Latest Judgments

Newly reported judgments from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the High Courts and tribunals, added as they are processed — free, full text, updated daily. Judgments marked NEW were added in the most recent update. 232594 judgments in total.

• HAYAT KHAN AND 6 OTHERS vs JAHANDAD AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 330 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-01-26
  occupancy tenancyabandonment of tenancyrevenue recordspresumption of correctnesssecond appealconcurrent findings of factadverse possession
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal under Article 58(3) of the 1962-Constitution arises from a second appeal before the High Court concerning a suit for a declaration of ownership and cancellation of a mutation. The plaintiffs-appellants claimed that the defendants-respondents had abandoned their occupancy tenancy rights by ceasing to cultivate the land for over 35 years, leading to the landlords' re-entry into possession. The trial court decreed the suit, and the lower appellate court affirmed it. However, the High Court reversed these concurrent findings, holding that there was no proof the land remained uncultivated for the required period under section 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act to establish abandonment, and that revenue records carried a statutory presumption of correctness under section 44 of the Land Revenue Act. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court held that the onus to prove abandonment lay heavily on the plaintiffs, which they failed to discharge as their oral evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption of correctness attached to the revenue records reflecting the respondents as occupancy tenants. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's interference with concurrent findings of fact since the lower courts failed to give effect to statutory presumptions, and consequently dismissed the appeal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court can interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal when the lower courts fail to give effect to the statutory presumption of correctness attached to revenue records?
  • What is the nature of the onus placed on a landlord seeking to prove the abandonment of occupancy tenancy rights by a tenant?
  • Can oral testimony of interested witnesses rebut the statutory presumption of correctness attached to entries in the revenue records under the Punjab Land Revenue Act?
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• HAYAT AND 10 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 541 · Lahore High Court · 1969-11-12Read full judgment →
• HASSAN MUHAMMAD Alias HASSAN AND 2 OTHERS vs THE CROWN1971 SCMR 177 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-04-15
  murderblood feudeye-witness testimonycorroborationcriminal appealforensic evidencecapital punishment
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from the conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and their consequent sentence of death for the murder of the deceased, committed amidst a long-standing and violent blood feud between two rival factions. The core legal questions involve the reliability of eye-witness testimony in cases of intense factional enmity and the necessity or availability of independent corroborative evidence, particularly concerning forensic firearm reports and prompt reporting. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal, holding that notwithstanding doubts surrounding the forensic ballistic evidence and the conflicting views of the lower courts regarding the factional affiliation of the eye-witnesses, the direct testimony of the eye-witnesses was inherently credible, truthful, and sufficiently supported by intrinsic circumstances and prompt reporting, obviating the need for external corroboration. The key principle laid down is that where eye-witness testimony is found to be inherently honest, natural, and corroborated by prompt disclosure and surrounding circumstances, minor discrepancies or doubts regarding secondary corroborative evidence like forensic reports do not vitiate a conviction for murder.

  Questions settled

  • Whether eye-witness testimony from a rival faction requires corroboration in cases of intense blood feuds?
  • Does doubt regarding forensic ballistic reports vitiate an otherwise credible eye-witness account in a murder trial?
  • Whether prompt reporting of a crime serves as an intrinsic indicator of truth sufficient to sustain a conviction without external corroboration?
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• HASAN RAZAQI AND 2 OTHERS vs Mst. MEHRUN NISA MEHR AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 266 · Sindh High Court · 1970-12-08Read full judgment →
• HARNANDRAI BADRIDAS vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, CALCUTTA1971 PTD 717 · Calcutta High Court · 1966-03-01Read full judgment →
• HARCHANDRAI vs THE POPULAR METAL WORKS, GUJRANWALA AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Karachi 925 · Sindh High Court · 1971-01-18
  acknowledgment of liabilitylimitation periodjural relationshippartnership debtrecovery of loan
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This civil appeal challenges the judgment and decree of the First Class Sub Judge, Mirpurkhas, dated March 19, 1962, which dismissed the appellant's suit for the recovery of a loan and interest on the ground of limitation. The core legal question before the court was whether a certain letter written by a partner of the respondent firm constituted a valid acknowledgment of liability under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908, so as to extend the period of limitation. The Sindh High Court held that the letter, read in conjunction with surrounding circumstances, account books, and subsequent correspondence, contained a clear admission of a subsisting jural relationship and indebtedness, thereby satisfying the requirements of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The court laid down the principle that an acknowledgment of liability need not be express but may be inferred by implication from the language of a writing and the surrounding circumstances, and that the Limitation Act, being in derogation of the right to sue, must be construed liberally to maintain the right to sue. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the plaintiff's suit decreed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an indirect admission in writing can constitute a sufficient acknowledgment of liability under section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908?
  • Can surrounding circumstances and subsequent correspondence be looked into to determine if a writing amounts to an acknowledgment of liability?
  • Whether the liability of one partner is binding upon other partners jointly and severally in a partnership debt recovery suit?
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• HAQDAD KHAN vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 274 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-25Read full judgment →
• HANGIMAL vs ABDUL AZIZ KHAN1971 PLD Karachi 147 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-30Read full judgment →
• HAMDARD DAWAKHANA (WAKF), KARACHI Claimant vs MESSRS K. B. JOSEPH1971 PLD Karachi 279 · Sindh High Court · 1970-03-26
  arbitration awardmisconduct of arbitratorerror of law apparent on the face of the awardcorporate personalityseparate legal entityobjections to award
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involves objections filed against an arbitration award arising from a dispute between Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) and Messrs K. B. Joseph. The core legal questions pertained to whether the arbitrator committed misconduct by deciding matters outside the reference, declining to decide a sub judice matter, not giving reasons, awarding excessive costs, and committing an apparent error of law by holding a director personally liable for a limited company's debts. The Sindh High Court held that an arbitrator is not bound to give reasons or record separate findings on every issue unless required, but committed an error of law apparent on the face of the award by piercing the corporate veil without justification, as a properly incorporated company is a distinct legal entity from its owners. Consequently, the court upheld the award against the first defendant company while setting it aside against the second defendant individual. The key principles established are that an arbitrator need not provide reasons for an award, and an award containing an error of law on a question not expressly referred to arbitration can be set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Is an arbitrator legally bound to give reasons for their decision or record separate findings on every issue framed?
  • Can an arbitrator's award be set aside on the ground of an error of law apparent on the face of the award?
  • Does a separate legal entity status of a private limited company prevent an individual owner from being automatically liable for the company's debts?
  • Under what circumstances does an error of law committed by an arbitrator warrant setting aside the award?
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• HAMAD AND Another vs KHUSHI MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER1971 SCMR 365 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-08
  pre-emptionreview petitionnew and important evidencelimitationcondonation of delayquestion of lawspecial leave to appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from an order of the Lahore High Court dismissing a review application in a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions involve whether the discovery of a pre-existing mortgage status constitutes new and important evidence for review under procedural law, whether a mortgagee-purchaser acquires ownership status at the relevant time to compete with a pre-emptor, and whether a new point of law can be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the review application was misconceived as the petitioner must have known of his own mortgage and that a new legal plea not raised in the lower courts cannot be entertained at the apex stage. The Court established that time spent pursuing a misconceived review petition cannot be condoned for limitation purposes, and dismissed the petition on both merits and limitation grounds.

  Questions settled

  • Does the discovery of a pre-existing mortgage held by the vendee constitute new and important evidence for the purposes of review?
  • Can a new point of law be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court of Pakistan?
  • Can time spent pursuing a misconceived review petition in the High Court be excluded for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal?
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• Hakim MOHAMMAD SHA RIF vs THE LAHORE IMPROVEMENT TRUST, LAHORE1971 PLD Supreme Court 460 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-20
  specific performancelimitation periodcause of actionrecovery of immovable propertystatutory noticeexclusion of timeallotment cancellation
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal, by special leave, arises out of a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale of plots against the Lahore Improvement Trust. The plaintiff had paid earnest money and three instalments, but the Improvement Trust subsequently cancelled the allotment and allotted the plots to another respondent. The trial court rejected the plaint as time-barred under section 98(3) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. The first appellate court reversed this decision and remanded the suit, but a learned Single Judge of the High Court restored the dismissal on limitation grounds. The core legal questions involved the determination of when the cause of action accrued, the applicability of section 15(2) of the Limitation Act regarding notice periods, and whether the suit fell within the exception for the recovery of immovable property under section 98(3) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the cause of action accrued upon the plaintiff's receipt of the final refusal letter, that the statutory notice period is excludable under section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, and that a suit containing a prayer for possession based on title is excepted from the six-month limitation period under section 98(3). The appeal was allowed, and the suit was remanded for a decision on the merits.

  Questions settled

  • When does the cause of action for a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale against an improvement trust accrue?
  • Whether the period of statutory notice given under section 98(1) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 is excludable in computing the period of limitation under section 15(2) of the Limitation Act?
  • Does a suit for specific performance coupled with a prayer for possession constitute an action for the recovery of immovable property excepted under section 98(3) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922?
  • Can a private office note of an improvement trust regarding the cancellation of a contract serve as the date of accrual of the cause of action without communication to the plaintiff?
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• Hakim AZIZ AHMAD vs IJAZUL MULK1971 PLD Lahore 305 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-08Read full judgment →
• HAKIM ALI vs The STATE1971 SCMR 412 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-26
  murderdeath sentencecorroborationrecoveryeye-witness testimonyrelated witnesses
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition arises out of an order of the High Court maintaining the conviction and sentence of death passed upon the petitioner under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, while three co-accused were acquitted. The core legal question was whether the testimony of related eye-witnesses, which required corroboration, was sufficiently corroborated by the recovery of a blood-stained tehband and the decapitated head of the deceased at the instance of the petitioner, despite the precise statements leading to the discovery being inadmissible. The Supreme Court held that the recovery of the decapitated head at the petitioner's instance and the recovery of the blood-stained tehband constituted valid corroborative evidence to sustain the conviction. The key principle laid down is that the fact of a recovery made at the instance of an accused can serve as good corroborative evidence even if the accompanying verbal statements leading to the discovery are inadmissible in law.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of incriminating items at the instance of an accused can corroborate related eye-witness testimony when the accompanying statements are inadmissible?
  • Can the conviction of a single accused be maintained upon proper corroboration while co-accused are acquitted based on a lack thereof?
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• HAKIM ALI vs THE CROWN1971 SCMR 298 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-04-07
  criminal appealmurderbenefit of doubtappreciation of evidenceeyewitness testimonyparity of reasoningmedical evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave was brought by Hakim Ali, who was convicted of murder and rioting under sections 302, 149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the daylight killing of Aziz Khan, alongside several co-accused. The High Court had dismissed his appeal while acquitting two other co-accused on the ground that a tuft of black hair found in the deceased's hand introduced an element of doubt regarding their identity. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant was entitled to an acquittal on the basis of parity of reasoning, given that two co-accused against whom the prosecution evidence was identical had been given the benefit of the doubt. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court's acquittal of the co-accused was based on an overly cautious and faulty process of reasoning regarding an insignificant medical piece of evidence, and that the clear, unimpeachable eyewitness testimony fully established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The key principle laid down is that an unjustified or faulty acquittal of some accused persons on the same evidence does not legally mandate or compel the acquittal of other properly identified co-accused whose guilt is otherwise proved beyond reasonable doubt.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the acquittal of co-accused persons on the basis of a doubtful circumstance compels the acquittal of another co-accused whose guilt is otherwise proved by reliable eyewitness testimony?
  • Can a mere negative medical opinion regarding a tuft of hair found on a deceased person create a reasonable doubt sufficient to discredit clear and consistent eyewitness identification?
  • Does an appellate court interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on the appreciation of evidence by the courts below when the testimony of eyewitnesses is unimpeachable?
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• HAKIM ALI AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 666 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-16Read full judgment →
• HAKIM ALI AND 4 Others vs THE STATE AND Another1971 SCMR 432 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-12
  acquittal appealburden of proofbenefit of doubtfree fightprivate defencedying declarationsuppression of injuriescriminal jurisprudence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a direct criminal appeal arising from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which set aside the acquittal of the appellants by the trial court and convicted them under sections 302/149, 307/149, 326, 324/149, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The prosecution alleged that the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly, waited in ambush, and attacked the complainants following disputes over local elections and the office of Lambardari. The trial court had acquitted all the accused, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case and that the accused acted in self-defence. The Supreme Court examined the evidence and found that the prosecution case suffered from major infirmities, including a false story of an ambush, suppression of injuries sustained by the accused, and failure to prove the alleged motive. The Court held that the prosecution must succeed on the strength of its own case and cannot rely solely on the weaknesses of the defence or the fact that the accused did not tell the whole truth. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and restored the acquittal.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court is justified in setting aside an order of acquittal when the prosecution fails to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt?
  • Does a statement recorded by a police officer during investigation become admissible as a dying declaration under section 32(1) of the Evidence Act 1872 read with section 162(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the prosecution succeed solely on the weakness of the defence case and the failure of the accused to explain all facts?
  • How is criminal culpability assessed in a case involving a free fight between two armed parties where the prosecution's foundational narrative is found to be false?
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• Haji SHAFIUDDIN SHAIKH--Plaintiff vs MUHAMMAD KHORSHEDUL ALAM--1971 PLD Dacca 101 · Dacca · 1969-12-17Read full judgment →
• Haji Sh. MANZOOR ILAHI vs Sh. ABU BAKAR1971 P Cr. L J 1021 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-19
  false affidavitperjuryverification of affidavitCode of Civil ProcedureCode of Criminal Procedureprosecution for false evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is an application under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 seeking to prosecute the respondent under section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for filing a false affidavit in support of a transfer application. The core legal question was whether a person can be prosecuted for perjury based on an affidavit whose verification clause states that the contents are true to the best of knowledge and belief without specifying which parts are based on personal knowledge and which on belief, in violation of procedural requirements. The Lahore High Court held that an affidavit must strictly conform to Order XIX rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by clearly distinguishing between facts based on personal knowledge and those based on belief, along with the grounds thereof. The court ruled that an ambiguous or defective affidavit failing this requirement is not a legal affidavit and cannot form the basis for a prosecution for perjury. The application was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an affidavit verified to the best of knowledge and belief without distinction can sustain a prosecution for perjury under Section 193 of the Pakistan Penal Code?
  • Does a verification clause stating facts are true to the best of knowledge and belief comply with Order XIX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What are the legal consequences of failing to specify which portions of an affidavit are based on personal knowledge versus belief?
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• Haji SABOO ETC. vs Mst. BASRAN ETC.1971 PLD (Revenue) Sind 18 · Board of Revenue · 1971-01-24Read full judgment →
• Haji NIAZ MUHAMMAD vs MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, PESHAWAR1971 PLD Peshawar 116 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-05-05Read full judgment →
• Haji NAZIMUDDIN MD. AMANULLAH AND OTHERS vs THE COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, DACCA ZONE, DACCA1971 PLD Dacca 179 · Dacca · 1970-02-20Read full judgment →
• Haji NAQEEBUDDIN vs THE STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN AND Another1971 SCMR 585 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-08-16
  foreign exchangerepatriationlimitationspecial leave to appealcriminal convictionexport permit
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court upholding the conviction of the petitioner under section 12 read with section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, for failing to repatriate the sale proceeds of exported handicrafts. The petition was barred by three days, and the explanation regarding the petitioner's illness was found unconvincing. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court examined the matter on merits. The core legal questions involved whether section 12(1) of the Act is punitive and creates an offence, and whether the modification of the export permit absolved the petitioner from the duty to repatriate foreign exchange. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that failure to realize or repatriate the full amount constitutes an offence under subsection (2) of section 12, that erroneous citation of subsection (1) in the charge caused no prejudice, and that the modification of the permit did not extinguish the statutory duty of repatriation. The key principles established relate to the scope of penal provisions under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the non-vitiation of trials due to minor misdescriptions in charges.

  Questions settled

  • Whether section 12 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 creates an offence for non-repatriation of foreign exchange?
  • Does an erroneous mention of subsection (1) instead of subsection (2) of section 12 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947 vitiate a trial?
  • Does the modification of an export permit from a contract basis to a consignment basis absolve an exporter from the duty to repatriate foreign exchange?
  • Whether illness without adequate proof of incapacitation constitutes sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal?
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• Haji MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ vs Babu KARAM BAKHSH AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 912 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-15Read full judgment →
• Haji MUHAMMAD ALI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1127 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-13Read full judgment →
• Haji MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM vs THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, THARPARKARAND1971 SCMR 63 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-21
  octroi dutyauction bidwrit jurisdictionjudicial reviewdiscretionary powerHigh Court procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed a writ petition challenging the refusal of the Controlling Authority to approve an auction bid. The petitioner had submitted a bid for leasing the octroi duty of the Municipal Committee, Jamesabad, which was rejected by the Controlling Authority on the basis that the lack of other participants meant the petitioner's bid could not be considered the highest. The core legal questions were whether the High Court could review its own oral pronouncement before signing the judgment and whether the Controlling Authority acted without lawful authority in withholding approval. The Supreme Court held that High Court judges possess the inherent power to modify or change their decision at any time prior to signing the formal judgment. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the auction was subject to the Controlling Authority's discretion under the relevant rules, and as no conditions constrained that discretion, the refusal to approve the bid was legally valid. The petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Can a High Court judge change or review an oral pronouncement before signing the final judgment?
  • Is the Controlling Authority bound to approve an auction bid for octroi duty in the absence of competing bids?
  • Does the Controlling Authority have the discretion to withhold approval for an auction bid under the relevant rules?
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• Haji Mirza MEHDI POOYA AND Another vs Agha Sayed ABUL HASAN HAFIZYAN1971 P Cr. L J 882 · Sindh High Court · 1970-08-19Read full judgment →
• Haji MALIK DAD KHAN vs THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY, CIVIL SECRETARIAT, LAHORE AND Another1971 SCMR 651 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-31
  octroi leaserevision petitionsecond appealconversion of proceedingsbona fide mistakerepeal of statutevested right
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant filed a suit for a declaration that he was not liable to pay the balance of octroi lease money, which was dismissed by the Senior Civil Judge and subsequently by the District Judge. A revision petition filed in the High Court was dismissed as incompetent due to the repeal of the British Baluchistan Courts Regulation VII of 1939 by the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance II of 1962, and the High Court also refused to convert the revision into an appeal. The core legal questions involved the competency of the revision petition under the repealed regulation, the bona fide mistake of counsel, and the exercise of discretion by the High Court in refusing conversion. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the mistake committed by the lawyer in filing the revision petition was bona fide and that the case was a fit one for converting the revision petition into a second appeal. The key principle laid down is that where a procedural or jurisdictional mistake by counsel is bona fide, particularly in mofussil areas, technical errors should not defeat a substantial vested right of re-examination, and courts should permit the conversion of proceedings to serve the ends of justice.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a revision petition filed under a repealed regulation can be deemed incompetent when the suit was instituted prior to such repeal?
  • Is a mistake committed by a counsel in a mofussil area regarding the choice of remedy considered bona fide?
  • Can a revision petition be allowed to be converted into a second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • Whether the High Court exercises its discretion properly by refusing to convert an incompetent revision petition into an appeal despite a bona fide mistake?
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• Haji HASHMATULLAH AND 9 OTHERS vs KARACHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION1971 PLD Karachi 514 · Sindh High Court
  writ petitioncontrolling authoritymunicipal administrationquashment of resolutionconditions precedentnatural justiceaudi alteram partemvested right
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan challenged an order passed by the Commissioner of Karachi as the Controlling Authority under section 111 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, whereby he quashed a Municipal Corporation resolution leasing a municipal plot to the petitioners' market association and instead directed its transfer to the Divisional Evacuee Trust Committee. The core legal questions involved the scope of the Controlling Authority's powers under section 111, the necessity of satisfying statutory conditions precedent before quashing municipal resolutions, and the applicability of the principles of natural justice. The Sindh High Court held that the Controlling Authority's powers are not absolute or despotic, and cannot be exercised in defiance of the statutory conditions precedent requiring a finding that the municipal act was against law or public interest. The Court laid down that an authority created by statute must act strictly within the scope of its conferred powers, that natural justice principles are read into enactments unless expressly excluded, and that the order of the Commissioner was illegal, without lawful authority, and set aside.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the powers of a Controlling Authority under section 111 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, to quash a municipal resolution are absolute and unreviewable?
  • Does the exercise of power under section 111 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960, require the satisfaction of a condition precedent that the municipal act is against law or public interest?
  • Are persons whose interests are adversely affected by an administrative order entitled to an opportunity of being heard under the principles of natural justice even if the governing statute is silent?
  • Whether a writ petition is maintainable by persons who suffer prejudice due to the non-observance of law by a public functionary, even in the absence of a strict juristic property right?
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• Haji GHULAM RASOOL AND OTHERS vs THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF AUQAF, WEST PAKISTAN1971 PLD Supreme Court 376 · Supreme Court of Pakistan
  Waqf propertiesMujawaranAuqafimmemorial userestoppelreligious endowmentstenancy rightspublic waqf
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter concerns appeals against a High Court judgment dismissing petitions challenging the takeover of properties attached to the shrine of Hazrat Data Ganj Bakhsh Sahib by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf. The appellants, claiming to be the Mujawaran (custodians), asserted rights over the shrine's offerings, landed properties, and the performance of religious ceremonies. The core legal questions were whether the Mujawaran had acquired personal rights to these properties through immemorial user and whether they were estopped from denying the Waqf nature of the properties given their long-standing revenue record entries. The Court held that while the Mujawaran had acquired rights to perform religious ceremonies and had established a long-standing practice of appropriating certain offerings and income, the properties themselves were public Waqf. The Court affirmed that the Mujawaran were estopped from denying the Waqf status of the lands due to their own historical acknowledgments in revenue records. However, the Court protected their existing possession and tenancy rights, ruling that the Administrator could not summarily evict them without due process of law.

  Questions settled

  • Can the Mujawaran of a shrine claim ownership of Waqf properties based on immemorial user?
  • Does the taking over of Waqf property management by the Chief Administrator of Auqaf automatically extinguish the existing tenancy or possession rights of the occupants?
  • Are the Mujawaran estopped from challenging the Waqf nature of properties after decades of acknowledging them as Waqf in revenue records?
  • Can the Chief Administrator of Auqaf lawfully take over the income from offerings made at a shrine?
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• Haji FATEH MUHAMMAD ETC. vs THE STATE1971 PLD (Revenue) Sind 27 · Board of Revenue · 1970-12-10Read full judgment →
• Haji DAD SHAH AND ANOTHER vs MUHAMMAD FAZAL AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Quetta 69 · Balochistan High Court · 1971-04-05
  revision applicationabatementlegal representativeslimitationsufficient causepre-emption suitcivil procedure
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The applicants filed a revision application in the High Court against the dismissal of their pre-emption suit. During the pendency of the revision, one of the respondents, Asfandyar, died. The applicants failed to bring his legal heirs on record within the period prescribed by law, and their applications under Order XXII, rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 were filed with unexplained delays. The core legal question was whether the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to revision applications in the High Court, and whether revision proceedings abate upon the death of a necessary party if legal representatives are not impleaded in time. The Court held that by virtue of section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the provisions of the Code apply to all civil proceedings in the High Court, including revisions, unless specially excepted, and that Order XXII is fully applicable to revision petitions. The Court laid down that failure to timely implead the legal heirs of a deceased respondent in a revision application results in the total abatement of the revision.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 apply to revision applications filed in the High Court?
  • Does section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 apply by its own force to applications under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
  • What is the effect of failing to bring the legal representatives of a deceased necessary party on record within time in a revision application?
  • Whether section 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 extends the application of the Code to all civil proceedings in the High Court other than those specially excepted?
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• Haji BAHAWAL KHAN vs ABDUL AZIZ AND OTHERS1971 PLD Baghdad-ul-Jadid 11 · Baghdad-ul-Jadid · 1969-09-30Read full judgment →
• Haji ANWAR AND ANOTHER vs Haji JAMIL AHMAD AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 806 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-09-03
  mandatory injunctionunauthorized constructionlease covenantassignment of reversionwaiver and acquiescenceforfeiture of grantlandlord and tenant
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal arose from a suit for arrears of rent and a mandatory injunction for the demolition of unauthorized constructions on a leased plot. The core legal questions concerned whether an assignee of a landlord could sue for a breach of covenant occurring prior to the assignment, whether the specific lease clause prohibited such constructions, and whether the landlords were barred by waiver or acquiescence from seeking a mandatory injunction. The Supreme Court held that an assignee of a leased property is entitled to enforce covenants running with the land, including those breached before the assignment, pursuant to Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The Court further determined that no waiver or acquiescence was established by the evidence. Regarding the mandatory injunction, the Court affirmed that while courts are generally reluctant to order the demolition of completed structures, such relief is permissible where the breach causes the landlord irreparable injury, such as the potential forfeiture of a government grant. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the decree for demolition.

  Questions settled

  • Can an assignee of a landlord sue for a breach of a covenant in a lease that occurred before the assignment?
  • Does the Transfer of Property Act 1882 allow an assignee to enforce covenants running with the land?
  • Under what circumstances can a court grant a mandatory injunction for the demolition of structures erected in breach of a lease covenant?
  • Does a breach of a lease covenant automatically entitle a landlord to forfeit the lease in the absence of an express proviso for re-entry?
  Read full judgment →
• HAJI AND 2 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 365 · Sindh High Court · 1969-12-23Read full judgment →
• HAJI AHMAD AND 2 Others vs The STATE1971 SCMR 326 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-17
  criminal appealmurderacquittal set asideeyewitness credibilitycorroborationrecovery of weapondelay in FIRbenefit of doubt
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This direct appeal arises from a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which set aside the acquittal of three appellants and convicted them under sections 302/34 and 323/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of one person and causing simple injuries to another. The core legal questions involved the credibility of eyewitness testimony from close relatives, the evidentiary value of blood-stained weapons whose origin could not be determined due to blood disintegration, the existence of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report, and the reliability of the prosecution's set motive. The Supreme Court held that the eyewitness accounts were natural and truthful, minor discrepancies did not vitiate their testimony, the recovery of blood-stained sotas corroborated the ocular account notwithstanding the serologist's inability to determine the blood origin, and there was no undue delay in reporting the crime. However, applying the principle of caution regarding interested witnesses, the Court acquitted one appellant due to a lack of corroborative evidence, while dismissing the appeal of the remaining two appellants.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the recovery of a blood-stained weapon can be used as corroborative evidence when the serologist is unable to determine the origin of the blood due to disintegration?
  • Does a minor delay in lodging the first information report and obtaining medical examination necessarily lead to an inference of fabrication of a false case?
  • Can the conviction of an accused be sustained on the basis of eyewitness testimony from close relatives without independent corroboration?
  • Whether an appellate court is justified in reversing an order of acquittal when the trial court's appreciation of evidence is found to be based on misreading and erroneous conclusions?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji ABUL QUASEM AND ANOTHER vs ABDUR RAHMAN ADAM AND OTHERS--1971 PLD Dacca 248 · Dacca · 1970-03-09Read full judgment →
• Haji ABDUL REHMAN vs SULTAN AND ANOTHER-Opponents1971 P Cr. L J 1164 · Sindh High Court · 1971-04-26
  quashing of proceedingspolice reportchallanmagistrate cognizanceadministrative orderfurther investigationsummoning of accused
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a criminal revision application filed under section 561-A read with sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash proceedings pending against the applicant before the Additional City Magistrate, Karachi. The core legal question revolved around the competency of a Magistrate to summon an accused person to stand trial after the police had initially submitted a report recommending release under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, followed by a subsequent challan and a complainant's application. The Sindh High Court held that an order passed under section 173(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 on the basis of a police report is essentially an administrative order rather than a judicial one, and it does not amount to a formal discharge or acquittal. The court laid down the key principle that a Magistrate is not bound by the police opinion or report, and possesses the legal competence to take cognizance and issue process against an accused person despite earlier police recommendations exonerating them, as the police are also not barred from conducting further investigations or submitting subsequent challans.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a Magistrate is bound by a police report or opinion recommending the release of an accused person under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Is an order passed by a Magistrate under section 173(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 a judicial order or an administrative order?
  • Does the submission of a final report by the police bar them from conducting further investigations and submitting a subsequent challan against an exonerated person?
  • Can a Magistrate take cognizance and issue process against an accused person whose name was mentioned in the police report despite an earlier administrative release order?
  Read full judgment →
• Haji ABDUL GHANI vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 938 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-31Read full judgment →
• HAIDER AND: Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 566 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-23Read full judgment →
• HAIDER AND 3 OTHERS--Convict vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 68 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-09Read full judgment →
• HABIBUR RAHMAN vs MEMRS AZMIR HOTEL, CHITTAGONG1971P LC 561 · Labour Court · 1970-07-06Read full judgment →
• HABIBUR RAHMAN vs JAZIRA COLD STORAGE AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES, DACCA1971 PLC 472 · Labour Court · 1970-11-13Read full judgment →
• HABIBULLAH vs The STATE1971 SCMR 341 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-08
  murderretracted confessioncorroborationrecovery of weaponmitigating circumstancesyouthful offendersentence reduction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant was convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of Bhangi Khan and sentenced to death by the trial court, which conviction was upheld by the High Court. Leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court to consider whether the appellant's retracted judicial confession was corroborated by satisfactory evidence and whether the death sentence awarded was legal. The Supreme Court found that the retracted confession was fully corroborated by the recovery of a blood-stained dagger at the appellant's instance and by credible direct eyewitness testimony. However, considering the appellant's youthful age of 16 or 17 years and the sudden quarrel arising from background circumstances without premeditation, the Supreme Court held that the extreme penalty of death was not warranted. Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed: the conviction under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code was maintained, but the sentence of death was altered to transportation for life. The key principle laid down is that while a retracted judicial confession corroborated by reliable recovery and eyewitness testimony is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction, mitigating factors such as the youthful age of the offender and the absence of premeditation justify commuting a death sentence to transportation for life.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a retracted judicial confession can be made the basis of a conviction when corroborated by satisfactory evidence?
  • Does the recovery of a blood-stained weapon at the instance of an accused corroborate a retracted confession?
  • Whether the death sentence should be commuted to transportation for life in view of the youthful age of the offender and lack of premeditation?
  Read full judgment →
• H. L. SUD, INCOME-TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES CIRCLE 1(1), BOMBAY vs TATA1971 PTD 1000 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-09-06Read full judgment →
• GWALIOR RAYON SILK MANUFACTURING (WEAVING) Co. LTD. vs INCOME-TAX1971 PTD 795 · Madhya Pradesh High Court · 1968-10-17Read full judgment →
• GULSHER vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 400 · Lahore High Court · 1970-03-20Read full judgment →
• GULABAT KHAN vs THE STATE1971 PLD Peshawar 7 · Peshawar High Court · 1970-08-10Read full judgment →
• GULAB KHAN AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE1971 PLD Karachi 299 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-22
  murdercircumstantial evidencelast seen theoryjudicial confessionconfession on oathself-exculpatory statementpointation of dead bodybenefit of doubtcriminal appeal
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal and murder reference arise from the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Larkana, convicting the appellants, Gulab Khan and Ali Akber, for the murder of Muhammad Hasan under section 302 and section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, along with convictions under section 201 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in a death sentence for Gulab Khan and transportation for life for Ali Akber. The core legal questions involve the evaluation of circumstantial evidence including the 'last seen' theory, the admissibility and evidentiary value of a self-exculpatory judicial confession recorded on oath, and the validity of pointing out a burial place already known or previously pointed out. The Sindh High Court held that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt, as the 'last seen' evidence lacked temporal proximity, the confession was self-exculpatory and vitiated by being recorded on oath in violation of sections 164 and 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 rendering it irrelevant under section 24 of the Evidence Act 1872, and the pointation lacked exclusive knowledge and discovery value. The convictions and sentences were set aside, the appeal was accepted, and the murder reference was rejected.

  Questions settled

  • Does a self-exculpatory statement amount to a confession that can be relied upon for a conviction?
  • Can a judicial confession recorded on oath be considered relevant under section 24 of the Evidence Act 1872?
  • Is the pointing out of a place where a dead body is buried considered a valid discovery when the location is already known to witnesses or the police?
  • Does the 'last seen' circumstance alone suffice to prove a murder charge when the time gap between parting company and death is insufficiently accounted for?
  Read full judgment →
• GULAB CHAND DHANNA LAL vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER1971 PTD 727 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-04-03Read full judgment →
• GUL RASUL vs TAZA GUL1971 PLD Peshawar 75 · Peshawar High Court · 1971-02-11Read full judgment →
• GUL JAMAL KHAN AND Another vs SHAH JAHAN KHAN1971 P Cr. L J 943 · Lahore High Court · 1971-02-02
  quashmentdishonour of chequecheatingcriminal breach of trustcivil liabilitycriminal proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 sought the quashment of criminal proceedings initiated under Sections 420 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The respondent filed a direct complaint alleging that the petitioners, after settling accounts for cotton supplied in 1968, issued a post-dated cheque for the outstanding balance of Rs. 4,000, which was subsequently dishonoured. The core legal question was whether the dishonour of a cheque issued to settle a pre-existing civil debt constitutes cheating or criminal breach of trust. The High Court held that because the cheque was issued for outstanding dues after the finalization of accounts, and not as a fraudulent inducement to part with property at the time of delivery, no criminal liability arose. The court reaffirmed that the liability for a dishonoured cheque under such circumstances is purely civil. Consequently, the High Court allowed the application and quashed the criminal proceedings.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the dishonour of a cheque issued in settlement of a pre-existing debt or outstanding account balance gives rise to criminal liability under Section 420 or Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can criminal proceedings for cheating be sustained if there is no evidence that the complainant was fraudulently induced to part with property at the time of the transaction?
  • Does the inability or refusal to pay an outstanding civil debt constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust?
  Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE, HYDERABAD vs ZAHOOR AHMAD1971 PLC 520 · Labour Court · 1971-01-01Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN vs MEEZAN CORPORATION AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Karachi 35 · Sindh High Court · 1969-07-26
  lease vs licenseexclusive possessionpermanent constructionevictioncompensationmala fideland dispute
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter involved consolidated suits between the Government of Pakistan (Railway) and Meezan Corporation regarding a plot of land in Karachi. The core legal question was whether the agreement between the parties constituted a lease or a license, and consequently, whether the Railway could summarily evict the Corporation. The Court held that the agreement was a lease, not a license, because the Corporation was granted exclusive possession for a permanent installation, despite the document's label. The Court emphasized that the substance of the agreement, rather than its nomenclature, determines its legal character. While the Railway was entitled to recover possession, the Court held that such eviction was conditional upon the Railway compensating the Corporation for its substantial investment in the permanent structure, minus accrued rent. The principle laid down is that exclusive possession and the nature of the rights transferred are the primary tests for distinguishing a lease from a license, regardless of how the parties characterize the document.

  Questions settled

  • Does the label 'license' in an agreement prevent a court from determining it is actually a lease?
  • Is exclusive possession a defining characteristic for distinguishing a lease from a license?
  • Can a government entity evict a lessee from land without compensating for permanent structures installed with the entity's knowledge?
  Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN THROUGH THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, HYDERABAD vs Haji ABDUL LATIF (REPRESENTED BY HIS 7 HEIRS)1971 PLD Karachi 692 · Sindh High CourtRead full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER vs AYUB HASSAN1971 PLD Karachi 848 · Sindh High Court · 1970-08-17Read full judgment →
• GOVERNMENT OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 2 OTHERS vs MUHAMMAD AKHTAR MIR1971 PLD Supreme Court 55 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-04
  history sheetsurveillance registerpunjab police rulesnatural justiceshow cause noticefundamental rightsreputationhabitual offender
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan which declared the opening of a history sheet under the Punjab Police Rules in respect of the respondent to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The core legal question was whether a history sheet of a person can be opened under the police rules without affording him an opportunity to show cause. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that since the opening of a history sheet and inclusion in the surveillance register lead to publicity among local officials and villagers, thus adversely affecting a person's reputation, it constitutes an action detrimental to reputation under the constitutional framework. The Court laid down the principle that the rules of natural justice are grafted into every law, and whenever a history sheet is opened on the ground that a person is reasonably believed to be habitually addicted to crime, a mandatory opportunity of showing cause must be given to the person concerned.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a history sheet of a person can be opened under the Punjab Police Rules without giving him a notice to show cause against its opening?
  • Does the opening of a history sheet and inclusion in the surveillance register affect the reputation of a person under the Constitution?
  • Are the rules of natural justice to be presumed to be grafted into the Punjab Police Rules regarding the opening of history sheets?
  Read full judgment →
• GOPAL SINGH vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX1971 PTD 82 · Punjab and Haryana High Court · 1968-04-03Read full judgment →
• GOLAM HUSSAIN vs MESSRS U. ALI & BROS. LTD., DACCA1971 PLC 466 · Labour Court · 1970-11-17Read full judgment →
• GODHARA BOROUGH MUNICIPALITY vs GODHARA ELECTRICITY Co. LTD.1971 PTD 637 · Supreme Court of India · 1968-03-20Read full judgment →
• GIRDHARI LAL LAXMAN PRASAD vs COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, U. P.1971 PTD 91 · Allahabad High Court · 1968-03-11Read full judgment →
• GHUNCHA GUL vs The STATE1971 SCMR 368 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-07
  murderinterested witnessescorroborationFirst Information Reportcriminal intentdeath sentence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The appellant, Ghuncha Gul, along with others, was tried for the murder of Abdullah Jan under section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The trial court acquitted two co-accused but convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death, which the High Court confirmed. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and an absconding co-accused fired effective shot-gun injuries at the deceased, while two other co-accused missed their shots. The Supreme Court examined the testimony of eye-witnesses, noting that related or interested witnesses cannot be discarded if their presence is natural and corroborated by prompt FIR and medical evidence. The Court held that the appellant's intention to kill was manifest, making him responsible for the result achieved, regardless of whether his specific shot on the victim's buttock was independently fatal. The appeal was consequently dismissed, upholding the conviction and sentence.

  Questions settled

  • Can the testimony of related or interested eye-witnesses be relied upon without corroboration?
  • Whether the evidence of related witnesses should be discarded merely on the ground of their relationship with the deceased?
  • Is proof of motive essential when the guilt of the accused is established by direct and acceptable evidence?
  • Does an accused remain liable for murder under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code if the specific injury caused by him was not independently fatal?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM SHABBIR SHAH vs INCOME-TAX OFFICER, LAHORE AND 2 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 34 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-30Read full judgment →
• GHULAM SARWAR vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER1971 P Cr. L J 2 · Lahore High Court · 1970-09-24Read full judgment →
• GHULAM SARWAR Arm 2 Others vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1043 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-06Read full judgment →
• GHULAM SARWAR Alias MOHAMMAD SARWAR vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1971 P Cr. L J 906 · Sindh High Court · 1969-09-05Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RUBBANI AND 3 OTHERS vs THE STATE AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 741 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-22Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RUBANI AND OTHERS vs MAQBOOL KHAN AND OTHERS1971 PLD Azad J & K 68 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• GHULAM RASUL vs THE STATE1971 PLD Supreme Court 467 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-07
  quashing of criminal proceedingsillegal gratificationexercise of personal influenceSpecial Judge jurisdictionjoint trial of offensesfirst information reportcriminal breach
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from a High Court judgment dismissing an application under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for quashing proceedings pending before a Special Judge, Anti-Corruption. The appellant, a private person, was charged with demanding and accepting money on the representation that he would influence police officers in a murder case. The core legal questions were whether the allegations made out offences under sections 162, 163, or 165-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and whether the Special Judge had jurisdiction to try the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the allegations prima facie disclosed offences punishable under sections 162 and 163 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and that under section 5(7) of the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958, a Special Judge may try an accused person for non-scheduled offences jointly with scheduled offences. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, affirming that the proceedings could not be quashed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether demanding money under the representation of influencing a public servant constitutes an offence under section 162 or 163 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Is it essential to name the specific public officer sought to be corrupted or influenced in the First Information Report to make out an offence under sections 162 or 163 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
  • Can a Special Judge try an accused person for a non-scheduled offence along with a scheduled offence under the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958?
  • Does the mere omission of the name of the public officer in the First Information Report render the accusation legally defective so as to warrant quashing of proceedings under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RASUL MUJAHID vs THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 101971 PLC 4 [C.S.T] · Service Tribunal · 1970-11-04Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RASOOL vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Supreme Court 128 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-11-24
  post-arrest bailbail cancellationmurder chargecommitment for trialprima facie case
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave arises from an order of the High Court releasing the respondents on bail after their bail had been cancelled by the Sessions Judge in a murder case under Section 302/149 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the discretionary order of the Sessions Judge cancelling bail, particularly after the accused persons had been committed for trial. The Supreme Court held that the commitment of an accused person for trial on a murder charge, disclosing a prima facie case, constitutes a strong ground for refusing bail during the pendency of the trial unless the commitment order is shown to be wholly unsatisfactory or liable to quashment. The appeal was consequently allowed and the bail of the respondents was cancelled, while noting that statutory grounds such as age under the proviso to Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be independently pursued.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the commitment of an accused person for trial on a murder charge furnishes a ground for cancelling bail?
  • Is the High Court justified in interfering with the discretionary order of a Sessions Judge cancelling bail without substantial reasons?
  • Do reasonable grounds for believing the accused guilty exist once a prima facie case is established for commitment?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM RASOOL Alias GHULAM HUSSAIN vs THE CROWN1971 SCMR 268 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1954-01-19
  murderdying declarationspecial leave to appealidentification of accusedcircumstantial evidencerecovery of weapondeath sentence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal by special leave was brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the appellant, Ghulam Rasool alias Ghulam Hussain, challenging his conviction for the murder of Mst. Ghulam Fatima and the death sentence confirmed by the High Court of Judicature at Lahore. The deceased had sustained fatal stab wounds from a long knife (churra) and made dying declarations naming her travel companion from Dipalpur as her assailant. The prosecution relied on the dying statements, evidence of witnesses who saw the appellant traveling with the deceased, the appellant's confessional statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and the testimony of a shopkeeper in Wazirabad who identified the appellant as the purchaser of the weapon. The Supreme Court evaluated whether the evidence establishing the appellant's identity as the assailant named in the dying declarations was sufficient to support the conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the circumstantial evidence, combined with the seller's identification of the appellant as the purchaser of the murder weapon in Wazirabad, conclusively proved the appellant's identity as the companion who committed the fatal assault.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a dying declaration naming an assailant can be corroborated and acted upon using circumstantial evidence of the accused's association with the victim and purchase of the murder weapon?
  • Whether minor discrepancies in the name or origin of an accused preclude reliance on a dying declaration where identity is otherwise established?
  • Whether the testimony of an independent shopkeeper identifying the accused as the buyer of a distinctive weapon is sufficient to establish guilt in a murder trial?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM QADIR vs FAZAL DIN AND 3 Other1971 SCMR 537 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-06-15
  compromise decreedissolution of partnershiprendition of accountscivil procedureappeal by special leaveremand
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenges an order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, which dismissed in limine a first appeal against a trial court judgment recording a compromise and passing a decree in a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts. The core legal question was whether a valid and binding compromise had been lawfully concluded between the parties under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The Supreme Court held that the evidence established that the draft compromise was not fully read over to the appellant, one respondent was absent during negotiations, the fair copy contained material alterations and was never signed by the appellant, and the appellant promptly repudiated it. Consequently, no lawful compromise was concluded, and the trial court erred in recording it. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders and remanded the case to the trial court for a decision on merits. The key principle laid down is that a court must refuse to act on an alleged compromise where material alterations exist, a party has not signed the final draft, and prompt repudiation raises serious doubts regarding the existence of a genuine, mutual agreement.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a compromise can be recorded under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when one of the parties has not signed the final fair copy and has promptly repudiated it?
  • Can a court act on a compromise petition when material alterations exist between the draft agreement and the final fair copy?
  • Is it proper for a first appellate court to dismiss an appeal in limine when foundational facts regarding the existence of a compromise are in serious dispute?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM NABI--Defendant vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 3 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 371 · Lahore High Court · 1970-11-09Read full judgment →
• GHULAM NABI MIR vs SARKAR1971 PLD Azad J & K 118 · High Court of Azad Jammu and KashmirRead full judgment →
• GHULAM MUSTAFA vs THE STATE AND 2 OTHERSs1971 P Cr. L J 551 · Lahore High Court · 1970-01-20Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUSTAFA vs THE DISTRICT MANAGER, GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT1971 PLC 127 · Labour Appellate Tribunal · 1970-07-29Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUSTAFA AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 485 · Lahore High Court · 1971-05-27Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUSTAEA AND Another vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 775 · Sindh High Court · 1970-10-06Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD--Convict vs THE STATE1971 PLD Lahore 850 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-09
  murderextra-judicial confessionjudicial confessionretracted confessioncriminal procedurerecoveriesburden of proof
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the murder of his employer. The core legal questions involve the evidentiary value and voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession, the legality and adequacy of warnings administered prior to recording a judicial confession under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the reliability of supporting recoveries. The Lahore High Court held that both the extra-judicial and judicial confessions were involuntary, untruthful, and vitiated by non-compliance with mandatory statutory safeguards, while the alleged recoveries were unconvincing and fabricated. Consequently, the court set aside the conviction and sentence, laying down key principles regarding the strict scrutiny required for extra-judicial confessions, the necessity of proper judicial warnings and adequate cooling-off periods before recording confessions to free the accused from police influence, and the requirement of independent corroboration.

  Questions settled

  • Whether an extra-judicial confession can form the basis of a conviction without close scrutiny and independent corroboration?
  • Does a failure by a magistrate to administer the precise warning mandated by subsection (3) of section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vitiate a judicial confession?
  • Are recoveries of weapons and blood-stained garments considered reliable corroboration when prosecution witnesses contradict each other regarding the timing and circumstances of the recovery?
  • What is the effect of police surveillance and proximity during the recording of a confession on its voluntariness?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1171 · Lahore High Court · 1971-06-02Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 1053 · Lahore High Court · 1971-09-28Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND Others vs THE COMMISSIONER, SARGODHA1971 SCMR 344 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-05
  special leave to appealwrit petitioncattle fairsmunicipal administrationlocus standiadministrative orders
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This is a petition for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which challenged an order of the Commissioner, Sargodha Division, concerning the fixation of days for holding cattle fairs under the Municipal Administration Ordinance 1960. The core legal question was whether the petitioners, as private contractors who purchased the right to hold cattle fairs from a Town Committee, were adversely affected by administrative orders adjusting the fair days of a neighboring municipality so as to permit daily fairs. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were not parties to the inter-municipal dispute adjudicated by the Commissioner, that their contractual right to hold fairs had not been restricted, and that they suffered no legal injury since they were under no obligation to hold fairs daily. The key principle laid down is that a third-party contractor whose substantive rights are unimpaired lacks standing to challenge administrative adjustments of municipal functions between local authorities under the relevant statutory framework.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a private contractor of a local body has locus standi to challenge an administrative order adjusting cattle fair days between rival municipal committees?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained by a party whose contractual rights have not been curtailed or restricted by the impugned administrative action?
  • Does an administrative order permitting daily cattle fairs adversely affect a contractor who is not bound to hold fairs on a daily basis?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND 3 OTHERS vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 4 · Lahore High Court · 1965-08-17Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MOHY UD DIN vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN THROUGH JOINT1971 SCMR 747 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-11-04
  evacuee propertylocus standipublic interestcompensation poolwrit jurisdictiontransfer of property
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal by special leave challenged the dismissal of a writ petition regarding the transfer of an evacuee shop. The appellant, a claimant displaced person, previously failed to secure the shop's transfer because settlement authorities found he lacked the requisite possession before December 20, 1958. After his previous legal challenges were exhausted, the Central Government transferred the shop to a third respondent under section 10(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The appellant challenged this transfer, claiming it was not in the public interest. The Supreme Court held that the appellant lacked locus standi to challenge the transfer because he had no established entitlement to the property. However, the Court observed that the Government's transfer was invalid because it failed to meet the statutory requirement of being made in the public interest. The Court established the principle that a transfer of evacuee property to a private individual for personal benefit under section 10(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, cannot be considered a transfer in the public interest.

  Questions settled

  • Does a claimant without an established entitlement to an evacuee property have locus standi to challenge its transfer by the Central Government?
  • Can a transfer of property to a private individual for personal benefit be considered a transfer in the public interest under section 10(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958?
  • Is a transfer of property by the Central Government under section 10(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, valid if the order does not state it was made in the public interest?
  Read full judgment →
• GHULAM MOHAMMAD vs GHULAM SARWAR AND 2 OTHERS1971 P Cr. L J 1036 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-08Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HUSSAIN vs THE STATE AND ANOTHERs1971 P Cr. L J 352 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-05-11
  special leave to appealinterim custody of propertyseizure of propertycheatingcriminal breach of trustdiscretion of High Courtquashment of proceedings
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of West Pakistan, whereby the High Court accepted a revision petition and directed that a disputed truck be handed over to respondent No. 2. The factual background involves a sale agreement of a truck where the petitioner alleged that respondent No. 2 committed offences under section 420 and 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 by fraudulently inducing him to part with the vehicle. The trial magistrate had initially ordered the seizure of the truck and later handed its custody to the petitioner. However, the High Court set aside the trial court's order and awarded custody to respondent No. 2 upon furnishing security. The core legal question concerns the proper exercise of discretion by the High Court in granting interim custody of seized property pending trial. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exercised its discretion properly and justly, noting that the truck was originally in the possession of respondent No. 2 and a strong case of cheating must be established before depriving him of custody. The petition was accordingly dismissed.

  Questions settled

  • Whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion in awarding interim custody of the seized truck to respondent No. 2?
  • Can a revision petition against an interim order for the disposal of seized property be entertained before the conclusion of the trial?
  • Should interim custody of a vehicle be taken from its original possessor before a strong case of cheating is established?
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• GHULAM HUSSAIN vs THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN,1971 PLC [C.S.T.] 102 · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-03-11Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HUSSAIN AND 2 Others vs GHULAM MUSTAFA AND 2 Other1971 SCMR 772 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-01-28
  second appealfindings of factres judicatainheritance claimdocumentary evidenceappellate jurisdiction
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter originated as a second appeal before the High Court concerning a property dispute over land in Muzaffargarh, where the petitioners claimed inheritance rights as heirs of Mst. Azim Khatoon. The core legal questions involved whether the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and whether the lower courts correctly determined the lineage of the parties and the applicability of res judicata based on a 1917 suit. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the petition for leave to appeal. The Court held that the High Court acted within its jurisdiction because the findings of the first appellate court were based on mere surmises and were contrary to documentary evidence of undisputed authenticity. The Court affirmed that when lower appellate findings ignore clear documentary evidence, the High Court is empowered to intervene in a second appeal to correct such errors, thereby ensuring the findings align with the established record.

  Questions settled

  • Does the High Court have jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when those findings are based on surmises rather than evidence?
  • Can findings of fact by a first appellate court be set aside if they are contrary to documentary evidence of undisputed authenticity?
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• GHULAM HAIDER vs Tits STATE1971 P Cr. L J 117 · Lahore High Court · 1970-07-20Read full judgment →
• GHULAM HAIDER vs THE PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN AND 15 OTHERS1971 PLD Quetta 57 · Balochistan High Court · 1969-08-26
  service lawsenioritypromotionpolice servicesupersessionspecific reliefjudicial reviewadverse remarks
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This appeal concerns a service dispute where the appellant, a police officer, challenged his repeated supersession by junior officers for promotion to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The core legal question was whether the appellant’s supersession was justified under the Baluchistan Police, Promotion and Appointment Rules, 1952, and whether he was entitled to a declaration of seniority and a permanent injunction. The court held that the appellant was illegally superseded due to the respondents' erroneous interpretation that his membership in the Prosecution Branch rendered him ineligible for executive promotion. Furthermore, the court found that the adverse remarks in his service record were not communicated as required by law and were insufficient to justify supersession. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the court affirmed that government servants are entitled to judicial relief for violations of service rules. Consequently, the court set aside the remand order, restored the trial court’s declaratory decree, and granted a permanent injunction directing the respondents to fix the appellant's seniority in accordance with the rules.

  Questions settled

  • Can a government servant seek judicial relief for the violation of service rules regarding seniority?
  • Does the Establishment of West Pakistan Act 1955 protect the existing terms and conditions of service of government employees?
  • Is an officer's supersession valid if based on an erroneous interpretation of cadre eligibility?
  • Can adverse remarks in a service record justify supersession if they were not communicated to the officer as required by law?
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• GHULAM HAIDER vs THE DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION, LAHORE REGION, LAHORE1971 SCMR 325 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-03-11
  service lawdate of birth correctionsuperannuationwrit jurisdictionadministrative proceedingslimitation periodservice record
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  The petitioner, an officiating Head Master, sought to challenge his retirement date, which was based on the date of birth recorded in his service book over 20 years prior. He contended that his actual date of birth was three years later and that he was entitled to a hearing regarding his representation for correction. After the Director of Education and the Provincial Government rejected his request, he filed a writ petition, which the High Court dismissed, ruling that the administrative proceedings did not grant him a right to be heard and that the request was time-barred under relevant rules. Upon petition for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court correctly dismissed the writ petition. The Court reasoned that the petitioner failed to comply with the prescribed two-year period for requesting a change in the date of birth under the Punjab Financial Rules. Furthermore, the Court clarified that Article 178 of the 1962 Constitution did not prescribe the mode for determining an employee's date of birth, and the retirement based on the existing service record was lawful.

  Questions settled

  • Does an employee have a legal right to be heard in administrative proceedings regarding the correction of a date of birth in their service record?
  • Does Article 178 of the 1962 Constitution prescribe the mode for determining the date of birth of a government employee?
  • Can a writ petition be maintained to enforce a change in the date of birth when the request is made after the period prescribed by the Punjab Financial Rules?
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• GHULAM HAIDER vs DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE, BOARD OF INTER-MEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, LAHORE AND ANOTHER1971 PLD Lahore 952 · Lahore High Court · 1971-04-01Read full judgment →
• GHULAM ALI vs The STATE1971 SCMR 105 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1970-08-17
  illegal gratificationanticorruptiontrap witnesssolvency certificatespecial leave to appealappreciation of evidence
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the petitioner, a clerk convicted under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, for demanding and accepting an illegal gratification of Rs. 5 for issuing a solvency certificate. A trap was arranged by the Anti-Corruption Establishment, and the marked currency note was recovered from the petitioner's hand by a Magistrate. The trial court convicted him and sentenced him to six months of rigorous imprisonment. The High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (four days) alongside a fine of Rs. 300. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the courts below failed to properly consider a plausible defense regarding the origin of the recovered marked currency notes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner's belated defense story was rightly disbelieved by the lower courts, especially since the explanation for the possession of the marked note was untenable and not raised at the immediate moment of recovery.

  Questions settled

  • Whether a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 can be sustained when marked currency notes are recovered from the accused during a trap?
  • Does a belated defense explanation regarding the receipt of marked currency notes warrant interference with concurrent findings of fact by lower courts?
  • Whether the failure of an accused to immediately explain the possession of marked currency notes to the recovering Magistrate affects the credibility of the defense?
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• GHULAM ALI vs THE SECRETARY, SINDHI ADABI BOARD, HYDERABAD1971 PLC 256 · Labour Court · 1970-11-25Read full judgment →
• GHULAM ABBAS vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 918 · Lahore High Court · 1970-10-30Read full judgment →
• GHLLAM HASAN AND 20 Other vs THE COMMISSIONER,MULTAN DIVISION, MULTAN1971 PLC 158[C.S.T.] · Civil Services Tribunal · 1971-04-09Read full judgment →
• GHAZI AND 8 OTHERS vs Mst. NIGHAT ARA BEGUM AND 38 OTHERS1971 PLD Lahore 825 · Lahore High Court · 1971-03-19Read full judgment →
• GHAZANFAR ALI vs THE STATE-1971 P Cr. L J 29 · Lahore High Court · 1970-04-17Read full judgment →
• GHAUS MUHAMMAD vs THE STATE1971 P Cr. L J 1089 · Lahore High Court · 1970-12-14Read full judgment →
• GHANI KHAN vs SAIL BADSHAH AND 3 Other1971 SCMR 371 · Supreme Court of Pakistan · 1971-04-12
  criminal appealacquittaldying declarationocular testimonycorroborative evidenceabscondencerecovery
  AI summary & questions settled

  AI-generated from this judgment — read the full text before relying on it.

  This criminal appeal challenges the judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondents of charges under sections 325 and 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, relating to the assault and subsequent death of the deceased along with the theft of his shot-gun. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the trial court's conviction based on minor discrepancies in the dying declaration and ocular testimony, along with discounting corroborative evidence of recovery and abscondence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court interfered with the well-reasoned findings of the trial court without valid justification, as the minor discrepancies did not undermine the otherwise credible dying declaration and eye-witness accounts. The Court laid down the principle that appellate interference with an acquittal or conviction must be grounded in substantial legal or factual infirmities, and minor inconsistencies that do not touch upon the core elements of the crime should not vitiate an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and the trial court's conviction and sentence restored.

  Questions settled

  • Whether minor discrepancies between a dying declaration and ocular testimony are sufficient to reject the prosecution's case?
  • Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with a trial court's judgment of conviction?
  • Does the unexplained abscondence of an accused serve as valid corroborative evidence of guilt?
  • Can delay in lodging a first information report which doubles as a dying declaration be satisfactorily explained by the physical condition of the injured person and transportation difficulties?
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