not govern Supreme Court procedural timelines.

  Questions settled

  • Does the summer vacation of the Supreme Court render the Court 'closed' for the purposes of Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908?
  • Can a petitioner invoke the practice of the High Court regarding vacation closures to seek condonation of delay for a petition filed in the Supreme Court?
  • Is a court deemed closed under Section 4 of the Limitation Act 1908 if its office remains open for the transaction of business during a vacation?
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• FARZAND ALI vs The STATE1971 SCMR 715 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-10-22
  attempted rapekidnappingsentence of whippingWhipping Ordinanceleave to appealinconsistent laws
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner against his conviction under sections 366 and 376 read with section 511 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal questions involved whether the ingredients of kidnapping were made out by lifting and moving the minor victim to a cattle-shed, and whether the sentence of whipping was legal despite the provisions of section 393 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in light of section 4(a) of the Whipping Ordinance. The Supreme Court held that all ingredients of kidnapping were established as the victim was forcibly taken away, and that the sentence of whipping under the Whipping Ordinance was legally sound as the Ordinance validly amended the Code of Criminal Procedure. The key principle laid down is that a provincial penal statute can lawfully amend procedural or ancillary sentencing provisions like the Code of Criminal Procedure to provide for mandatory whipping notwithstanding general bars in the Code.

  Questions settled

  • Does moving a victim from a field to a nearby cattle-shed satisfy the ingredients of kidnapping under section 366 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Whether the sentence of whipping can be awarded notwithstanding the restrictions contained in section 393 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in view of section 4(a) of the Whipping Ordinance 1969?
  • Does a Provincial Legislature have the competence to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure through a subsequent special ordinance regarding sentences of whipping?
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• FARZAND ALI AND Another vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER s1971 P Cr. L J 49 · Lahore High Court · 1970-08-25Read full judgment →
• FARIDA KHAN vs THE CHAIRMAN, KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, KARACHI1971 SCMR 109 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-19
  municipal taxaggrieved personlocus standiwrit jurisdictionlease agreementtax assessment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal arose from the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which challenged the assessment of municipal taxes on a residential building owned by the petitioner. The petitioner had leased the property to a tenant under an agreement stipulating that all municipal taxes would be paid by the lessee. Following an assessment, the petitioner objected only to the quantum of the tax, and upon rejection of the objections, the tenant paid the demanded tax. The petitioner subsequently filed a writ petition challenging the assessment procedure. The High Court dismissed the petition in limine, holding that because the taxes were payable and actually paid by the lessee, the petitioner was not an 'aggrieved person' under the Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, affirming that the petitioner lacked locus standi as an aggrieved person, particularly since the procedural objections raised in the writ petition departed from the quantum-only objections raised before the municipal authorities. The petition for leave to appeal was consequently dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a lessor is considered an 'aggrieved person' under writ jurisdiction to challenge a tax assessment when the lessee is contractually bound to pay and has already paid the tax?
  • Can a petitioner challenge a tax assessment on procedural grounds in a writ petition if their initial objections before the taxing authority were restricted solely to the quantum of the tax?
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• FARID AHMED vs THE CHAIRMAN, OMAR SONS LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 50 · Labour Court · 1970-07-31Read full judgment →
• FAREED KHAN AND Another vs THE STATE -1971 P Cr. L J 333 · Sindh High Court · 1970-03-17Read full judgment →
• FAQIR MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 929 · Lahore High Court · 1971-07-27
  sodomyrevision petitionres gestaeadmissibility of statementmedical evidencechild witness
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner Faqir Muhammad sought revision against his conviction under section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code for committing sodomy, which had been upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge. The core legal question concerned the admissibility of the victim's out-of-court statements regarding the incident, given that the victim was a minor child who was found incapable of giving evidence at trial. The Lahore High Court held that while the lower appellate court erroneously relied on section 32 of the Evidence Act, the victim's statement to a witness immediately after the occurrence was admissible under section 6 of the Evidence Act as part of the res gestae. Coupled with medical evidence and chemical reports confirming semen and blood stains, the prosecution successfully proved its case. The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, upholding both the conviction and the sentence of four years' rigorous imprisonment and ten stripes.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the statement of a child victim of sodomy is admissible under section 32 of the Evidence Act when the child is incapable of giving evidence?
  • Is the statement made by a victim immediately after an occurrence admissible under section 6 of the Evidence Act as res gestae?
  • Whether medical and chemical examiner reports corroborated by circumstantial witness testimony are sufficient to uphold a conviction under section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
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• FALAK SHER vs THE STATE1971 PLD Peshawar 108 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-02-15Read full judgment →
• FAKIR ALI vs THE S. I. T. E. LIMITED, KARACHI1971PLC190 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-09-30Read full judgment →
• FAIZUR RAHMAN SARKAR vs THE STATE And 2 Other1971 SCMR 116 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-06-15
  criminal breach of trustmiller contractfood directorateshort deliverycriminal liabilityspecial leave petition
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave arises out of criminal proceedings where the petitioner, a miller appointed under the Food Directorate of the Government of East Pakistan, was convicted under Section 407 of the Pakistan Penal Code for criminal breach of trust in respect of government paddy and rice entrusted to him. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was liable for criminal breach of trust for the missing rice stock, or whether his liability was merely civil under the terms of the milling contract. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's failure to account for the missing stock, coupled with his absolute silence, inaction against his manager, and failure to report the disappearance over several months, negated his plea of innocence. The Court ruled that the contractual provision for compensation for short delivery does not exclude criminal liability. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the concurrent findings of the lower courts and the High Court.

  Questions settled

  • Does a contractual provision for compensation for short delivery under a milling contract exclude criminal liability for breach of trust?
  • Whether silence and inaction by an owner regarding missing stock after recovery from illness is compatible with innocence in a charge of criminal breach of trust?
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• FAIZULLAH KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE SECRETARY, BASIC DEMOCRACIES, SOCIAL WELFARE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT, LAHORE1971 SCMR 424 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-18
  age of superannuationcompulsory retirementvested rightlocal council servicerule-making powerextension in service
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal arising from the retirement of the petitioner, a Chief Officer in the Local Council Service, upon attaining the age of 55 years, after the Provincial Government refused to grant him an extension in service up to the age of 60 years. The core legal questions are whether the petitioner had a vested right to continue in service until the age of 60 years under the West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committees Service Rules, 1963, and whether the subsequent rules could lawfully take away such a right. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no unqualified right or vested interest to continue in service until age 60, and that any expectation created by the earlier rules could be competently rescinded or amended by the rule-making authority. The key principles laid down are that the age of superannuation governed by conditional administrative instructions or superseded rules does not confer an indefeasible vested right of retention, and that the power to issue rules under statutory provisions includes the power to amend, vary, or rescind them pursuant to section 21 of the General Clauses Act.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an employee has a vested right to continue in service until the age of sixty years under the West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committees Service Rules, 1963?
  • Can a rule-making authority take away or rescind a right to continue in service created by previous rules?
  • Does the power to issue rules under a Central Act or Regulation include the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind such rules?
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• FAIZUL KABIR CHOUDHURY vs SIEMENS (PAKISTAN,) ENGINEERING Co., LTD., KARACHI AND ANOTHER1971 PLC 450 · Labour Court · 1970-12-08Read full judgment →
• FAIZ ULLAH KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 474 · Lahore High Court · 1969-04-14Read full judgment →
• EVACUEE PROPERTY TRUST BOARD, HYDERABAD vs SETTLEMENT1971 PLD Karachi 228 · Sindh High Court · 1970-09-22Read full judgment →
• ERODE TRANSPORTS (PVT.) LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS1971 PTD 533 · Madras High Court · 1971-04-04Read full judgment →
• ERFAN SHAIKH AND Another vs THE STATE-Opposite-Party1971 P Cr. L J 486 · Dhaka High Court · 1970-04-30Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES' UNION (RECD.) LYALLPUR AND 11 Other vs THE ROAD TRANSPORT1971 PLC 160 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-11-03Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs WAH CEMENT WORKS, WAH1971 PLC 207 · Labour Court · 1970-02-23Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs SIEMENS (PAKISTAN) ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD., KARACHI AND1971 PLC 447 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1971-01-21Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LAHORE1971 PLC 383 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs NATIONAL STEELS LTD., KARACHI1971 PLC 418 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-12-04Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS SIMPLEX RUBBER MANUFACTURERS LTD., KARACHI1971 PLC 380 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-12-11Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS FISHERMEN's CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD., KARACHI AND1971 PLC 128 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-09-09Read full judgment →
• EMPLOYEES UNION vs MESSRS DAWOOD CORPORATION LTD., CHITTAGONG1971 PLC 564 · Labour Court · 1970-07-18Read full judgment →
• Elahi Qurban. Members MUHAMMAD AZAM vs ROAD TRANSPORT1971 PLC 226 · Labour Court · 1970-12-10Read full judgment →
• Elahi Qurban, Members MUHAMMAD ALI vs Chaudhri ABDUL MAJID1971 PLC230 · Labour Court · -Read full judgment →
• EKABBAR ALI AND 10 Others vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 275 · Dhaka High Court · 1970-03-31Read full judgment →
• EJAZ HUSSAIN AND 2 Others vs The STATE1971 SCMR 516 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-04
  acquittal appealdying declarationinjured witnesscorroborationperverse findingeye-witness testimonymurder conviction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenged the High Court's decision to set aside an acquittal and convict the appellants for murder and causing simple injuries. The core legal question concerned the propriety of the trial court's rejection of eye-witness testimony and the evidentiary value of a dying declaration recorded by a police officer. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, holding that the trial court's acquittal was based on perverse reasoning, particularly in disregarding the testimony of an injured eye-witness and other disinterested witnesses without valid grounds. The Court affirmed that the testimony of an injured witness, being inherently reliable, does not strictly require corroboration, though in this case, it was amply corroborated by medical evidence, the dying declaration, and the recovery of incriminating items. The key principle laid down is that the evidence of an injured witness is highly credible and, when consistent and disinterested, is sufficient to sustain a conviction, and that a dying declaration recorded by a police officer is not rendered inadmissible or valueless merely because it was not recorded by a Magistrate.

  Questions settled

  • Is the testimony of an injured eye-witness sufficient to sustain a conviction without independent corroboration?
  • Does a dying declaration lose its evidentiary value if it is recorded by a police officer rather than a Magistrate?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court set aside an order of acquittal?
  Read full judgment →
• EDMUND CHRISTOPHER GONSALVES AND ANOTHER vs Mrs. LILIAN D'CRUZE1971 PLD Dacca 32 · Dacca · 1969-11-24Read full judgment →
• EASTERN RUBBER WORKERS' UNION vs THE MANAGING PARTNFR, EASTERN1971 PLC 468 · Labour Court · 1970-11-14Read full judgment →
• EAST PAKISTAN SUGAR MILLS WORKERS UNION, RAJSHAHI vs THE ADMINISTRATOR, NORTH BENGAL SUGAR MILLS Co. LTD.,1971 PLC 269 · Labour Court · 1970-10-31Read full judgment →
• EAST AND WEST STEAMSHIP Co., KARACHI vs COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, KARACHI AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 14 · Sindh High Court · 1970-06-01Read full judgment →
• DURGA PROSAD MORE vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL II1971 PTD 228 · Calcutta High Court · 1967-12-20Read full judgment →
• DUR MUHAMMAD AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1161 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-05Read full judgment →
• DULLAH AND 2 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 17 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-23Read full judgment →
• Dr. SARWAR H. REHMAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 872 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-12Read full judgment →
• DR. Saied NAZIR SHAH vs AZAD GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS1971 PLD Azad J & K 60 · High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir · 1971-03-24Read full judgment →
• DR. NAIMUDDIN AHMAD KHAN AND 2 Others vs The GOVERNMENT OF WEST1971 SCMR 803 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-24
  contempt of courthistory-sheetpolice recordsmisrepresentationinfructuous appealadministrative orders
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arose from a contempt of court petition filed by the petitioners against respondents, alleging that the respondents failed to comply with a representation made to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The petitioners contended that despite an assurance given by the Additional Advocate-General in 1963 that their police history-sheets had been closed—leading to the dismissal of their previous appeal as infructuous—the police later claimed in separate proceedings that the history-sheets remained open. The core legal question was whether the respondents committed contempt of court by allegedly misleading the Supreme Court regarding the status of these history-sheets. Upon review of the evidence, including an affidavit from the relevant police official and the specific administrative notation "transfer to personal file" in the records, the Court found that the history-sheets had indeed been closed in 1961. The Court held that the notation effectively signified the closure of the history-sheets, and the subsequent reopening in 1968 was due to new criminal allegations, not a violation of the previous undertaking. Consequently, the Court dismissed the contempt petition, finding no evidence of willful disobedience or misrepresentation.

  Questions settled

  • Does the administrative notation 'transfer to personal file' in a police history-sheet constitute an order to close the history-sheet?
  • Can a contempt of court petition be sustained when the alleged misrepresentation to the court is refuted by evidence of administrative compliance?
  • Under what circumstances can a previously closed police history-sheet be reopened?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. RAUF AHMED vs Mst. RAZIA FARHAT1971 PLD Karachi 897 · Sindh High Court · 1971-03-26Read full judgment →
• DR. MUHAMMAD ELIAS DUBASH, JOINT DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES vs GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 5 OTHERS1971 PLC 22 [C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1970-10-27Read full judgment →
• DR. MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs THE STATE1971 PLD Supreme Court 447 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-27
  approveraccomplice testimonycorroborationdouble jeopardyres judicatabenefit of doubtmurder
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant was tried and convicted of murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while being acquitted of charges of criminal conspiracy, robbery, and causing disappearance of evidence. The prosecution's case rested primarily on the testimony of an accomplice turned approver, supported by circumstantial corroborative evidence. On appeal, the appellant argued that evidence disbelieved or found insufficient for the acquitted charges could not be used as corroborative evidence for the murder charge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while such evidence is legally admissible and not barred by the principle of double jeopardy or res judicata under Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, its weight must be carefully evaluated. Applying the double test for accomplice evidence, the Court determined that the approver's testimony was inherently improbable, unnatural, and untrustworthy. Finding the corroborative evidence insufficient to connect the appellant to the crime, the Court extended the benefit of doubt, set aside the conviction, and ordered the appellant's release.

  Questions settled

  • Can evidence that was found insufficient to sustain charges of conspiracy and robbery in the same trial be legally admitted and relied upon as corroborative evidence for a murder charge?
  • What is the legal test for evaluating the reliability and admissibility of an approver's testimony in a criminal trial?
  • Does the principle of autrefois acquit or double jeopardy under Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 bar the use of evidence from acquitted charges to prove a separate charge in the same trial?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. MUHAMMAD BAQIR vs THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION1971 SCMR 550 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-07-08
  displaced personevacuee propertysettlement commissionerproperty transferlocus standicompensation poolpartition of India
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal challenges a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition regarding the appellant's status as a 'displaced person' and the cancellation of the transfer of a property in Lahore. The core legal questions were whether the appellant qualified as a displaced person under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and whether the Settlement Commissioner (Policy) possessed the jurisdiction to cancel the property transfer. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, a resident of Pakistan, failed to prove that his residence in Delhi was of such a permanent character that he would not have abandoned it but for the civil disturbances. The Court found that the appellant had voluntarily accepted employment with the Pakistan Wing in Delhi, indicating his departure was not solely due to the partition or communal disturbances. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Settlement Commissioner (Policy) had the requisite jurisdiction under the Act to initiate cancellation proceedings. The key principle established is that for a person originally from Pakistan to qualify as a displaced person, they must demonstrate that their residence in India was permanent and that their migration was compelled by the partition or associated civil disturbances, rather than professional exigencies.

  Questions settled

  • Does a Settlement Commissioner (Policy) have the jurisdiction to exercise powers under Section 20(3) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • What criteria must a person originally from Pakistan satisfy to be classified as a 'displaced person' under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Can an informant who reports an illegal transfer of evacuee property be granted the property in question?
  • Are associates who contribute to the payment of property price entitled to notice before a Provisional Transfer Order (P.T.O.) granted to the main applicant is cancelled?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. MISS I. ALI MUHAMMAD vs MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ1971 PLD Supreme Court 494 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-18
  ejectmentbona fide personal requirementtrustee as landlordurban rent restrictionabatement of right
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave arises from ejectment proceedings initiated by the appellant landlord against the respondent tenant under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, on the ground that the shop in dispute was required in good faith for her personal use to run a second clinic. After concurrent findings by the lower appellate and High Court authorities against the appellant, and prior to the leave petition, the appellant created a trust over her properties, appointing herself as the sole trustee. The core legal question was whether the creation of the trust and the resultant shift in the appellant's legal status extinguished her personal ground for ejectment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that although a trustee falls within the definition of 'landlord', the requirement of the premises for the personal capacity of the individual (running a clinic) does not constitute a requirement for the trustee-landlord's own use for the purposes of the trust. The key principle laid down is that a landlord who creates a trust over tenanted property loses the right to seek ejectment for personal use unless the requirement directly serves the purposes and benefit of the trust.

  Questions settled

  • Does the creation of a trust over a rented property by a landlord during the pendency of litigation extinguish the personal ground for ejectment?
  • Can a trustee-landlord maintain an ejectment application on the ground of personal use for an activity that does not benefit or serve the purpose of the trust?
  • Does the definition of landlord under section 2(c) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 enable a trustee to seek eviction for individual non-trust purposes?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. MD. MOBARAK ALI vs PROF. MD. ALLARAKHA--Opposite-Party1971 PLD Dacca 293 · Dacca · 1970-08-18Read full judgment →
• DR. MD. AKRAM HOSSAIN vs NORTH BENGAL SUGAR MILLS Co. LTD., (EPIDC), GOPALPUR AND1971 PLC 220 · Labour Court · 1970-10-19Read full judgment →
• DR. MAZHAR ALI HASHMI vs ABDUL QADIR AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 278 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-03Read full judgment →
• DR. GHULAM MUSTAFA vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 658 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-16Read full judgment →
• DR. GHULAM HUSSAIN (REPRESENTED BY 8 HEIRS) vs The STATE1971 SCMR 35 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1960-03-18
  illegal gratificationprevention of corruptionburden of proofpresumption of guiltcriminal appealabatement of appealmedical practitioner
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal arose from the conviction of Dr. Ghulam Hussain, an Assistant Medical Officer, under Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 for accepting illegal gratification. The core legal question was whether the appellant had received the money as a bribe or as legitimate payment for professional services rendered to the complainant, and whether the defence had sufficiently rebutted the statutory presumption of guilt. The appellant died during the pendency of the appeal, but the matter proceeded regarding the sentence of fine. The Supreme Court held that the conviction was proper, finding the appellant's explanation regarding a credit account and the supporting diary entries inconsistent and unreliable. The Court affirmed that the burden of proof lay on the appellant to rebut the presumption of illegal gratification, which he failed to do. The principle laid down is that where an accused admits receiving money, the burden shifts to them to prove it was legal remuneration; failing this, and where defence evidence appears to be an afterthought or fabricated, the conviction stands.

  Questions settled

  • Does an appeal against a sentence of fine abate upon the death of the appellant under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • What is the effect of the presumption under Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 when an accused admits receiving money but claims it as legal remuneration?
  • Can a court rely on documentary evidence produced by the defence that was not mentioned or produced at the time of the incident?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. FASIHULLAH vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Supreme Court 771 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-30
  jurisdictioncontempt of courtreprimandletters patentabuse of powershow-cause notice
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an appeal by special leave against an order passed by a learned Single Judge (acting as Chief Justice) of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, whereby a doctor was reprimanded following a written complaint submitted by a High Court Judge regarding discourteous and unprofessional behaviour shown towards the judge's wife and son at a medical centre. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had any jurisdiction to initiate proceedings and pass such a reprimand order against the appellant under the circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted wholly without jurisdiction and that the impugned order was unwarranted by law, as the allegations did not constitute a criminal offence under the Pakistan Penal Code empowering a preliminary investigation under Letters Patent provisions, nor did discourteous behaviour toward a judge's family members amount to contempt of court. The key principle laid down is that a judge's jurisdiction and powers are strictly limited by law, and superior courts possess no administrative control or judicial authority to summon and penalize citizens for alleged misconduct unless authorized by specific statutory provisions.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to reprimand a citizen for discourteous behavior towards a judge's family members?
  • Can an allegation of unprofessional or discourteous conduct be treated as a criminal case subject to preliminary investigation under the Letters Patent?
  • Does a contempt of court occur by offering insult to members of the household of a judge?
  • What are the legal limits of a judge's authority when dealing with personal grievances outside judicial proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• DR. ANSAR HASSAN RIZVI vs Syed MAZAHIR HUSSAIN ZAIDI AND 3 Other1971 SCMR 634 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  possessiondisplaced personstransfer of propertycompromiseadvocate authorityletters patent appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal challenges the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan, which declared certain orders of the Settlement authorities in favour of the petitioner regarding the transfer of a disputed house as without lawful authority. The core legal questions involve whether the petitioner was in lawful possession of the disputed house within the meaning of the relevant statute and whether an advocate has the implied authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of a client. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner was not in lawful possession of the property as contemplated by law, having entered by permission and having agreed to vacate through previous lawful compromises, which were validly entered into by his counsel under implied authority. The key principle laid down is that possession for the transfer of evacuee property must meet the strict statutory definition of lawful possession, and advocates possess implied authority to settle matters unless expressly barred.

  Questions settled

  • Whether possession obtained with the permission of another and subject to a compromise to vacate constitutes lawful possession under Section 2(6) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Does an advocate have the implied authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of a client in the absence of an express restriction in the vakalatnama?
  • Can orders of settlement authorities based on invalid or non-existent statutory possession be set aside in writ proceedings?
  Read full judgment →
• DOST MUHAMMAD KHAN vs IMAM BAKHSH1971 PLD Peshawar 150 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-06-03
  pre-emptiongiftmushaadelivery of possessionregistration of documentimprovement of statussecond appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This second appeal arose from a pre-emption suit filed by Dost Muhammad against a sale of a house in favor of Imam Bakhsh. The trial court and the first appellate court both dismissed the plaintiff's suit, holding that the vendee had successfully improved his status and equaled his pre-emptive right by obtaining a gift of a contiguous portion of a house. The core legal questions involved whether a gift of an undivided share (mushaa) under Muslim Law is void without delivery of possession, whether a third party stranger to the gift can challenge it on the ground of non-delivery of possession, and from what date a registered gift deed operates under Section 47 of the Registration Act. The Peshawar High Court dismissed the appeal in limine, holding that an irregular gift is not void and can be validated by subsequent delivery of possession, that the issue of delivery of possession can only be raised between the donor and donee or those claiming under them and not by a stranger, and that under Section 47 of the Registration Act, a registered document operates from the time it would have commenced to operate if registration were not required. The key principle laid down is that a third party pre-emptor cannot challenge the validity of a Muslim gift on the ground of non-delivery of possession when the donor supports the gift.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a gift of an undivided share in property is void or merely irregular under Muslim Law?
  • Can a third-party stranger to a gift challenge its validity on the ground of non-delivery of possession?
  • From what point in time does a registered document operate under Section 47 of the Registration Act?
  • Does a vendee defeat a pre-emptor's superior right by acquiring a contiguous property through a gift executed before the institution of the pre-emption suit?
  Read full judgment →
• DOST MUHAMMAD AND 15 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 381 · Lahore High Court · 1969-04-18Read full judgment →
• DOST MOHAMMAD vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1971 P Cr. L J 885 · Sindh High Court · 1970-07-14Read full judgment →
• DOST MOHAMMAD AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1971 PLD Peshawar 41 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-09-24
  murderconfessionretracted confessionco-accusedexculpatory statementcorroborationrecoverycausing disappearance of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from the conviction and death sentences of two appellants, Dost Mohammad and Shamshad, handed down by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mardan, under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Amanullah. The core legal questions involved the definition and admissibility of an exculpatory statement as a confession, the evidentiary value of a retracted confession against a co-accused, and the necessity of independent corroboration for convictions based on retracted confessions. The Peshawar High Court held that a statement containing self-exculpatory matter denying participation and alleging protest does not amount to a confession in law. Furthermore, a retracted confession carries significantly less evidentiary weight against a co-accused and cannot be utilized without the fullest corroboration, nor can it corroborate other tainted evidence. The court set aside the murder convictions and death sentences of both appellants, acquitting Shamshad entirely due to lack of corroboration for his retracted confession, and altering Dost Mohammad's conviction to Section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for concealing evidence after establishing his role in disposing of the deceased's head.

  Questions settled

  • Does a statement containing self-exculpatory matter denying participation in a crime amount to a confession?
  • What is the evidentiary value of a retracted confession against a co-accused?
  • Can a retracted confession be utilized to corroborate other tainted evidence?
  • Is a retracted confession alone sufficient to justify the conviction of its maker without independent corroboration?
  Read full judgment →
• DOABA GOODS FORWARDING AGENCY LTD. THROUGH SH. AZIZ AHMAD, SARAI1971 SCMR 527 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-28
  constitutional jurisdictionwrit petitionacademic exercisespecial leave to appealimpounding of vehiclesgoods forwarding agents
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against an order of the Lahore High Court disposing of a writ petition challenging the impounding of the petitioners' trucks and certain actions taken under the West Pakistan Bus Stand and Traffic Control (Lahore) Ordinance, 1963 and a notification. During the High Court proceedings, the official respondents undertook to recall the impounding orders, return the vehicles and goods, and act strictly in accordance with law, whereupon the High Court disposed of the petition. The core legal question is whether the High Court is bound to adjudicate upon the validity of a notification or law as an academic exercise when the specific grievance of the aggrieved party has already been redressed through the withdrawal of the impugned action and official undertakings. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 98 is not meant for academic pronouncements on laws or notifications in the absence of a subsisting grievance. The principle laid down is that once the impugned action is withdrawn and full relief is granted along with an undertaking of lawful conduct, no live controversy remains, and a petition seeking merely an academic declaration becomes misconceived and liable to dismissal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 is required to pronounce upon the validity of a law or notification as an academic exercise when the petitioner's specific grievance has already been redressed?
  • Does a petitioner retain the right to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court after receiving all sought-after relief and official undertakings that no action will be taken save in accordance with law?
  Read full judgment →
• DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT (WORKSHOP), P. W. R., LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD1971 PLD Lahore 355 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-06Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD. vs MEHMOOD ALI1971 PLC 234 · Labour Court · 1970-11-25Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs MUHAMMAD KHAN1971 PLC 255 · Labour Court · 1970-11-25Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs MOHAMMAD YAQOOB1971 PLC 235 · Labour Court · 1970-11-25Read full judgment →
• DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs AHMED ALI1971 PLC 253 · Labour Court · 1970-11-25Read full judgment →
• DINOO vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1176 · Sindh High Court · 1971-02-26Read full judgment →
• DIN MUHAMMAD vs THE COMMISSIONER, BAHAWALPUR DIVISION AND OTHERS1971 PLD Baghdad-ul-Jadid 1 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1969-10-08Read full judgment →
• DIN MUHAMMAD AND 3 Others vs AHMAD AND Another1971 SCMR 490 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-07
  excess land allotmentDisplaced Persons (Land Settlement) Actadministrative jurisdictioncancellation of allotmentultra viresrehabilitation authorities
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a revision petition regarding the cancellation of excess agricultural land allotment. The petitioners, having been allotted land exceeding their entitlement, claimed they were entitled to retain the excess area through a sale authorized by the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner based on a specific government letter. The core legal question was whether the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner had the jurisdiction to sell excess land to the petitioners, thereby immunizing it from cancellation by subsequent Settlement authorities. The Supreme Court held that the authorization letter relied upon by the petitioners was explicitly inapplicable to land situated in the Punjab region, rendering the initial sale order illegal and ultra vires. Consequently, the Settlement authorities possessed the jurisdiction to cancel the unauthorized sale and resume the excess land. The Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal of the revision petition, establishing that administrative instructions regarding the disposal of excess land are geographically limited in scope and cannot validate an illegal transfer of land outside their intended jurisdiction.

  Questions settled

  • Does the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner have the authority to sell excess land to an allottee in the Punjab region based on instructions intended for the N.-W.F.P. and Sind regions?
  • Can Settlement authorities cancel an allotment if the initial sale of excess land was made without legal jurisdiction?
  • Is the protection afforded by Section 15 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958 applicable to land sold illegally by the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner?
  Read full judgment →
• DILMIR SARDAR KHAN vs MAJOR MOHAMMAD AKBAR ALI AND 2 Other MAJOR1971 SCMR 469 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-03
  border area allotmentborder area committeeouster of jurisdictionconstitutional writ petitionimmunity from judicial reviewland cancellationtemporal dividing line
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves several consolidated appeals concerning the cancellation of land allotments within the Border Area by the Border Area Committee. The core legal question is whether the legality and validity of cancellation orders passed by the Border Area Committee are immune from judicial review by the courts. The Supreme Court held, following its previous precedents, that any order of cancellation made by the Border Area Committee prior to the commencement of the 1962 Constitution on 8 June 1962 is protected and immune from attack in any court, including the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Conversely, orders of cancellation made on or after 8 June 1962 are not immune from judicial review, and the High Court has jurisdiction to examine their validity on merits. The key principle laid down is that the ouster of jurisdiction regarding Border Area Committee orders ceased to operate upon the coming into force of the 1962 Constitution on 8 June 1962, thus creating a temporal dividing line for the maintainability of writ petitions challenging such cancellations.

  Questions settled

  • Are orders of cancellation of land allotments passed by the Border Area Committee before 8 June 1962 immune from challenge in court?
  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to examine the validity of an order passed by the Border Area Committee on or after 8 June 1962?
  • When did the ouster of courts' jurisdiction under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation, 1959 cease to be operative?
  Read full judgment →
• DILMEER KHAN AND 5 OTHERS vs SUBHAN KHAN AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 1040 · Lahore High Court · 1971-08-20Read full judgment →
• DILAWAR SHAH vs THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE1971 PLD Lahore 280 · Lahore High Court · 1970-06-24Read full judgment →
• DIL MUHAMMAD AND 2 Others vs IQBAL MUHAMMAD AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 321 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-02
  revision petitionmisreading of evidencesuit for possessionSpecific Relief Actjurisdictional errorrevenue recordsforcible dispossession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated as a suit for possession of an Ihata under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, following the alleged forcible dispossession of the respondents by the appellants. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove physical possession. The High Court, in revision, set aside this decree, concluding that the trial court had misconstrued evidence and acted illegally by admitting a criminal court judgment into evidence after the trial concluded. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether a finding of fact could be varied in a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the trial court had ignored material documentary evidence and misread oral testimony. The Court held that the trial court acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 115(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by relying on inadmissible evidence and failing to properly evaluate revenue records, thereby justifying the High Court's interference in revision.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court interfere with a finding of fact in a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Does the admission of a criminal court judgment into evidence after the conclusion of a civil trial constitute an illegal exercise of jurisdiction?
  • Is a suit for possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 maintainable where the plaintiff proves prior possession and forcible dispossession?
  Read full judgment →
• DHRUBA JIBAN SHAHA vs THE PROPRIETOR, ELECTRO HOUSE, DACCA1971 PLC 85 · Labour Court · 1970-07-03Read full judgment →
• DHOLPUR GLASS WORKS LTD. vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI AND RAJASTHAN1971 PTD 912 · Rajasthan High Court · 1968-07-29Read full judgment →
• DHIRENDRA LAL DEY vs AMINUR RAHMAN AND ANOTHER1971 PLC 535 · Labour Court · 1970-06-11Read full judgment →
• DHANI BUX vs Pir KHALID JAN AND ANOTHER1971 P Cr. L J 38 · Sindh High Court · 1971-07-14Read full judgment →
• DEVENDRA PRAKASH vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, BARELLY1971 PTD 810 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-05-09Read full judgment →
• DELHI MUSLIM HOTEL vs DELHI MUSLIM HOTEL KARMACHARI UNION,1971 PLC 17 · Labour Court · 1970-05-07Read full judgment →
• DELDAR ALI KHAN AND 7 Others vs THE STATE1971 SCMR 74 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-05-30
  theftbona fide claim of rightcriminal misappropriationsettlement of landleave to appealcrops
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Sessions Court, which convicted the petitioners under Section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the theft of crops. The petitioners contended that they held a bona fide claim of right over the disputed land, asserting that the land had been settled with them by the Government prior to the incident. The core legal question was whether the petitioners could successfully invoke a bona fide claim of right to justify the forcible reaping and removal of crops cultivated by the complainant party. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the petitioners' revisional application by the High Court. The Court held that even assuming the petitioners had obtained a settlement of the land in December 1966, they could not assert a bona fide claim of right over crops that had been cultivated by the complainant party prior to that date. The petition was consequently dismissed, affirming that a subsequent claim to land does not retroactively validate the misappropriation of pre-existing crops.

  Questions settled

  • Can a party assert a bona fide claim of right over crops cultivated by another person prior to the party's alleged settlement of the land?
  • Does a subsequent settlement of land by the Government justify the forcible removal of crops grown by a previous possessor?
  Read full judgment →
• DARJEE KARMACHARI UNION, DACCA vs IDRIS MASTER1971 PLC 476 · Labour Court · 1970-11-11Read full judgment →
• DARA AND 3 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 391 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-23Read full judgment →
• DALMIR vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 157 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-25Read full judgment →